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Secret History of the English 
Occupation of Egypt 



BOOKS BY WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT 
PROSE 

THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 1882 
IDEAS ABOUT INDIA 1885 

THE Secret history series 

I THE secret history OF THE ENGLISH OCCU- 
PATION OF EGYPT 1907 
II INDIA UNDER RIPON 1909 

III GORDON AT KHARTOUM 1911 

IV THE LAND WAR IN IRELAND 1912 

V MY DIARIES PART I, [tHE SCRAMBLE FOR 

AFRICA] 1919- 
VI MY DIARIES PART II. [THE COALITION 
AGAINST GERMANY] 1920 

POE TR r 

LOVE SONNETS OF PROTEUS 1880 

THE WIND AND THE WHIRLWIND 1883 

IN VINCULIS 1889 

A NEW PILGRIMAGE 1889 

ESTHER AND LOVE LYRICS 1892 

GRISELDA 1893 

SATAN ABSOLVED 1899 

SEVEN GOLDEN ODES OF ARABIA 1903 

POETICAL WORKS. A COMPLETE EDITION 1914 




(3)J}c^u/Ko ~y/fof}aym.niea ^S^bdt 



HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH 
OCCUPATION OF EGYPT 

Beiei a Persoeal Narrative of Eveets 



WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT 




NEW YORK ALFRED -A- KNOPF MCMXXM 



COPYRIGHT, 1922, 
BY WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT 

Published, October, isn 



/v" 






OOPYRIQHT OFFICE 
NOV h I82f 



Set up and printed bu the Vail-Ballou Co., Bingliamton, N. Y. 

Paper furnished 6j/ W. F. Etherington <£ Co., New York, N. Y. 

Bound by the Plimpton Press, \orwood, Mass. 



MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



OCT 11*22 



PUBLISHER'S NOTE 

When I first arranged with Mr, Blunt to publish The Secret History 
of the English Occupation of Egypt, I suggested that he write for the 
American Edition a brief foreword bringing the book into even closer 
relation to the Anglo-Egyptian situation as it stands today. He thought 
this idea a good one, and agreed to write such a note. But Mr. Blunt 
was born in 1840, and has for a number of years been in faihng health. 
In June he wrote me that he was so ill as to be quite unable to finish the 
foreword, which he had actually commenced to write. He felt further- 
more that any advantage the edition would gain by having a new preface 
by him would be more than counterbalanced by any delay in the appear- 
ance of the book "at the present extremely critical moment." 

He remarked further: "What could I have said more appropriate to- 
day as a new preface than the few words which already stand as the short 
preface I set to the first edition of my Secret History (published in Lon- 
don and which you reprint in this new edition). This and my poem The 
Wind and the Whirlwind (which you also give as an Appendix). Both 
are absolutely true of the present shameful position of England in Egypt 
and the calamity so closely threatening her Eastern Empire. What could 
I say more exactly suited? This is the punishment we are reaping today 
for our sin of that sad morning on the Nile which saw the first English 
gun open its thunder of aggression just forty years ago at Alexandria in 
the name of England's honour. What could I add to my words of grief 
and shame then uttered and repeated here? Let these stand for my new 
preface. My day is done. Alas! that I should have lived to see those 
words come true of England's punishment, more than true." 

A, A. K. 



PREFACE OF 1895 

I desire to place on record in a succinct and tangible form the 
events which have come within my knowledge relating to the 
origin of the English occupation of Egypt — not necessarily for 
publication now, but as an available document for the history 
of our times. At one moment I played in these events a some- 
what prominent part, and for nearly twenty years I have been 
a close and interested spectator of the drama which was being 
acted at Cairo. 

It may well be, also, that the Egyptian question, though now 
quiescent, will reassert itself unexpectedly in some urgent form 
hereafter, requiring of Englishmen a new examination of their 
position there, political and moral; and I wish to have at hand 
and ready for their enlightenment the whole of the materials 
I possess. I will give these as clearly as I can, with such doc- 
uments in the shape of letters and journals as I can bring 
together in corroboration of my evidence, disguising nothing 
and telling the whole truth as I know it. It is not always in 
official documents that the truest facts of history are to be read, 
and certainly in the case of Egypt, where intrigue of all kinds 
has been so rife, the sincere student needs help to understand 
the published parliamentary papers. 

Lastly, for the Egyptians, if ever they succeed in re-establish- 
ing themselves as an autonomous nation, it will be of value that 
they should have recorded the evidence of one whom they know 
to be their sincere friend in regard to matters of diplomatic 
obscurity which to this day they fail to realize. My relations 
with Downing Street in 1882 need to be related in detail if 
Egyptians are ever to appreciate the exact causes which led to 
the bombardment of Alexandria and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, 
while justice to the patriot leader of their "rebellion" requires 
that I should give a no less detailed account of Arabi's trial, 
which still presents itself to some Egyptian as to all French 
minds, in the light of a pre-arranged comedy devised to screen 
a traitor. It does not do to leave truth to its own power of 
prevailing over lies, and history is full of calumnies which have 



viii Preface of 189S 

remained unrefuted, and of ingratitudes which nations have 

persisted in towards their worthiest sons. 

Sheykh Obeyd, Egypt. 

189s 



PREFACE ON PUBLICATION 

Since the first brief preface to my manuscript was written 
twelve years ago, events have happened which seem to indicate 
that the moment foreseen in it has at last arrived when to the 
public advantage and without risk of serious indiscretion as far 
as individuals are concerned, the whole truth may be given to 
the world. 

Already in 1904 the original manuscript had been thoroughly 
revised, and in its purely Egyptian part remodelled under cir- 
cumstances which add greatly to its historic value. My old 
Egyptian friend, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, of whom so much 
mention is made in it, had taken up his country residence at my 
doors at Sheykh Obeyd, and I found myself in almost daily 
intercourse with him, a most precious accident of which I did 
not fail to take full advantage. That great philosopher and 
patriot: — now, alas, lost to us, for he died at Alexandria, nth 
July, 1905, the day being the twenty-third anniversary of the 
bombardment of that city — after many vicissitudes of evil and 
good fortune had attained in the year 1899 ^^ the supreme 
position in Egypt of Grand Mufti, and having thus acquired a 
wider sphere than ever of influence with his fellow countrymen, 
had it at heart to bequeath to them a true account of the events 
of his time, events which had become strangely misunderstood by 
them, and clothed with legends altogether fantastic and unreal. 

On this subject he often spoke to me, regretting his lack of 
leisure to complete the historic work, and when I told him of 
my own memoir, he urged me very strongly to publish it, if not 
in English at least with his help in Arabic, and he undertook to 
go through it with me and see that all that part of it which 
related to matters within his knowledge was accurately and 
fully told. We had been personal friends and political allies 
almost from the date of my first visit to Egypt, and with his 
garden adjoining mine it was an easy matter for us to work 
together and compare our recollections of the men and things 



X Preface on Publication 

we had known. It was in this way that my history of an epoch 
so memorable to us both took final shape, and I was able (how 
fortunately!) to complete it and obtain from him his approval 
and imprimatur before his unlooked-for death closed forever 
the chief source of knowledge which he undoubtedly was of the 
political movement which led up to the revolution of 1881, and 
of the intrigues which marred it in the following year. 

The Mufti's death, a severe blow to me as well as to Egypt, 
postponed indefinitely our plan of publishing in Arabic, nor 
till the present year has the time seemed poHtically ripe for the 
production of my work in English. The events, however, of 
1906, and now Lord Cromer's retirement from the Egyptian 
scene, have so wholly changed the situation that I feel I ought 
no longer to delay, at least as far as my duty to my own country- 
men is concerned. We English are confronted to-day in our 
dealings with Egypt with very much the same problem we mis- 
understood and blundered about so disastrously a generation 
ago, and if those of us who are responsible for public decisions 
are, in the words of my first preface, to "re-examine their posi- 
tion there, poHtical and moral," honestly or to any profit, it is 
necessary they should first have set before them the past as it 
really was and not as it has been presented to them so long by 
the fallacious documents of their ofiicial Blue Books. I should 
probably not be wrong in asserting that neither Lord Cromer at 
Cairo nor Sir Edward Grey at home, nor yet Lord Cromer's 
successor Sir Eldon Gorst, have any accurate knowledge of 
what occurred in Egypt twenty-five years ago — this notwith- 
standing Lord Cromer's tardy recognition of the reform move- 
ment of 1 88 1 and his eulogium of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu 
repeated so recently as in his last annual Report. Lord Cromer, 
it must be remembered, was not at Cairo during any part of 
the revolutionary period here described, and, until quite re- 
cently, has always assumed the "official truth" regarding it 
to be the only truth. 

For this reason I have decided now finally on publication, 
giving the text of my Memoir as it was completed in January, 
1905, the identical text of which my friend signified his approval 
suppressing only certain brief passages which seem to me still 
too personal in regard to individuals living, and which could 
be excised without injury to the volume's complete historic 



Preface on Publication xi 

value. I can sincerely say that in all I have written my one 
great aim has been to disclose the verite vraie as it is known to 
me for misguided History's sake. 

If there is at all a second reason with me, it must be looked 
for in a promise publicly made as long ago as in the September 
number of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of 1882 that 
I would complete some day my personal Apologia in regard to 
events then contemporary. At that time and out of considera- 
tion for Mr. Gladstone, and for the hope I had that he would 
yet repair the wrong he had done to liberty in Egypt, I for- 
bore, in the face of much obloquy, to exculpate myself by a 
full revelation of the hidden circumstances which were my justi- 
fication. I could not clear myself entirely without telling facts 
technically confidential, and I decided to be silent. 

There is, however, a limit to the duty of reticence owed to 
public men in public affairs, and I am confident that my ab- 
stention of a quarter of a century will excuse me with fair 
judging minds if I now at last make my conduct quite clear in the 
only way possible to me, namely, by a complete exposure in detail 
of the whole drama of financial intrigue and political weakness 
as it was at the time revealed to me, substantiating it by the con- 
temporary documents still in my possession. If the suscepti- 
bilities of some persons in high places are touched by a too 
candid recital, I can but reply that the necessity of speech has 
been put on me by their own long lack of candour and generosity. 
During all these years not one of those who knew the truth 
has said a confessing word on my behalf. It will be enough if 
I repeat with Raleigh: 

Go, Soul, the Body's guest. 

Upon a thankless errand. 
Fear not to touch the best, 

The truth shall be thy warrant. 
Then go, for thou must die, 
And give the world the lie. 

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. 
Newbuildings Place, Sussex. 
April, 1907. 



CONTENTS 

Preface of 1895 ^" 

Preface on Publication, 1907 ix 

I. Egypt under Ismail i 

II. Sir Rivers Wilson's Mission 19 

III. Travels in Arabia and India 38 

IV. English Politics in 1880 51 
V. The Reform Leaders at the Azhar . 73 

VI. Beginnings of the Revolution in Egypt , 92 

VII. Triumph of the Reformers in Egypt 109 
VIII. Gambetta's Policy. The Joint Note 129 

IX. Fall of Sherif Pasha 146 

X. My Pleading in Downing Street 162 

XI. The Circassian Plot 186 

XII. Intrigues and Counter Intrigues 210 

XIII. Dervish's Mission 228 

XIV. A Last Appeal to Gladstone 25 1 
XV. The Bombardment of Alexandria 270 

XVI. The Campaign of Tel-el-Kebir 285 

XVII. The Arabi Trial 323 

XVIII. Dufferin's Mission 349 

APPENDICES 

I. Arabi's Autobiography 367 

II. Text of National Programme 383 

III. Text of Egyptian Constitution of 1882 388 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 

IV. Letter from Boghos Pasha Nubar 397 

V. Note as to the Berlin Congress 401 

VI. The Wind and the Whirlwind 4^4 



-Secret History of the English 
Occupation of Egypt 



CHAPTER I 



EGYPT UNDER ISMAIL 



My first visit to Egypt was in the winter of 1875—6, when I 
spent some pleasant months as a tourist on the lower Nile. Be- 
fore, however, describing my impressions of this my earliest 
acquaintance made with the Egyptian people, it may be as 
well, that, for their benefit and the benefit of foreign readers 
generally, I should say a few words in explanation of what my 
previous life had been as far as it had had any relation to public 
affairs. It will show them my exact position in my own country, 
and help them to understand how it came about that, beginning 
as a mere onlooker at what was passing in their country, I 
gradually became interested in it politically and ended by taking 
an active part in the revolution which six years later developed 
itself among them. I was already thirty-five years of age at 
the date of this first visit, and had seen much of men and things. 

I began life rather early. Belonging to a family of the 
landed gentry of the south of England with strong Conservative 
traditions and connected with some of the then leaders of the 
Tory party, I was placed at the age of eighteen in the Diplomatic 
Service, in the first instance as attache to the British Legation at 
Athens where King Otho was still on the throne of Greece, 
and afterwards, during a space of twelve years, as member of 
other legations and embassies to the various Courts of Europe, 
in all of which I learned a little of my profession, amused my- 
self, and made friends. I was thus, between 1859 ^^^ 1869, 
for some weeks at Constantinople in the reign of Sultan Abd-el- 
Mejid; for a couple of years in the Germany of the Germanic 
Confederation; for a year in Spain under Queen Isabella; and 
for another year in Paris at the climax of the Emperor's prestige 
under Napoleon III; and I was also for a short time in the 
Republic of Switzerland, in South America, and in Portugal. 
Everywhere my diplomatic recollections are agreeable ones, but 



2 Diplomacy in the Sixties 

they are without special political interest or importance of any 
official kind. 

Our English diplomacy in those days, the years following the 
Crimean War, which had disgusted Englishmen with foreign ■ 
adventures, was very different from what it has since become. 
It was essentially pacific, unaggressive, and devoid of those subtle- 
ties which have since earned it a reputation of astuteness at 
the cost of its honesty. Official zeal was at a discount in the 
public service, and nothing was more certain to bring a young 
diplomatist into discredit at the Foreign Office than an attempt, 
however laudable, to raise any new question in a form demand- 
ing a public answer. We attaches and junior secretaries were 
very clearly given to understand this, and that it was not our 
business to meddle with the politics of the Courts to which 
we were accredited, only to make ourselves agreeable socially, 
and amuse ourselves, decorously if possible, but at any rate in 
the reverse of any serious sense. It is no exaggeration when I 
affirm it that in the whole twelve years of my diplomatic life I 
was asked to discharge no duty of the smallest professional 
importance. This discouraging regime gave me, while I was 
in the service, a thorough distaste for politics, nor was it till 
long after, and under very different conditions and under cir- 
cumstances wholly accidental, that I at last turned my attention 
seriously to them. My pursuits as an attache were those of , 
pleasure, social intercourse, and literature. I wrote poems, not 
despatches, and though I assisted diplomatically at some of the 
serious dramas of the day in Europe, it was in the spirit of a 
spectator rather than of an actor, and of one hardly admitted 
at all behind the scenes. On my marriage in 1869, which was 
soon followed by the death of my elder brother which left me 
heir to the family estates in Sussex, I retired without regret from 
the public service to attend to matters of private concern which 
had always interested me more. 

Nevertheless my early connection with the Foreign Office, 
though it was never to be officially renewed, was maintained on a 
friendly footing as of one honourably retired from the service, 
and this and my experience of Courts and capitals abroad, proved 
later of no little value to me when I once more found myself 
thrown by accident into the stream of international affairs. It 
gave me the advantage of a professional knowledge of the 



Early Friends 3 

machinery of foreign politics and, what was still more important, 
a personal acquaintance with many of those who were working 
that machinery. Not a few of these had been my intimate 
friends. Thus at the very outset of my life I had found my- 
self in official fellowship with Lord Currie, who for so many 
years directed the permanent policy of the Foreign Office, with 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Sir Frank Lascelles, Sir Edward 
Malet, Lord Dufferin, Lord Vivian, and Sir Rivers Wilson, all 
closely connected afterwards with the making of Egyptian his- 
tory, with Lord Lytton who was to be Viceroy of India in 
the years immediately preceding the crisis of 1881, and amongst 
foreign diplomatists with M. de Nelidoff, Russian Ambassador 
at Constantinople, Baron Haymerly, who died Prime Minis- 
ter of the Austrian Empire, and M. de Staal, for twenty years 
Russian Ambassador in London. With all these I was on 
terms of personal intimacy long before I paid my first visit 
to Egypt, and it is with a full knowledge of their individual 
characters that I am able to speak of them and judge them. 
Having been myself, as it were, of the priesthood, I could 
not well be deceived by the common insincerities which are the 
stock in trade of diplomacy, or mistake for public policy action 
which was often only personal. It is far too readily believed 
by those who are without individual experience of diplomacy 
that the great events of the world's history are the result of 
elaborate political design and not as they are really in most 
instances, dependent upon unforeseen accidents and the personal 
strength or weakness, sometimes the personal whim, of the 
agents employed. 

For the first few years of my retirement from the serv- 
ice I occupied myself entirely with my domestic affairs, and, 
as I have said, it was only by accident that my mind 
was gradually turned to politics. In 1873, finding myself in 
indifferent health, and to escape a late spring in England, I 
made with my wife our first common journey in Eastern lands. 
We went by Belgrade and the Danube to Constantinople, where 
we found Sir Henry Elliott at the Embassy and renewed ac- 
quaintance with other friends connected with it, among them 
with Dr. Dickson, of whom I shall have afterwards to speak in 
connection with the tragical death of Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, and 
who attended me with great kindness during a sharp attack 



4 Journey in Asm Minor 

of pneumonia I had there and for whom I contracted a sincere 
regard. The Ottoman Empire was then enjoying a period 
of comparative tranquillity before the storm of war which 
was so soon to burst over it, and I troubled myself little with 
its internal broils, but my sympathies, such as they were at that 
time, were, in common with those of most Englishmen of 
the day, with the Turks rather than the Christians of the Empire. 
On my recovery from my illness, I bought half a dozen pack 
horses at the At-maidan, the horse market at Stamboul, and 
with them we crossed over to Scutari and spent six pleasant sum- 
mer weeks wandering in the hills and through the poppy fields 
of Asia Minor, away from beaten tracks and seeing as much 
of the Turkish peasant life as our entire ignorance of their 
language allowed. We were impressed, as all travellers have 
been, with the honest goodness of these people and the badness 
of their Government. We judged of the latter by what we 
saw of the ways of the Zaptiehs, our semi-military escort, whose 
manner with them was that of soldiers in an invaded country. 
Yet it was clear that with much fiscal oppression a large personal 
liberty existed in rural Turkey for the poor, such as contrasted 
not unfavourably with our own police and magistrate-ridden 
England. The truth is that everywhere in the East the ad- 
ministrative net is one of wide meshes, with rents innumerable 
through which all but the largest fish have good chance of es- 
caping. In ordinary times there is no persecution of the quite 
indigent. I remember telling some peasants, who had com- 
plained to me through my Armenian dragoman of hardship in 
their lives at Government hands, that there were countries in 
still worse plight than their own, where if a poor man so much 
as lay down by the roadside at night and got together a few 
sticks to cook a meal he ran the risk of being brought next day 
before the Cadi and cast into prison; and I remember that my 
listeners refused to believe my tale or that such great tyranny 
existed anywhere in the world. My deduction from this in- 
cident is the earliest political reflection I can remember making 
in regard to Eastern things. 

The following winter — that is to say, the early months of 
1874 — we spent in Algeria. Here we assisted at another spec- 
tacle which gave food for reflection : that of an Eastern people 
in violent subjection to a Western. The war in which France 



Algeria 5 

had just been engaged with Germany had been followed In 
Algeria by an Arab rising, which had spread to the very out- 
skirts of Algiers, and the Mohammedan natives were now ex- 
periencing the extreme rigours of Christian repression. This 
was worst In the settled districts, the colony proper, where the 
civil administration was taking advantage of the rebellion to 
confiscate native property and in every way to favour the 
European colonists at the native expense. With all my love for 
the French (and I had been at Paris during the war, and had 
been enthusiastic for its defence at the time of the siege) I 
found my sympathies In Algeria going out wholly to the Arabs. 
In the Sahara, beyond the Atlas, where military rule prevailed, 
things were somewhat better, for the French officers for the 
most part appreciated the nobler quahtles of the Arabs and de- 
spised the mixed rascaldom of Europe — Spanish, Italian, and 
Maltese as well as their own countrymen — which made up the 
"Colonle." The great tribes of the Sahara were still at that 
time materially well off, and retained not a little of their ancient 
pride of Independence which the military commandants could 
not but respect. We caught glimpses of these nomads in the 
Jebel Amour and of their vigorous way of life, and what we 
saw delighted us. We listened to their chauntlngs In praise of 
their lost hero Abd-el-Kader, and though we misunderstood 
them on many points owing to our Ignorance of their language, 
we admired and pitied them. The contrast between their noble 
pastoral life on the one hand, with their camel herds and horses, 
a life of high tradition filled with the memory of heroic deeds, 
and on the other hand the ignoble squalor of the Frank settlers, 
with their wineshops and their swine, was one which could not 
escape us, or fail to rouse In us an angry sense of the incongruity 
which has made of these last the lords of the land and of those 
their servants. It was a new political lesson which I took to 
heart, though still regarding it as In no sense my personal affair. 

Such had been the preliminary training of my life, and such its 
main circumstances when, as I have said, in the winter of 1875—6 
I first visited Egypt. The only other matter which, perhaps, 
deserves here a word of explanation to non-English readers, and 
it is one that in Europe will receive its full appreciation, is the 
fact that my wife, Lady Anne Blunt, who accompanied me on all 
these travels, was the grandaughter of our great national poet, 



6 First Visit to Egypt 

Lord Byron, and so was the Inheritor, in some sort, of sym- 
pathies in the cause of freedom in the East, which were not 
without their effect upon our subsequent action. It seemed to 
us, in presence of the events of 1 88 1-2, that to champion the 
cause of Arabian liberty would be as worthy an endeavour as 
had been that for which Byron had died in 1827. As yet, 
however, in 1875, neither of us had any thought in visiting 
Egypt more serious than that of another pleasant travelling ad- 
venture in Eastern lands. We had on leaving England the 
plan of entering Egypt from the south, by way of Suakim, 
Kassala, and the Blue Nile, and so of working our way north- 
wards to Cairo in the spring, but this, owing to the issue, just 
then so unfortunate to Egypt, of the Abyssinian campaign, was 
never reahzed, and the only part of our program which we 
carried out was that instead of landing at Alexandria, as was 
then the universal custom, we went on by the Canal to Suez 
and there first set foot upon Egyptian soil. 

My first impression of all of Egypt is of our passage on 
the last day of the year 1875 through Lake Menzaleh, at that 
time the unpersecuted home of innumerable birds — a truly won- 
derful spectacle of prodigal natural life — to a point on the 
Canal north of Ismailiyah. What a sight it was! Lake 
Menzaleh was still an almost virgin region, and the flocks of 
flamingos, ducks, pelicans, and ibises which covered it, passed 
all behef In their prodigious magnitude. The waters, too, of 
the lakes and of the Canal itself were alive with fish so large | 
and in such great quantities that not a few were run down by 
our ship's bows In passing, while everywhere they were being 
preyed on by fish hawks and cormorants, which sat watching on 
the posts and buoys. I Imagine that the letting In of the sea 
for the first time on land never before covered with water 
provided the fish with feeding ground of exceptional richness, 
an advantage which has since been lost. But certain it is 
that both fish and birds have dwindled sadly since, and it seems 
unlikely that the splendid spectacle we saw that winter will be 
again enjoyed there by any traveller's eyes. 

We landed at Suez In the first days of the year 1876, and 
the news of the great disaster which had overtaken the Egyptian 
army In Abyssinia was the first that greeted us. The details of 
it were not generally known, but it appeared that seven ortas, 



The Suez Desert 7 

or divisions, of the Khedivial troops had perished, while a tale 
was In circulation of the Khedive's son, Prince Hassan, having 
been captured and mutilated by the enemy, an exaggeration 
which was afterwards disproved, for the prince, a mere boy at the 
time, had been carried away from the battlefield of Kora early 
in the day, at the very beginning of the rout, as had Ratib 
Pasha himself, the Egyptian general in command, who was in 
charge of him. Lorlnge Pasha, however, the American, had 
really lost his life with many thousands of the rank and file, 
and the misfortune put a final limit to the Khedive Ismail's am- 
bition of universal empire on the Nile. In our small way it 
affected us, as making our thought of a journey to Kassala Im- 
possible, and deciding us on a less adventurous one immediately 
in Lower Egypt. 

We were anxious, nevertheless, to see Egypt In a less con- 
ventional way than that of ordinary tourists, and, having our 
camping equipment with us for the longer journey, we hired 
camels at Suez and went by the old caravan route to Cairo. 
It Is not necessary that I should say much of our journey across 
the desert. The four days spent in it alone with our Bedouin 
camel-men gave us our first practical lessons in Arabic — in 
Algeria we had been dependent wholly on a dragoman — and 
they laid the basis, too, of those relations with the desert tribes 
of Arabia which were afterwards to become so pleasant to us 
and so Intimate. On the fifth morning we entered Cairo, greeted 
on our arrival at Abbassiyeh by the whistling of bullets fired 
by the Khedivial troops at practice, for we had unwittingly en- 
camped overnight just behind their targets and the aim of the 
recruits was very uncertain, but no harm was suffered. We little 
thought at the time that we should ever be interested in the 
doings of these soldiers as a fighting army, and still less that 
our sympathies would one day be with them In a war against our 
own countrymen. I was as yet, though not perhaps even then 
enthusiastically so, a believer in the common English creed that 
England had a providential mission In the East, and that our 
wars were only waged there for honest and beneficent reasons. 
Nothing was further from my mind than that we English ever 
could be guilty, as a nation, of a great betrayal of justice in 
arms for our mere selfish Interests. 

Neither need I say anything in detail about Cairo, through 



8 Tolhiya 

which we passed that day without stopping longer than to ask 
for our letters at the Consulate. Our object was to see the 
country districts and not to waste time on a city already in 
part European, and we thought to find camping ground im- 
mediately beyond the Nile. So we rode on. We did not under- 
stand the entreaties of our camel-men that we should alight and 
let them and their camels go back, or realize that we were do- 
ing them an injustice by forcing them to break the tribal rule 
which forbade them as Bedouins of the eastern desert to cross 
over to the west. In spite of their expostulations we held on 
our way by the Kasr-el-Nil bridge and the road to Ghizeh. 
We had caught sight of the Pyramids and pushed on eagerly 
in their direction, and were only stopped by the failing light 
which overtook us at sunset close to the little fellah village 
jt Tolbiya, the last but one before the Pyramids are reached. 
It was there that we made our halt and alighted for the first 
time on the black soil of the Nile, as yet hardly dry from the 
autumn inundation. 

The good people of Tolbiya, in their hearty fellah fashion, 
received us with all possible hospitality. Though living on 
the tourist road to the Pyramids and accustomed to treat 
Frank travellers in some sort as their prey, the fact of our alight- 
ing at their village for a night's lodging gave us a character 
of guests they at once recognized. Of all the Europeans who 
for many years had passed their way, not one had made a pause 
at their doors. Thus our relations with them were from the 
outset friendly, and the accident served us as an introduction in 
the sequel to other villagers when, after a few days spent among 
these, we went once more on our way. We had no choice at 
the time but to stay where we were, for in the morning our 
Biedouins refused to go a mile farther with us, and, having 
received their hire, departed with their camels. Other camels 
then had to be found. So it happened that my first week in 
Egypt was occupied in going a round of the neighbouring vil- 
lage markets in search of the needed beasts, and making pur- 
chases of pack saddles and water skins and all kinds of travel- 
ling gear for our further journey. 

The fellahin at that time were in terrible straits of poverty. 
It was the first of the three last terrible years of the Khedive 



English Popularity 9 

Ismail's reign; Ismail Sadyk, the notorious Mufettish, 'was 
in power; the European bondholders were clamouring for their 
"coupons," and famine was at the doors of the fellahin. It 
was rare in those days to see a man in the fields with a turban 
on his head, or with more than a shirt to his back. Even in 
the neighbourhood of Cairo, and still more in the Fayum to 
which we took our way as soon as the camels were procured, 
I can testify that this was the case. The country Sheykhs 
themselves had few of them a cloak to wear. Wherever we 
went it was the same. The provincial towns on market days 
were full of women selling their clothes and their silver orna- 
ments to the Greek usurers, because the tax collectors were in 
their villages whip in hand. We bought their poor trinkets and 
listened to their stories, and joined them in their maledictions 
on a government which was laying them bare. We did not 
as yet understand, any more than did the peasants themselves, 
the financial pressure from Europe which was the true cause 
of these extreme exactions; and we laid the blame, as they did, 
on Ismail Pasha and the Mufettish, Ismail Sadyk, little sus- 
pecting our English share of the blame. 

The villagers were outspoken enough. Englishmen in those 
days were popular everywhere in Mohammedan lands, being 
looked upon as free from the political designs of, the other 
Frank nations, and individually as honester than these in their 
commercial dealings. In Egypt especially they stood in amiable 
contrast with the needy adventures from the Mediterranean 
sea-board — the Italian, Greek, and Maltese money-lenders — 
who were sucking the life blood of the Moslem peasantry. Al- 
ready there were rumours in the air which had reached the 
village of a possible European intervention, and the idea of 
it, if it was to be English, was not unpopular. The truth 
is that the existing state of things was wholly unendurable, and 
any change was looked to with joy by the starving people as a 
possible relief. England to the fellahin in their actual condi- 
tion of beggary, robbed and beaten and perishing of hunger, 
appeared in the light of a bountiful and friendly providence 
very rich and quite disinterested, a redresser of wrongs and 
friend of the oppressed, just such, in fact, as individual English 
tourists then often were, who went about with open hands and 



lo Character of the Fellahin 

expressions of sympathy. They did not suspect the immense 
commercial selfishness which had led us, collectively as a nation, 
to so many aggressions on the weak races of the world. 

In the year 1876 I too, as I have said, was a believer In 
England, and I shared the common idea of the beneficence of 
her rule in the East, and I had no other thought for the Egyp- 
tians than that they should share with India, which I had not 
yet seen, the privilege of our protection. "The Egyptians," I 
wrote in my journal of the time, "are a good, honest people 
as any in the world — all, that is, who do not sit in the high places. 
Of these I know nothing. But the peasants, the fellahin, have 
every virtue which should make a happy, well-to-do-society. 
They are cheerful, industrious, obedient to law, and pre-emi- 
nently sober, not only in the matter of drink, but of the other 
indulgences to which human nature is prone. They are neither 
gamblers nor brawlers, nor licentious livers; they love their 
homes, their wives, their children. They are good sons and 
fathers, kind to dumb animals, old men, beggars, and idiots. 
They are absolutely without prejudice of race, and perhaps 
even of religion. Their chief fault is a love of money, but 
that is one political economists will readily pardon. ... It 
would be diflficult to find anywhere a population better fitted to 
attain the economical end of the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. In politics they have no aspirations except 
to live and let live, to be allowed to work and keep the produce 
of their labour, to buy and sell without interference and to 
escape taxation. They have been ill-treated for ages without 
losing thereby their goodness of heart; they have few of the 
picturesque virtues; they are neither patriotic nor fanatical nor 
romantically generous. But they are free from the picturesque 
vices. Each man works for himself — at most for his family. 
The idea of self-sacrifice for the public good they do not under- 
stand, but they are innocent of plots to enslave their fellows. . . . 
In spite of the monstrous oppression of which they are the vic- 
tims, we have heard no word of revolt, this not from any super- 
stitious regard for their rulers, for they are without political 
prejudice, but because revolt is no more in their nature than it 
is in a flock of sheep. They would hail the Queen of England, 
or the Pope, or the King of Ashantee with equal eagerness if 



Cave's Mission ii 

these came with the gift for them of a penny less taxation in the 
pound." 

Such were my first thoughts about Egypt in the early days 
of 1876, not altogether inaccurate ones, though I was far from 
suspecting the growth already beginning of political ideas in 
the towns. Neither did I understand the full influence of 
European finance in the hardships from which the peasantry 
were suffering. Nevertheless, on our return to Cairo in March 
I saw something of the reverse of the medal. Mr. Cave's 
financial mission had arrived during our tour, and was estab- 
lished in one of the palaces on the Shubra Road, and from its 
members — one of whom was an old acquaintance, Victor Buck- 
ley of the Foreign Office, and from Colonel Staunton, our 
Consul-General — I learned something of the condition of finan- 
cial affairs; while a little later Sir Rivers Wilson, also my friend, 
who was to play later so prominent a part in Egyptian affairs, 
appeared at Cairo and joined the other members of the financial 
inquiry. What their report was of the condition of affairs 
I need not here relate In detail, but it will help to an under- 
standing of the matter If I give a very short account of it and 
how their mission came to be appointed, the first of its kind 
in Egypt* 

The Khedive Ismail's reign had begun In the full tide of 
a period for Egypt of high material prosperity. His predeces- 
sor, Sai'd, a man of fairly enlightened views, had had the good 
sense to give all possible encouragement to the fellahin in agri- 
cultural matters. He had abandoned the claim of the Viceroy 
to be sole landlord on the Nile, had recognized proprietary 
rights in the existing occupiers of land, and had fixed the land 
tax at the low figure of forty piastres to the feddan. This 
had resulted in a general enrichment of the population, and 
the fellahin, emancipated from their old condition of serfdom 
to the Circassian Pashas, were everywhere accumulating wealth. 
Egypt at the close of Said's reign had become not only the most 
prosperous province of the Ottoman Empire, but one of the 
most progressive agriculturally of the Eastern world. The 

* Note. For a fuller and better account of the finance of that time 
serious students of Egyptian history should consult "Egypt's Ruin" by Theodore 
Rothstein published by A. C. Fifield, 13. Clifford's Inn, London, in 1910 with an 
introduction by me. 



12 Ismail's Character 

revenue, though small in comparison to what it is now, probably 
not more than four millions sterling, was easily collected, and 
the expenses of administration were insignificant, while the 
pubHc debt amounted to only three millions. It is true that 
in his later years Sa'id had granted a number of concessions to 
European adventurers on terms which were becoming a heavy 
burden on the state, but the general wealth of the country was 
so large that this was not more than its light taxation could 
bear, and the Viceroy had at his disposal, when all yearly 
claims had been discharged, probably not less that a couple of 
millions for his free expenditure. Certainly there never had 
been an age in Egypt when the mass of the native inhabitants 
had been so materially prosperous ; and to the f ellahin especially 
it had come to be spoken of as, for them, the "age of gold." 
Ismail, when in i860 he succeeded to the Viceroyalty, was with- 
out question the richest of Mohammedan princes and master of 
the most prosperous of Mohammedan states. 

Ismail's character, before he became Viceroy, had been 
that of a wealthy landed proprietor managing his large estates 
in Upper Egypt according to the most enlightened modern 
methods. He was praised by nearly all European travellers 
for the machinery he had introduced and the expenditure he had 
turned to profit, and it is certain that he possessed a more 
than usual share of that natural shrewdness and commercial 
aptitude which distinguishes the family of Mohammed 'Ali. 
His succession to the Viceroyalty had been more or less a sur- 
prise to him, for until within a few months of Said's death he 
had not been the immediate heir, and his prospects had been 
only those of an opulent private person. It was perhaps this 
unexpected stroke of fortune that from the beginning of his 
reign led him to extravagance. By nature a speculator and 
inordinately greedy of wealth, he seems to have looked upon 
his inheritance and the absolute power now suddenly placed in 
his hands, not as a public trust, but as the means above all things 
else of aggrandizing his private fortune. At the same time 
he was as inordinately vain and fond of pleasure, and his head 
was turned by his high position and the opportunity it gave him 
of figuring In the world as one of its most splendid princes. He 
was surrounded at once by flatterers of all kinds, native and 
European, who promised on the one hand to make him the 



His Schemes of Wealth ■ 13 

richest of financiers, and on the other the greatest of Oriental 
sovereigns. In listening to these his own cleverness and com- 
mercial skill betrayed him, and made him only their more 
ready dupe. Ismail, before his accession, had been an astute 
money-maker according to the ways in which money was then 
made in Egypt, and he had had, too, a European education of 
the kind Orientals acquire on the Paris boulevards, superficial 
as regards all serious matters, but sufficient to convince him of 
his capacity to deal with the rogues of the Bourse with the 
weapons of their own roguery. In both directions he was led 
astray. 

His first act of self aggrandizement was simple and success- 
ful. The revenue, which rested chiefly on the land tax, was 
low, and he raised it by progressive enhancements from the 40 
piastres where he found it, to 160, where it has ever since stood. 
The country under his hand was rich and at first could afford 
the extra burden. Men gave of their superfluity rather than of 
their necessity, and for some years did so without complaint. 
This enhancement, however, of the revenue was only part of his 
rapacious program. His native flatterers reminded him that 
in the days of his grandfather the whole land had been regarded 
as the Viceroy's personal property, and that, moreover, Mo- 
hammed Ali had claimed and exercised for some years a monoply 
of its foreign trade. Ismail schemed to revive these rights 
in his own person, and though he did not dare, in the face of 
European opinion, to commit any great acts of open confiscation 
in regard to the land, he gained to a large extent his ends 
by other means, and so rapidly that in a few years he managed 
to get into his own hands a fifth of the whole area of the 
cultivable land of Egypt. His method was by various means 
of intimidation and administrative pressure to make the posses- 
sion of such lands as he desired to acquire a burden to their 
owners, and to render their lives so vexatious that they should 
be constrained to sell at prices little more than nominal. In 
this way he had, as I have said, possessed himself of an enormous 
property in land, and he doubtless thought that this was to 
prove to him a correspondingly enormous source of personal 
income. But his very covetousness in the matter proved his 
ruin. It was found in practice that while under his personal 
management as a comparatively small owner his estates had 



14 Ismail Sadyk, the Mufettlsh 

been well worked, and had brought him wealth, his new gigantic 
ownership laid him open to losses In a hundred ways. In vain 
he laid out enormous sums on machinery. In vain he laid whole 
villages and districts under contribution to furnish him forced 
labour. In vain he started factories on his estates and employed 
managers from Europe at the highest salaries. He was robbed 
everywhere by his agents, and was unable to gather from his 
lands even a fraction of the revenue they had brought In taxa- 
tion when not his own. This was the beginning of his finan- 
cial difficulties, coinciding as it did with the sudden fall In agri- 
cultural prices, and especially of cotton, which soon after set In, 
and It was the beginning, too, of the ruin of the peasantry, whom, 
to supply his deficiency, he now loaded with irregular taxation 
of all kinds. Ismail Sadyk, the notorious Mufettlsh, was his 
chief agent In this disastrous history. 

It was not long, however, before Ismail fell Into much more 
dangerous hands, and embarked In much more ruinous adven- 
tures than these early ones. To say nothing of the enormous 
sums which he poured out like water on his own private pleas- 
ures, of his follies of palace building, his follies with European 
women, and his follies of royal entertainment, there were schemes 
of ambition vast enough to drain the purse of any treasury. 
It Is not known precisely how many millions he expended at 
Constantinople in procuring himself the Khedivlal title, and In 
getting the order of the viceregal succession altered In favour 
of his son. But It must have been very many, while still more 
went In hair-brained schemes of speculation and In liabilities 
contracted towards European syndicates. Lastly, there was 
the conquest of the Upper Nile, and the attempted conquest of 
the kingdom of Abyssinia. To provide for all these immense 
expenditures loans had to be raised, at first on a small scale 
with local bankers and Greeks of Alexandria, and presently in 
more reckless fashion on the European Stock Exchange. Here 
his worst counsellor and evil genius had been Nubar Pasha, 
the Armenian financier, who, by a strange Inversion of Ideas, 
has come to be regarded by a certain class of Egyptian opinion 
Ignorant of history as an "Egyptian patriot." Nubar was, 
however, In fact, the one man who, more than any other after 
Ismail himself, was responsible for Egypt's financial ruin. 
Commissioned by his master to find him money at any cost 

Note in correction as to Nubar's wealth see Appendix. 



Nuhur Pasha 15 

to meet his extravagant wants, he raised loan after loan for 
him In Europe on terms which realized for him hardly more 
than 60 per cent, of the capital sums he inscribed himself for as 
debtor, while he, Nubar, pocketed as commission several milHons 
sterHng. Of the ninety-six millions nominally raised in this 
way, it has been calculated that only some fifty-four reached 
Ismail's hands. 

At the date which I am writing of the whole of this liability 
had not yet been incurred, but already the interest on the foreign 
debt amounted to four millions yearly, and to raise sufficient 
revenue to meet it and to carry on the administration and pay 
the huge expense of the Abyssinian war, the peasantry were 
being fleeced, as I have described, under pressure of the whip, 
of their last hoarded piastres. Those who talk lightly in these 
days of Ismail as a prince rather unfortunate than guilty, and 
to be pitied in some sort for the betrayal of the country finan- 
cially to Europe, know nothing of the truth, nor do they realize 
the enormity of the ruin inflicted by his selfish folly on his 
fellah subjects. It has been calculated that the total cost of 
his reign to Egypt amounted to something like 400 millions 
sterling, nor is this in my opinion an exaggerated estimate, for 
it had gathered In the whole of the peasant savings of a number 
of prosperous years, and nearly the whole of their agricultural 
stock besides the public debt, and left them, moreover. Indebted 
privately to the amount of something like twenty millions to the 
Greek and other local usurers. 

Such had been the causes of Egypt's misfortunes as I learned 
them at Cairo In the spring of 1876. With regard to the origin 
of our financial intervention, it was certainly at that time Ismail's 
own foolish doing, and was not, as far as I know, prompted by 
any direct political motives in England. He most certainly ap- 
plied to the English Government for financial assistance through 
Colonel Staunton in the autumn of 1875, and In a way that al- 
most necessitated the assistance having a political character. 
His reason for choosing England rather than France as the 
recipient of his confidences was that at the time England was 
In a far better position financially to help him. The French 
Government was still crippled by the expense of the war with 
Germany of 1870, and was really unable to assist him in any 
effectual way, while, as I have already said, the friendship 



1 6 Purchase of Canal Shares 

long existing between England and Turkey, and the abstention 
of Englishmen so far from commercial intrigues in Egypt had 
probably convinced him, in company with the general opinion 
of the Mohammedan East, that England was a non-aggressive 
power as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned. Especially 
in the matter of the Suez Canal the French Government had be- 
come an object of suspicion, and it was therefore natural that 
when Ismail resolved to sell his shares In the Canal, it was to 
England rather than to France that he made the offer of them. 
I remember well the impression produced in England at the 
time. It was by no means one of general approval, and Disraeli 
was much blamed for involving the Government in a transaction 
which had almost necessarily political consequences. What 
Is, I think, not generally known, at any rate in Egypt, is that 
the agreement to purchase the Khedive's share for four millions 
sterling was made not by the English Government collectively, 
for Lord Derby was averse to it, but on the personal responsi- 
bility of the Prime Minister who, without consulting his col- 
leagues other than Lord Derby, they being absent from London, 
arranged with the London house of Rothschild to advance the 
money. What may have been in Disraeli's mind politically 
about it I do not know, but I am very sure that Lord Derby, 
who was then at the Foreign Office, had no Idea connected with 
it of political aggression. Lord Derby was a man whose view 
of foreign policy was essentially one of non-intervention, nor 
had Disraeli as yet succeeded in indoctrinating his party with 
his own imperialistic Ideas. The transaction, nevertheless, was 
one of evil augury for Egypt, and especially by reason of the 
part played in it by the Rothschilds. As will be seen later, the 
financial connection of this too powerful Hebrew house with 
Egypt was the determining cause, six years later, of England's 
military intervention. ^ 

Mr. Cave's mission, which followed Immediately on the pur- 
chase of the Canal shares, was without any question Ismail's 
doing also. The object in Ismail's mind, as Is perfectly clear, 
when he asked for it, was still further to work the new mine of 
English political assistance he had discovered, with a view to 

1 Since this was written much new information with regard to the purchase 
of the Canal shares has been made public, modifying in some degree the account 
here given; the main facts however regarding the Rothschilds' connection with 
it and Disraeli's remain untouched. 



I 



Mr. Cave's Character 17 

further loans. He wanted to get some public testimonial, in 
the shape of a published report, in favour of his continued 
solvency, and so to re-open to him the European stock exchanges. 
It was for this purpose that he applied to Colonel Staunton for 
an English inquiry, and to a large extent he succeeded in his 
plan. Mr. Cave, who was chosen by the English Government 
for the inquiry, was a worthy and, I believe, quite disinterested 
man, but one who lacked experience of the East, and so was 
specially easy to deceive; he lacked also the fibre necessary 
for dealing quite courageously with all the facts. Ismail, like 
most spendthrifts, when it came to the point of showing his ac- 
counts, had always concealed a part of them, and, with the as- 
sistance of Ismail Sadyk, now gave a fanciful budget of his 
revenue, which Cave too readily accepted. He also allowed 
dust to be thrown in his eyes to ^some extent as to the misery 
of the fellahin. It was the Khedive's plan to surround dis- 
tinguished financial visitors whom he desired to captivate with 
the show of great wealth. The mission was splendidly enter- 
tained and taken about everywhere by the Khedive's officers, 
who arranged things beforehand, and prevented as far as pos- 
sible the nakedness of the land from being seen. Thus Cave's 
report, when it was published, gave only a partial truth. I 
think too that Cave might have insisted, if he had been of a 
stronger character, on the fact which lay at the bottom of all 
Egypt's financial difficulty, namely, that in justice, and indeed 
it might have been maintained in law, Ismail's debts were per- 
sonal not public ones, and should have been so treated. Cave's 
weakness on this point was the beginning of the political inter- 
vention in favour of the bondholders, and his report led by a 
necessary logic to the recognition of Ismail's debt as a public 
obligation. Sir Rivers Wilson, who immediately followed him, 
though a far abler man, was equally inexperienced, and was at 
that time chosen, I believe, principally for his knowledge of 
the French language. I knew him intimately, and I knew 
also, but in a less degree. Cave; and I continued in correspond- 
ence with Wilson for some years and am well acquainted with 
all his Egyptian doings. 

My last recollection that winter at Cairo is of a barbaric ban- 
quet offered by the Khedive to Mr. Cave and the members 
of his commission, to which I was by accident invited. It 



1 8 Banquet at the Pyramids 

was given in the Viceregal Kiosque at the Pyramids, and was one 
of those extravagant entertainments Ismail was accustomed to 
dazzle European eyes with, nor was there anything wanting to 
point the contrast between the wealth of the entertainer and 
the poverty of those at whose expense it was really given. The 
table was spread for us literally under the eyes of a starving 
multitude of peasants, the very peasants Mr. Cave was there 
to save from ruin. Yet none of us seemed to feel the incon- 
gruity of it all. We feasted elaborately, and drank champagne 
of the best, and went our way, and it is only now that, with 
a better knowledge of the whole circumstances, I recall the 
real character of the scene and recognize it for what it in all 
verity was with its waste and surrounding misery, a true pre- 
sentment of the twin causes of the coming revolution. 



I 



CHAPTER II 

SIR RIVERS Wilson's mission 

On leaving Cairo that spring of 1876 we paid our first visit 
to the confines of Arabia. It was then more the custom with 
European tourists than it is now to go on from Egypt into Syria 
by way of the desert, and we took once more to our camels 
and our tent life, and with the same Bedouins who had es- 
corted us from Suez, crossed the Suez Canal and made a long 
tour through the Sinai peninsula and on by Akabah to Jerusalem. 
As we were strange to the country we passed through, and 
were still very ignorant of Arabic and had with us no dragoman, 
we got into some rather perilous adventures which are now 
amusing to recollect, though at the time they were disagreeable 
enough. It is perhaps worth recording as a curious accident 
of travel that as we were passing along the shore of the Gulf 
of Akabah, which is fringed in places with coral reefs, we 
had stopped to examine these and to admire the wonderful 
colours, purple, gold, and vermilion, of the innumerable little 
fishes which live in them. I was standing thus at the sea's edge, 
my gun, which I always then carried, in my hand, when I saw 
a great commotion in the water near me and suddenly, before 
I was well aware of the cause, a large shark, one of a shoal, 
leaving the rest came straight to where I stood and was already 
within a few yards of me before I understood what manner of 
fish it was or that that I was the object of its attack. I had 
barely time to raise my gun when it turned, as these fishes do, 
on its side and rose half out of the water to take hold of me, 
and it was so near me when I fired that my charge of small shot 
killed it without the need of a second barrel, so that we were 
able, with the help of a lasso, to bring it high and dry on shore. 
It was a very large one, nearly ten feet long, and I do not doubt 
that if I had been a little more careless than I was I might have 
been carried from the rock into the sea by it. The incident 

19 



20 Desert Adventures 

brought home to me the danger which was once so common in 
Egypt for the fellahin from crocodiles in the Upper Nile, and 
I have been cautious in the matter of sea bathing ever since. 

We fell into trouble, too, with certain Arabs on our way, 
through our ignorance of the rules and customs of the desert. 
When camped outside Akabah, we received a visit from Abunjad 
the well-known Sheykh of the Alawin, a branch of the Howeytat 
tribe, who had the customary right of escorting travellers to 
Petra, and whom we managed to offend, with the result that we 
ended by starting without escort or guides, our only native 
companions being two Arab boys who had followed us from 
Mount Sinai, and knew nothing of the northern country. With 
these we ventured north for Palestine, and presently ran short 
of water. The wells, when we by fortune found them, proved 
to be almost dry, and it was only after great hardships under 
a burning sun that we at last reached an Arab encampment. 
Things had become so bad for us one night that we had resolved 
that if at noon on the following day we should have still failed 
to find water we must abandon our baggage and push on on our 
best camels for our bare lives to the settled country. An hour, 
however, before the time agreed on, the happy sound of an ass 
braying told us that a camp must be near, and presently we 
spied an Arab child perched on a mound, and from him, under 
some compulsion of fear, got knowledge of their watering place. 
It was a beautiful pool of rain water in the hollow of a rock, 
and here we lay long and quenched our thirst and filled our goat 
skins. By good fortune it was, the men of the place, Azazimeh 
Arabs, were away or I doubt if we should have been allowed to 
take so liberal a share of this "Bounty of God," for they were 
in possession of the place and had sown a little barley field, as 
Bedouins often do on the Syrian frontier for the chance of rain, 
and this was all their drinking store till their corn should be 
ripe. Nor were they otherwise than justly angry on their 
return, and we had to watch all night for fear of an attack. It 
was not till morning that they came with shouts and menaces, 
but we had already loaded our camels, and being well armed 
held on our way. Knowing the ways of Bedouins better now, 
I feel sure that we need not thus have quarrelled with them, and 
that with a little explanation and payment for our disturbance 
of their rights they would have received us well. But as it 



The Russo Turkish War of 1877 21 

was, we were within a hair's breadth of a serious misadventure, 
and deserve to be thankful that the following day we at last 
reached the grass lands between Hebron and Gaza. Here the 
more settled Arabs gave us a good reception, and having made 
friends with them the memory of our past danger was soon 
forgotten. This ended our travels for that year, and from 
Jerusalem we returned in the early summer by the ordinary sea 
route to England. 

The winter of 1877-8 saw us again in the East, this time with 
a larger program of adventure. We visited Aleppo, and 
passed down the Euphrates to Bagdad, and on our return 
journey made acquaintance with the great Bedouin tribes of 
Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert south of Palmyra. We 
began now to know something of the language, and to under- 
stand the customs of the Arabs, and made no more mistakes of 
the kind I have just described. For this we were largely 
indebted to the wise counsels of the then English Consul at 
Aleppo, Mr. Skene, who had had a large experience of Bedouins 
and their ways, and who taught us to approach them on their 
nobler side, and putting aside all fear to trust them as friends, 
appealing to their law of hospitality. The history of this most 
interesting and successful journey has been very fully written 
by my wife in her "Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates," in reality 
a joint work, in which my first political views in regard to 
Arabian liberty may be traced by those who care to seek them. 
My sympathy with the Arabs as against the Turks, with whom 
they were at chronic war, was the result of no pre-conceived 
idea, and still less of any political plan, but was caused by what 
I saw, the extreme misgovernment of the settled districts by the 
Ottoman officials, and the happiness of the still independent 
tribes. It was a time of much local disorganization. The 
Russo-Turkish war was in its last desperate throes at Kars 
and Plevna, and though our good wishes were all with the 
Moslem armies as against the invading Muscovites, the sight 
of the miserable Syrian and Mesopotamian villagers being 
driven in chains as recruits to the sea coast moved us to anger 
against the imperial government, an anger which the hatred 
everywhere manifested by the Arabs against the Turks daily 
intensified. It was impossible in those days of far worse rule 
than now for any one with the instinct of liberty to do otherwise 



22 Conversation with Lord Salisbury 

than resent the Ottoman misgovernment of its Arabic-speak- 
ing provinces. It was a government of force and fraud, 
corrupt and corrupting to the last degree, where every evil 
engine was employed to enslave and degrade the people, where 
the Moslems were worse treated than the Christians, and where 
all alike were pillaged by the Pashas. The Turk in his own 
home in Asia Minor has a number of honest and manly virtues, 
but as a master in a subject land he is too often a rapacious 
tyrant. Every villayet had been bought with money at 
Constantinople, and the purchasing Valy was making what 
fortune he could during his term of office out of those he was 
given to administer. The land of Bagdad, under Ottoman 
rule, we had seen turned into a wilderness, Damascus into a 
decaying city. Everywhere land was falling out of cultivation, 
and the Government, like a moral plague, was infecting the 
inhabitants with its own corruption. Can it be wondered at if, 
in view of these doings, we thought and spoke strongly, and, 
though our Government at the time was in open alliance with 
the Porte, our sympathies were with any scheme which might 
make the Arabian provinces independent of the Empire? 

On my return to England I find a record that on the 14th of 
May, 1878, I was taken by my cousin, Philip Currie (now Lord 
Currie), who was then his private secretary and one of the 
highest officials at the Foreign Office, to see Lord Salisbury. 
Lord Salisbury had just accepted the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and, though I knew nothing of it, must have been at 
the point of signing the famous secret treaty with the Sultan 
known as the Cyprus Convention, and our journey in Arabian 
lands had excited his interest to learn from me something about 
them. In answer to his questions I told him all my thoughts 
very frankly, and I remember especially suggesting to him the 
possible independence some day of Syria, and that it might join 
hands with Egypt against the common misgovernment of their 
Turkish rulers. To this, however, he by no means responded, 
saying that there could be no political connection between the 
two provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and that the case of 
each stood on a separate basis. He was more influenced by 
me, however, when I spoke unfavourably of the then much 
talked of Euphrates Valley Railway scheme, under English 
guarantee, in which I saw a new danger to Arabian liberty, and 



The Goschen-Joubert Arrangement 23 

I have reason to know that my arguments weighed with him to 
the extent that he shortly after refused all Foreign _ Office 
support to the enterprise, which has remained to this day 
abandoned. My conversation on this occasion left me with a 
high opinion of Lord Salisbury's intelligence on Eastern matters, 
and, though his view of them has never been mine, I have always 
preserved a strong feeling of his personal integrity, while it 
began a connection between us never intimate, but always 
friendly on his part. To the last he allowed me to write to 
him on these subjects, and though seldom agreeing he invariably 
responded to my occasional letters with more than the usual 
official courtesy. 

Any hopes, however, that I may have had of persuading Lord 
Salisbury to my views about the Arabs were speedily dispelled 
by his attitude that summer at Berlin, when his policy was 
publicly proclaimed of guaranteeing to the Sultan the whole 
of his Asiatic dominions. The inner history of the Congress 
of Berlin as it affected Egypt is so curious, and at the same time 
so important, that it is necessary I should tell it here as I learned 
it soon after the events had happened. 

It will be remembered that the terrible winter of 1877-8 
witnessed the final scenes of the war between Russia and Turkey, 
and that the spring of the new year found the Czar's army at 
the gates of Constantinople. The same period had been one 
of extreme misery in Egypt. The Cave mission, whose arrival 
I had seen at Cairo, had been followed by other financial mis- 
sions of less integrity, which had resulted in what was known 
as the Goschen-Joubert arrangement of the Khedive Ismail's 
debts, a truly leonine settlement, according to which the 
enormous yearly charge of nearly seven millions sterling had 
been saddled on the Egyptian revenue, an amount which could 
only be wrung out of the ruined fellahin by forcing them, under 
the whip, to mortgage their lands to the Greek usurers who 
attended the tax-gatherers everywhere on their rounds through 
the villages. The last two Niles had been very bad ones, and 
there had been famine in the land from the sea to Assouan. 
Many thousands of the villagers — men, women, and children — 
had died that winter of sheer hunger. There had been noth- 
ing like it since the beginning of the century. Under these 
circumstances it was clear that either the Khedive must go 



24 The Cyprus Convention 

bankrupt or a reduction be made on the interest of his debts, 
the Goschen-Joubert arrangement being abandoned. The 
former course would have been the more equitable and by far 
the better one for the country, but in the foreign bondholders' 
interests this was put aside, and a final attempt was made by 
these, this time successfully, to secure the diplomatic interven- 
tion of the great Powers for yet another settlement between 
Ismail and his creditors. The moment was a favourable one 
as far as England was concerned, for it coincided with the 
resolve of the English Government, under Disraeli's guidance, 
to play a forward political game, and take the leading part in 
the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Lord Derby, who so far 
had gone unwillingly with his chief in his new policy of imperial 
adventure, now would go no further with him and left the For- 
eign Office, and, as we have seen, was replaced by Lord 
Salisbury. It was the signal of a general diplomatic advance, 
not unaccompanied with menace. The British fleet was brought 
through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora, the Russian 
army wa^ overawed and prevented from entering Stamboul, and 
under pressure of the English demonstration a treaty of peace 
was hurriedly drawn up between the Czar and the Sultan, the 
treaty of San Stefano. On the side of Egypt, at the same time, 
an official Commission of Inquiry was appointed, which, though 
nominally international, was intended at the Foreign Office to 
be mainly an English one, my friend Sir Rivers Wilson being 
chosen as English commissioner. His appointment was, I 
believe, almost the first Lord Salisbury signed on taking the 
command in Downing Street. 

It will also be remembered that two months later a secret 
convention was negotiated at Constantinople by our then 
Ambassador, Sir Henry Layard, a man of great ability and 
knowledge of the East, who had acquired the personal con- 
fidence of the still youthful Sultan, Abdul Hamid, in accordance 
with which the island of Cyprus was leased to England and a 
guarantee given to the Sultan of the integrity of all his Asiatic 
provinces in lieu of promises of reform to be enforced by the 
presence in Asia Minor of certain ambulant English consuls, 
military men, who were to give advice and report grievances. 
The idea of the Cyprus Convention, certainly in the minds of 
Disraeli and Salisbury who signed it and of Layard its true 



Disraeli's Scheme for Asia Minor 25 

author, was to establish informally but none the less effectually 
an English protectorate over Asiatic Turkey, The acquisition 
of Cyprus was in their view to be the smallest part of the bar- 
gain. The island was really of very little value to England as 
a place d'armes, and its selection for that purpose was due less 
to its fitness for the purpose than to a fantastic whim of 
Disraeli's, backed up by the roseate report of its potential 
wealth sent in by one of our consuls who had an interest in the 
island. Disraeli many years before, as a quite young man, had 
in his novel "Tancred" advanced half jestingly the idea of a 
great Asiatic empire under an English monarchy, and Cyprus 
was to be specially included in it as recalling the historic fact 
that our English king, Richard Coeur de Lion, had once been also 
Its sovereign. The whole thing was a piece of romantic fooling, 
but Disraeli loved to turn his political jests Into realities and to 
persuade his English followers, whom as a Jew he despised. In 
all seriousness to the ways of his own folly. The really im- 
portant object aimed at by Layard In the Convention — and It 
was certainly his rather than Salisbury's, who was new to office 
and whose experience the year before at Constantinople had 
made him anything but a Turcop>hile — ^was to acquire 'the 
strategic control of Asia Minor, which It was thought might be 
effected through the ambulant consular posts it created. These 
were to supervise the civil administration In the provinces, and 
see that the peasantry were not too much robbed by those 
who farmed the taxes, and that the recruiting grounds of the 
Ottoman army were not depopulated by mismanagement. Thus 
the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean might. It was 
thought, be checked In Asia as their advance In Europe had been 
checked at San Stefano. 

Looking back at the position now, with our knowledge of 
subsequent events, and especially of the Sultan Abdul Hamid's 
character. It seems strange both that the Sultan should have 
signed such a Convention which, if It had been carried out, would 
have put Asiatic Turkey as much into English military hands as 
Egypt Is to-day, or that our Foreign Office should have be- 
lieved In Its success, and the epithet applied to it at the time 
by Gladstone, who denounced It as an "insane Convention," 
seems more than justified. It must, however, be remembered 
that as regards Abdul Hamid he had really no choice, with 



26 Congress of Berlin 

the Russian army still at his doors, but to accept the English 
alliance even if it should mean tutelage, and also that up to 
that point England had always proved a reliable and disinter- 
ested friend. Layard, on the other hand, was conscious of his 
personal ascendency at the palace, and he knew how great the 
prestige was in the Asiatic provinces of the English name. 
An English Consul in those days held a position of absolute 
authority with Valys and every class of Ottoman officials, and 
he may well have thought that this could be indefinitely extended. 
The honour of England was so great in all Turkish eyes, and her 
policy towards the Moslem Empire had been so sympathetic 
that no suspicion existed anywhere of her having selfish plans. 
Layard, too, was himself a believer in the Turks, and he may 
have had dreams of playing the part at Constantinople of 
Make du Palais, which Lord Cromer has shown us an example 
of since at Cairo. Now, it is only astonishing that such English 
dreams should ever have been indulged in, or that by Moslems 
England's disinterestedness should ever have been trusted. 

Lastly, it will be remembered that a month after the secret 
signature of the Cyprus Convention, the great European Con- 
gress of 1878 met at Berlin. It had been called together princi- 
pally at Disraeli's instance, and was to be the most important 
meeting of the Powers since the Congress of Paris. Like the 
earlier Congress its special object was to determine the fate 
of European Turkey and of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, 
and on England's part to revise the treaty of San Stefano. On 
its success in this direction Disraeli had staked his whole reputa- 
tion as a statesman. England had intervened, according to his 
showing, on the highest motives of policy as Turkey's best and 
most disinterested friend, and it was on her approval as such by 
the other great Powers that depended his political position at 
home no less than abroad. So vital, indeed, to Disraeli did 
success at the Congress appear, that he went himself to it as 
chief plenipotentiary, taking Lord Salisbury, who was still new 
to diplomacy, with him as a second ambassador, while Russia 
was represented by Prince Gortschakoff, France by M. Wadding- 
ton, and Italy by Count Corti, Prince Bismarck presiding as 
host over the whole august assemblage. I may add that 
Currie accompanied Lord Salisbury as precis writer on the oc- 
casion, and Lord Rowton, Disraeli. 



) The Ambassador's Declaration I'l 

The general proceedings of the Congress are of course well 
known, and I need not here describe them, but what has never 
been pubhshed is the following all important incident, of which, 
as already said, I learned the particulars some little time after 
It occurred.! The Congress assembled on the 13th of June, 
and as the matters to be discussed were of the highest moment, 
and there was not a little suspicion of each other among the 
plenipotentiaries in regard to a possible partition of Turkey, 
it was proposed at the outset that a preliminary declaration 
should be made by each Ambassador affirming that his Govern- 
ment came to the Congress unfettered by any secret engagement 
as to the questions In dispute. This declaration Disraeli and 
Salisbury, who seem to have been taken by surprise, and were 
unprepared to make a clean breast of their secret doings with 
the Sultan, had not the presence of mind to refuse, and no 
less than the others formally agreed and gave their word to — 
It must be remembered that both were new to diplomacy. It 
may therefore be Imagined how high a surprise It was, and 
scandal at Berlin when a few weeks later, 9th July, the text of 
the hidden Cyprus Convention was published In London by 
one of the evening papers. One Marvin, an Oriental traveller 
and linguist, but who had no official position at the Foreign 
Office, had been imprudently employed as translator and copyist 
of the Turkish text by Currie, and had sold his Information for 
a round sum, to the "Globe." The publication came as a 
thunderclap on our Embassy at Berlin, and though the authen- 
ticity of the text was promptly denied in London, the truth at 
Berlin could not long be concealed. Our two plenlpotentaries 
found themselves confronted with the unexplainable fact that 
they had perpetrated a gross breach of faith on their European 
colleagues, and stood convicted of nothing less than a direct and 
recorded lie. The discovery threatened to break up the Con- 
gress altogether. Prince Gortschakoff declared himself out- 
raged, and he was joined in his anger on the part of France by 
M. Waddlngton. Both gave warning that they would with- 
draw at once from the sittings, and M. Waddlngton went so 
far as to pack up his trunks to leave Berlin. The situation was 
an ugly one, and was only saved by the cynical good offices 
of Bismarck, on whom Disraeli, as a fellow cynic and a man of 
bold ideas, had made a sympathetic Impression. The German 



28 Secret Agreement abQUt Tunis 

Chancellor, as "honest broker," brought about the following 
compromise, with which M. Waddington declared himself satis- 
fied. It was agreed between the French and English pleni- 
potentiaries: 

I. That as a compensation to France for England's acquisi- 
tion of Cyprus, France should be allowed on the first convenient 
opportunity, and without opposition from England, to occupy 
Tunis. 

2.1 That in the financial arrangements being made in Egypt, 
France should march pari passu with England; and, 

3. That England should recognize in a special manner the 
old French claim of protecting the Latin Christians in Syria. 

It was in consideration of Disraeli's surrender on these three 
points that Waddington consented to remain at Berhn and 
join the other ambassadors in arranging the Balkan settlement, 
which eventually was come to more or less on the lines of the 
English proposals. The price thus paid to France by Disraeli 
of a province belonging to his ally the Sultan, it is curious to 
reflect, enabled that statesman to return a little later to London 
and claim a public triumph, with the famous boast in his mouth 
that he had brought back "peace with honour." A curious 
history truly, and deserving to be specially noted as marking the 
point of departure for England of a new policy of spoliation and 
treacherous dealing in the Levant foreign to her traditional 
ways. To the Cyprus intrigue are directly or indirectly refer- 
able half the crimes against Oriental and North African liberty 
our generation has witnessed. It suggested the immediate hand- 
ing over of Bosnia to Austria. It helped to frustrate a sound 
settlement in Macedonia. It put Tunis under the heel of 
France, and commenced the great partition of Africa among 
the European Powers, with the innumerable woes it has inflicted 
on its native inhabitants, from Bizerta to Lake Chad, and 
from Somaliland to the Congo. Above all it destroyed at a 
critical moment all England's influence for good in the Ottoman 
Empire. It embittered Moslem hearts against her in 1881 and 
1882, and, as I will show, was a powerful factor in the more 
violent events of those troubled years in Egypt. Also it most 
certainly defeated its own end in Asiatic Turkey if England's 
co-operation in reform was really contemplated. The doings at 
the Congress opened the Sultan's eyes to the danger there might 



Betrayal of North Africa 29 

be In any English co-operation, and also beyond question hard- 
ened his heart to a policy contrary to English advice, and in 
which he has been only too successful, that of suppressing all 
liberty and self-government among his own Turkish subjects. 
To it the Liberal party at Constantinople owes more than to any- 
thing else its ruthless persecution, and it is even not too much 
to say that whatever woes have been inflicted on the Armenians 
have been caused by the false hopes raised at Berlin of their 
emancipation by England's moral help, a help her own immoral- 
ity has made her powerless to give. The immediate effect in 
Egypt of the compromise come to with M. Waddington was 
the despatch of a telegram from Berlin to .Wilson at Alexandria 
ordering him, much to his chagrin and surprise, to see that in 
all the financial appointments made in connection with his official 
inquiry, France should receive an absolutely equal share. It 
was, indeed, though unknown to Wilson at the time, the deter- 
mining cause; a year later, of the Anglo-French condominium. ^ 
Public affairs were in this position when in the autumn of 
that same year, 1878, I found myself once more upon my road 
eastwards. My journey of the winter before to Bagdad, and 
especially the success I had had In a matter much more Interest- 
ing to me than any politics, the purchase and bringing safely 
home of the Arab mares which were to form the nucleus of my 
now well-known stud at Crabbet, had roused considerable In- 
terest and curiosity In England, and I had spent the summer 
preparing my wife's journal for publication, and It was now in the 

1 1 have given the story of the arrangement made with Waddington as I heard it 
first from Lord Lytton at Simla in May, 1879. The details were contained in a 
letter, which he showed me, written to him from Berlin, while the Congress was 
still sitting, by a former diplomatic colleague and have since been confirmed to me 
from more than one quarter, though with variations. In regard to the main 
feature of the agreement, the arrangement about Tunis, I had it very plainly stated 
to me in the autumn of 1884 by Count Corti who had been Italian Ambassador at 
the Congress. According to his account, the shock of the revelation to Disraeli 
had been so great, that he took to his bed, and for four days did not appear at the 
sittings, leaving Lord Salisbury to explain matters as he best could. He said there 
had been no open rupture wth Waddington, the case having been submitted by 
Waddington to his fellow ambassadors, who agreed that it was one that could not 
publicly be disputed, "II faut la guerre ou se taire." The agreement was a 
verbal one between Waddington and Salisbury, but was recorded in a dispatch 
subsequently written by the French Ambassador in London, in which he reminded 
the latter of the conversation held in Berlin, and so secured its acknowledgment in 
writing. 

See Appendix VI. as to the Berlin Congress, 



30 Murder of Ismail Sadyk 

Press. We were not content, however, with this, and had 
made up our minds to a new expedition still more adventurous 
than any we had yet attempted, and were on our way back to 
Damascus, from which starting point we designed to penetrate 
into central Arabia and visit Nejd, the original home and birth- 
place of the Arabian horse. Our sea-voyage from Marseilles 
would touch at Alexandria, and it so happened that I found on 
board the Messageries steamer at Marseilles my friend Sir 
Rivers Wilson who had just been appointed Finance Minister 
in Egypt, and in his company we made the voyage. During the 
six days' passage I had ample opportunity to learn from him 
all that had happened during the past two years at Cairo, and 
the tale he told me of the condition of the country was a 
very terrible one. I remember well his account of that most 
dramatic of the many crimes of the Khedive Ismail, his murder 
of the Mufettish Ismail Sadyk, an act of treachery which more 
than any other alienated from the Khedive the allegiance, I will 
not say of his Egyptian subjects at large, for that he had already 
lost, but even of that group of slaves and servants by which he 
was surrounded. 

Ismail Sadyk was an Algerian by birth but had come at an 
early age to Egypt, and had by his abilities risen in the viceregal 
service, his first connection with the Court having been, I 
believe, under Abbas I as a superintendent of his stud. Under 
Sai'd and Ismail he had served in various official capacities and 
had made himself, as we have seen, Ismail's dme damnee in the 
work of extracting their last piastres from the fellahin. With 
all his cruelties to them — and he had shown inexhaustible in- 
genuity in devising means for their spoliation — he had main- 
tained a certain honourable repute at Cairo as an Arab gifted 
with the traditional virtue of generosity and a large liberality 
in spending the wealth he had acquired, and so as an old man 
was not unpopular. For the last few years of his life he had 
been Finance Minister, and to Ismail had always proved himself 
a devoted and faithful servant. Ismail had nevertheless be- 
trayed him a few months before the time I am writing of basely 
to his death, and under circumstances so revolting that the 
Egyptian world, used as it was to crime in high places, had 
been shocked and confounded. The Khedive's motive had been 
the wholly base and selfish one of screening himself by casting 



Ismail Pasha's Treachery 31 

upon his too faithful Minister the blame of certain frauds he 
had himself committed, and he had insured his silence by having 
the old man murdered almost in his own presence. 

The details given me by Wilson were as follows : Ismail 
had been in the habit, in his dealings with the various European 
commissioners whom he had from time to time invited to 
inquire into his financial affairs, of concealing as far as was 
possible from them the extreme truth of his senseless extrava- 
gances, and with his Minister Ismail Sadyk's help had once 
more now, as on previous occasions, presented to the new official 
commission a false statement of his debts. The pressure, how- 
ever, on him was severe, as the commission had received a hint, 
if I remember rightly, from Riaz Pasha, that they were being 
befooled on this point, and he, fearing that the whole truth would 
come out, and when the matter should be fully gone into by the 
commission his Minister might tell the facts, determined to be 
beforehand with him and make of him his scapegoat and victim. 
He took the execution of the deed into his own hands. It was 
his custom with his Minister, with whom he was on the 
closest possible terms of personal friendship, to call sometimes 
for the old man in the afternoon at the Finance Office and 
take him for a drive with him to Shubra or to one or another of 
his palaces; and so on this occasion he did, and, suspecting 
nothing, the Minister mounted with him and they drove to- 
gether to the Jesireh Palace and there got down and entered. 
No sooner, however, were they inside than Ismail on some 
pretext left him alone in one of the saloons and immediately sent 
to him his two younger sons Husseyn and Hassan and his aide- 
de-camp, Mustafa Bey Fehmy, when the princes struck and 
insulted the unarmed Minister and hustled him on board one 
of the viceregal steamers which was lying with steam up beside 
the quay, and there, though not without a vigorous resistance, 
the old man was despatched. According to Wilson, the actual 
doer of the deed was Mustafa Bey, acting under the Khedive's 
order, and he added that the truth had been disclosed through 
the young aide-de-camp falling ill of fever soon after and telling 
it in his delirium. I have reason, however, to believe that as 
far as Mustafa's personal act went this was a mistake, though 
the rest of the facts have been fully confirmed to me, and that 
the Mufettish was handed over by Mustafa to Ishak Bey, in 



32 The Rothschild Loan 

whose charge he perished, though whether at once or a little 
later is uncertain. Some say that Ismail Sadyk was thrown 
as many another had been thrown, with a stone tied to his feet 
into the Nile, others that he was conveyed alive as far as to 
between Waddy Haifa and Dongola and there strangled. All 
that is quite beyond dispute is that once on board the steamer 
he was never seen again alive, and that the steamer having gone 
up the river, it was some weeks later officially announced that 
the Mufettish was away in Upper Egypt for a change of air 
and ultimately that he had there taken to drink and died. 
It is also certain that Mustafa, a mild young man and unused 
to scenes of violence, and being himself, as the Mufettish was, 
of Algerine extraction, was so horrified at the role he had 
been ordered to play in it that he had a long and dangerous 
illness. It was this experience that a year later caused him to 
take the part he did against his master Ismail and utimately to 
join Arabi in the earlier phases of the revolution of 1 88 1—2. 
He is the same Mustafa Fehmy who has for so many years 
filled the office of Prime Minister in Egypt. 

Of all these things we talked as we sat day after day on the 
deck of the Messageries steamer, and, especially, of course, of 
Wilson's own important mission as Ismail Sadyk's successor. 
Wilson's hopes at that time were high regarding his own ad- 
ministrative success, and he showed a keen appreciation of the 
responsibility of the charge he had undertaken of restoring 
Egypt to prosperity and rescuing the fellahin from their finan- 
cial bondage, but he was also fully aware of the difficulties which 
lay before him. The Khedive's character he had learned to 
understand, and he was prepared to find in him an astute and 
unscrupulous opponent. But he counted on his own bonhomie, 
tact, and knowledge of the world to be able to live on friendly 
terms with him, and to avoid what personal risks he might run. 
He relied too on his French education, for he had lived 
much at Paris, to preserve intact the dual character of the 
Anglo-French Ministry, of which he formed a part, and above 
all he relied on Nubar. In Nubar he reposed unlimited confi- 
dence, believing him to be a heaven-born Eastern statesman, 
and one devoted to English interests. He had, moreover, be- 
hind him, as he thought, the full support of the London Foreign 
Office, and what was perhaps even a stronger stay in Europe, 



Wilson's Failure in Egypt 33 

the interest and power of the house of Rothschild. On this last 
he knew he could rely, for he had just persuaded them on his 
passage through Paris to advance that fatal loan of nine mil- 
lions on the Khedivial Domains which was to bind them to the 
cause of European intervention whenever necessary on the part 
of the bondholders. To myself, who knew Wilson well, though 
I sympathized to the full with his humanitarian hopes and per- 
sonal aspirations, there seemed to be certain elements of doubt 
in his position which did not augur altogether well for his 
success. 

We parted at Alexandria in good hope that all would go well 
with him in a mission so much one of despair to a ruined state, 
but with misgivings. The difficulties before him we both 
guessed would be immense, and in spite of his excellent qualities 
of heart and head and his great savoir vivre, I had my fears for 
him. The event more than justified my forebodings, and in a 
shorter time than either of us could have thought possible. 

Sir Rivers Wilson's brief career as Finance Minister in 
Egypt failed through many causes. It was of ill omen, I think, 
at the very outset that it should have commenced with a new and 
heavy loan, the proceeds of which it is difficult to find were put 
to any serious purpose. Errors of administration, too, there 
certainly were which inflicted great injustice on the people, and 
which, as will be seen later, prepared the way for a general dis- 
content. It is not, however, necessary for me to go into 
these, for they are matters of notoriety to be found in the 
Blue Books. Wilson's excuse for them must be found in the 
fact that in all matters of internal policy he trusted absolutely 
for guidance to Nubar, and that he greatly overrated Nubar's 
power to deal with them. If Wilson had been more of a states- 
man and less of a financier he would not have blundered as he 
did into political difficulties which, with a little more experience 
of the arts of government, might have been easily avoided. 
Nubar was a weak reed on which to lean. As a Christian and 
an alien it was not difficult for one so astute as Ismail to rouse 
Mohammedan opinion against him, and when, thinking only of 
restoring the financial equilibrium, Wilson began a series of 
crude retrenchments among the native officials, a discontented 
class was at once brought into existence which gave the Khedive 
his opportunity of diverting the popular ill-will from himself 



34 The Nubar-Wilson Ministry 

to his Christian Ministers. What made it the more easy for 
him was that in these retrenchments no European salaries were 
cut down. The agreement with France had made it imperative 
that each Enghshman employed in Egypt should be duplicated 
with a Frenchman, and Wilson did not dare touch one of 
them. Wilson, as holding the purse strings, had to bear the 
odium of all this. 

Nor did he, in spite of his good intentions, succeed in re- 
lieving the peasantry in any way of their burdens. It was an 
essential part of his program that the Khedive should remain 
solvent, and that meant that the interest on the enormous debt 
should be punctually paid. The nine millions advanced by the 
Rothschilds went mostly in paying the more urgently immediate 
calls, and not a tax was reduced or a demand remitted. On the 
contrary, the regime of the whip went on, even more merci- 
lessly than before, in the villages, and an additional terror was 
introduced into the agricultural situation by the institution, 
at great expense and most futilely carried out, of a new 
revenue survey, under English direction, which was interpreted 
as the prelude of a still enhanced land-tax. Lastly, the project, 
lightly suggested by Wilson, of rescinding the Moukabalah ar- 
rangement, which would have meant confiscation by the Govern- 
ment of landed property representing something like fifteen 
millions, disturbed every landowner's mind, and led to the be- 
lief that even worse things might be expected of the English 
Minister than any they had suffered from his predecessors. 
It seems to me astonishing now with my better knowledge of 
Egypt that any one so intelligent and well meaning as Wilson 
undoubtedly was should have fallen into such errors, and I 
half suspect that some of them were suggested to him for his 
discomfiture by the Khedive himself. The climax of the Wil- 
son-Nubar political unwisdom was reached when, without any 
arrears of pay being given them, the native army, including 
2,500 oflicers, began to be disbanded. This put the alien Minis- 
try finally Into the Khedive's hands, and It was a chance Ismail 
did not throw away. 

The history of the emeute of February, 1879, which over- 
threw the Nubar-Wilson Ministry, needs to be recounted here 
as it really happened, for the truth about it will not be found in 
any published history. The Khedive was, as we have seen, anx- 



Nubar's Unpopularity 35 

ious to divert the popular hatred with which he was regarded 
in Egypt from himself to his new Ministers, and he was also 
most desirous of ridding himself of their tutelage. By an Act 
called the Rescript of i878 he had abdicated his personal con- 
trol of the revenue and the administration into their hands, and 
used as he was for eighteen years to absolute power in Egypt 
it irked him already to have lost it. He had only signed the 
Rescript as an alternative to bankruptcy, and this being averted 
he did not intend to stand by the letter of his bond. Being 
also an astute judge of character, he had seen at once the weak- 
ness of the Ministry, how Wilson and his French colleague, 
de Blignieres, depended, in their foreign ignorance of Egyptian 
things, altogether on Nubar for their knowledge how to act, 
and also how helpless Nubar himself was as a Christian to rule 
a Mohammedan country. 

Nubar was known to the Mohammedan official class as an 
Armenian adventurer, who had enriched himself as agent of 
the loan-mongers of Europe at the public expense, and to the 
fellahin as the author of the International Tribunals, an institu- 
tion extolled by foreigners, but to them especially odious as 
having laid them more than any other agency had done in bond- 
age to the Greek usurers. As these Courts were then adminis- 
tered in Egypt, a fellah who had once put his signature to any 
paper for money borrowed could be sued before foreign judges 
according to a foreign procedure and in a foreign language, 
without the smallest chance, if he was a poor man, of defending 
himself, or of showing, as was often the case, that the figures 
had been altered or the whole paper a forgery, and he might 
be deprived of his land and of all he possessed before he well 
knew what the claim made on him rightly was. Nubar was 
known especially for this, and was without following of any 
native kind or supported by any opinion but that of the foreign 
commercial class of Alexandria. It was therefore through 
Nubar that Ismail saw the new regime could be most easily 
attacked, and most surely reduced to impotence. All that 
was needed to overthrow it was a public native demonstration 
against the unpopular Christian, and this the discontent of the 
2,500 officers cashiered and cheated of pay and pension made 
it a very easy matter to arrange. 

Ismail's chief agents in getting up the emeute of February 



^6 He is Assaulted in the Street 

were Shahin Pasha, one of his own Court servants, and Shahln's 
brother-In law, Latif Effendi Selim, who, as Director of the 
Mihtary College, held a position specially advantageous for 
the purpose. By these a demonstration of the students of the 
college was arranged, which at the hour named marched through 
the streets of Cairo announcing their intention of demanding the 
dismissal of the obnoxious Ministry, and they were joined by 
the crowd and especially by such of the cashiered officers as 
chanced to be upon their way, and it was so arranged that they 
should arrive at the Government offices at the hour when the 
Ministers were about to leave it. There they found Nubar 
Pasha in the act of stepping into his carriage, and they insulted 
and assaulted him, Nubar's moustache being pulled and his ears 
boxed. A general popular demonstration followed, and pres- 
ently the first regiment of the Khedivial Guard under its colonel 
Ali Bey Fehmy, which had been held in readiness, appeared upon 
the scene, and a little after the Khedive himself. A few shots 
were then fired over the heads of the demonstrators, and the 
Khedive having ordered them to their homes the crowd dis- 
persed. The program, arranged beforehand with Ali Bey, 
had been successfully carried out, and the Khedive was able 
to claim of the English and French Consuls, to whom he im- 
mediately appealed, the necessity of Nubar's dismissal, and to 
persuade them that but for his powerful intervention and au- 
thority with the people worse things would have happened. 
Nubar therefore was advised to resign, and a Moslem official 
of the Khedive's choosing, Ragheb Pasha, was allowed to be 
named Prime Minister in his place. With Ragheb, a special 
adherent of his own, at the Ministry of the Interior, Ismail 
knew that Wilson and de Blignieres would be powerless to ad- 
minister the country, and that their fall also must speedily 
follow. 

Nubar having been thus successfully disposed of, Wilson's 
tenure of office as Finance Minister became, as the Khedive had 
calculated, all but impossible, and his fall was hastened by ex- 
traneous circumstances. Our then Consul-General in Egypt, 
Vivian (afterwards Lord Vivian and Ambassador at Rome) 
had been estranged from Wilson by a personal quarrel which 
had taken place between them, and when in his political difficul- 
ties Wilson appealed to him for support, the support was grudg- 



Assault on Wilson 37 

ingly given or altogether withheld. Wilson's final discom- 
fiture soon followed; an incident, somewhat similar to that of 
February, was arranged in March at Alexandria, on which oc- 
casion he and his wife were hustled and hurt by the mob, and 
when Wilson laid his complaint before the Foreign Office it 
refused him any efficient backing for redress. He was advised, 
as Nubar had been, to resign, and, there being no other course 
left him, he retired from office and returned to Europe. 

I have an interesting letter from Wilson of this date. Writ- 
ing on 30th April, 1879, he says: "You will I daresay have 
heard that I have been upset by that little scoundrel the Khedive. 
He didn't quite have me assassinated, as you not without reason 
imagined might be the case, but he had me attacked in the street 
and very roughly handled, and now he has had the satisfaction 
of getting rid of me altogether, H. M.'s Govt., with their usual 
loyalty to their agents, having left me to my fate. Crepy 
Vivian is the cause and chief abettor of this sudden overthrow 
of arrangements which he was instructed specially to protect. 
Partly from jealousy, and a good deal from want of intelligence, 
with the addition of a great deal of vanity, he went at once into 
the Khedive's camp. His Highness, whose highest art of gov- 
ernment lies in the disunion of the people he has to deal with, 
might reasonably have expected to make a split between Blig- 
nieres and myself, or between one or both of us and Nubar, 
but in his wildest dreams he never could have hoped that the 
English Consul-General would become his toady and instrument 
for the overthrow of the Ministry imposed on him by an Eng- 
lish Government. . . . We leave on the 6th and shall get to 
London about the 15 th, I am glad to be out of the place now. 
The whole thing is going to the devil. The country is pesti- 
lential with corruption. The French and English Governments 
seem afraid of acting, and for the moment the Khedive rides 
rampant and is bleeding the country to death. The smash can- 
not be delayed, but in the Interval it Is dreadful to think of the 
mischief and misery that are being worked." 



CHAPTER III 



TRAVELS IN ARABIA AND INDIA 



While these important events had been happening in Egypt 
I had been away, still travelling with my wife on our new 
adventure in Central Arabia, far removed from all knowledge 
of them or of the affairs of the outside world. 

On our way to Damascus, where we were to begin our serious 
campaign, we had stopped for some days in Cyprus, being 
curious to look at the new English possession, just acquired at 
the cost of so much scandal, which we found receiving its first 
lessons in English administration at the hands of Sir Garnet 
Wolseley. The island was still in its summer heat, no rain hav- 
ing fallen, and seemed to us little better than a dusty wilderness. 
We called on Wolseley at his government house at Nicosia, 
and found him making the best of a rather forlorn and very 
isolated position. In his talk with us he put as good a face 
as he could on the outlook of this latest "gem of Empire," but 
it was clear that in his professional mind the island had no 
great merit, and was rather in the nature of that gross of spec- 
tacles brought home from the fair we read of in the "Vicar of 
Wakefield." It was diflRcult, indeed, to see what use it could 
be put to, or how it could be made to pay its cost of manage- 
ment. Its acquisition had already begun to bring discredit to 
the English name, and it was generally spoken of, we found 
among the Mohammedans of Syria, as a backshish taken by 
England for services rendered to the Sultan. 

At Damascus we met several interesting personages, among 
others the old hero of the Algerian war with France, Seyyid 
Abd-el-Kader, and that other in some ways hero, the ex-leader 
of the Turkish constitutional party, Midhat Pasha. My im- 
pression of the latter, much as I was inclined to sympathize 
with Mohammedan reform, was not favourable. Personally 

38 



J 



Midhat Pasha at Damascus 39 

he was unimpressive, of no distinguished appearance, and with 
a certain boastful and self-assertive manner which suggested 
vanity as a leading characteristic. In a long conversation I 
had with him on the subject of Ottoman regeneration, I found 
his ideas shallow and of that commonplace European kind 
which so often in the East do service for original thought and 
depth of conviction. His ideas of reform for the Empire, and 
of the Syrian villayet of which he had just been appointed Valy, 
as he expounded them to me, were wholly material ones, the 
construction of railroads, canals, and tramways, all excellent 
things in their way, but leaving untouched the real necessities of 
the administration and which, as he had no funds whatever at 
his disposal for public works, were in his own province quite 
illusory. Of the larger matters of economy, justice, and pro- 
tection for the poor, he did not speak, nor did he show himself 
in the smallest degree in sympathy with the people of the prov- 
ince he had come to govern. Indeed, he was imbued with more 
than the usual Turkish contempt for everything Arabian, which 
he took no pains to conceal, and his avowed methods in deal- 
ing with the Bedouins were brutal in the extreme. This natur- 
ally repelled me. Nevertheless I cannot help regretting now 
that I did not make some effort at the time of his misfortunes 
to rouse public feeling in his favour in England, when such 
might have perhaps saved him from the terrible punishment he 
suffered at the Sultan's hands. I did not, however, at that time 
know all the facts, and it was only in 1884 that I learned, from 
a source on which I could rely, the true history of Midhat's 
trial on the false charge of murder brought against him three 
years before. This is so important a matter that I make no 
excuse for relating it here in detail. 

It may be remembered that when I was at Constantinople 
in 1873 I had been cared for during a serious illness by Doctor 
Dickson, the then physician of the British Embassy, with whom 
I had formed a very pleasant intimacy. This worthy old man, 
who had already at that time been some thirty-five years in 
Turkey, had become thoroughly orientalized and possessed a 
wider experience and more complete knowledge of all things 
Ottoman than perhaps any other Englishman then living. He 
had, moreover, a loyal sympathy with the people among whom 
he had so long lived, and had retained with it a very high integ- 



40 Story of Ahd-el-Aziz' Death 

rity and sense of old-fashioned English honour, which made 
him the most capable and reliable witness possible in regard 
to events which had come under his notice. His evidence, 
therefore, on what I am about to relate may be considered as 
absolutely final on the matter it touches. In 1884 I was again 
at Constantinople, and it was then that he gave it me; and it 
seemed to me so important as a corrective to history that I at 
once on the day I heard it wrote it down. It is textually as fol- 
lows: 

"Nov. 3, 1884. Doctor Dickson was sent by the English 
Embassy to investigate the circumstances of Abd-el-Aziz' death; 
and he gave us a most precise account of all he had seen at the 
palace that day. The party of doctors consisted of a Greek, 
Marco Pasha, of an old Englishman who had been Lord Byron's 
doctor, and several others. They found the body in the guard 
house and examined it carefully. The Sultan was dressed in 
a silk shirt, such as the caiquejis wear, plain without stripes, 
and pink silk trousers. When stripped the body was found 
without scratch or bruise, 'the most beautiful body in the world,' 
with the exception of the cuts in the two arms on the inside 
where the arteries are. The cut on the left arm was deep to 
the bone and Dr. Dickson had put his finger into the wound. 
That on the right was imperfect and the artery was not severed. 
They were manifestly the cause of death. The other doctors 
were satisfied with this examination and went away; but Dr. 
Dickson and the other English doctor insisted upon taking the 
evidence of the Sultan's mother, and this was her account: 
Abd-el-Aziz had twice since his deposition tried to destroy him- 
self, once by trying to throw himself down a well, once into 
the Bosphorus, but had been prevented; and the Sultana had 
been warned to give him no instrument with which he could 
effect his purpose. When therefore he had asked her for a 
mirror and scissors to trim his beard she had chosen the smallest 
pair she possessed, and thought it impossible he should harm 
himself with them. She occupied the room next to his, and 
there were always one or two girls on watch when she was 
not herself with him. It happened, however, that one afternoon 
he had ordered the girls out and bolted the door, saying he 
wished to be alone; and the girls did not dare disobey. But 
when half an hour was passed they came and told her, and at 



Trial of Midhat for Murder 41 

first she was not alarmed, but bade them wait at the door and 
listen. Then they came back and said they heard nothing, and 
at the end of the hour she herself went, followed by her women, 
and pushed the door open. They found the Sultan leaning 
on his side on the sofa dead in this position. 

[Here in my journal is a sketch.] 

"The sofa and the curtains of the room were of velvet, red 
on yellow ground. And Dr. Dickson's colleague examined the 
place and found the left arm of the sofa saturated with blood, 
and a great pool of coagulated blood on the floor beneath; 
also on the middle of the sofa a small mark of blood corre- 
sponding with the wound on the right arm, but though he ex- 
amined carefully there was not a speck elsewhere than close 
to the sofa, so that it was impossible there could have been any 
struggle or murder. As the Sultana said : 'If he was murdered 
the murderer must have been myself, for I was in the next room 
and nobody else could have come near him.' At the trial of 
Midhat and the rest for murder, they produced a linen, not a 
silk, shirt, with a cut in the side as from a sword thrust, a pair of 
green or yellow trousers, and a fur dressing gown, not those 
which were on the corpse, and chintz covers of the sofa and 
chintz curtains sprinkled with blood, not those of the room where 
the body was found. Dr. Dickson had thereupon written a 
protest stating what he knew, and had given it to Lord Duf- 
ferin, begging him to have it handed as evidence to the Presi- 
dent of the Court. But Dufferin would not interfere without 
instructions, and while he telegraphed, or pretended to tele- 
graph, Midhat was condemned.^ Marco Pasha, he says, must 
have been induced to give the evidence he did. The story of 
men having been seen climbing in and out of the window was 
ridiculous, as it was so high from the ground the men must 
have broken their legs jumping out. Dr. Dickson is a very 
precise old gentleman, and the sort of witness whose evidence 
would be accepted by any jury in the world. I therefore en- 
tirely believe his account, improbable as at first sight it seems, 
that a Sultan should not have been murdered and should have 
committed suicide. Midhat and Damad died in chains at 
Tai'f some months ago, having been starved to death. Mid- 



42 Sir Edward Malet 

hat's end was hastened by a carbuncle, but he was none the less 
made away with. The Sheykh el Islam has also recently died 
mere, who gave the fetwa authorizing Abd-el-Aziz' deposition. 
This act of terror has given Abdul Hamid the absolute power 
he now holds." 

Another person of importance to my narrative whom we met 
that autumn of 1878 at Damascus was Sir Edward Malet, at 
that time Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, and who was 
making a tour of Syria partly for his amusement, partly to gather 
information. During my diplomatic career I had served twice 
under his excellent father, and had been very intimate with 
his family and with himself from the days when we were both 
attaches, and I am therefore able to speak of his character, 
which has been strangely misunderstood in Egypt, from in- 
timate personal knowledge. Malet was a man of fair ordi- 
nary abilities, gifted with much industry, caution, and good 
sense. Having been born, so to say, in diplomacy and put into 
the service by his father when he was only sixteen, he had had a 
thoroughly professional training, and, as far as the traditions 
and usages of his work went, he was an entirely competent public 
servant. He could write a good plain despatch, and one which 
might be trusted to say not a word more than his instructions 
warranted, and would commit his Government to nothing not 
intended. He had the talents which are perhaps the most use- 
ful under the ordinary circumstances of the service to which 
he belonged, prudence, reticence and a ready self-effacement, 
those in fact which should distinguish a discreet family solicitor, 
— and the duty of a diplomatist, except in very rare cases, is 
in no way different from that of a solicitor. Imagination, 
however, Malet had none, nor initiative, nor any power of 
dealing on his own responsibility with occasions requiring strong 
action and prompt decision.: He was the last man in the world 
to lead an intrigue or command a difficult situation. Personally 
he was amiable, without being attractive, and he had retained 
a certain boyishness of mind which in his unofficial moments was 
very apparent. His industry was great and his conduct irre- 
proachable. As a quite young man this was very noticeable. 
He always preferred his work, however little interesting, to 
any form of amusement, and even when on leave would spend 
his spare afternoons copying despatches with us in his father's 



Journey to Nejd 43 

chancery rather than be at the trouble of inventing occupation 
for himself elsewhere. I record this because he has been credited 
in Egypt with an ambitious and intriguing restlessness which was 
the precise opposite of his very quiet character. Neither in 
pleasure nor in work had he the smallest spirit of adventure. 
Otherwise it is possible that he might have accompanied us, as 
I proposed to him to do, to Arabia, but he was not one to leave 
the beaten track, and, though I interested him as far as I could 
In my more romantic plan, he preferred to follow the common 
tourist road, and so went on after a few days to Jerusalem. 

Our own journey was a very different one, and proved to 
be of even more interest than I had anticipated. The full 
detail of it has been published both in English and in French, 
under the title "A Pilgrimage to Nejd," and so I will deal 
with it here briefly. To narrate it in a very few words : we 
travelled by the Haj Road as far as Mezarib and from thence 
to the Jebel Hauran, where one of the Druse chiefs of the 
Atrash family provided us with a rafyk or guide, and so passed 
down the Wady Sirhan by Kaf to Jof where Mohammed el 
Aruk, son of the Sheykh of Tudmor, who was with us, had 
relations. Thence, after some stay with these, we crossed the 
Nefud, a hazardous passage of ten days through the great sand 
desert to Hail and, though we had no letters or introductions 
of any kind, were received by the Emir Mohammed Ibn Rashid, 
the then sovereign of independent Nejd, with all possible honour. 
Our quality of English people was a sufficient passport for us in 
his eyes, and the fact of our visits made the previous year to 
so many of the Anazeh and Shammar Sheykhs, rumours of 
which had reached him. By this time we had learned sufficient 
Arabic to be able to carry on a conversation, and we found him 
courteous and amiable, and exceedingly interested to hear all 
we had to tell him about the affairs of the great world from 
which Nejd Is so completely shut off by the surrounding deserts. 
On matters which at all concerned Arabia he was curious to 
learn our opinion, and especially as to the characters of the 
various Bedouin Chiefs, his enemies or rivals. European poli- 
tics interested him very little, and hardly more the politics of 
Constantinople or Egypt, for at that time the Sultan, though 
Nejd was called at Bagdad a province of the empire, was in no 
way recognized by the WahhabI Princes as their sovereign, and 



44 Freedom in Arabia 

the only relations they had had with him for a century had 
been those of a hostile character. The recollection of Moham- 
med Ali's invasion of Nejd was still a living memory, and Mid- 
hat Pasha's more recent seizure of El Hasa on the Persian 
Gulf and his abortive expedition to Jof were much resented 
at Hail. It stood us in good stead with Ibu Rashid that we had 
come to him without the intervention of any Ottoman author- 

The result of this friendly visit to the capital of independent 
Arabia, with the view I obtained there of the ancient system of 
free government existing for so many centuries in the heart of 
that wonderful peninsula, was to confirm me in the enthusiastic 
feelings of love and admiration I already entertained for the 
Arabian race. It was indeed with me a political "first love," 
a romance which more and more absorbed me, and determined 
me to do what I could to help them to preserve their precious 
gift of independence. Arabia seemed to me in the light of a 
sacred land, where I had found a mission in life I was bound 
to fulfil. Nor do I think that I exaggerated the value of the 
traditional virtues I saw practised there. 

By nearly all Orientals the Bedouin system of government 
is looked upon as little else than brigandage, and on the con- 
fines of civilization it has, in fact, a tendency to degenerate into 
such. But in the heart of Arabia itself it is not so. In Nejd 
alone of all the countries of the world I have visited, either 
East or West, the three great blessinsg of which we in Europe 
make our boast, though we do not in truth possess them, are a 
living reality: "Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood," names only 
even in France, where they are written up on every wall, but 
here practically enjoyed by every free man. Here was a com- 
munity living as our idealists have dreamed, without taxes, 
without police, without conscription, without compulsion of any 
kind, whose only law was public opinion, and whose only order 
a principle of honour. Here, too, was a people poor yet con- 
tented, and, according to their few wants, living in abundance, 
who to all questions I asked of them (and in how many lands 
had I not put the same in vain) had answered me invariably, 
"Thank God, we are not as the other nations are. Here we 
have our own government. Here we are satisfied," It was 
this that filled me with astonishment and pleasure, and that 



Ottoman and Persian Misrule 45 

worked my conversion from being an idle onlooker at the mis- 
fortunes of the Eastern world into one filled with zeal for 
the extension of those same blessings of liberty to the other na- 
tions held in bondage. Our journey back to the civilized but 
less happy world of Irak and Southern Persia, which we visited 
in turn in the following spring, only confirmed and intensified 
my conviction. How wretched a contrast indeed to Nejd were 
the lands of the Lower Euphrates, inhabited by the same Arab 
race, but a race demoralized, impoverished, and brutalized by 
Ottoman rule! How still more wretched Persian Arabistanl 
I cast about in my mind for some means of restoring them to 
their lost dignity, their lost prosperity and self-respect, and, 
for a moment, I saw in England's protection, if it could 
be given, a possible road for them to salvation. It was 
with ideas of this sort taking shape and substance in my mind 
that, after a most difficult land journey from Bagdad to Bushire 
on the Persian Gulf and thence by sea to Kurrachi, I found 
myself at last in India, where experiences of another kind were 
awaiting me and a new lesson in the economy of Eastern things. 
My reason for going on to India, after the severe journey we 
had just made, was that on our arrival at Bushire we had found 
letters awaiting us from Lord Lytton, who had for many years 
been my most intimate friend, inviting us to pay him a visit 
at Simla. Lytton, of whose endearing personal qualities I 
need here say nothing, for I have already paid that tribute 
to his beloved memory, had been like myself in the diplomatic 
service, and I had served with him at Lisbon in 1865, and we 
had written poetry and lived together in an intimacy which had 
been since continued. Now in 1879 ^e had been a little over 
two years Viceroy in India, and at the time we arrived at Simla 
was just bringing his first Afghan campaign to a successful con- 
clusion, and he signed the Treaty of Gandamak in the first 
month of our staying with him. Lytton, who was a man of very 
superstitious temperament, though a rationalist in his religious 
beliefs, spent much of his spare time during the war, hard 
worker though he was, in making fire-balloons which he launched 
at intervals, arguing from their quick or slow ascensions good 
or bad fortune to his army. Not that he allowed such results 
to decide his action, for he was a steady worker and sound 
reasoner, but it soothed hi§ nerves, which were always highly 



46 Lord Lytton's Ideas about Arabia 

strung, to have these little intimations of a supernatural kind 
in which he persuaded himself half to believe. He connected 
my coming to Simla with the good turn the war had taken, 
and looked upon me as a fortunate influence as long as I was 
with him. He made me the confidant of all his thoughts, and 
from him I learned many interesting things in the region of 
high poUtics which I need not here particularize, though some 
of them will be found embodied in this memoir. With my 
Arabian ideas, as a man of romance and a poet, he at once 
professed his sympathy, and gave instructions to Sir Alfred 
Lyall, who was then his Foreign Secretary, to talk the matter 
over with me and give me all possible information. 

The Indian Government was at that time not at all disinclined 
to make a forward movement in the Persian Gulf. There had 
been for many years past a kind of protectorate exercised by the 
Indian Navy of the Arabian seaports, a protectorate which, be- 
ing rigidly restricted to the prevention of piracy and quarrels 
between the tribes at sea without any attempt at Interfering 
with them on shore, had been wholly beneficent, and the recent 
assertion of the Ottoman claim to sovereignty over them was 
resented at Calcutta. The Sultan Abdul Hamid too had 
already begun to alarm our authorities by his Pan-Islamic 
propaganda, which It was thought was affecting the loyalty of 
the Indian Mohammedans. Ideas, therefore, of Arab in- 
dependence were agreeable to the official view, and Sir Alfred 
Lyall reported well of mine to Lytton, so well that there was 
a plan half agreed to between us that I should return the fol- 
lowing winter to Nejd and should be the bearer of a com- 
plimentary message from the Viceroy of Ibn Rashid. I am 
glad now, with my better knowledge of the ways of the Indian 
Government, that this proposal led to no practical result. I 
see plainly that It would have placed me in a false position, and 
that with the best will in the world to help the Arabs and serve 
the cause of freedom I might have made myself unconsciously 
the Instrument of a policy tending to their subjugation. It 
Is one of the evils of the English Imperial system that it cannot 
meddle anywhere among free people, even with quite innocent 
Intentions, without in the end doing evil. There are too many 
selfish Interests always at work not to turn the best beginnings 
into ill endings, 



My Ideas about Arabia 47 

These matters, however, were not the only ones I discussed 
with Lytton and his subordinates. Sir John Strachey, his 
finance minister, put me through a course of Instruction on 
Indian finance and Indian economics, the methods of deahng 
with famines, the land revenue, the currency, the salt tax, and 
the other large questions then under discussion — Strachey being 
the chief official advocate of what was called the forward policy 
in public expenditure — and with the unexpected result that my 
faith, up to that moment strong In the honesty of the Indian 
Government, as the faithful guardian of native interests, was 
rudely shaken. The following extracts from letters written 
by me at the time from Simla will show how this short glimpse 
of India at headquarters was affecting me : "I am dis- 
appointed," I wrote, "with India, which seems just as Ill-gov- 
erned as the rest of Asia, only with good Intentions Instead 
of bad ones or none at all. There Is just the same heavy 
taxation, government by foreign officials, and waste of money 
one sees In Turkey, only, let us hope, the officials are fools 
instead of knaves. The result is the same, and I don't see 
much difference between making the starving Hindoos pay for 
a cathedral at Calcutta and taxing Bulgarians for a palace on 
the Bosphorus. Want eats up these great Empires in their 
centralized governments, and the only way to make them pros- 
per would be to split them up and let the pieces govern them- 
selves." Also to another friend, Harry Brand, Radical Mem- 
ber of Parliament, now Lord Hampden, "The natives, as they 
call them, are a race of slaves, frightened, unhappy, and terribly 
thin. Though a good Conservative and a member of the 
Carlton Club I own to being shocked at the Egyptian bondage 
In which they are held, and my faith In British institutions and 
the blessings of British rule have received a severe blow. I 
have been studying the mysteries of Indian finance under the 
'best masters,' Government secretaries, commissioners, and the 
rest, and have come to the conclusion that If we go on develop- 
ing the country at the present rate the Inhabitants will have, 
sooner or later, to resort to cannibalism, for there will be noth- 
ing but each other left to eat. I do not clearly understand why 
we English take their money from these starving Hindoos to 
make railroads for them which they don't want, and turnpike 



48 Cavagnari 

roads and jails and lunatic asylums and memorial buildings to 
Sir Bartle Frere, and why we insist upon their feeding out of 
their wretched handfulls of rice immense armies of policemen 
and magistrates and engineers.. They want none of these 
things, and they want their rice very badly, as anybody can see 
by looking at their ribs. As to the debt they have been saddled 
with, I think it would be honester to repudiate it, at least as a 
Debt on India. I never could see the moral obligation govern- 
ments acknowledge of taxing people for the debts they, and not 
the people, have incurred. All public debts, even in a self- 
governing country, are more or less dishonest, but in a foreign 
despotism like India they are a mere swindle." 

On the whole, this brief visit to India at headquarters had 
considerable influence with me in the shaping of my ideas on 
the larger questions of Imperial policy, and giving them the 
direction they afterwards took. I still believed, but with fail- 
ing faith, in the good intentions, if no longer in the good results, 
of our Eastern rule, and I thought it could be improved and 
that the people at home would insist upon its being improved if 
they only knew. 

One of my last recollections of my two months' stay with 
Lytton at Peterhoff, as the Viceregal residence was then called 
at Simla, was of a dinner at which I sat next to Cavagnari the 
evening before he set out on his fatal mission to Kabul. He 
was an interesting man, the grandson, so he told me, of a 
Venetian merchant who, when the French Republican army 
occupied Venice, lent a large sum of money to Bonaparte, which 
was never repaid. The Emperor, however, rewarded him by 
making his son his private secretary, who became a devoted 
adherent of the Imperial family. Lewis Napoleon Cavagnari, 
the grandson, was also a strong Bonapartist, and believed him- 
self, on account of his name, to have before him a very high 
destiny. He had faith in his "star," and I can testify that in 
his talk to me that night — and it was long and intimate — the 
last thing he seemed to think of was failure or danger in his 
mission. Yet only a few days before he must have had an 
admonition in the tragic news, of which we also talked, of the 
Prince Imperial's death in South Africa. When we parted it 
was with an engagement on my part and on my wife's that we 
would go in the autumn to visit him at Kabul. "You must not 



Ismail is Deposed 49 

come, however," he said, "before the autumn, because I shall 
not have got the Residency comfortable or fit to receive ladies." 
Of any more dangerous reason he gave us no kind of hint. 

Another acquaintance at that time with whom a tragic history 
is connected was Colley, then Lytton's military secretary, who 
the year following was to die on Majuba Hill. Lytton had the 
highest possible opinion of his military talents, and between 
them they had in large measure directed the Afghan campaign 
from Simla. His fault was, I think, too great self-confidence 
and too much ambition. He occupied Majuba because he 
could not bear to let the campaign end without gaining some 
personal success. Melgund again, who is now Lord Minto, 
Pole-Carew, and Brabazon, Lytton's aides-de-camp, were all 
three, with Lord Ralph Kerr, among our friends of that time, 
and Plowden and Batten, the husbands of their two fair wives. 
We made the voyage hack from Bombay in Melgund's company 
and that of Major Jack Napier, leaving India on the 12th of 
July in full monsoon and arriving at Suez on the 25th, and on 
the same day by train to Alexandria. 

I think it was at Aden, as we passed it to the Red Sea, that 
we learned the great news of the day in Egypt, the deposition 
of the Khedive Ismail, a subject to us of great rejoicing, and 
no sooner had we arrived at Alexandria than I learned the full 
details of his share in the affair from that other intimate friend 
of my diplomatic days, Frank Lascelles, whom I found acting 
Consul-General at the British Agency. What he told me does 
not differ much from the account of it officially published, and 
I need not repeat it here. What, however, is not generally 
known is the part played in it by the Rothschilds, which 
Lascelles did not at that time know but which I heard later 
from Wilson. Wilson, indeed, was able to boast that through 
these he had had his full revenge. On his return, he told me, 
from Egypt, crestfallen and abandoned by his own Government, 
he had gone straight to the Rothschilds at Paris and had rep- 
resented to them the danger their money was running from 
the turn affairs had taken at Cairo and Alexandria. The 
Khedive intended to repudiate his whole debt and to shelter 
himself in doing so by proclaiming Constitutional government 
in Egypt. If they did not prevent this, all would be lost. He 
thus succeeded in alarming the Rothschilds and in getting them 



50 Accession of Tewfik 

to use the immense political influence they possessed in favour 
of active intervention. At first, however, they had pulled the 
strings both at Downing Street and on the Quai d'Orsay in vain. 
The English Government was no longer in an intervening mood, 
trouble having broken out for them in South Africa; and at 
Paris, too, there was an equal unwillingness. In despair for 
their millions the Rothschilds then made supplication at Berlin 
to Bismarck, who ever since his Frankfort days had extended a 
certain contemptuous protection to the great Hebrew house, 
and not in vain. The French and English Governments were 
given to understand by the then all-powerful Chancellor that if 
they were unable to intervene effectively in Egypt in the bond- 
holders' interests the German Government would make their 
cause its own. This settled the matter, and it was agreed that, 
as the least violent form of intervention, the Sultan should be 
applied to to depose his too recalcitrant vassal. To the last 
moment Ismail refused to believe that the Porte, on which he 
had lavished so many millions and was still appealing cash in 
hand — for he had hidden treasures — would desert him. The 
pressure from Europe was too great. Wilson claims to have 
had the question of Ismail's successor submitted to him as be- 
tween Halim, whom the Sultan much preferred, and Tewfik, 
and to have decided in favor of the latter as being known to 
him to be of weak character and so the more convenient political 
instrument. But be that as it may, the fatal telegram was 
despatched conveying to Ismail the news of his fall, and that his 
Viceregal functions had passed away from him to his son. It 
had been Lascelles' disagreeable duty to convey the news to 
the old tyrant of eighteen irresponsible and ruinous years. 
True to his rapacious habit, his last act had been to deplete the 
treasury of its current account and to gather together all the 
valuables he could anywhere lay hands on, and so retire to his 
yacht, the "Mahroussa," with a final spoil of his Egyptian sub- 
jects amounting, it is said, to three millions sterling. Nobody 
had cared to hinder him or inquire, or bid him stay even for 
an hour. 



CHAPTER IV 

ENGLISH POLITICS IN 1880 

Cavagnarl's tragical death at Kabul, which took place before 
the summer of 1879 was over, a disaster which involved Lytton 
in a new war and endless political trouble, effectually ended any 
projects we had made of fresh travel for that year, either in 
Afghanistan or Arabia. I spent, therefore, a full twelve 
months in England, the busiest as yet in some ways of my life. 
Up to that date, though I was now in my fortieth year, I had 
not only taken no public part in politics, but I had never so 
much as made a speech to an audience or written an article for 
a review, or a letter to a newspaper. Constitutionally shy in 
early life I had shrunk from publicity in any shape, and the 
diplomatic training I had had had only aggravated my repug- 
nance to being en evidence. Diplomacy, whether it has or has 
not anything to hide, always affects secrecy and entertains a 
distrust of public speaking and an extreme jealousy of the in- 
discretions of the Press. Now, however, having persuaded my- 
self that I had a mission in the Oriental world, however vague 
and ill defined, I began to talk and write, and even overcame 
my timidity to the extent of appearing once or twice upon a 
platform. The first occasion on which I ever thus spoke was 
at a meeting of the British Association at Sheffield on the 22nd 
of August, to which I was invited as a distinguished traveller 
in the company of M. Serpa Pinto, M. de Brazza, and Captain 
Cameron, all of African fame, and where I opposed Cameron's 
advocacy of a Euphrates Valley Railroad. I was able to speak 
on this matter with more authority than he, for, though he had 
gone out with much beating of drums the year before to explore 
the route, he had turned back from the difficult part of it — that 
which lay between Bagdad and Bushire — while we had made 
the whole route from sea to sea; and I followed up my opposi- 

51 



^2 The Midlothian Campaign 

tion in an article on the same subject, the first I ever wrote, in 
the "Fortnightly Review." John Morley was at that time 
editor of the "Fortnightly," and I had an introduction to him 
from Lytton, and managed to interest him in my Eastern ideas. 
Both these little ventures with speech and pen brought me credit 
and encouraged me to do more in the direction of what was 
now my propaganda. I was busy too with poetry; and, again, 
I had my wife's book of travels, "A Pilgrimage to Nejd," to 
arrange and edit. The multiplied work occupied me fully all 
the winter. 

With home politics I troubled myself not at all, though it 
was a time of crisis, and Gladstone, with the General Election 
of 1880 at hand, was in the full fervour of his Midlothian 
preaching. My sympathies, as far as England was concerned, 
were still rather with the Tories, and on Oriental questions I 
looked upon Gladstone, little as I loved the Turks, as an igno- 
ramus and fanatic. My personal friends, with the exception of 
two or three, Harry Brand and Eddy Hamilton, were all 
Tories, and my love for Lytton covered in my eyes the worst 
of Disraeli's Imperial sins. I clung to the thought that Eng- 
land in the East might yet, through the Cyprus Convention 
properly interpreted, be made an instrument for good, and I 
was swayed backwards and forwards in regard to her Imperial 
position by opposing hopes and fears. It was not till I had 
cleared my thoughts by putting them into print that I gradually 
came to any settled plan. One great pre-occupation, too, I had 
that year in the establishment of my stud of Arab horses at 
Crabbet, about which I was in constant correspondence with the 
world of sport, including a public one with the Jockey Club. 
Curiously enough, it was in connection with my views on horse- 
flesh that I first came into epistolary communication with Mr. 
Gladstone. His well-known hobby about ancient Greece had 
made him curious to learn my opinion about the horses of 
antiquity, and especially the probable breeding of those of 
Greece and Troy; and a message was conveyed to me through 
Mr. Knowles, the editor of the "Nineteenth Century Review," 
asking a memorandum on their genealogy. This, and the 
accident of his naming Edward Hamilton, with whom I was 
intimate, his private secretary when he took office in April in 



Lord Stratford de Redclife 53 

succession to Disraeli, were the links which led to our cor- 
respondence later on Egyptian affairs. 

A few extracts from a fragmentary journal I began to keep 
in 1880 will show the chaos of ideas, literary, social, and poHt- 
ical in which during that year, I lived.. The extracts are only 
such as have some relation to Eastern affairs, and I find them 
embedded in a mass of notes recording events of private and 
ephemeral interest no longer of any value. The first gives a 
picture of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, for so many years our 
Ambassador at Constantinople, and who was now living in 
retirement and extreme old age with his two daughters on the 
borders of Kent and Sussex: 

''March, 1880. — A visit to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at 
Frant. Lord Stratford has given me a paper on reforms for 
Turkey, which he is thinking of sending to the 'Times,' and I 
read it in bed. It is an old man's work, rambling and vague, 
with hardly an occasional touch of vigour. Old men should 
write nothing but their recollections, and Lord S. is ninety-four. 
A wonderful old man, nevertheless, with a countenance of 
extreme benignity, a complexion of milk and rose leaves, clear 
blue eyes, and hair as white as snow. Though rather deaf, 
he still talks well. I wrote him in return a memorandum with 
my ideas for Asiatic Turkey, and later spent the morning with 
him listening to his old-world recollections. He was Charge 
d'Af aires at Constantinople when Byron passed through on his 
Childe Harold journey, and had ridden with him every day for 
six weeks. Byron had been very agreeable, and there was noth- 
ing at that time scabreux in his conversation. He had also (be- 
fore that) in 1805 met him at Lord's Cricket Ground at the 
Eton and Harrow match, both of them playing in the elevens 
on opposite sides. Byron played cricket 'as well as could be 
expected considering his infirmity.' He, Lord S., had never 
been willing to think there had ever been anything really wrong 
between B. and Lady Caroline Lamb.. The impression Lord 
S. gives me is one of extreme kindness, gentleness, and benig- 
nity, quite foreign to his reputation. I had rather sit listening 
to these old-world confessions than to the talk of the prettiest 
woman in London." 

"March 16. — Breakfasted with Rivers Wilson and discussed 



54 General Gordon 

Colonel Gordon's character. All the world is agreed about 
his being a very wonderful man. He has ruled the Soudan for 
four years single-handed, and has repressed the slave trade 
completely. Now he comes home to England and nothing is 
done for him. Neither Lord Beaconsfield nor any of the Min- 
isters will so much as see him. He made a mistake at starting 
(in his relations with them). Passing through Paris (on his 
way home) he called on Lord Lyons (at the Embassy), and 
begged him to see to the appointment of a European successor 
to himself in the Soudan, and in the course of conversation held 
out the threat that, if the English Government would not do 
this, he would go to the French Government. Whereupon a 
correspondence ensued with Lord Lyons, in which Gordon 
wrote a last very intemperate letter ending in these words: 'I 
have one comfort in thinking that in ten or fifteen years' time 
it will matter little to either of us. A black box, six feet six 
by three feet wide, will then contain all that is left of Ambas- 
sador, or Cabinet Minister, or of your humble and obedient 
servant.' This has stamped him (in official eyes) as a mad- 
man. Now he has left Europe, shaking the dust off his feet, 
for Zanzibar." 

This little anecdote is very characteristic of Gordon and is 
in harmony with much of his correspondence, four years later, 
with Sir Evelyn Baring.. Our officials always detested him, for 
he habitually violated the rules of their diplomacy and the 
conventions of their official intercourse. Some thought him 
mad, others that he drank, and others again that he was a reli- 
gious fanatic who, when he was in doubt between two courses, 
consulted his Bible for an oracle, or as a last solution "spun a 
coin." Not one of them understood or trusted him. At the 
moment of which I am writing, the early spring of 1880, he 
was very angry with the English Government for the part it 
had taken in deposing Ismail. Gordon for some reason or 
other liked Ismail, and hated his successor Tewfik, and 
as soon as he learned at Khartoum what had happened, he 
had thrown up his Governorship, and was now especially angry 
because a Turkish pasha, and not a European, had been 
appointed in his place. Gordon was a man of genius, with 
many noble qualities, but he was also a bundle of contradictions, 
and the officials were probably right when they looked upon 



Cardinal Manning 55 

him as not being at all times quite of a sound mind. This, as 
will be seen, was the official opinion even at the very moment 
of his being charged at the Foreign Office with his last mission 
to Khartoum. 

The following, too, of the same date, i6th March, is interest- 
ing: "Called on Cardinal Manning. Our conversation was 
on politics. He asked me which way I should vote at the 
Elections. I said, 'I should vote only on one consideration, a 
£5 note,' Cardinal: 'You mean you will not vote at all?' /: 
'I can get up no interest in these things. I look upon European 
civilization as doomed to perish, and all politics as an expedient 
which cannot materially delay or hasten the end.' Cardinal: 
'I take the same view, though probably on different grounds. 
Europe is rejecting Christianity, and with it the reign of moral 
law. The reign of force is now beginning again, as in the 
earliest ages, and bloodshed and ruin must be the result. Per- 
haps on the ruins the Church may again build up something 
new.' Talking of Asia, he said that Ralph Kerr had told him 
that the inhabitants of India attributed the mildness of our rule 
to fear. They respect the Russians because they govern by 
military law. /: 'The Russians are Asiatics. They govern in 
the Asiatic way — by fraud if possible — if not, by force. This 
Asiatics understand.' Cardinal: 'The Russians, as you say, are 
Asiatics; and I will tell you more: their Nihilists are Buddhists. 
Nihilism is a product not of the West, but of the East.' " 

The General Elections, it must be remembered, of 1880 were 
fought to a very large extent on questions of Eastern policy. 
Gladstone in his Midlothian campaign had attacked with 
tremendous violence the whole of Disraeli's scheme of imperial 
expansion, and had denounced as grossly immoral his interven- 
tion at Constantinople and Berlin in favour of the Turks, his 
acquisition of Cyprus, his purchase of the Suez Canal shares, 
and his aggression on Egypt — as also Lytton's two Afghan 
campaigns and the Boer War still raging in South Africa. 
With regard to Egypt, Gladstone had as long before as the 
year 1877 made known his views in print, and in an article in 
the August number of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of 
that year, "Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East," 
had declared himself in the clearest and strongest terms opposed 
to the undertaking by England of any form of responsibility 



^6 Gladstone's Views on Egypt 

on the Nile. This article is so remarkable and so wonderfully- 
prescient of evils he was himself destined to inflict upon Egypt 
that it deserves quoting. He objects in it to such aggression 
on 'various grounds: first, as increasing England's burden of 
Eastern rule, already too great; secondly, because extensions 
of imperial rule can only be effected by immoral means; thirdly, 
as regarded Egypt, that the pretence of protecting the route to 
India by occupying the Nile Valley was a false one, the route 
by the Cape of Good Hope being England's true line of 
communication; and, fourthly, because intervention of any kind, 
whether on the Suez Canal or at Cairo, must inevitably lead to 
farther and farther adventures in Africa. "Our first site in 
Egypt," he writes, "be it by larceny or be it by emption, will 
be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire that will 
grow and grow till another Victoria and another Albert, titles 
of the lake sources of the White Nile, will come within our 
borders, and till we finally join hands across the Equator with 
Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and 
the Orange 'River on the south or of Abyssinia or Zanzibar 
to be swallowed by way of viaticum on our journey — and then, 
with a great empire in each of the four quarters of the world 
... we may be territorially content but less than ever at our 
ease." He had made also a plea for the continuation of 
Mohammedan self-government at Cairo. "The susceptibilities 
which we might offend in Egypt," he says, "are rational and 
just. For very many centuries she has been inhabited by a 
Mohammedan community. That community has always been 
governed by Mohammedan influences and powers. During a 
portion of the period it had Sultans of its own. Of late, while 
politically attached to Constantinople, it has been practically 
governed from within, a happy incident in the condition of any 
country and one which we should be slow to change. The 
grievances of the people are indeed great, but there is no proof 
whatever that they are incurable. Mohammedanism now 
appears in the light of experience to be radically incapable of 
establishing a good or tolerable government over civilized and 
Christian races; but what proof have we that in the case of a 
Mohammedan community, where there are no adverse complica- 
tions of blood or religion, or tradition or speech, the ends of 
political society, as they understand them, may not be passably 



General Election of 1880 57 

obtained." Lastly, he had foreseen the quarrel which an 
attempt by England to seize Egypt would create with France: 
"My belief is that the day which witnesses our occupation of 
Egypt will bid a long farewell to all cordiality of political rela- 
tions between France and England. There might be no imme- 
diate quarrel, no exterior manifestation, but a silent, rankling 
grudge there would be like the now extinguished grudge of 
America during the Civil War, which awaited the opportunity 
of some embarrassment on our side and on hers of returning 
peace and leisure from weightier matters. Nations have long 
memories." He had ended his article by a solemn warning and 
an appeal to the hand of the Most High to confound the in- 
trigues of Cabinets, and secure the great emancipation of the 
East. "No such deliverance," he concludes, "has for centuries 
blessed the earth. We of this country (England) may feel 
with grief and pain that we have done nothing to promote It. 
Whatever happens, may nothing still worse than this lie at our 
door. Let us hope . , . that to abdicate duty we may not 
have to add a chapter of perpetrated wrong." 

With these noble declarations, reiterated In a score of 
speeches during the Election campaign of 1880, I could not but 
be In sympathy, had it been possible to take them as quite 
sincere or as representing a policy intended by the Liberal Party 
to be carried out when they should be in office. But Gladstone 
did not at that time Inspire me with any confidence, and be- 
tween Whigs and Tories there seemed to me to be but little 
difference. 

"March 20. — John Pollen (then private secretary to Lord 
Ripon) dined with us. We talked of the Elections and agreed 
there was not much to choose between Whigs and Tories. I 
shall not vote. Though Lord Salisbury's policy is less 
contemptible than Lord Granville's or Gladstone's, It is coquet- 
ting too much with the Germans to please me. To bring Ger- 
many down to Contantlnople would be a greater misfortune 
than anything Russia can accomplish." 

"April 6. — Paris (the Elections being over and having 
resulted in a large Liberal majority) . Godfrey Webb and I 
breakfasted with Bitters (my cousin Francis Gore Currie), and 
I then went to the Embassy. Sheffield (Lord Lyon's private 
secretary) very important about the new Liberal Government — 



5 8 Madame de Novikof 

what he said to Hartlngton, and what Granville said to him. 
Though I abstain from politics, I confess I think the Gladsto- 
nian triumph a great misfortune. They are so strong now that 
we shall have all sorts of experiments played with our British 
Constitution. The game laws, the land laws, and all the 
palladiums will be dismantled. Our policy in Asia will suffer. 
The Whigs know nothing of the East and will be afraid to 
reverse the Tory policy, and afraid to carry it logically out. 
They will try to reform Turkey, and, finding it impossible, will 
lose their temper and very likely drift into a war. Personally 
the change is annoying to me, as now Lytton will resign with 
the Ministry and we shall be baulked of our Indian visit next 
winter. But all these things are trifles in the march of history." 

"April 9. — (Still at Paris.) A letter from Anne full of 
politics. . . . 'Hartington is to be Premier, Goschen Ad- 
miralty, and Gladstone finance . . . nothing in the foreign 
policy will be changed! Cyprus kept, Russia thwarted, and 
Turkey administered from Gallipoli. . . . Lord Ripon does 
not know his own place, if any. I hear Mme. de Novikoff ^ 
still described as the Egeria of Gladstone.' . . . Dined with 
Adams (first secretary of the Paris Embassy) and met there 
Rivers Wilson, who goes to-morrow to Egypt with Dicey, and 
Arthur SuUivan the composer — all pleasant company." (This 
was Wilson's final mission in which he arranged the law of 
liquidation.) 

''April 26. — Home to England, where Gladstone is the talk 
of the hour. He has taken office (as Prime Minister) and has 
surrounded himself with ineptitudes, Childers, Bright, Gran- 
ville ! Hartington, who is a good second-rate man, takes the 
India Oflice and Ripon goes to India. This last arrangement 
is a secret." 

Lord Ripon's appointment to India as Viceroy was the only 
quite sincere attempt made in foreign policy by Gladstone to 
carry out in office what he had preached when in opposition. 

1 Madame de Novikoff, a very charming woman, who was in the confidence of the 
Russian Government, had come to England for the first time a little before this 
date, her very earliest English visit being paid to us at Crabbet. She had 
brought an introduction to us from Madame de Lagrene, a Russian friend of ours 
living in Paris, and as yet knew no one. She stayed with us a week, but find- 
ing me unsympathetic with her anti-Islamic views, went on and soon after made 
a political capture of Mr. Gladstone. 



Lord Ripon in India 59 

Ripon was a thoroughly honest man, of no very brilliant parts 
but straightforward and in earnest. He took seriously the mis- 
sion with which he was entrusted by the new Government of 
making and keeping the peace on the Indian frontiers, and of 
inaugurating a new policy having for its object to carry out 
the Queen's proclamation of self-government among the natives. 
To the astonishment, and indeed scandal, of the official world, 
he took with him as his private secretary Gordon, whom all 
looked upon as mad — than which no better proof could have 
been given of his bona fides towards Native India. Gordon, 
however, was not of the stuff of which private secretaries, even 
with a chief like Ripon, are made, and he had hardly landed at 
Bombay before he resigned. I do not think that Ripon was in 
fault in this, but rather Gordon's restless chafing against all 
rules and conventions. I shall have later to describe Ripon's 
viceroyalty when I come to my second Indian journey in 1884. 
Now it will be enough to say that, if it achieved comparatively 
little, It was through the pusillanimity of the Ministry at home 
rather than his own. He valiantly went on in the course traced 
out for him at the start, but like boys who sometimes in a race, 
to make a fool of their companion who is in front of them, hang 
back and stop, he found out to his confusion after a while that 
he had been running alone and that the Ministers who had 
changed their minds without letting him know had long been 
laughing at him for his persistence. It must have been a bitter 
moment for him when he, too, had to give in. The other 
appointments made were all, as far as the highest offices went, 
given by Gladstone to the Whigs. Lord Granville — the mat- 
ter which interested me most — got the Foreign Office, an 
amiable old nobleman with a good knowledge of French, but 
very deaf and very idle, whose diplomacy was of the old 
procrastinating school of never doing today what could possibly 
be put off till to-morrow, or, as he himself was fond of putting 
it, of "dawdling matters out" and leaving them to right them- 
selves alone. Of such a Minister nothing in the way of a new 
policy could be expected, and none was attempted either in 
Turkey, or Egypt, or elsewhere. The Cyprus Convention was 
neither repudiated nor turned to account for any good purpose, 
and beyond a little sham pressure put upon the Sultan in the 
matter of Montenegro and the Greek frontier, things were left 



6o Layard's Secret Despatch 

precisely as they were. The only change made was that 
Layard, the author of the Convention, was recalled from 
Constantinople and Goschen appointed in his place, the same 
Goschen who had made the leonine arrangement for the bond- 
holders in Egypt three years before, his own family firm of 
Goschen and Friihling being one of them. The only act of the 
new Foreign Secretary which showed that he remembered Mr. 
Gladstone's denunciations of the Turks was that, in order to 
prove that Gladstone had been right and Disraeli and Salisbury 
wrong about them, he in defiance of the ordinary rule in such 
matters at the Foreign Office published a secret despatch of 
Layard's which contradicted everything the Ambassador had 
written about the situation at Constantinople in his public 
despatches. In this unfortunate document he had laid bare 
the secret vices and weaknesses of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, his 
personal cowardice especially being insisted on and emphasized 
with details then unknown to the world, but now notorious, of 
his system of spy-government. Its publication was a gross act 
of treachery to Layard, and was, moreover, an act of folly 
from the effects of which our diplomacy at Constantinople has 
not yet recovered.^ Layard had been, so to say, Abdul Hamid's 
bosom friend and had received from him favours of a kind 
not usually accorded to European Envoys. The Sultan had 
shown himself to Layard as to a comrade on whom he could 
rely, and the disclosure of what he considered Layard's treach- 
ery alienated for ever his goodwill from England. 

Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the unpromising position 
at the Foreign Office, I was resolved in the interests of my 
propaganda to make a bid for sympathy for my plans with the 
new Prime Minister. I was encouraged to this by the appoint- 
ment he had made on taking office of one of my most intimate 
friends, Eddy Hamilton (now Sir Edward Hamilton, K.C.B.), 
to be his private secretary, from whom I learned that, what- 
ever might be the public exigencies of the moment abroad, Mr. 
Gladstone's sympathies with Oriental liberty were no whit 
abated. From Hamilton I had no secrets as to my own views 
and plans, and all that he thought necessary to win his master 
to them was that I should give them a wider publicity in print. 
There were other channels, too, through which it was judged 



My Eastern Propaganda 6i 

that Gladstone might be Influenced, and some of these are 
referred to in my journal. 

"June 12. — ^Hamilton Aide took me to call upon Mrs. L, 
who lives in a big house in M . . . Square, a plump, good- 
natured Irishwoman of fifty, impulsive, talkative, but without 
trace either of beauty or anything else. She is one of Glad- 
stone's Egerias, and our visit was partly diplomatic, as I want 
to indoctrinate her with my Arabian ideas, and through her 
the Prime Minister. She is already enthusiastic about such 
Arabs as she has seen, and affects a serious interest in the East. 
She read us with much spirit a drama she had been writing 
about Herod, Cleopatra, and Julius Caesar — sad stuff, which 
she assured us Gladstone admired exceedingly. 

"RoUand, John Pollen and Lawrence Oliphant to dinner. 
The last a very attractive man. He has just come back from 
Constantinople, where he has been trying to get a concession 
from the Sultan for lands beyond Jordan to be colonized by 
the children of Israel." 

"June 22. — The Plowdens to dinner and Eddy Hamilton, 
who is now Gladstone's private secretary. Plowden goes to 
Bagdad to-morrow as Resident. I indoctrinated him and Eddy 
on the Eastern question." 

"June 26. Lord Calthorpe, Percy Wyndham, and Captain 
Levitt joined us at Crabbet, and we had a show of horses. 
Lord C. tells me he has shown my letter about Arab horse- 
racing to several members of the Jockey Club, and he will bring 
the matter forward at one of the club meetings next month; so 
that it is to be hoped we shall succeed. If I can introduce a 
pure Arabian breed of horses into England and help to see 
Arabia free of the Turks, I shall not have quite lived in vain. 
My fourth letter to the 'Spectator' (on the poHtics of Central 
Arabia) has appeared to-day, and my article In the 'Fortnightly' 
('The Sultan's Heirs in Asia') is advertised. . . . Later to the 
i Admiralty, where Lord Northbrook complimented me on my 
letters (they were the first I had ever written to a newspaper). 
Sir Garnet Wolseley was there, a brisk little jerky man, whom 
it is difficult to accept as a great general. I reminded him of 
our visit to Cyprus. He said, 'I believe Lady Anne is writing 
a book.' 'Yes, but we have said nothing about Cyprus in it.' 



62 The Sultan's Heirs in Asia 

'Oh, you didn't stay long enough.' 'We thought It best to say 
nothing." 

The article here spoken of, "The Sultan's Heirs in Asia," 
was, as I have said, a bid for Gladstone's serious attention to 
my ideas, and through Hamilton's help, who brought it under 
his notice, it was completely successful, though characteristically 
the feature of it which interested him most was that which has 
proved least politically practical, and was to me the least 
important, namely, the future of the Armenian provinces as an 
independent state. The idea I propounded was, that in the 
same way as a large portion of European Turkey had been 
given its independence, so in the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
the Asiatic provinces should also be encouraged to form them- 
selves into independent states, according to their prevailing 
nationalities; and I appealed by name to Mr. Gladstone to make 
good his words, so freely and so recently uttered in favour of 
Eastern liberty, by making use of the instrument devised by 
his predecessors in office, the Cyprus Convention, not for the 
selfish purposes of English imperialism, but for the good of 
the peoples of the East. Its publication in the July number 
of the "Fortnightly" led to my being Invited to Downing Street, 
where I had an opportunity of pressing my views personally 
on the Prime Minister. It will be seen that I was not on that 
first occasion much Impressed by him; but I was encouraged 
to develop my Ideas, and from that time my opinion, conveyed 
to him generally through Hamilton, was of some account with 
Gladstone In regard to Eastern affairs. 

"June 27. — Called on A. with whom I found Queensberry. 
He began at once to expound to us his religious doctrines, talk- 
ing In an excited, earnest way. These doctrines seem to me 
mere Comtlsm. There is some sort of Supreme Being, not a 
personal God, and a conscience by which man is guided in his 
search of perfection. The principle doctrine, 'faith In human- 
ity,' and the principal duty, 'the perfectioning of body and soul,' 
especially body. The Marquess Is not a very lucid expounder, 
and proposed to recite us a poem instead — a poem he had 
written. While we were expecting this in came Philip Currle 
and a little old man with a long nose and very black eyes, 
Malkum Khan, the Persian Ambassador. These sat down and 
listened while Queensberry recited. The poem was in blank 



Malkum Khan 63 

verse, vague, doctrinal, fantastic, beginning with the Matter- 
horn and going on to Humanity. When he had finished the 
Oriental spoke. He said, 'Perhaps it would interest you to 
hear the story of a religion which was founded some years ago 
in Persia, and of which I was at one time the head. It will 
exemplify the manner in which religions are produced, and you 
will see that the doctrine of Humanity is one at least as conge- 
nial to Asia as to Europe. Europe, indeed, is incapable of 
inventing a real religion, one which shall take possession of 
the souls of men; as incapable as Asia is of inventing a system 
of politics. The mind of Asia is speculative, of Europe prac- 
tical. In Persia we every day produce "new Christs." We 
have "Sons of God" in every village, martyrs for their faith 
in every town. I have myself seen hundreds of Babis suffer 
death and torture for their belief in a prophet whose doctrines 
were identical with those of Jesus Christ, and who, like Him, 
was crucified. Christianity is but one of these hundred Asiatic 
preachings, brought into notice through its adoption by the 
Greek mind and given a logical form and a material complex- 
ion. If it had remained an Asiatic faith it would long ago 
have perished, as a hundred moral and mystic teachings have 
perished before and after it. When I was a young man I, too, 
as I told you, founded a religion which at one time numbered 
30,000 devotees. I was born an Armenian Christian, but I 
was brought up among Mohammedans, and my tone of thought 
is theirs. I was foster-brother to the Shah and when he came 
to the throne he made me his Prime Minister. At the age of 
twenty I was practically despotic in Persia. I saw the abuses 
of government, the decline of material prosperity in the country, 
and I was bitten with the idea of reform. I went to Europe 
and studied there the religious, social, and political systems of 
the West. I learned the spirit of the various sects of Chris- 
tendom, and the organization of the secret societies and free- 
masonries, and I conceived a plan which should incorporate 
the political wisdom of Europe with the religious wisdom of 
Asia. I knew that it was useless to attempt a remodelling of 
Persia in European forms, and I was determined to clothe my 
material reformation in a garb which my people would under- 
stand, the garb of religion. I therefore, on my return, called 
together the chief persons of Teheran, my friends, and spoke 



64 He Founds a Religious Sect 

to them in private of the need which Islam had of purer doc- 
trine. I appealed to their moral dignity and pride of birth. 
There are in Persian two words, each signifying Man — insan, 
from the Arabic, and adhem (Adam), more strictly Persian in 
derivation. The second signifies Man as a genus, a particular 
kind of animal — the first man as an intellectual and distin- 
guished being (the homo and vir of Latin). You all, I said, 
pride yourselves that you are more than adhem; you are also 
insan. And it is to enable you to justify that pretension that 
I will advise you to do this and that. They all found my rea- 
soning good, and in a short time I had got together 30,000 
followers. Under the name of a Reformation of Islam I thus 
introduced what material reforms I could. To my doctrine is 
due the telegraph, the reorganization of the administrative 
departments, and many another attempted improvement since 
gone to ruin. I had, however, no intention at the outset of 
founding a religion. The character of saint and prophet was 
forced on me by my followers. They gave me the title of 
"Holy Ghost," and the Shah that of "Reformer of Islam." I 
wrote a book, a bible of my creed, and enthusiasts maintained 
that I worked miracles. At last the Shah was alarmed at my 
power, which in truth had become superior to his own. He 
sought, in spite of our old friendship, to kill me, and my fol- 
lowers sought to kill him. For two months we both lived in 
great fear of assassination, and then we came to an explana- 
tion. I loved and revered the Shah, and I asked permission to 
travel. My followers took leave of me with tears, even the 
Mollahs kissing my feet. I went to Constantinople, thinking 
to get permission from the Sultan to reside at Bagdad, and 
I in fact went there and gained new converts from among 
the resident Persian and Bagdad Shiahs. But the Turks de- 
ceived me, and I had to leave my work unfinished. My fol- 
lowers in Persia urged me to return, but I was deterred through 
several motives; first, I feared to find my death for a religion 
in which I did not believe, secondly, my health broke down, 
and, thirdly, I had married a wife. I wrote to the Shah, who 
replied, offering me any appointment I would, so I would re- 
main abroad; and I accepted the position of Ambassador-Gen- 
eral to all the Courts of Europe.' It was strange to hear this 
little old man, in European clothes and talking very good French, 



New Ideas about Islam 65 

recounting a tale so purely Oriental. I walked home with him 
afterwards (he lived on the other side of Hyde Park), and he 
detailed to me his ideas about the East and West, both of 
which he knows, and knows thoroughly. I left him with the 
impression that he was the most remarkable man I had ever 
met, and more convinced than ever of the superior intelligence 
of the Eastern mind. Who is there in Europe that could have 
made one thus feel like a child? 

This chance meeting, at a fine lady's house in Belgravia in 
the middle of the London season, affected me profoundly, and 
to a certain extent revolutionized my ideas. I trace to it, and 
to other talks which I had later with this singular personage, 
the conviction which rapidly overcame me that in all my thought 
of freeing and reforming the East I had begun at the wrong 
end, and that, if I was to effect anything either for the Arabs or 
for any other of the Moslem peoples subject to the Turks, I 
must first make myself thoroughly acquainted with their religious 
ideas. As yet I had passed among them, in spite of my political 
sympathy, as a stranger to their more serious thought; without 
religious prejudice myself of the ordinary Christian kind, I 
had learned to respect Islam, but I did not comprehend it, nor 
had I ever discussed its teachings with any one learned in its 
law or conversant with its modern thought. I saw at once 
the weakness, nay the absurdity of my position, and I resolved 
before I went any farther to devote the following winter to a 
study of at least the main features of the Mohammedan doc- 
trines as they affected Mohammedan politics. With this view 
I made my plans for the winter. My thought was to go to 
Jeddah at or about the time of the pilgrimage, and there inform 
myself as I best could, and then take any occasion that might 
offer for further action. I wished to penetrate once more into 
Arabia, if possible through Hejaz, or perhaps Yemen to Nejd. 
I had an idea that among the Wahhabis I might find a teacher 
who would give me the Arabian as opposed to the Ottoman 
view of Islam, and that I might devise with him a movement of 
reform in which I should suggest the political, he the religious 
elements. It was a sufficiently wild idea, but I entertained it 
seriously at the time, and the confession of having done so 
will explain to Egyptian readers how it came about that I took 
the line I did at Cairo a year later. 



S6 Sabunji 

I was influenced, too, at that time in London by another 
learned Oriental, one Sabunji, whose acquaintance I had made 
in the character of Arabic teacher. He, too, like Malkum 
Khan, was of Christian origin, a member of one of the Catholic 
sects of Syria, and he had even taken priest's orders and served 
the Congregation of the Propaganda at Rome; but he had 
latterly thrown off the cassock and, like the Ambassador, was 
much more in sympathy with Islam than with his own faith. 
As an Arabic scholar he was very remarkable, and he had a 
wide acquaintance with the questions, half political, half re- 
ligious, which were being discussed just then among Moham- 
medans. He had done the main work for the late Dr. Badger 
in compiling the Arabic-English Dictionary which goes by Dr. 
Badger's name, and in 1880 was carrying on in London an 
Arabic newspaper called "El Nakhleh," the Bee, in which re- 
ligious reform was preached to Mohammedans once a month, 
on the most advanced lines of modern thought. There was 
a mystery about the financing of this little journal, and the mo- 
tives prompting its issue, which I never quite fathomed. His 
own account of it was that his chief patron was the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, a very enlightened and liberal-minded ruler. But I 
was never quite satisfied with this explanation, and I have since 
had reason to believe that the funds to support it, and the 
suggestion of its politics came, in part at least, from the ex- 
Khedive Ismail. Ismail was at that time very angry with the 
Sultan for his betrayal of him to Europe, and the "Bee" was 
violent against Abdul Hamid, and denounced him especially as an 
usurper of the title of Emir el Mumenin and Caliph. I do 
not well remember whether it was from this Sabunji or from 
Malkum Khan that I first came to understand the historical 
aspect of the caliphal question and its modern aspects, but, 
opposed as I was to Ottoman rule, it struck me at once as one 
of high importance to the kind of reform I was beginning now 
to look for. There is notice in my journal of my having sent 
in a memorandum to Mr. Gladstone on the subject, and I have 
a letter from Hamilton, showing that the idea was considered 
one of importance by members of the Cabinet and generally in 
Downing Street. 

"July 3. — A tea party at A.'s, a 'collection of mystics,' old 
Holland, Dunraven, and Oliphant. The two latter and I had 



The Question of the Caliphate 67 

a conference in a back room which resulted in our agreeing to 
act in common on the Eastern question, so as to influence public 
opinion in England. We are to have a preliminary meeting at 
Dunraven's on Thursday." 

"July 8. — Called on Percy Wyndham and converted him to 
my political creed. Also received a visit on the same subject 
from Mr. Boyce, M. P. Dined with Dunraven, Oliphant, Ot- 
way, Percy Wyndham, Harry Brand, and Whittaker, editor of 
the 'Levant Herald,' at Limmer's Hotel, to arrange a course 
of action with a view to influencing public opinion in England 
respecting Asia. Nothing more definite settled than the forma- 
tion of a committee for receiving news. Later to Bryce's, 
where I met one Robertson Smith, who has been lately in the 
Hejaz." (This was the well-known professor.) " 

"July 13. — Went to a party at Mrs. Gladstone's. We ar- 
rived early, before other people had come, and I had twenty 
minutes' conversation with the great man. I detailed to him 
my ideas about the regeneration of the East, in which he seemed 
to take an interest, as far as a man can who is totally ignorant 
of the A B C of a question. His remarks struck me as the 
reverse of profound, and his questions contrasted unfavourably 
with those put to me three years ago by Lord Salisbury. A 
British steamer had been fired on by some Arabs on the Tigris, 
and he began by remarking that he feared this fact showed a 
marked antagonism towards England on the part of Arabia. 
The state of the Ottoman Empire he considered most critical. 
Probably the East had never been in a more critical state than 
now. If the Treaty of San Stefano had been carried out Turkey 
could hardly have been more critically situated than she was. 
I succeeded however, I think, in grafting him with two ideas, 
one that the Caliphate was not necessarily vested in the House 
of Othman, the other that Midhat Pasha was a fool. He has 
evidently made up his mind about nothing, and will let himself 
drift on till the smash comes." 

"July 15. — Attended a meeting of Philo-Asiatics. In the 
afternoon to Aldermaston, a fine park with a tiresome modern 
house; Sir Henry Layard doing the honours. I had a great 
prejudice against him, but find him agreeable and without pre- 
tension, considering his position. He talks well, especially of 
his travels, and he really understands the East, reminding me 



68 Sir Charles Dilke 

a little of Skene and Rolland, both fellow travellers of his in 
old days. . . . Layard's memoirs would be the most interesting 
of any man's of the present century. 'His rise from the posi- 
tion of a wandering outcast among the Kurds, almost himself 
an outlaw, to that of British Ambassador to the Porte, contains 
all the romance of human life." 

'^July 17. — An interview with Sir Charles Dilke (Under- 
Secretary of State) at the Foreign Office. I explained to him 
my idea of going to Nejd this autumn with Abdallah Ibn Saoud, 
and to my surprise he seemed to acquiesce. Although our 
conversation was not a long one, it left me with the impression 
of Dilke being a superior man. His questions were plain and to 
the point, and, once understood, he wrote the draft of a despatch 
to Goschen at Constantinople, referring me for further details 
to Tenterden (the permanent Head of the Foreign Office), and 
I am now full of the notion of going to Arabia and heading a 
movement for the restoration of the Arabian Caliphate. Peo- 
ple have been called great who have sacrificed themselves for 
smaller objects, but in this I feel the satisfaction of knowing 
it to be a really worthy cause." 

Sir Charles Dilke, who was destined to play a considerable 
part in the events of 1882 in Egypt, had in 1880 been only a 
few months at the Foreign Office. He and Chamberlain, who 
were great political friends, represented with Bright the Radi- 
cal element in the new government. Chamberlain got the Local 
Government Board and a seat in the Cabinet, and Dilke the 
Foreign Under-Secretaryship, which, with his chief. Lord Gran- 
ville, in the House of Lords and an idle man besides, was a 
position of great power Dilke knew how to take advantage of. 
Neither of the two men belonged to the class from which Minis- 
ters in England are usually chosen, but were looked upon as 
middle-class men, and I remember the disgust with which Dilke's 
appointment was received at the Foreign Office, where aristo- 
cratic pretensions are traditional among the clerks. Dilke, 
however, soon showed his mettle by the way he took his work 
in hand, and, what was even more to the purpose with them, 
by certain Gallicisms in conversation which were also a Foreign 
Office characteristic, so that in a very few weeks he found him- 
self not only tolerated but popular. The Abdallah Ibn Saoud 
referred to in my journal was a certain Abdallah Ibn Theneyyan 



/ Consult the Foreign Office 69 

Ibn Saoud, of the old princely family of Nejd, who had found 
his way to Constantinople, and had there applied to the Brit- 
ish Embassy for help to gain or regain a political position in 
his own country. I had heard of him from Currie, and had 
jumped to the conclusion that this might be the opportunity 
I sought in Arabia, and so applied to the Foreign Office to put 
me in communication with him and favour my projected journey. 
The plan, however, came to nothing, though, as has been seen, 
not altogether disapproved at the Foreign Office, for when 
the matter was referred to Lord Tenterden, the permanent 
Under-Secretary, he demurred, on the ground that the thing if 
undertaken with the cognizance of the Foreign Office would be 
liable to be regarded as a "secret mission," and such missions 
were contrary to the traditions of the Office. And so the plan 
was abandoned. Just at this time, too, the news of the dis- 
graceful defeat of the British army under Burrows at Candahar 
by the Afghans reached London, and I fancy made them doubly 
cautious in Downing Street. The defeat was a final blow to 
Lytton, and to the policy of adventure beyond the Indian fron- 
tier he had made his own, and at no time within recollection did 
the imperial fortunes of England seem so low. All the world 
was depressed by it, even I, little of a Jingo as I had become. 

''August 5. — To Portsmouth by train, having got a telegram 
to say the Lyttons are expected to-night or to-morrow. Ports- 
mouth is a strange, old-fashioned town, still without a decent inn; 
and we are at a pot-house called the 'Star and Garter.' In the 
house opposite there is a bust of Nelson, and from the windows 
one can see the 'St. Vincent' and the 'Victory.' Little as one 
may care for one's country — and Heaven knows I am no Chau- 
vin — it Is Impossible not to be touched by these relics of Eng- 
land's greatness. I never till this moment quite realized the 
decay of her fortunes since sixty years ago. What a shock it 
would be for Nelson and his companions If he could read the 
papers to-day, full of dastardly congratulations at the discovery 
that not 2,000 but only 1,000 men were lost on the Helmund, 
and at General Burrows not having positively run away; of fears 
lest England should embark single-handed on a war with Turkey, 
and an abject hope that France may think fit to see us through 
our difficulties In the East — all this, with Lytton's arrival at 
Portsmouth, Lytton who, if things go wrong with India, will 



yo Lytton's Return from India 

leave a name in history as the first of the unsuccessful Viceroys 
of the British Empress and the one most responsible for India's 
loss. All this, I say, gives one a feeling of sorrow impossible 
to describe. Yet I do not join with those who cry out on Lyt- 
ton's policy, still less on its execution. His policy was a neces- 
sary one, and its execution has been bold and successful. He 
has been conspicuous in the history of England's decay only 
because he is himself conspicuous. He could not have stemmed 
the tide of events. He went with them, guiding as he could 
but powerless to do more. England's decay rests upon causes 
far more general than any one man or party of men can be re- 
sponsible for. We fail because we are no longer honest, no 
longer just, no longer gentlemen. Our Government is a mob, 
not a body endowed with sense and supported by the sense of 
the nation. It was only by immense industry, immense sense, 
and immense honour that we gained our position in the world, 
and now that these are gone we find our natural level. For 
a hundred years we did good in the world; for a hundred we 
shall have done evil, and then the world will hear of us no more." 

"August 6. — After several false alarms the 'Himalaya' was 
signalled; and, having fortunately met the rest of the small party 
of friends come to greet Lytton, we went out to meet her and 
were taken on board just opposite Osborne. At the gangway, 
brown as a berry and very ill dressed in clothes of four years ago 
and a flap-away Indian hat, stood Lytton with that cigarette in 
his mouth which cost him his Viceroyalty. On what trifles 
success depends ! If he could have refrained from smoking out 
of season, and if he could have gone to church with his wife, all 
his sins, though they had been like scarlet, would have been 
forgiven him by the Anglo-Indian public. As it was, he had 
this against him throughout his reign, and it turned the scale 
when he was politically defeated. But for this he would never 
have been recalled. He himself, conscious of having done his 
best and done well, cares nothing for such things, and he is 
right. I could envy him this feeling almost as much as I envy 
him the delight of going home to Knebworth. When we had 
seen them on shore and taken tea with them at the inn, we 
wished them good-bye.i 'Oh, the dear drunken people in the 
streets!' Lady Lytton exclaimed, 'how I love them!'" 

"September 7. — ^Knebworth. In the morning I wrote and 



His View of Things in 1880 71 

read, but In the afternoon I went down with Lytton to the fish- 
ing house and talked over the Eastern question, in which I 
find his views not very divergent from my own. We are both 
agreed that the day of England's empire is fast ending — for my 
own part I do not care how soon. Lytton has more patriotism." 

^'October 29. — Crabbet. Spent the day with Lytton . . . 
he read me his defence for the House of Lords. He has an 
immensely strong case, and should make one of the most re- 
markable speeches of the age if he is allowed to bring forward 
all the documents in his possession. He showed me these, the 
Russian correspondence taken at Kabul and the draft of a secret 
treaty between Shere Ali and the Russians. He also told me 
that when he was going to India Schouvaloff called on him and 
proposed to him to divide Afghanistan between Russia and 
England." 

This is nearly the last entry in my journal of 1880, which un- 
fortunately I discontinued till two years later. The full ex- 
planation Lytton was never allowed to make in Parliament, and 
his speech, robbed of its strongest points, fell comparatively 
flat when he made it before the House of Lords. I will, how- 
ever, add an extract from a letter he wrote me on the i8th of 
November, which will complete this chapter of my story. It is 
of value as giving a very accurate epitome of the political situa- 
tion of the date : "I saw," Lytton writes, "in one of the papers 
the other day a statement that the new Sherif of Mecca (Abdul 
Mutalleb), who is completely a tool of the Sultan, is working 
actively under orders from Constantinople to put the Moham- 
medans against us In all parts of the world. The cry is now, 
'The Caliph in danger.' This was to be expected, and I fear 
the opportunity has passed for the good which might have been 
effected a year ago through the Arabs. The only result of 
Gladstone's action, so far as I can see, has been to destroy our 
Influence at Constantinople and transfer it to Germany, without 
substituting for it any other means of controlling the Moham- 
medan world. The Mansion House speech (Gladstone's), ex- 
pected with so much curiosity, seemed to me a weak confession 
of utter failure In the policy of the Government. They drop 
Greece and Armenia, and everything else, with the admission 
that their fingers are scorched by the burning end of the stick 
at which they grasped so wildly nine months ago. And In 



72 The Sonnets of Proteus 

Ireland they are drifting into great difficulties which may even 
break up the Cabinet. The fact is the policy which the Govern- 
ment wants to carry out is everywhere rejected by the Nation; 
and the policy which the Nation wants carried out the Govern- 
ment naturally shies at, not wishing to stultify its promises and 
declarations. So the result is, for the present, no policy at all. 
As for myself I keep silence, morne et profond, till Parliament 
meets, though my heart burns within me." 

The last weeks of my stay In England that autumn were, 
however, less occupied with politics than with the publication 
of a volume of poetry, to which I had been persuaded by Lytton, 
and the proofs of which I left to him to correct. This was 
"The Sonnets of Proteus," which had a considerable success and 
which has since gone through many editions. It gave me al- 
most at once a certain rank in the literary world which was not 
altogether without its influence on my subsequent relations with 
my political friends. 



CHAPTER V 

THE REFORM LEADERS AT THE AZHAR 

I left England that autumn of 1880 on the 3rd of November, 
In the first place for Egypt, and without any more definite 
further plan than to go on from thence to Jeddah and educate 
myself in view of possible future opportunities. My wilder 
schemes in regard to the Arabs seemed for the moment im- 
practicable, and all that I hoped for was to gain sufficient knowl- 
edge of the doctrine and modern tendencies of Islam to put it 
into my power to act should circumstances become more favour- 
able. On leaving London I had arranged with Hamilton that 
we should correspond during the winter, and that I would let 
him know anything of special Interest which might occur on 
my journey and which he might communicate to Mr. Gladstone, 
who was still, he assured me, though I had not seen him again. 
Interested in my Ideas. At the Foreign Office I was looked upon, 
though In a friendly way, more as a visionary than as anything 
seriously likely to affect the official view of Eastern policy, even 
under a Radical Prime Minister. 

At Cairo, where I arrived a few days later, I found much 
change, and all, as It seemed to me, for the better. The old ir- 
responsible tyranny of Ismail had given place to the compara- 
tively mild regime of the Anglo-French Condominium. The 
finances had been regularized, and order put into most of the 
Administrations. I visited some of the same villages I had 
known In such terrible straits five years before, and found that 
the worst evils affecting their position had been put a stop to, 
and, though still poor and highly-taxed, there was no longer that 
feeling of despair among the fellahin which had made them 
pour out the history of their woes to me when I had first come 
among them as a sympathetic stranger. I went to the British 
Agency, and was delighted to find established there as Consul- 

73 



74 Egypt under the Condominium 

General my friend Malet, who gave me a roseate account of the 
reforms that had been effected or were in project, for as yet 
little had been actually done except financially. All was going 
slowly but steadily on the road of improvement, and the 
only clouds he could see on the horizon were, first, in the Soudan, 
which was so great a drain upon Egypt's resources, and, sec- 
ondly, in the Army, where there had been latterly symptoms 
of discontent. He spoke much in praise of the new Khedive, 
Tewfik, and took me to see him at the Palace, and I found him, 
if not very interesting, at least holding the language of a civil- 
ized and liberal-minded Prince. An echo of Malet's optimism 
may be recognized in my letters from Egypt of that date, and 
I find the draft of one I wrote to Hamilton of which the follow- 
ing is an extract: 

"I find a great change here for the better since five years 
ago, and, whatever may be the shortcomings the late Govern- 
ment may have to answer for elsewhere, their policy in Egypt 
certainly was a success. The country people now look fat and 
prosperous, and the few I have talked to, people who in former 
years complained bitterly of their condition, now praise the 
Khedive and his administration. They seem, for once, to have 
gone the right way to work here, making as few changes as 
possible in the system of government and only taking care that 
the men who caused the disorder should be changed. It was 
a great stroke of policy getting rid of Ismail, and I feel little 
doubt that with proper management the present man will go 
straight. Egypt is so rich and such a cheap country to govern 
that its finances must come right, if it limits its ambition to its 
own natural prosperity. But there are one or two rocks ahead, 
the government of the Soudan for instance, which will always 
be an expense and will always be an excuse for maintaining an 
army. I cannot conceive why Egypt should charge itself with 
governing the Nile beyond the First Cataract, its old boundary. 
Putting down the slave-trade in Africa is an amusement only 
rich countries need afford themselves. It will also be a great 
misfortune if such protection and supervision as the Government 
gets from England should be withdrawn, at least for some years 
and until a new generation has grown up used to a better order 
of things than the old. I should like immensely to see Syria 
put under another such regime. That, too, if there is no at- 



The True Fakth of Islam 75 

tempt to hold the desert, is a fairly rich country and might be 
made to pay its way. But it would require a very distinct pro- 
tection fromEurope to relieve it of the cost of an army. For 
police purposes a very small force would be sufficient, and I am 
convinced that people in England exaggerate immensely the 
difficulty of keeping the peace betwen the mixed Mohammedan 
and Christian populations there. These have all lain groaning 
together so long under the same tyranny that the edges of their 
prejudices have got worn down." 

With regard to my plan of seeking Mohammedan instruction, 
I was from the outset singularly fortunate. Rogers Bey, a 
distinguished Eastern scholar whom I had known some years 
before as Consul at Damascus, was now an official of the Finance 
Office at Cairo, and from him I obtained the name of a young 
Alem connected with the Azhar University, Sheykh Moham- 
med Khalil, who came to me daily to give me lessons in Arabic, 
and stayed to talk with me often through the afternoons. It 
happened, however, that he was far more than a mere professor 
of the language of the Koran. Mohammed Khalil, of all the 
Mohammedans I have known, was perhaps the most single- 
minded and sincere and at the same time the most enthusiastic 
Moslem of the larger and purer school of thought such as that 
which was being expounded at that time at Cairo by his great 
master, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu. I like to think of him as 
he then was, a young man of about thirty, serious, intelligent, 
and good, without affectation, pious and proud of his religion, 
but without the smallest taint of Pharisaism or doctrinal in- 
tolerance or of that arrogant reserve which is so common with 
Mohammedans in dealing with persons not of their own faith. 
He was all the contrary to this. From almost the first day of 
our intercourse he made it his duty and his pleasure to teach 
me all he knew. His school of interpretation was of the very 
widest kind. He accepted as true creeds all those that professed 
the unity of God; and Judaism and Christianity were to him only 
imperfect and corrupted forms of the one true rehgion of Abra- 
ham and Noah. He would hear nothing of intolerance, nothing 
of bitterness between believers so near akin. The intolerance 
and the bitterness were the evil legacy of ancient wars, and he 
believed the world to be progressing towards a state of social per- 
fection where arms would be laid down and a universal brother- 



76 Sheykh J emal-ed-din Afghani 

hood proclaimed between the nations and the creeds. As he 
unfolded to me these ideas and based them on texts and tradi- 
tions, declaring them to be the true teaching of Islam, it may 
be imagined how astonished and delighted I was — for they were 
very close to my own — and the more so when he affirmed that 
they were the views beginning to be held by all the more intelli- 
gent of the younger generation of students at his own univer- 
sity, as well as elsewhere in the Mohammedan world. He gave 
me, too, an account of how this school of enlightened interpreta- 
tion had sprung up almost within his own recollection at the 
Azhar. 

The true originator of the Liberal religious Reform move- 
ment among the Ulema of Cairo was, strangely enough, neither 
an Arab, nor an Egyptian, nor an Ottoman, but a certain wild 
man of genius, Sheykh Jemal-ed-din Afghani, whose sole experi- 
ence of the world before he came to Egypt had been that of 
Central Asia. An Afghan by birth, he had received his re- 
ligious education at Bokhara, and in that remote region, and 
apparently without coming in contact with any teacher from 
the more civilized centres of Mohammedan thought, he had 
evolved from his own study and reflection the ideas which are 
now associated with his name. Hitherto all movements of 
religious reform in Sunnite Islam had followed the lines not 
of development, but of retrogression. There had been a vast 
number of preachers, especially in the last 200 years, who had 
taught that the decay of Islam as a power in the world was due 
to its followers having forsaken the ancient ways of simplicity 
and the severe observance of the law as understood in the early 
ages of the faith. On the other hand, reformers there had been 
of a modern type recently, both in Turkey and Egypt, who had 
Europeanized the administration for political purposes, but these 
had introduced their changes as it were by violence, through 
decrees and approvals obtained by force from the unwilling 
Ulema, and with no serious attempt to reconcile them with the 
law of the Koran and the traditions. The political reforms had 
been always imposed from above, not suggested from below, and 
had generally been condemned by respectable opinion. Jemal- 
ed-din's originality consisted in this, that he sought to convert 
the religious intellect of the countries where he preached to the 
necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position, and, in- 



The Traditions Expounded 77 

stead of clinging to the past, of making an onward intellectual 
movement in harmony with modern knowledge. His intimate 
acquaintance with the Koran and the traditions enabled him to 
show that, if rightly interpreted and checked the one by the 
other, the law of Islam was capable of the most liberal develop- 
ments and that hardly any beneficial change was in reality op- 
posed to it. 

Having completed his studies in 1870, and being then thirty- 
two years old, he passed through India to Bombay and joined 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, and, this duty accomplished, he came 
on to Cairo and afterwards to Constantinople. He remained 
on this first visit no more than forty days in Egypt, but he had 
time to make acquaintance with certain of the Azhar students 
and to lay the foundations of the teaching he afterwards de- 
veloped. At Constantinople his great eloquence and learning 
soon asserted itself, and he was given a position in the Anjiiman 
el Elm, where he lectured on all subjects, his knowledge being 
almost universal. He had great quickness of intellect and an 
astonishing memory, so that it is said of him that he could read 
a book straight off on any subject and master the whole contents 
as inscribed upon his mind forever. Beginning with grammar 
and science, his lectures went on to philosophy and religion. 
He taught that Sunnite Islam was capable of adapting itself to 
all the highest cravings of the human soul and the needs of 
modern life. As an orthodox SunnI, and with the complete 
knowledge he had of the hawadith, he was listened to with 
respect and soon got a following among the younger students. 
He inspired courage by his own boldness, and his critical treat- 
ment of the received commentaries, even those of El Hanafi, 
was accepted by them as it would hardly have been from any 
other. Their consciences he was at pains to free from the 
chains in which thought had lain for so many centuries, and to 
show them that the law of Islam was no dead hand but a system 
fitted for the changing human needs of every age, and so itself 
susceptible of change. All this stood in close analogy to what 
we have seen of the re-awakening of the Christian intellect 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe and its 
adaption of orthodox doctrines to the scientific discoveries of the 
day. It is strange, however, that in Western Islam the new 
spirit of criticism should have been initiated as it was, by 



78 The Sheykh at Constantinople and Cairo 

one whose education had been made in such unprogressive 
lands as those of Central Asia, and at a university so far away. 

Sheykh Jemal-ed-din's career at Constantinople was a brilliant 
but a short one. He was essentially a free lance, and, like 
most Afghans, a disregarder of persons and of those ceremonial 
observances which regulate among the Ottoman dignitaries the 
personal intercourse of the great with those who attend their 
levees. Although protected by certain of the Liberal States- 
men, and notably by Ali and Fuad Pashas, who saw in his 
teaching a support to their unorthodox political reforms against 
the old-fashioned Ulema, Jemal-ed-din had managed to give of- 
fence to the high religious authorities, and especially by his 
independent personal attitude to the Sheykh el Islam, and these 
soon found in his lectures matter for reproof and condemnation. 
Advantage was taken of certain passages In his lectures to 
denounce him to the Government as an atheist and a perverter 
of the law, and when the Afghan reformer had replied by a 
courageous demand to be confronted with his high accusers and 
heard in a public discussion the official sense of propriety was 
shocked and alarmed. The challenge was producing an im- 
mense excitement among the Softas, the younger of whom were 
all on Jemal-ed-din's side, and the quarrel seemed likely to 
lead to serious trouble. Notice was somewhat reluctantly given 
that he had better leave once more for Egypt and the Holy 
Places. It was thus under the cloud of religious persecution 
that he returned to Cairo, but not without having sown the 
seed of inquiry which was to mature some years later at Con- 
stantinople in the shape of a general demand among the Softas 
for constitutional reform. It was the religious part of the 
movement which was to culminate in the political revolution 
attempted by Midhat Pasha in 1876. 

At the Azhar, when he returned to Cairo in 1871, Jemal-ed- 
din's reputation had of course preceded him, and, though Egypt 
was then In the darkest night of its religious unintelligence, for 
the moral corruption of the Government, especially in Ismail's 
reign, had infected all classes and had extinguished every tradi- 
tion of courage and independence among the Ulema, consider- 
able curiosity was felt about him. The few friends he had made 
on the occasion of his first visit welcomed him, If not openly, 
in secret, and presently the wonderful fire and zeal of his con- 



He Founds a School of Reform 79 

versation drew around him, as it had done at Constantinople, 
a group of young and enthusiastic followers. The most re- 
markable of these, his earliest disciples at the Azhar, were 
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who was to play so important a 
part in public affairs later and who is now Grand Mufti of 
Egypt, and Sheykh Ibrahim el AghanI the well-known publicist. 
To these he was able to communicate without reserlve his 
stores of varied knowledge, and to inspire them with his critical 
spirit and something of his courage. Courage indeed was 
needed in those days for any man at Cairo to speak out. Ismail 
brooked no kind of opposition and wielded power so absolute 
in the country that Independent speech; almost Independent 
whispering, had disappeared from men's mouths. It was only 
the fellahm of the village, already despoiled of all, that dared 
complain, or those In the city too poor and Insignificant to be 
of any political count. The highest religious authorities, as 
well as the highest officials, had long been silent about injustice 
and had chosen their part of acquiescence, content so long as 
they could get their share, each one however small, of the 
general plunder. 

On this dark state of intellectual and moral things Jemal-ed- 
din's courageous teaching broke like an apparition of strange 
light, and his very courage for awhile secured him a hearing 
undisturbed Iby admonition from the Government. Perhaps 
his quarrel at Constantinople was a passport to Ismail's toler- 
ance, perhaps he deemed this Afghan too Insignificant a force 
to call for suppression. Perhaps, like AH and Fuad Pashas, 
he thought to turn the new teaching to account in his long war 
with the European Consuls. Be this as it may, Jemal-ed-din 
was allowed during the whole of the remaining years of Ismail's 
reign to carry on his lectures, and it was only on Tewfik's ac- 
cession and the establishment of the Anglo-French condominium 
that he was arrested on an executive order, sent untried to 
Alexandria, and summarily exiled. He had, however, already 
done his work, and at the time of which I am writing his 
principles of Liberal reform upon a theological basis had so 
far prevailed at the Azhar that they had already been adopted 
by all that was intellectual there among the students. The 
reformer's mantle had fallen upon worthy shoulders, shoulders 
indeed it may be said, worthier even than his own. My little 



8o Sheykh Mohammed Ahdu 

Arabic instructor, Mohammed Khalil, was never weary of speak- 
ing to me of the virtues and intellectual qualities of him who 
was now his spiritual master, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the 
acknowledged leader at the Azhar, in Jemal-ed-din's succession, 
of the Liberal Party of reform. 

I find a note among my papers that it was on the 28th of 
January, 1881, that I was first taken by my enthusiastic Alem 
to Mohammed Abdu's little house in the Azhar quarter, a day 
to be marked by me with an especially white stone, for it began 
for me a friendship which has lasted now for nearly a quarter 
of a century with one of the best and wisest, and most interest- 
ing of men. When I use these words of him it must not be 
thought that they are light or exaggerated judgment. I base 
them on a knowledge of his character gained in a variety of 
circumstances on very difficult and trying occasions, first as a 
religious teacher, next as leader of a movement of social reform 
and as the intellectual head of a political revolution; again, as 
prisoner in the hands of his enemies, as exile in various foreign 
lands, and for some years under police surveillance at Cairo 
when his exile had been annulled; lastly, by the strength of 
his intellect and his moral character reasserting himself as a 
power in his own country, resuming his lectures at the Azhar, 
placed in the judicature, named Judge of Appeal, and finally, in 
these last days, Grand Mufti at Cairo, the highest religious and 
judicial position attainable in Egypt. 

Sheykh Mohammed Abdu when I first saw him in 188 1 was a 
man of about thirty-five, of middle height, dark, active in his 
gait, of quick intelligence revealed in singularly penetrating 
eyes, and with a manner frank and cordial and inspiring ready 
confidence. In dress and appearance purely Oriental, wearing 
the white turban and dark kaftan of the Azhar Sheykhs and 
knowing as yet no European language, or, indeed, other lan- 
guage than his own. With him I discussed, with the help of 
Mohammed Khalil, who knew a little French and helped on my 
insufficient Arabic, most of those questions I had already de- 
bated with his disciple, and between them I obtained before 
leaving Cairo a knowledge really large of the opinions of their 
liberal school of Moslem thought, their fears for the present, 
and their hopes for the future., These I afterwards embodied 
in a book published at the end of the year under the title of 



/ Fisit Jeddah 8i 

"The Future of Islam." Sheykh Mohammed Abdu was strong 
on the point that what was needed for the Mohammedan body 
politic was not merely reforms but a true religious reformation. 
On the question of the Caliphate he looked at that time, in 
common with most enlightened Moslems, to its reconstitution 
on a more spiritual basis. He explained to me how a more 
legitimate exercise of its authority might be made to give a 
new impulse to intellectual progress, and how little those who 
for centuries had held the title had deserved the spiritual head- 
ship of believers. The House of Othman for two hundred 
years had cared almost nothing for religion, and beyond the 
right of the sword had no claim any longer to allegiance. They 
were still the most powerful of Mohammedan princes and so 
able to do most for the general advantage, but unless they 
could be induced to take their position seriously a new Emir el 
Mumenin might legitimately be looked for. Certainly a new 
political basis was urgently required for the spiritual needs of 
Islam. In all this there was a tone of moderation in the ex- 
pression of his views very convincing of their practical wisdom. 
;In the course of the winter I made with my wife our in- 
tended visit to Jeddah, where I gathered much information 
of the kind I sought as to the opinions of the various sects 
of Islam. No place accessible to Europeans could have been 
better chosen for the purpose, and I made the acquaintance of a 
number of interesting Moslems through the help of one Yusuf 
Effendi Kudsi, who had a connection with the English Consulate. 
Among them the most remarkable were Sheykh Hassan Johar, 
a learned and very intelligent Somali, Sheykh Abd-el-Rahman 
Mahmud from Hyderabad in India, Sheykh Meshaat of Mecca, 
several members of the Bassam family from Aneyzah in Nejd, 
and a certain Bedouin Sheykh, a highly educated man, from 
Southern Morocco. My stay in Jeddah, however, was but a 
short one, as I fell ill of a malarious fever very prevalent there, 
and this prevented any idea I may still have had of penetrating 
into the interior. The moment, too, I found was a most un- 
favourable one for any plan of this kind, through the new 
hostility of the Meccan authorities to England. Already the 
Sultan Abdul Hamid had begun to assert himself, a thing for 
many generations unknown to his Ottoman predecessors, as 
spiritual Head of Islam, and in Arabia especially he had be- 



82 /Assassination of the Sherif 

come jealous of his authority, while his quarrel with our Govern- 
ment made him suspicious, more than of any other, of English 
influences. Only a few months before my visit to Jeddah he 
had made a vigorous assertion of his authority at Mecca by 
the appointment of a new Grand Sherif of strong reactionary 
and anti-European views. The former Grand Sherif Huseyn 
Ibn Aoun had been a man of liberal ideas and known for his 
friendly relations with the English Consulate, and had so in- 
curred his displeasure and met a violent death. Whether this 
was in reality contrived by the Sultan, or perhaps his Valy, it 
is not possible precisely to say, but it was certainly believed to 
have been so when I was at Jeddah. 

I learned the particulars of the Sherif Huseyn's death from 
his agent at Jeddah, Omar Nassif, who most certainly laid it 
to the Sultan's charge. According to this account, which I 
have since had confirmed to me from other quarters of authority, 
Huseyn had just ridden down from Mecca at the close of the 
pilgrimage, as the custom was, to Jeddah, there to give his 
blessing to the departing pilgrims. He had travelled down 
by night and was making his entrance on horseback to the sea- 
port riding in state with an escort, partly Arab, partly Ottoman, 
intending to alight at Omar Nassif's house, when an Afghan 
pilgrim poorly dressed, came forward from the crowd as if to 
ask alms and stabbed him in the belly. The Sherif, though 
wounded, rode on and died in his agent's house in the course of 
the day, having, as I heard, been unskilfully treated for his 
wound which need not have been fatal. There were various 
circumstances which seemed to differentiate the case from one 
of fanaticism or common murder. The assassin was no Shiah 
schismatic, as was first supposed, but an orthodox Sunni, and he 
used language after his arrest which seemed to show that he 
considered himself commissioned. "There was an elephant," 
he said, when asked the reason for his deed, "the greatest beast 
of the forest, and to him was sent an ant, the least of living 
creatures, and the ant bit him and he died." Also there was 
no open trial made of the assassin, who was executed within 
four days of his arrest, while everything was done to hush up 
as far as was possible and conceal the affair. 

Huseyn's successor who was of the rival house of Zeyd, the 
Sherif Abdul Mutalleb, belonged to the extremest school of 



Troubles in the English Cabinet 83 

Mohammedan reaction. iHe was an aged man, old enough to 
have been Sherif at the time Mecca was occupied by the 
Wahhabis, when he had conformed, at least outwardly, to the 
Wahhabi doctrine. Now, in extreme age, he was reinstated 
as Prince in order to further the Pan-Islamic views held at 
Constantinople. Under Huseyn it would have been very pos- 
sible for an Englishman to have travelled through the Hejaz 
without molestation, and both Doughty and Professor Robert- 
son Smith had received his aid and protection. Now any such 
attempt would have been very dangerous, and, in fact, the 
French traveller Hiiber lost his life in venturing in that same 
year. We consequently, returned to Suez, and later by IsmaTlia 
into Syria. 

Passing through Egypt I received the following letters from 
Hamilton in answer to two of mine. They are principally in- 
teresting as showing how the Government's attention to Eastern 
matters was already being diverted and distracted by their 
troubles nearer at home in Ireland. It is a curious and melan- 
choly thing to observe how the necessity, as the Whigs in the 
Cabinet considered it to be, of putting down nationalism and 
liberty in Ireland reacted upon the fine feelings they had 
expressed so readily out of office of sympathy with national 
freedom in the East. Gladstone, whose inclination no doubt 
would have 'been for liberty in both directions, had weighed 
himself in the Cabinet by these Whig Ministers, his colleagues, 
who were all along bent on leading him in the opposite direction. 
Ireland throughout the history of the next two years proved 
the stumbling-block of his policy, and, as I will show in its place, 
the decision of coercion there was decided on in 1882 at the 
self-same Cabinet Council with the decision to coerce in Egypt. 
The connection of misfortune between the two countries was a 
fatality not a little tragical, both to the countries themselves 
and doubly so to English honour. 

"10, Downing Street, Deer. 22, 1880. 
"... I took the liberty of showing your letter to several 
who I knew would like to read it, including Lord Granville, 
Rivers Wilson, Pembroke, and Harry Brand. I think it espe- 
cially pleased Rivers Wilson, who looks with a very tender eye 
on his work in Egypt, and who was naturally gratified to hear 



84 Cromwellian Policy for Ireland 

from an independent source that what he had so prominent a 
hand in had resulted in so much good. I am afraid he considers 
that his own contribution to the result has not been fully 
appreciated. 

"Ireland has continued to monopolize all the time and en- 
ergies of the Government, and I am afraid it is difficult to 
exaggerate the grave state of affairs in that distracted country. 
Thank goodness, we are now within hail of the re-assembling 
of Parliament. Whether or no the Government has erred on 
the side of over-patience and excessive forbearance remains to 
be proved, and it is not for me to venture to express an opinion. 
The present state of things is certainly a disgrace to this 
country; and the Government are driven reluctantly to hark 
back on the old stereotyped course of strong coercive measures. 
I am beginning, most unwillingly, to think that Ireland is not 
fitted for a Constitutional Government, and that, however much 
we may try to remove legitimate grievances, she will not be 
got into hand again without a return to something like a Crom- 
wellian policy. It is heart-breaking work all round, and unless 
some extraordinary transformation can be effected, we shall 
probably have to submit in this country to any amount of 
shipwrecks of governments within the next few years. I feel 
very gloomy as to the look out. Would that we could apply 
to Ireland a regeneration such as you have found in Egypt. . . . 
That wretched Ireland has nearly knocked the Government out 
of time as regards foreign policy. They will, however, still 
manage, I hope, to find a corner of room for Greece, and not 
let that question entirely slide, which would inevitably mean 
war between Turkey and Greece. Greece could never contend 
single-handed with Turkey successfully, and Turkey at war would 
probably be the signal for a general revolt in Eastern Roumelia 
and Macedonia. I still trust some sort of compromise on the 
question of adjusting the territory of the kingdom of the 
Hellenes may be effected by the intervention of the Powers in 
the direction of a small slice northwards, and perhaps the 
handing over of Crete. There Is no doubt that a means of 
strengthening and opening out Greece must be found, not only 
to keep the peace temporarily in the East, but to lay the 
foundations for some power that may grow into a set-off 
against the Slavic nationalities. , . ." 



English Policy in the East 85 

"10, Downing Street, Fehy. 11, 188 1. 

"Your letter has since its receipt made a little ministerial 
round. I read parts of it to Mr. Gladstone; and Lord Gran- 
ville and Mr. Goschen have both had the benefit of perusing it 
themselves, and of perusing it, as I am told, with interest. Lord 
Granville, moreover, sent a copy of your postscript, which 
related to Indian matters, to Lord Hartington. I hope in 
having turned your information to official account I shall not be 
considered to have abused your confidence. I have shown it 
also to Harry Brand. His father, the Speaker, has had 
difficulties to encounter such as no predecessor in the Chair 
ever had before; and he has come out of the ordeal magnif- 
icently. What with unprecedented continuous sitting of the 
House for days and nights and wholesale suspensions of 
obstructive Members, we have been having most exciting Par- 
liamentary times. I trust, however, that the neck of obstruc- 
tion as of the Irish land-agitation has been fairly well broken; 
and when once the Coercive, or rather Protective, measures 
have been passed, and a fair, just and strong and comprehensive 
Land Bill has become law, we shall not be troubled again 
immediately with the Irish nightmare. 

"Meanwhile of course all public attention has for the last 
few months been centred on that wretched God-forsaken 
country, and the public have not troubled their heads much 
with foreign affairs. However, the Greek question has not 
been forgotten. Lord Granville has been pulling the strings 
most diplomatically, and not, I hope, without success. Of 
course the great stumbling-block of making head with this 
difficult question has been the very shabby part which France 
has played, first blowing so hot and then blowing so cold. 
However, Bismarck has been induced to take the initiative in 
making a new proposal which may possibly lead to good results. 
The primary condition of all the Powers is of course to maintain 
the peace of Europe. If it were not that the outbreak of war 
between Turkey and Greece would almost inevitably lead to 
the outbreak of disturbances and fighting in Bulgaria and 
Eastern Roumelia, and if it were not that Greece's chances 
single-handed in a combat would be very small, the natural 
preliminary to Greece raising herself in the European scale 
would be by an appeal to the sword. The modern Romans 



86 A New Desert Journey 

would not have had a united kingdom but for fighting for It, 
and the modern Greeks could hardly complain were they obliged 
to face similar difficulties and dangers. But apart from the 
dangers of a stand-up fight, Greece, having been made the spe- 
cial protege of Europe, has a right not to be thrown overboard 
now. If the Berlin award cannot be enforced peacefully — and 
owing to France's action this seems to be admitted — I believe 
the massacre of the award has been termed in diplomatic 
phraseology, 'Le Barthelemy de St. Hilaire' — the best alter- 
native seems to be to find some equivalent for Greece — I mean 
by compensating her elsewhere for what she does not obtain, 
Thessaly and Epirus, which she would accept and which the 
Powers would in concert help her to obtain. Such a proposal 
as this may possibly be the new departure. I am afraid your 
remedies, though far more effective, are too drastic for accept- 
ance by Europe." 

I do not remember what In my letters can have suggested 
this long digression about Greece, which did not particularly 
Interest me at the time. The phraseology of the letter is so 
like Mr. Gladstone's own that I half think this and the previous 
letter must have been more or less dictated by him. For this 
reason I quote them almost in extenso, and because the long 
account of the difficulties of his Greek policy suggested to me 
the Idea that perhaps he might, if there was a rising on the 
Greek frontier, also encourage one concurrently with it of the 
Arabs In Syria. 

Our journey from Ismailla was an Interesting one. Once 
across the Suez Canal we struck due eastwards, over a long 
track of sand dunes, to a very little known hill region called 
the Jebel Hellal. This, on a small scale, has some of the 
characteristics of Nejd, in vegetation and in the arrangement 
of its sand drifts, and we made friendly acquaintance there with 
the Alaideh, the Teyyaha, and, further north, with the Terrabin 
tribes, as well as with those very Azazimeh with whom we had 
been so nearly having an encounter five years before. All these 
tribes were at that time Independent of the Ottoman Govern- 
ment, living as they did in the no man's land which forms the 
frontier between Syria and Egypt. They had, however, as is 



i 



The Tribes East of the Suez Canal 87 

always the case in independent Arabia, been at feud with each 
other and, with debts of blood on either side, the war had gone 
on and on, causing much disturbance even to the confines of 
Gaza. The Ottoman Government, to put an end to the trouble, 
had resorted to one of their common devices. They had invited 
the chiefs of the two principal tribes to a friendly conference 
with the Muteserif of Gaza, and had had them treacherously 
surrounded and captured, and were now holding them as 
hostages for the peace of the frontier in prison at Jerusalem. 
At that time the long tradition of English influence in Turkey 
was still alive among the Arabs, and as we passed through the 
tribes the relations of the imprisoned sheykhs besought my 
intervention with the Government to obtain their release. In 
pity for them I consented to do what I could, and I took with 
me the acting Sheykh of the Teyyaha, AH Ibn Atiyeh, and the 
little son of the Sheykh of the Terrabin, who rode on with us 
to Jerusalem, making our way over the hills by no road so that 
we arrived at El Kuds, or rather at Bethlehem, without hav- 
ing entered a single town or village on all our journey. At 
Jerusalem I called at once upon our Consul, Moore, and 
obtained through him from the Pasha an order to visit the 
prisons, and found there the sheykhs I was in search of in an 
underground dungeon near the Mosque of Omar. They were 
in a pitiable condition, suffering from disease and long confine- 
ment, and I made an application to the governor on their be- 
half for an amnesty for them on condition that a general peace 
should be agreed to between the tribes, an agreement which I 
had got them to sign and seal. The Muteserif, however, 
declared himself incompetent to order their release, and 
referred me to his superior, the Valy of Damascus, as being in 
a position to do so; and to Damascus we therefore went, still 
accompanied by Ali Ibn Atiyeh and with our camel caravan, by 
way of the Jordan valley and the 'Hauran plain, a beautiful 
and interesting journey, for the whole country, there having 
been heavy rain, was a garden of Eden with flowers. In the 
Hauran we found war going on between the Ottoman troops 
and the Druses, but managed to slip by between the two 
armies without molestation and so arrived at Damascus, where 
we alighted at a little house in the Bab Touma quarter which 



88 An Attempt to Bribe a Valy 

I had purchased, with an acre of garden behind it, on our visit 
of three years before when we were starting for Nejd. 

Our house at Damascus was next door to that of the well- 
known Englishwoman Lady Ellenborough, or, as she was now 
called, Mrs. Digby, who, after many curious adventures in the 
East and West, had married in her old age a Bedouin sheykh 
of one of the Anazeh tribe, and was living with her husband, 
Mijwel, at Damascus, being no longer able to bear the hard- 
ships of her former desert life. From her and from her ex- 
cellent husband, whom we knew well, we received the advice 
that we should put our case for the release of the prisoners 
neither before the Consul nor directly before the Valy, but 
indirectly throught the intermediary of their distinguished friend 
and our acquaintance of 1878, Seyyid Abd-el-Kader, whose 
influence at Damascus was more powerful on all things re- 
lating to the Arabs than any other with the Government. Abd- 
el-Kader was then a very old man, and was leading a life of 
religious retirement and held in great reverence by all in the 
city, and amongst the Arabs in Syria especially, he had a large 
following, for he had often proved their protector. Mijwel 
assured me that it would be merely a matter of money with 
the Valy and that if the Seyyid would undertake the negotiation 
with a sufficient sum in hand it could be easily managed. I con- 
sequently called with him and Ali Ibn Antiyeh on Abd-el-Kader, 
whom we found with his eldest son Mohammed, a very worthy 
man, born to him while he was still in Algeria of an Algerian 
mother, and explained our errand, and the Seyyid gladly con- 
sented to be our intercessor with the Pasha, and if possible 
to arrange for the release of the Teyyaha and Terrabin sheykhs 
on the condition prescribed of a general peace between the tribes, 
and I left with him a bag containing 400 Napoleons in gold, 
which he considered would be a sufficient sum to obtain what 
we required. Bribery was so much a matter of course In 
dealing with Ottoman officials in those days that I do not think 
either the Seyyid or I or any of us had a scruple about offering 
the money. The sum was a large one, but my sympathy was 
strong with the imprisoned Bedouins, and I had it at heart to 
be able to send Ali Ibn Atiyeh back to Jerusalem with an order 
of release for them. So I made the sacrifice. As it turned 



Revolutionary Ideas iti Syria 89 

out, however, the negotiation failed of the effect intended. A 
few days later the bag was brought back to me by Mohammed 
Ibn Abd-el-Kader untouched, with a message from his father 
that the Valy sent me his compliments and would have been very 
pleased to be agreeable to me in the matter but It was beyond 
his competence; It had already been referred to Constantinople, 
and it was there alone that the thing could be arranged. 

The sequel of this little Incident Is curious, and has a direct 
bearing on events the following year In Egypt. Finding my 
local efforts vain, I took the Valy's advice and wrote to Goschen, 
our Ambassador at Constantinople, and laid the case before him, 
urging as a reason for his interesting himself In It, that possibly 
some day our Government might have need of securing the 
passage of the Suez Canal from possible attack on the east- 
ern side should England happen to be at war with any other 
power. Goschen, If I remember rightly, took some steps in 
the matter, and when a few weeks later Lord Dufferin suc- 
ceeded him at the embassy It was handed on to him, and even- 
tually, after long waiting, what I had asked was granted, and 
the sheykhs were set free. My suggestion, however, about 
the tribes was to bear fruit later of a kind I did not at all 
contemplate or intend, for when in the summer of 1882, the 
military expedition under Wolseley was decided on, It was 
remembered by Goschen, or some one else connected with the 
Government, and, using my name with the Bedouins, a secret 
agent was sent precisely to the tribes I had befriended south 
of the Gaza to draw them Into alliance with the English forces 
against the Egyptian Nationalist army. I was therefore, as 
they say, unworthily "hoist with my own petard." This was 
the famous Palmer mission, about which I shall have more to 
say In Its place. 

Syria and all the Arab frontier was at this time In a great 
state of political ferment. There were two currents of feeling 
there among Mohammedans, the one of fanaticism fostered 
by the Sultan, the other in favour of liberal reform, represent- 
ing the two sides of the Pan-Islamic movement, and at Damascus 
It was represented to me that the feeling against the Sultan and 
the corrupt Ottoman administration was so strong that a general 
revolt might at any time occur. I spoke to Mohammed Ibn 



oo Desert Politics 

Abd-el-Kader about it, and found that he and his father were 
strongly on the liberal side and that, like the rest of the Arabic 
speaking Ulema, they favoured the idea of an Arabian Caliph- 
ate, if such could be made to come about; and the thought 
occurred to me that no one then living had a better title to be 
candidate for the Ottoman succession than Abd-el-Kader him- 
self might have. I therefore begged Mohammed to sound the 
old Seyyid on the subject, and to ask him whether he would 
be willing, should such a movement come to a head, to be 
put forward as its leader. Mohammed did so, and brought 
back a message from his father to the effect that, though too 
old to take any active part in a movement of the kind himself, 
his sons would be willing, and he would not refuse to give 
his name as a candidate for the Caliphate, should such candi- 
dature be thrust upon him. There would, however, be no 
chance of success to the movement unless it should have sup- 
port from without, the Ottoman Government being militarily 
too strong, and it was arranged that I should communicate his 
answer confidentially to our Government and ascertain what 
attitude England would assume in case of a Syrian rising. 
This therefore I did, using my usual channel of communication 
with Mr.. Gladstone, his private secretary Hamilton, asking 
what help the Arabian movement might count on. I suggested, 
in reference to Hamilton's letter already quoted, that such a 
movement might be favourably regarded by our Government, 
especially in connection with their difficulties with the Porte 
about Greece. Gladstone's interest, however, in the East and 
in foreign politics had by this time altogether cooled down, and 
Hamilton's answer was brief and discouraging. "I hope," he 
wrote, "that there is good prospect that the war between Greece 
and Turkey will be averted, and therefore I trust there will be 
no necessity to resort to your scheme in Syria. I can, I am 
afraid, only say that it is conceived that such a state of things 
might arise when something of the sort you suggest might be 
necessary, but that the case is not considered to have arisen. 
This is confused and enigmatic, but I fear I can say no more." 
With this I had to be content, and I made no delay in communi- 
cating the result to the Seyyid. 

The rest of our journey that summer was without political 



Bedouin Religion 91 

Interest. We again visited our friends the Anezeh Bedouins, 
whom we found encamped near Palmyra, but our dealings with 
them were merely about horses. The Anezeh care nothing 
about politics other than those of the desert and as little for 
the affairs of religion. They can hardly indeed be counted as 
even nominally Mohammedans, as they neither fast nor pray 
nor practice any Moslem observance. Their only connection 
with Islam is that they have in common with it the old Arabian 
customary law on which the law of the Sheriat was founded, 
but they do not, as far as I have ever been able to ascertain, 
hold any of the Moslem beliefs except vaguely and negatively 
the unity of God. They are without respect for Prophet or 
Saint or Koran, and know nothing whatever of a future life. 
With them we travelled northwards to the border of their 
wanderings and found ourselves at the beginning of the summer 
heat at Aleppo, and soon after once more in England.^ 

1 It is worth recording that while at Aleppo on this occasion we made friends 
with two English officers afterwards prominently connected with Egypt and the 
Soudanese war, Colonel Stewart, who shared with Gordon in the defence of 
Khartoum against the Mahdi, and Colonel Sir Charles Wilson who succeeded to 
the command of the British army at Metemneh after the battle of Abu Klea. 
Stewart, at my suggestion, made a tour that summer among the Anazeh and 
Shammar Bedouins, but failed to get on good terms with them, the truth being 
that he was quite out of sympathy with Orientals. Wilson, a man of far wider 
ideals, accompanied us on our homeward journey as far as Smyrna, which we 
reached in the time of Midhat Pasha's arrest. Both were at that date Consuls in 
Asia Minor of the perambulating kind provided by the terms of the Cyprus Con- 
vention. 



CHAPTER VI 

BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT 

The summer of 1881 I spent almost entirely at Crabbet, 
writing the book which was the fruit of my winter experience : 
"The Future of Islam." It was composed somewhat in haste 
and under circumstances unfavourable to deliberate judgment, 
for in the very act of writing it, events crowded so closely on 
events, and portents upon portents that a calm forecast of 
Islam's destiny seemed at times almost impossible. Neverthe- 
less, and in spite of many defects, I look upon the work as still 
of serious value, if only historically, as showing the condition 
of the Mohammedan hopes and fears of the day when it was 
written. In it I committed myself without reservd to the 
Cause of Islam as essentially the "Cause of Good" over an 
immense portion of the world, and to be encouraged, not 
repressed, by all who cared for the welfare of mankind. I 
gave an historical sketch of its origin, its glories, and its ap- 
parent decay, a decay which was very similar to that which 
had seemed to overtake Christendom four hundred years be- 
fore, and which might be met as Christendom had met its 
troubles by a religious reformation and the freeing of its thought 
from the bondage of a too strict tradition impeding its evolution. 
I expounded the ideas, as I had learned them from Sheykh 
Abdu, of the liberal school of teaching, and appealed to all 
that was best among my own countrymen to sympathize with 
their hopes as against the party of reaction which, hide-bound 
in the old and evil ways, had nothing to offer but a recrudescence 
of fanaticism and a last desperate appeal against its many ene- 
mies to the sword. To England especially, as Interested so 
largely in the future of Islam through India, I addressed my- 
self, urging that her policy should be an active one of friend- 

92 



The Future of Islam 93 

ship with the better elements of Eastern thought in its struggle 
with the worse, not merely to profit by its decay for the ex- 
tension of her own material interests. "The main point," I 
said, "is that England should fulfil the trust she has accepted 
(by her inheritance of the Mogul Empire and her long connec- 
tion with Ottoman affairs) of developing, not destroying the 
existing elements of good in Asia. She cannot destroy Islam 
or dissolve her own connection with her. Therefore, in God's 
name, let her take Islam by the hand and encourage her boldly in 
the path of virtue. This is the only worthy course and the 
only wise one, wiser and worthier, I venture to assert, than 
a whole century of crusade." 

The chapters of this little volume, as they came out in 
monthly numbers of the "Fortnightly Review," produced a 
considerable effect in England and also among the English- 
reading Moslems of India, and found their way, to some extent, 
in translation to Egypt. Already, while I was writing them, it 
had become clear that great events were imminent in the Moham- 
medan world and were even now in progress. Early in May 
the French Government with hardly a note of warning, and in 
pursuance of the secret arrangement made at Berlin three years 
before between M. Waddington and our Foreign Office, in- 
vaded Tunis and, on the fanciful pretext of protecting the Bey 
from a quite unreal danger threatened him by his subjects, oc- 
cupied the western portion of the Regency and proclaimed a 
French Protectorate. This sudden act of aggression on a per- 
fectly inoffensive and harmless neighbour was justified by nothing 
in the condition of the province either in the way of ill govern- 
ment or danger to Europeans or even financial embarrassment. 
The Bey himself was a mild and respectable personage, and 
had in no way forfeited the goodwill of his people. The seizure 
of his person by General Breart, and the usurpation of his au- 
thority by the French Republic was an act of cynical illegality 
almost without parallel in the history of modern aggression 
upon weaker nations, if we except the invasion of Egypt by 
Bonaparte in 1799, and was generally condemned in England 
where the history of the Berlin betrayal was not as yet sus- 
pected. In the Mohammedan world it lit a flame of anger and 
dismay which gathered in intensity as the truth became slowly 



94 Constitutional Ideas in Egypt 

known. The western Tunisians, taken wholly by surprise at 
first, had hardly fired a shot against the French, and the Bey 
had been forced to sign the Treaty presented to him at the 
sword's point by Breart, which surrendered the independence of 
the Regency, before the real state of the case came to be under- 
stood. But in the eastern provinces the tribes of the desert 
took up arms, and before the middle of summer the revolt had 
spread to the Algerian Sahara and a wave of anger against 
Christendom was rolling eastwards which, as will be seen, had 
begun to affect Egypt dangerously, and remains in truth to this 
day responsible for precipitating the action of the liberal re- 
formers there and of the army in demanding self government. 

It is worth noting, as showing the complicity of our Govern- 
ment in this scandalous affair, that Lord Granville allowed him- 
self to be content with an assurance given him by the French 
Government, that the occupation of the Regency was only for 
the restoration of order, though it was patent that order had 
not been so much as threatened, and that it would not con- 
tinue a day longer than might be necessary to secure the safety 
of the Bey's Government — a line of falsehood closely imitated 
by Lord Granville himself the following year when the posi- 
tions of France and England were reversed in Egypt. It is 
most noticeable too that, though Parliament was sitting at the 
time. Lord Sahsbury, the leader of the opposition, maintained 
an absolute silence about Tunis, though his followers, who did 
not know his secret reasons, were clamorous for explanations. 
Bismarck was equally silent at Berlin, and no single Power of 
those who had been represented at Berlin dissented, though the 
Italian public was deeply aggrieved by the French action. The 
Sultan alone of them recorded his public protest, Tunis having 
been always reckoned as part of the Ottoman dominions. By 
the European Governments it was accepted speedily as a fait 
accompli. 

The history of the rise of what in the summer of 1881 began 
to be known as the Egyptian National movement needs here 
to be told. It had its origin as a practical idea in the last 
desperate efforts made by the Khedive Ismail when he had 
quarrelled with Wilson to maintain himself in power against the 
consular tutelage in which he had, by his folly and his debts, 



Tewfik as a Reformer 95 

placed himself. He sought to recover the moral status he had 
lost and the goodwill of his subjects by making to them a popular 
appeal for support, and in the spring of 1879 he proclaimed his 
intention of calling together an assembly of Notables. There 
is little doubt that his intention was, under the cloak of a na- 
tional demand, to repudiate at least a portion of the debt, and 
though no one in Egypt, except perhaps certain European resi- 
dents, thought him sincere, the idea of a constitutional form of 
government as a remedy for the ills they were suffering began 
from that time to be popularized at Cairo. Sheykhs Jemal- 
ed-din and his school had always maintained that the growing 
absolutism of Mohammedan princes in modern times was con- 
trary to the spirit of Islam which in its essence was a Republic 
where every Moslem had the right of free speech in its as- 
semblies, and where the authority of the ruler rested on his 
conformity to the law and on popular approval. Ismail was 
condemned by the Azhar reformers on the double ground of 
his being a breaker of the law and a political tyrant. In the 
spring of 1879 it had been much discussed among them in private 
how, and by what means, he could be deposed or even, if there 
were no other way, removed by assassination. It was the 
consciousness of his double peril, both at home and from Europe, 
and of the opinions held at the Azhar that determined him to 
appear as a Constitutionalist. Constitutionalism, it must, more- 
over, be remembered, was much in the air just then not only in 
Egypt, but at Constantinople, where an assembly had met con- 
voked by decree of the Sultan only five years before. Little, 
therefore, as Ismail was trusted by the Reformers, his new 
move was one of which they could not but approve, and it was 
taken up and expounded by such printed organs of opinion as 
had furtively begun to be established at Cairo under their di- 
rection. Apart from the Azhar, there were not a few of the 
high officials who at this time were Constitutionalists, notably 
Sherif Pasha, Ali Pasha Mubarak and Mahmud Bey Sami el 
Barodi. Nor was this all. The Khedive's heir apparent and 
eventual successor, Mohammed Tewfik, had come under Jemal- 
ed-din's potent influence, and through him was in close communi- 
cation with the Reformers, and had given them repeated pledges 
that if ever he came to the Khedivial throne he would govern 



96 Tewfik's Character 

on strictly constitutional lines. Ismail's latest Ministry, which 
lasted three months, included Tewfik and Sherif, Constitutional- 
ists both, and they were actually in charge of the administration 
when the old Khedive was deposed. 

Tewfik's accession was therefore greeted by Jemal-ed-din and 
the Reformers as a stroke of good fortune, and, though they 
regretted that it had not been in the power of the Egyptians 
themselves to depose the tyrant, they looked forward to the 
new regime with the confident expectation of men who had at 
last obtained a lever to their wishes. The new Khedive, how- 
ever, like many another heir apparent when he has succeeded 
to power, was not long in changing his opinion, and a month 
had hardly elapsed before he had forgotten his promises and be- 
trayed his friends. Tewfik's character was one of extreme 
weakness. The son of a woman who had been a servant only 
in his father's house, he had been from his childhood treated as 
of small account by Ismail and brought up by his mother in 
bodily fear of the unscrupulous Khedive, and in those habits of 
insincerity and dissimulation which in the East are the tradi- 
tional safeguards of the unprotected. He had grown up in 
this way, in the harem more than with men, and had been unable 
to rid himself of a certain womanish timidity which prompted 
him always to yield his opinion in the presence of a stronger 
will than his own, and after yielding, to regain his ground, if 
possible, by indirect means and covertly as is the habit of women. 
He had, too, a large share of the womanish quality of jealousy 
and of the love of small vengeances. Otherwise, in his do- 
mestic life he was well-conducted as compared with most of his 
predecessors, and not unadorned with respectable virtues. As 
a ruler his was too negative a character not to be a danger to 
those who had to deal with him. His first impulse was always 
to conceal the truth and to place upon others the blame of any 
failure that might have occurred by his fault. His resentments 
were shown not by open displeasure, but by tale-bearing and 
false suggestion and the setting of one against another where 
he desired to prevail or be revenged. It has been said of him 
that he was never sincere, and that no one ever trusted him who 
was not betrayed. 

When therefore on his accession Tewfik found himself placed 



Tewfik Betrays the Reformers 97 

between two forces with opposite ends in view, the force of his 
reforming friends urging him to fulfil his constitutional promises, 
and the force of the consulates forbidding him to part with 
any of his power, a power they intended to exercise in his name 
themselves, he consented first to his Minister Sherif's sugges- 
tion that he should issue a decree granting a Constitution and 
then at the instance of the Consuls refused to sign it. This 
led to Sherif's resignation, and the substitution in his place 
of a nominee of the Consulates, Riaz Pasha, on whom these 
counted to carry out their ideas of financial reform while 
leaving him full power, under the Rescript of 1878, to carry on 
the internal administration as he would, without check from 
any Council or Assembly, in the Khedive's name. The weak- 
ness shown by the Khedive in this, the first important decision 
of his reign, was the cause of all his future troubles. Had he 
remained loyal to his promises to the Reformers and to his 
Ministers, and summoned at that time a Council of Notables, he 
would have had his subjects enthusiastically with him and would 
have been spared the intrigues and counter intrigues which 
marked the next two years and prepared the way for the revolu- 
tion of 1882. As it was, he found himself by his compliance 
deprived of all authority, and treated as a mere dummy prince 
by Consuls whose will he had obeyed and by his new Minister. 

The character of Riaz has been much debated. At the 
time of my visit to Egypt in the autumn of 188 1, his name was 
in execration with the Nationalists as the author of the violent 
but abortive measures which had been taken for their repres- 
sion, but as I now think in part unjustly. Riaz was a man of 
the old regime and as such a disbeliever in any but the most 
absolute forms of government, and he carried on the administra- 
tion while in power according to the received methods which had 
prevailed In Ismail's time, by espionage, police rule, arrests, and 
deportations. But he was neither unjust nor personally cruel, 
and he was certainly animated throughout his public career by 
a real sense of patriotism. His idea in taking office under the 
joint control of the English and French Consulates, and the 
assistance he gave them in opposition to the popular will, was, 
as he -has since assured me, simply to recover Egypt from its 
financial misfortunes and redeem the debt and so get rid as 



98 Riaz Pasha and the Joint Control 

speedily as possible of the foreign intervention, nor is there any 
doubt that in the first year of his being in office great progress 
had been made in relieving the fellahin from their financial 
burdens. But the process of redemption must in any case 
have been a very slow one, and there is no probability that he 
would have succeeded either in freeing Egypt from the tute- 
lage imposed on it or even of seeing the grosser evils of the 
administration which still weighed upon the people sensibly re- 
lieved. The regime of the Joint Control which Riaz served 
looked solely to finance and troubled itself hardly at all about 
other matters. The fellahin were still governed mainly by the 
kurbash, the courts of justice were abominably corrupt, the 
landed classes were universally in debt and were losing their 
lands to their creditors, and the alien caste of Turks and Cir- 
cassians still lorded it over the whole country. There was no 
sign during the period of anything in the shape of moral im- 
provement encouraged by the Government or even of improve- 
ment in the administrative system. This was the weak side of 
the Anglo-French regime and the cause of its failure to win 
popular favour. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether 
the crisis would have come as speedily as it did, but for the 
Khedive's own insincerities and intrigues against his Minister. 
It was his character, as I have explained, to yield outwardly to 
pressure but at the same time to seek to regain his end by other 
means. Thus it happened that he had hardly taken Riaz to 
his counsels before he began to intrigue against him. He was 
jealous of his authority and grudged the power that he had 
given to his too independent Minister. This is the true history 
of the series of crises through which Egypt passed in 1881, in- 
cluding, to a large extent, the military troubles which ended in 
Riaz' fall from power. 

The intervention of the army during the winter of 1880-81 
as a political force in Egypt is so important a matter that it 
needs careful explanation. As an element of discontent, it may 
be said to date from the disastrous campaign in Abyssinia which 
destroyed in it the Khedivial prestige, and at the same time 
by the financial difficulties it had involved made the pay of the 
soldiers precarious and irregular. The men who returned from 
the campaign had no longer any respect for their generals who 



Ahmed Araht 99 

had shown themselves incompetent, and the subordinate officers 
for the most part made common cause against them with the 
men. This came about the more naturally because the higher 
posts in the army were occupied exclusively by the Turkish- 
speaking "Circassian" class which at that time monopolized of- 
ficial power, while the common soldiers and the officers to the 
rank of captain were almost as exclusively drawn from the 
Arabic-speaking fellahin population. The class feeling became 
strong when it was precisely these that were mulcted of their 
pay, while the Circassians continued to enjoy their much larger 
salaries undiminished. During the last three years, therefore, 
of Ismail's reign the rank and file of the army had fully shared 
the general discontent of the country, and there had been con- 
spiracies, never made public, among the lower officers which at 
one moment very nearly came to the point of violent action. A 
leader in this class feeling in the army was, as early as 1877, 
Ahmed Bey Arabi, whose rank as lieutenant-colonel, a very 
unusual one to be held by a fellah, gave him aj)Osition of excep- 
tional influence with his Arabic-speaking fellow countrymen. 
A short biography of this remarkable man will not be here 
out of place. 

Arabi was born in 1840, the son of a small village sheykh, 
the owner of eight and a half acres of land, at Horiyeh, near 
Zagazig, where his family had been long established and en- 
joyed a certain local consideration of a semi-religious kind. 
Like many other village sheykhs they claimed a strain of Seyyid 
blood in their otherwise purely fellah lineage, and had a tradi- 
tion of being, on that account, somewhat superior to their rustic 
neighbours. How far this claim was a valid one — and it has 
been disputed — I do not know, but it had at least the effect 
of giving them a desire for better religious education than is 
to be found in the Delta villages, and Arabi, like his father, 
was sent as a youth to Cairo and was a student there for two 
years at the Azhar. At the age of fourteen he was taken for 
a soldier, and as he was a tall, well-grown lad and Said Pasha, 
the then Viceroy, had a scheme for training the sons of village 
sheykhs as officers, he was pushed on through the lower ranks of 
the army, and at the early age of seventeen became lieutenant, 
captain at eighteen, major at nineteen, and Caimakam, liey- 



lOO He Advocates Fellah Rights 

tenant-colonel, 'at twenty. This rapid and unexampled ad- 
vancement in the case of a fellah was due in part to the protec- 
tion of the French general under whom he was serving, Suliman 
Pasha el Franzawi, but still more to the favour shown by the 
Viceroy, who affected to be, like the mass of his subjects, an 
Egyptian, not merely a member of the alien Turkish caste, 
and wished to have fellah officers about him. Arabi, a pre- 
sentable young fellow, even so far enjoyed his favour as to be 
named his A. D. C, and in this capacity he accompanied Said 
to Medina the year before his death. It was during this close 
intercourse with the Viceroy that he acquired his first political 
ideas, which were those of equality as between class and class, 
and of the respect due to the fellah as the preponderating ele- 
ment in Egyptian nationality. It is this particular advocacy of 
fellah rights which distinguished Arabi from the other reformers 
of his day. The Azhar movement was one of general Moham- 
medan reform, without distinction of race. Arabi's was es- 
sentially a race movement and as such far more distinctly na- 
tional and destined to be far more popular. 

The unexpected death of his master. Said, was a great blow 
to Arabi's hopes. Under Ismail the favour shown to the fellah 
officers was withdrawn, and all preferment was once more given 
to the Circassians. Arabi found himself treated with scant 
courtesy by these, and was given only subordinate duties to per- 
form in the transport service and semi-civilian posts. This 
threw him into the ranks of the discontented and made him more 
than ever the advocate of the rights of his own class. He was 
eloquent and able to expound his views in the sort of language 
his countrymen understood and appreciated, not very precise 
language perhaps, but illustrated with tropes and metaphors and 
texts from the Koran, which his Azhar education supplied. He 
thus exercised a considerable influence over those with whom he 
came in contact. During this period he came a good deal into 
the society of Europeans, especially at Alexandria, where he had 
been sent on business, not altogether military, connected with 
the Khedive's Daira. His relations with these were friendly, 
and throughout his career he remained free from the least taint 
of fanatical intolerance in regard to Christians. On points of 
religion, though his practice was strict, he belonged to the 



Osman Rifky, Minister of War loi 

largest and most liberal school of Mohammedan interpretation, 
and he was essentially a humanitarian in his ideas of the frater- 
nity of nations and creeds. He knew no language, however, but 
his own, and maintained his integrity free from the European 
vices which are so easily acquired. 

In the Abyssinian war Arabi saw some service, but only on 
the communication lines between Massawa and the front, and 
he returned from the campaign like all the rest, incensed at the 
way in which it had been mismanaged. It was this that turned 
his attention decidedly to politics and gave a wider scope to 
his indignation now principally directed against the Khedive. 
This was intensified when he found himself arrested, with an- 
other fellah officer, Ali Bey Roubi, on a false charge of having 
been concerned in the attack on Nubar, a manoeuvre of Ismail's 
intended to screen his own part in the affair; and, after his re- 
lease, he for a moment joined with others in a plan which, how- 
ever, came to nothing, of deposing the Khedive. It is probable 
that, if Europe had not intervened when it did, this result would 
have ultimately happened, either through the action of the army 
or perhaps by Ismail's assassination, for such a solution too was 
at one time seriously discussed at the Azhar. All the Reform- 
ing party it is certain, and the soldiers with them, rejoiced at 
Ismail's downfall. It is a mistake also to suppose that Arabi 
was at the outset hostile to the new regime. Neither with 
Tewfik nor with the European Consuls had he the smallest 
quarrel. On the contrary, he saw in Tewfik a friendly in- 
fluence, and in the Consuls protectors for the fellahin from their 
old oppressors. Moreover, he had obtained the command of 
a regiment of the guard, and was quartered where he would 
most have desired to be, in the Abbassiyeh barracks at Cairo. 
Had moderate prudence been used in dealing with the soldiers' 
very real grievances, and a War Minister less hostile to the 
fellah officers been appointed, there is every reason to believe 
that neither he nor any of his fellow officers would have thought 
of taking up an attitude hostile to the Government. Action in 
self defence was forced upon them, and for this the Khedive's 
jealousy of Riaz was mainly responsible. 

The trouble came about in this way: when the new Ministry 
under Riaz was formed, Osman Rifky, a Turkish pasha of the 



102 M. de Ring 

old school, was made Minister of War. He was an extreme 
representative of the class which for centuries had looked upon 
Egypt as their property and the fellahin as their slaves and 
servants, His attitude, therefore, towards the fellah officers 
was from the first a hostile one, and in the appointments made 
by him it was to the Circassian, not the fellah, element in the 
army that preference was always given. The soldiers too were 
angry at being made use of for purposes outside their military 
duty, and subjected to a kind of corvee of hard labour such as 
the digging of canals and agricultural work on the Khedivial 
estates, to which they had become unaccustomed, and it was 
for taking their part and refusing to allow the men of his 
regiment to be ordered away to dig the Towfikiyeh Canal that 
Arabi first incurred the Minister's displeasure. There were 
questions too of pay withheld which called for redress, and 
on the 20th of May, 1880, a first petition was sent in by the 
fellah officers, of whom Arabi was one, setting forth their 
grievances. 

The address included nothing political, and was made in 
proper form to the Ministry of War, and led, through the 
intervention of the French and English Consuls, to an official 
inquiry which proved the justice of the complaints. In this 
matter the French Consul, M. de Ring, took the part, as 
was just, of the officers, and from that time gave them to 
a certain extent his protection, especially when during the course 
of the Inquiry he had found himself in personal altercation with 
Riaz. Arabi in all this, while taking a leading part, was prudent 
and moderate, and his conduct was approved by the Consuls. 
Since his return to Cairo, as Colonel of the Fourth Regiment, 
he had renewed his acquaintance with the reformers of the 
Azhar and the Constitutional party, and through a mutual 
friend and Arabi's fellow officer Ali Bey Roubi, was in communi- 
cation with two of the Ministers, Ali Pasha Mubarak and 
Mahmud Bey Sami. These, though Constitutionalists and ad- 
herents of Sherif Pasha, had retained their places as Ministers 
of Public Works and Religious Foundations (Awkaf) when 
Sherif had been dismissed. By Mahmud Sami, Arabi and the 
fellah officers were especially befriended. 

It was in this conjuncture of affairs that the Khedive, see- 



Tewfik Intrigues with the Soldiers 103 

ing in it the elements of an intrigue against Riaz, put himself 
in communication with the officers through the intermediary of 
his A. D. C, Ali Bey Fehmi, an officer of fellah origin but at- 
tached through his Circassian wife to the Palace, and Colonel 
of the I St regiment of the Guard. This Ali Fehmi was a very 
worthy young officer, and though he had not taken any part 
in the petition sent in to the Ministry and was without political 
bias, was already on friendly terms with Arabi and the rest, 
and had no difficulty in persuading them that the Khedive too 
was on their side in the quarrel, and had sent him to warn them 
that worse things were being designed against them by Osman 
Rifky and Riaz, and that unless they could procure the dismissal 
of these they would always be in danger. Arabi was the easier 
persuaded of this because Riaz had already had many of the 
Constitutionalists arrested, and some of these had been friends of 
his own. Sheykh Jemal-ed-din had been summarily dealt with, 
and a young landowner of the Sherkiyeh, Hassan Mousa el Ak- 
kad, a special friend of Arabi, had been deported only a short 
time before to the White Nile, for the mere reason that in re- 
sponse to an invitation pubHcly made by Sir Rivers Wilson he had 
petitioned against the Moukabalah confiscation. It was there- 
fore suggested to the officers that they should be beforehand 
with Osman Rifky and should petition for his dismissal, a re- 
quest which the Khedive would view favourably. 

The affair came to a crisis about the end of the year 1880, 
when one evening, Arabi being with other officers at the house 
of Nejm el Din Pasha, he learned that it had been decided at 
the Ministry that he and his fellow Colonel of the Black 
Regiment, Abd-el-Aal Bey Helmi, were to be deprived of their 
commands and dismissed the service; and almost at the same 
time news was brought him that Ali Fehmi was at his own 
house and desired to see him. On returning home, therefore, 
he found Ali Fehmi waiting for him, and with him Abd-el-Aal 
who confirmed what he had heard, and after taking counsel 
it was decided that they should all three together — for Ali 
Fehmi expressed himself willing to throw in his lot with theirs 
— go to the Prime Minister and insist upon an end being put to 
their persecution by the dismissal of Osman Rifky; and this the 
next day they did. Arabl's own account given to me of their 



I04 A Hanging Matter 

interview with Riaz is interesting and I have no doubt correct: 
"We went," he says, "with our petition to the Ministry of the 
Interior and asked to see Riaz. We were shown into an outer 
room and waited while the Minister read our document in the 
inner room. Presently he came out. 'Your petition,' he said, 
'is muhlik, a hanging matter. What is it you want? to change 
the Ministry? And what would you put in its place? Whom 
do you propose to carry on the government?' And I answered 
him, 'Ya saat el Basha, is Egypt then a woman who has borne but 
eight sons and then become barren?' By this I meant himself 
and the seven Ministers under him. He was angry at this, 
but in the end said he would see into our affair, and so we left 
him." 

At the Council of Ministers which assembled immediately 
after this incident the Khedive played a treacherous part. 
In order to involve the Ministry in an open quarrel with the 
officers, in which he knew the officers would have M. de Ring's 
protection, he proposed that they should be arrested and placed 
upon their trial by Court Martial, but to this Osman Rifky ob- 
jected because he also would thus be put on trial, while Riaz was 
against making it a case of public scandal at all, and took the 
officers' part. It was pointed out however to Riaz privately 
that his opposition would be misinterpreted, and would be 
looked upon as an act disloyal to the Khedive, and he with- 
drew his opposition, and a compromise was come to according to 
which Osman Rifky was to be left to deal with the officers sum- 
marily, and according to methods common in Ismail's reign. No 
open action therefore was taken against the officers, and the 
case was left undecided by the Council. 

What followed is well known. Some days later the three 
Colonels who had signed the petition received an invitation to 
attend at the Kasr el Nil Palace to arrange with the Minister 
what part their regiment should take in some festivities which 
were being organized for the Princess Jamila's wedding. Ar- 
rived there, they found a number of their superior officers, 
Circassians, with Osman Rifky, and were at once arrested, dis- 
armed, and insulted. Arabi has always maintained that it 
was intended to put them on board a steamer which was lying 
in the river outside, and have them conveyed up the Nile 



Arabics Growing Popularity 105 

and drowned; and I isee no reason to doubt that this was 
the case. Osman Rifky's object was to avoid a trial, which 
would have exposed his own tyrannical proceedings, and it would 
doubtless have been reported that the officers had been dis- 
missed the service and gone to their homes. Be this however 
as it may, they were speedily released by the soldiers of Ali 
Fehmi's regiment, who, under the command of their major, 
Mohammed Obeyd, a good and loyal man who was afterwards 
killed at Tel-el-Kebir, marched down on news being brought and 
forced the Palace doors. The Circassian Generals then beat a 
retreat as they best could, and Osman Rifky was forced to an un- 
dignified flight through a ground-floor window, whereupon the 
three Colonels marched fback at the head of their troops, 
and with drums beating, to their barracks. Here they drew up 
a letter telling what had happened, and explaining that their 
action had been one of self-defence only, and in no way endan- 
gered the safety of any one, and addressed it to M. de Ring, 
begging his intercession with the Khedive, and that another 
Minister might be appointed in Osman Rifky's place, to which 
in the course of the day the Khedive readily acceded. It is 
certain, however, that he and M. de Ring together made a 
strong effort to get RIaz also dismissed, on the plea that as 
Prime Minister he was principally responsible for the disorder 
which had happened. Nevertheless RIaz was too strongly 
supported by the Financial Controllers and by the German 
Consul General, and, I think, by Malet, who was at that 
time, as I have recorded, by no means favourably disposed to 
the officers, and on the matter being referred to London and 
Paris the Khedive's wish was disregarded, and shortly after M. 
de Ring was recalled by his Government In disgrace. 

The date of this first military disturbance at the Kasr el Nil 
was I St February, 188 1. It took place while I was still in 
Egypt, but after I had left Cairo, and I do not remember to 
have heard Arabl's name mentioned before it happened. The 
public part, however, that he played that brought him Into Im- 
mediate notoriety, and at once his name was in all men's mouths 
as that of a man who had been able successfully to defy the 
Government and bring about a change of Ministers. His posi- 
tion in a very few weeks became one of power in the country, or 



io6 He Becomes a Fellah Leader 

at least of imputed power, and, as the custom is in Egypt, 
petitions of all kinds poured in upon him from persons who had 
suffered wrong and who sought his aid to get justice. The fact 
that he had appeared in the affair as champion of fellah wrongs 
against the Turkish ruling class gave him popularity outside of 
Cairo, and many of the Notables and country sheykhs put them- 
selves into communication with him. To all he returned what 
good answers he could and help as far as his limited power ex- 
tended, and wherever men met him his fine presence, attractive 
smile, and dignified eloquence in conversation conveyed a favour- 
able impression. 

In personal appearance Arabi was at that time singularly well 
endowed for the part he was called upon to play in Egyptian 
history as representative of his race. A typical fellah, tall, 
heavy-limbed, and somewhat slow in his movements, he seemed 
to symbolize that massive bodily strength which is so char- 
acteristic of the laborious peasant of the Lower Nile. He had 
nothing in him of the alertness of a soldier, and there was a cer- 
tain deliberation in his gesture which gave him the dignity one so 
often sees in village sheykhs. His features in repose were dull, 
and his eyes had an abstracted look like those of a dreamer, and 
it was only when he smiled and spoke that one saw the kindly 
and large intelligence within. Then his face became illumined 
as a dull landscape by the sun. To Turkish and Circassian 
pashas this type of man seemed wholly negligible, that of the 
peasant boor they had for generations dominated and held in 
slavery and forced to labour for them without pay, and it seemed 
impossible to them he should be used otherwise than as a tool 
in their astute hands. Riaz from first to last despised him, and 
even the intellectual Reformers of the Azhar took little count 
of him as a political force. But with his own peasant class 
his rusticity was all in his favour. He was one of themselves, 
they perceived, but with their special qualities intensified and 
made glorious by the power they credited him with, and by the 
semi-religious culture he had acquired at the Azhar superior to 
their own. It must be remembered that in all Egyptian history, 
for at least three hundred years, no mere fellah had ever risen 
to a position of any political eminence in Egypt, or had appeared 
in the light of a reformer, or whispered a word of possible 



Mahmud Sami 1 07 

revolt. I doubt, however, whether his qualities alone, which 
were after all rather negative ones, or his talents, of which he 
had as yet given no proof, would have sufficed to bring him 
to the front as a National leader, but for the unwise persecu- 
tion to which he was subjected by Riaz in the months following 
the affair of Kasr el Nil, and which, through the intrigues of 
the Minister's political enemies, he was always able to thwart 
and circumvent. The most important of these, and the man in 
the best position to warn him of his dangers was the new 
Minister of War, Mahmud Bey Sami, who, through M. de 
Ring's influence, had been given Osman Rifky's succession, and 
who, as one of the ex-Minister Sherif's party, was a strong 
Constitutionalist. Though not personally acquainted with 
Arabi hitherto, he had already been friendly disposed towards 
him, and with one of the fellah officers, Ali Bey Roubi, he was 
on terms of intimacy. Having become Minister of War, he 
was in a position to help them actively, and to give them notice 
of designs against them such as came to his ears; and he was 
able to do this the more effectively because he still saw little of 
Arabi personally, though remaining in touch with him through 
Ali Roubi. He had made the officers a general promise that if 
at any time the Khedive joined actively against them they would 
know it, even if he did not warn them directly, by his retirement 
from the Ministry. 

Mahmud Samiel Barodi's part in the revolution of that year 
was a determining one in the course it took. Of a Circassian 
family long established in the country, and so of the traditional 
ruling class, he was, like Sherif Pasha, a reformer and a patriot. 
Intellectually, he was far superior to Arabi, and was indeed 
one of the most cultivated intelligences in Egypt, with a good 
knowledge of literature, both Arabic and Turkish, and especially 
of Egyptian history, besides being an elegant and distinguished 
poet. English writers, following the lead, or mislead, of the 
Blue Books, talk of him only as an Intriguer, but he was some- 
thing much more than this, and it must be remembered that 
in intriguing, as he undoubtedly did here against Riaz, he 
acted against a Minister who was of a different party from his 
own, and whom he had not elected to serve. At the time 
Riaz took office in 1879, Mahmud Sami was already in the 



io8 Tewfik's Jealousies 

Ministry, and there had been an understanding that he and 
AH Mubarak, who were Constitutionalists, should remain on 
«,n independent footing as far as their own departments were 
concerned. In the spring of 1881 they were both undoubtedly 
Intriguing against Riaz, but It was with the object of restoring 
their own party chief Sherif Pasha, to power. This puts a 
different complexion upon Mahmud Saml's action, and I fancy 
might find many a parallel In the annals of our own English 
Cabinets. His part, as I see It, throughout the troubles that 
were coming was a perfectly loyal one, both to the Constitutional 
and the National cause, and he paid dearer for his constancy, for 
he was a rich man and so had more to lose, than any other con- 
cerned in the rebellion. 

The Khedive's part in the next seven months was far less 
straightforward. He seems throughout to have been torn with 
irresolutions, jealousies, fears, and ambitions. Riaz' enemies 
had suggested to him that that masterful Minister was plotting 
against him to supplant him as Khedive, an altogether absurd 
suspicion which he nevertheless at times gave ear to. At other 
times Arabl's growing popularity aroused his jealousy, and he 
was constantly shifting from one dread to the other, while his 
ambition was to regain his own or rather his father's lost au- 
thority. The Anglo-French control irked him sorely, and he 
knew that by the bulk of his subjects he was disliked and de- 
spised. His Circassian entourage, the men of his Court, were 
all violent against the fellah officers and were constantly urging 
him to take strong measures against them, while Sherif Pasha 
and the Constitutionalists were for his making use of them on 
the lines already attempted to get rid of Riaz and the Consular 
subjection In which he lay, by another military demonstration. 
Such was the state of things In the month of August when the 
general ferment In the Mohammedan world, caused by the 
French invasion of Tunis, brought matters at Cairo to a definite 
crisis. 



CHAPTER VII 

TRIUMPH OF TH£ REFORMERS IN EGYPT 

It is difficult to determine the precise part played by the 
Khedive in the final act of the revolutionary drama, the mili- 
tary demonstration of the 9th September at Abdin Palace. 
According to Ninet and certain other writers there was a com- 
plete pre-arrangement and community of action between Tewfilc 
that day and the military leaders with the object of bringing 
about the fall of Riaz and with it of the Consular tutelage in 
which Tewfik found himself enmeshed. But this is only true in a 
general sense. Arabi himself has always assured me that during 
the summer of 188 i he had no personal relations with the Khe- 
dive beyond those official ones which his service as colonel of 
one of the guard regiments entailed. He only on three occasions 
had speech with His Highness, and on these no political subject 
was touched on between them. At the same time it is quite cer- 
tain that the idea of a demonstration with the objects named had 
been suggested from time to time during the summer by Tewfik 
to the officers through the intermediary of his A. D. C, AH 
Fehmi. AH Fehmi, though he had been concerned with Arabi in 
the affairs of the Kasr-el-Nil and had been arrested with him, 
was none the less received back into the Khedive's favour, 
who thought to make use of him still in the double capacity of 
spy on the fellah officers and intermediary, if he required it, 
with them. AH Fehmi's connection with the Court through 
his marriage seemed to Tewfik a guarantee of his fidelity, and 
it was on account of his ultimately siding entirely with Arabi, 
notwithstanding his Court connection, that Tewfik's resentment 
was afterwards so bitter against him. Tewfik, however, was 
a man, as we Have seen him, of varying moods, and while he 
still counted on the help of the army to rid himself of Riaz 

J 09 



no The Constitutional Movement 

he was also swayed by occasional fits of jealousy of Arabi's 
rapidly growing popularity. This popularity was very marked 
all through the summer months and brought him into commu- 
nication with innumerable country sheykhs and Notables to 
whom the idea of fellah emancipation which he preached was 
naturally congenial. He began to be talked of in the provinces 
as "el wahhid" the "only one," and in truth he deserved the 
appellation, for he was the only man of purely fellah origin 
who had for centuries been able to resist successfully the tyr- 
anny of the reigning Turco^Circassian caste. 

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the National 
movement of 1881 was essentially a fellah movement, having 
for its object the emancipation of the fellahin, and that it was 
directed primarily against the iniquitous Turkish Government, 
which had ruined the country, and only incidentally against 
the Anglo-French control when this last declared itself openly 
the ally and supporter of that tyranny. Other interests, how- 
ever, naturally joined in with the movement; and besides being 
sought out by the fellah Notables, Arabi soon found himself 
approached as an ally by the professed Constitutionalists, many 
of whom were members of the ruling caste, and were at heart 
as much opposed to fellah liberty as was Riaz himself. The 
idea of a Constitution in the minds of men of this class was 
one in which the supreme power, though taken from the 
Khedive, should remain in the hands of the Turco-Circassian 
oligarchy, the only ones they considered capable of governing 
the country. The chief of these Turkish Constitutionalists 
was Sherif Pasha, and the course of the summer found him in 
indirect but close correspondence with Arabi as the means of 
bringing about the Constitution which should be the road for 
him to a resumption of office. Arabi, always sympathetic to 
the Constitutional plan, lent himself readily to the idea, and 
the more so because Sultan Pasha, the most powerful of the 
fellah Notables, was himself a strong Constitutionalist, and 
acted as intermediary between him and Sherif. It was arranged 
between them all that, when a favourable moment should occur, 
Arabi should add the weight of the army's influence to any 
pressure that it might be necessary to bring to bear upon the 
Khedive to obtain his consent to the Constitvitiorial demand. 



Mahmitd Sami's Dismissal 1 1 1 

Nor was the Khedive by any means averse from the thing 
demanded, as it necessarily included the dismissal of Riaz, an 
object still to him of prime importance; and, at the time when 
this feeling predominated in his mind, he, through Ali Fehmi, 
encouraged Arabi to go forward with his plan and assured him 
of his approval. 

The first message received by Arabi in this sense was one 
very characteristic of Tewfik's indirect and timid methods of 
intrigue. Speaking one day with Ali Fehmi about the growing 
power of the army as a political influence, he said: "You three, 
Arabi, Abd-ed-Aal, and yourself, are three soldiers — with me 
you make four." And he bade him deliver this declaration 
as a message to Arabi. It was followed by hints far more 
direct, so that it was soon accepted as certain that any dem- 
onstration that might be made by the army which should demand 
Riaz' dismissal would have the Khedive's secret approval if 
not his open favour. It was necessary, in order to put con- 
straint upon the Consuls, that the Khedive should seem to yield 
to a physical necessity when consenting to a change of Min- 
isters. 

Nevertheless, when the moment for action actually arrived, 
it was far from certain what line the Khedive would take. The 
crisis came about in this way. In the month of August Riaz 
Pasha, who up to then had despised the fellah movement too 
completely to think it at all dangerous, became for the first 
time alarmed. The part in it played by the soldiers he had 
thought to be able to cope with by some of those irregular 
methods which are the time-honoured tradition of Turkish 
Government. He had beset Arabi and his fellow colonels with 
^Spies and had sought constantly to involve them through the 
police in some personal quarrel or street disturbance which 
should put them in his power, but always in vain. The soldiers 
invariably received warning of any serious design through their 
friend at the War Office, Mahmud Sami, and were constantly 
on their guard. It had been arranged, too, between Mahmud 
Sami and Arabi that if ever the Minister should be forced to 
retire from the War Office, it would be a sign to the fellah of- 
ficers that they must expect the worst, even if they should hear 
nothing of it from himself. When, therefore, in August Riaz, 



112 Riaz Takes Strong Measures 

losing patience, quarrelled with the War Minister and It was 
announced that Mahmud Sami had resigned, the officers saw 
that the moment for action, as far as they were themselves 
concerned, could not long be delayed. Riaz had insisted with 
Mahmud Sami on the banishment of the two leading colonels 
with their regiments from Cairo and had got the Khedive, in 
one of his fits of jealousy at Arabi's popularity, to go with him 
in ordering it, and when Mahmud Sami demurred, his dismissal 
had been summarily announced to him.. The Khedive and Riaz 
were at the time away still for the summer season at Alexan- 
dria, and Mahmud Sami, in his disgrace, had been ordered by 
letter to leave Cairo at once for his village, and so had not 
had time to communicate with his military friends. These, 
nevertheless, knew that trouble was in store for them, and it 
was the more apparent because Mahmud Sami's successor was 
no other than a certain Circassian general of the worst reac- 
tionary type, Daoud Pasha Yeghen, the Khedive's brother-in- 
law, whom they knew to be especially their enemy. In the first 
days of September the Court returned to Cairo, and the 
colonels, having taken counsel only with Sultan Pasha and 
their most intimate civilian allies, prepared for immediate 
action. They were resolved that, which way soever the Khedive 
might now be inclined towards them, they would carry out the 
projected demonstration and insist on a change of Ministry as 
a guarantee of their personal security. They saw plainly 
enough that if they allowed themselves to be separated from 
each other and removed from Cairo it would be an easy mat- 
ter for Riaz to ruin them in detail. The least they might 
expect at his hands would be dismissal from the service, and It 
was far more likely that they would be arrested and tried for 
mutiny In connection with their doings In February. It was 
part, too, of their program to obtain an increase of the army, 
and they added to it a demand of the Constitution, which 
seemed to all the only permanent guarantee against arbitrary 
government. 

The crisis came suddenly on the 8th of September. Daoud 
Pasha, who like most men of his class held the fellah officers 
in supreme contempt and who anticipated no resistance from 
them, issued his order for the departure of the two regiments, 



The Abdin Demons trapion < 113 

Arabi's to Alexandria and Abd-el-Aal's to Damietta, and on 
receiving it the colonels decided upon instant action. That 
they counted upon the Khedive's tolerance, if not his sympathy, 
is certain, and they knew his weak character too well to doubt 
that, whatever he might have resolved on in counsel with Riaz, 
the day before, on the day of trial he would be found on the 
side of the strongest battalions. All they were in any real 
anxiety about was the attitude of Ali Fehmi, though on him 
too they counted as almost certainly a friend. Ali Fehmi and 
his regiment, the first of the guard, had been excepted from 
the Ministerial order of removal from Cairo, and was still 
quartered at Abdin barracks, and if the Khedive was really 
hostile to them, and Ali obedient to orders, the result might 
be a conflict. Otherwise the demonstration had all the prob- 
ability of being a pacific one. In order, however, to minimize 
the risk of a misunderstanding they sent word in writing to the 
Khedive apprising him of their plans, and as a proof that there 
was no hostility intended to himself declared that they would 
not march to his residence in the Ismailyeh quarter but to Abdin, 
the oflicial palace, and begged him there to meet them and hear 
their complaints. 

The rest may be best told in Arabi's own words: "The next 
morning," he says in his most complete account of the affair, 
"I wrote a letter stating our demands and sent it to the Khedive 
at Ismailyeh Palace saying that we should march to Abdin 
Palace at the Asr (mid-afternoon) there to receive his answer. 
And the reason of our going to Abdin, and not to Ismailyeh 
where he lived, was that Abdin was his public residence, and 
we did not wish to alarm the ladies of his household. But if 
he had not come to Abdin we should have marched on to 
Ismailyeh. When, therefore, the Khedive received our mes- 
sage he sent for Riaz Pasha and Khairi Pasha and Stone Pasha 
(the American), and they went first to Abdin barracks, where 
both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoke to the soldiers, and 
they gave orders to Ali Fehmi that he should, with his regiment, 
occupy the palace of Abdin. And Ali Fehmi assented, and 
he posted his men in the upper rooms out of sight, so that they 
should be ready to fire at us from the windows. But I do not 
know whether they were given ball cartridge or not. Then 



114 Arabics Account of It 

the Khedive, with the Generals, went on to the Kalaa (citadel), 
and they spoke to the soldiers there in the same sense, calling 
onFuda Bey to support the Khedive against us, the Khedive 
scolding him and threatening 'I shall put you in prison.' But 
the soldiers surrounded the carriage, and the Khedive was 
afraid and drove away. And he went on by the advice of Riaz 
to Abbassiyeh to speak to me. But I had already marched with 
my regiment by the Hassaniyeh quarter to Abdin. And they 
stopped to ask about the artillery and were told that it also 
had gone to Abdin. 

"And when the Khedive arrived at Abdin he found us 
occupying the square, the artillery and cavalry being before the 
west entrance and I with my troops before the main entrance. 
And already when I arrived before the Palace I had sent to Ali 
Fehmi who, I had heard, was there and had spoken with him 
and he had withdrawn his men from the Palace, and they and 
Ali Fehmi stood with us. And the Khedive entered by the back 
door on the east side, and presently he came out to us with his 
Generals and aides-de-camp, but I did not see Colvin with him 
though he may have been there. And the Khedive called on 
me to dismount and I dismounted. And he called on me to 
put up my sword, and I put up my sword; but the officers, my 
friends, approached with me to prevent treachery, about fifty 
in number, and some of them placed themselves between him 
and the palace. And, when I had delivered my message and 
made my three demands to the Khedive, he said 'I am Khedive 
of the country and I shall do as I please' (in the Egyptian pa- 
tois) 'ana Khedeywi el beled, wa amal zay ma inni awze.' I 
replied, 'We are not slaves and shall never from this day forth 
be inherited' (nahnu ma abid, wa la nurithu bad el yom) . That 
is to say, 'We shall never be, as slaves are, subject to being 
bequeathed by will from one master to another.' He said noth- 
ing more, but turned and went back into the palace. And 
presently they sent out Cookson to me with an interpreter, and 
he asked why, being a soldier, I made demand of a parliament. 
And I said that it was to put an end to arbitrary rule, and I 
pointed to the crowd of citizens supporting us behind the sol- 
diers. Then he threatened me, saying 'But we will bring a 
British army' ; and much discussion took place between us. 



Tewfik Capitulates 115 

And he returned six or seven times to the palace, and came 
out again six or seven times to me, until finally he informed me 
that the Khedive had agreed to all. And the Khedive men- 
tioned Haidar Pasha to replace Riaz, but I would not consent. 
And when it was put to me to say it, I named Sherif Pasha, 
because he had declared himself in favour of a Mejliss-el 
Nawwab, Council of Notables. I had known Sherif a little in 
former years when he was serving in the army. And the same 
evening the Khedive sent for me, and I went to him at the 
Ismailia Palace, and I thanked him for having agreed to our 
requests, but he said only: 'That is enough, go now and occupy 
Abdin, but let it be without music in the streets.' " 

This seems to me a very straightforward account and agrees 
with everything else that I have been able to learn about the 
events of the day from native evidence, and even in a general 
way with the Blue Books. The Khedive's part in it was, 
according to its showing, hardly heroic, but it was less a case 
with him of physical cowardice than the English official account 
suggests. He knew perfectly well that he ran no danger from 
the soldiers, nor was there anything they had asked of him 
that he was not quite willing to grant or at least to promise. 
He stood, as they say, to win in either event, and was in the 
secret of much that, to Cookson and Colvin, was altogether a 
mystery. 

These two Englishmen, mentioned by Arabi, were respectively 
Sir Charles Cookson, the British Consul at Alexandria tem- 
porarily in charge of the English Agency in Malet's absence 
on leave at Cairo, and Sir Auckland Colvin, the English Finan- 
cial Controller. They were almost the sole representatives 
of the Foreign official body then in Egypt — for M. de Sinkie- 
wicz, the new French Minister, had not yet arrived, and M. 
de Blignieres, Colvin's French colleague, was also away. They 
had, therefore, the leading part to play in advising the Khedive 
and reporting the matter home. Colvin, an Indian official with 
the traditions of the Anglo-Indian art of government, and 
being quite unsuspicious of the semi-understanding there was 
between Tewfik and the officers, was all for violent measures, 
and recommended that the Khedive should adopt such an 
attitude towards them as might have been taken successfully 



ii6 A Constitution Promised 

by Mohammed Ali sixty years before, but was quite unsuited 
to the actual circumstances. His advice was that he should 
without more than a short parley shoot Arabi with a pistol with 
his own hand. Cookson, who knew Tewfik's timidity better, 
though he also was ignorant of his partial collusion with the 
officers, was for compromise, and effected precisely that solution 
which Tewfik had schemed so long to obtain, namely, the 
dismissal of Riaz and the recall of Sherif. His account of the 
affair may be read with profit in the Blue Books, as also Col- 
vin's narrative of it in the "Times," to which he communicated 
the account published, and in the "Pall Mall Gazette," of which 
he was the regular correspondent. The publicity thus given to 
their action gained the thanks of the English Government for 
both officials, and for Colvin the honour of a knighthood and 
a political position in Egypt he did not till that time possess. 
And so the matter ended. Riaz, who with the recollection of 
Nubar's and Osman Rifky's adventures had taken no part in 
the discussion with the soldiers but had remained prudently in- 
side the Palace, received that evening his dismissal and retired 
to Alexandria and thence to Europe to remain there till help 
should come to him from the protecting Powers; and Sherif 
Pasha, after some show of reluctance, was installed Prime 
Minister in his stead. All Egypt woke next morning to learn 
that not merely a revolt but a revolution had been effected, 
and that the long reign of arbitrary rule was, as it hoped, for 
ever at an end. The Khedive had promised to assemble the 
Notables and grant a Constitution, and henceforth the land of 
the Pharaohs and the Mamelukes and the Turkish Pashas was 
to be ruled according to the laws of justice and administered not 
by aliens but by the representatives of the Egyptian people them- 
selves. 

The three months which followed this notable event were 
the happiest time, politically, that Egypt has ever known. I 
am glad that I had the privilege of witnessing it with my own 
eyes and so that I know it not merely by hearsay, or I should 
doubt its reality, so little like was it to anything that I had hith- 
erto seen or am likely, I fear, ever to see again. All native 
parties and, for the moment, the whole population of Cairo were 
united in the realization of a great national idea, the Khedive 



The National Rejoicing 117 

no less it seemed than the rest. He was delighted, now the 
crisis was over, in the success of his plot for getting rid of Riaz, 
and with him the most irksome features of the Dual Control, 
and he trusted In Sherif to rid him sooner or later of Arabi. 
Sherif and the Turkish liberal magnates were no less elated at 
their return to power, and even the reactionary Turks, who 
were by no means at one with Riaz, shared in what they consid- 
ered a triumph against Europe. The soldiers were relieved of 
the Incubus of danger which had so long weighed on them, and 
the civilian reformers rejoiced at the civil liberties they now 
looked on as assured. Those who had most doubted and held 
back longest acknowledged that the appeal to force with its 
bloodless victory had been justified by results. Throughout 
Egypt a cry of jubilation arose such as for hundreds of years 
had not been heard upon the Nile, and it is literally true that 
In the streets of Cairo men stopped each other, though stran- 
gers, to embrace and rejoice together at the astonishing new 
reign of liberty which had suddenly begun for them, like the 
dawn of day after a long night of fear. The Press, under 
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's enlightened censorship, freed more 
than ever from its old trammels, spread the news rapidly, and 
men at last could meet and speak fearlessly everywhere in the 
provinces without the dread of spies or of police Interference. 
All classes were infected with the same happy spirit, Moslems, 
Christians, Jews, men of all religions and all races, including 
not a few Europeans of those at all intimately connected with 
native life. Even the foreign Consuls could not but confess that 
the new regime was better than the old, that Riaz had made 
mistakes, and that Arabi, if he had not been wholly right, had 
at least not been wholly wrong. 

Arabi's attitude both towards the Khedive and towards the 
new Ministers was correct and dignified. He had several 
interviews with Tewfik which, at any rate on Arabi's side, were 
of a most cordial character, while with the Sherif and Mahmud 
SamI (restored as Minister of War) he showed himself per- 
fectly willing, now his work was done and the liberty of the 
country obtained, to stand aside and leave its development to 
his civilian friends. All his speeches of that time — and some of 
them are to be read In the Blue Books — are In this reasonable 



ii8 Sherif Pasha Minister 

sense and reveal him as deeply imbued with those lofty and 
romantic humanitarian views which were a leading feature of 
his political career. There is not a trace in them of anything 
but a large-minded sympathy with men of all classes and creeds, 
nor is it possible to detect unfriendliness even to the European 
financial control whose beneficial influence on Egypt he, on the 
contrary, cheerfully acknowledges. The old regime of Turkish 
absolutism is past and done with — that is the theme of most of 
the speeches — and a new era of national freedom, peace, and 
goodwill to all men has begun. On the 2nd of October, a fort- 
night after Sherif's installation at the Ministry, we find Arabi 
leaving Cairo with his regiment for Ras-el-Wady amid the 
universal enthusiasm of a grateful city. 

There was only one cloud at that date visible on the Egyptian 
horizon, the possible hostility of the Sultan to the idea of a 
Constitution. Abdul Hamid, after playing for a while with 
Constitutionalism at Constantinople, had shown himself at last 
its implacable enemy, and that very summer had ordered the 
mock trial and condemnation of Midhat, its most prominent 
advocate. The appearance, therefore, of a Special Commis- 
sion at Cairo early in October representing the Sultan and 
instructed to inquire into what was happening in Egypt 
disturbed, to a certain extent, men's minds, and doubtless has- 
tened the departure both of Arabi to Ras-el-Wady and of Abd- 
el-Aal to Damietta. The visit, however, of the Commissioners 
passed off quietly. The new Ministers were able to explain 
that in the political movement which was now avowedly a na- 
tional one, no disloyalty was Intended to the Sultan. On the 
contrary, the fate of Tunis had convinced the Egyptians that 
their only safety from European aggression lay In strengthen- 
ing, not loosening, the link which bound them to the Ottoman 
Empire, and that In reality the object of the Revolution had 
been to prevent further encroachments by the Financial Control 
of France and England on Egypt's political independence. All 
was for the best, and the country was now content and pacified. 
AH Pasha NIzami, the chief commissioner, was consequently 
able to take back with him a favourable report of the situation, 
and this was strengthened by the second commissioner, Ahmed 



Arahi and the Sultan's A. D. C. 119 

Pasha Ratib, who had an opportunity of personal talk with 
ArabI on his way to Suez and Mecca. 

This interview, which had important consequences later for 
the growth of the political situation, took place in the train be- 
tween Zagazig and Tel-el-Kebir, Arabi had assured me on his 
part an accidental one, he having gone to Zagazig to visit his 
friends Ahmed Eff. Shemsi and Suliman Pasha Abaza and being 
on his way home. "As I was returning," he has told me, "by 
train to Ras-el-Wady it happened that Ahmed Pasha Ratib 
was on his way to Suez, for he was going on to Mecca on 
pilgrimage. And I found myself in the same carriage with him, 
and we exchanged compliments as strangers, and I asked him 
his name and he asked me my name, and he told me of his 
pilgrimage and other things. But he did not speak of his mis- 
sion to the Khedive, nor did I ask. But I told him I was loyal 
to the Sultan as the head of our religion, and I also related to 
him all that had occurred, and he said, 'You did well.' And 
at Ras-el-Wady I left him, and he sent me a Koran from 
Jeddah, and later, on his return to Stamboul, he wrote to me, 
saying that he had spoken favourably of me to the Sultan, and 
finally I received the letter dictated by the Sultan to Sheykh 
Mohammed Zaffer telling me the things you know of." The 
Ottoman Commission therefore passed off without leading to 
any immediate trouble. It was coincident with the arrival at 
Alexandria of a French and an English gunboat, which had 
been ordered there by the two Governments at the moment of 
receiving the news of the demonstration at Abdin; and the gim- 
boats and the commissioners left on the same day in October. 
Malet by this time had returned to his post, and so had 
Sinkiewicz, and it was agreed between them that the situation 
needed no active intervention. Malet indeed wrote at that 
time in the most favourable terms to his Government both of 
the new Ministers and of Arabi, whose honesty and patriot- 
ism, though he had had no personal communication with him, 
he was now inclined to believe in. 

It was at this junction of affairs in Egypt that early in 
November I returned to Cairo. I had had no recent news from 
my Azhar friends, and was ignorant of what had happened 
there during the summer beyond what all the world knew, and 



I20 / Return to Cairo 

it was not even my intention when leaving London to do more 
than pass through the Suez Canal on my way back (for such 
was again my plan for the winter) to Arabia. I had been 
deeply interested in the crisis which was being witnessed 
throughout the Mohammedan world, and I still hoped to be 
able to take some personal part in the great events -I saw 
impending — I hardly knew what, except that it should be as a 
helper in the cause of Arabian and Mohammedan liiberty. 
When the revolt took place in Algeria in connection with the 
French aggression on Tunis, I had written to my friend Seyyid 
Mohammed Abd-el-Kader at Damascus asking him for an 
introduction to its leader, Abu Yemama, but this he had not 
been able to give, and I had also tried in vain to discover 
Sheykh Jemal-ed-din Afghani's whereabouts in America, where, 
after wandering two years in India, he was said to be, and now 
my thoughts were once more turned to Arabia which I had 
come to look upon as a sacred land, the cradle of Eastern liberty 
and true religion. Strangely enough, I did not suspect that 
in the National movement in Egypt the chief interest for me 
in Islam already lay, as it were, close to my hand, and it was 
a mere accident that determined my taking any part in what 
was coming there, even as a spectator. 

The reason for my blindness and indifference was that in 
England the events of September had been represented in the 
Press as purely military, and even at the Foreign Office there 
was no knowledge of their true significance. I share with most 
lovers of liberty a distrust of professional soldiers as the 
champions of any cause not that of tyranny, and I found it 
difficult to believe, even as far as Malet did, that Arabi had 
an honest purpose in what he had done. I knew also that 
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and the rest of my Azhar friends 
were for other methods than those of violence, and that the 
reforms they had so long been preaching would in their 
opinion take a lifetime to achieve. It seemed impossible to 
understand that the events of a single summer should have 
brought them already to maturity. As to the promised Con- 
stitution, the London Press declared that it was mere talk, a 
pretext of the kind that the ex-Khedive Ismail had made use 
of against Wilson, and Malet was reported to have declared 
that it would remain a promise only because the Sultan whom 



Philip Currie's Advice 121 

he had seen at Constantinople on his way back to Egypt would 
never allow it. 

The Ottoman Commission added to my distrust of the whole 
movement and the fact that Arabi had demanded an increase 
of the army to the number of 18,000 men. These were the 
common views of the day in England and I had no special 
knowledge in correction of them. I remember shortly before 
leaving London, that when I called on my cousin Philip Currie 
at the Foreign Office, he surprised me by expressing an opinion 
that perhaps there was something more In the National Move- 
ment In Egypt than appeared on the surface. "Malet," he 
said, "is rather Inclined now to believe in It. I wonder you do 
not go there. Perhaps you might find in Arabi just the man 
you have been looking for." He knew of course my ideas, 
which he had never taken quite seriously or as more than a 
romantic fancy, and his words were lightly spoken and we 
laughed together without discussion. Yet afterwards I recalled 
them to memory and wondered that I had been so little respon- 
sive. My thoughts, however, were fixed elsewhere. 

It Is worth recording that the night before I started I 
entertained at dinner at the Travellers' Club three of my then 
rather Intimate friends, John Morley, who had recently be- 
come editor of the "Pall Mall Gazette" besides being editor 
of the "Fortnightly Review," Sir Alfred Lyall, and our Consul 
at Jeddah, Zohrab. With these I had a long talk about 
Mohammedan and Eastern affairs, and it was agreed between 
me and Morley that, if I found the champion of Arabian reform 
that I was seeking, I should let him know and he would do his 
best to put his claims prominently before the English public. 
Morley was not as yet in Parliament, but he already held a 
position of high influence with the Government through his 
personal connection with Chamberlain; his paper, the "Pall 
Mall," was one of the few Mr. Gladstone read, the only one, 
I believe, in the soundness of whose views he had any confidence. 
It was a pleasant dinner and we all took rather enthusiastic 
views as to the possibilities of the future of Islam. On the 
subject of Egypt, however, Morley was unfortunately already 
under other influences than mine. His correspondent for the 
"Pall Mall Gazette" was no other than the Financial Control- 
ler, Sir Auckland Colvin, and so it happened that when the 



122 Ditke and Gambetta 

crisis came in the spring he was found, contrary to what might 
have been expected of him, on the English official and jfinancial 
side, and one of the strongest advocates of violent measures 
for the suppression of liberty. 

On my way to Egypt an incident occurred which I shall have 
to return to when its full importance comes to be considered. 
At Charing Cross Station I found Dilke and his private sec- 
retary, Austin Lee, on their way, as I was, to Paris, and I made 
the whole journey in their company. Dilke that day was in 
the highest possible spirits. His intimate friend Gambetta 
had just, 15th November, succeeded St. Hilaire as French 
Prime Minister; and Dilke, who had been for the last six 
months the English Commissioner at Paris for the negotiation 
of a renewal of the Commercial Treaty with France without 
having succeeded in concluding it, was now returning to his 
work confident that with the change at the Quai d'Orsay he 
should no longer have any difficulty. Gambetta, on his side, 
had a plan of his own in which Dilke as Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office could be of the greatest use to him. St. 
Hilaire had made a terrible mess of the Tunis invasion and 
had left all North Africa in a blaze for his successor to deal 
with. Gambetta had come into office determined to use strong 
measures, and, as they say, to "grasp the nettle" with both 
hands. He was filled with apprehension of a general Pan- 
Islamic rising, and saw in the National movement at Cairo only 
a new and dangerous manifestation of Moslem "fanaticism." 
He was closely connected, too, through his Jewish origin with 
the great financial interests involved in Egypt, and had made 
up his mind to better St. Hilaire's halting aggression on Tunis 
by forcing our intervention also in Egypt. In this he wanted 
our Government to go with him and join in an anti-Islamic 
crusade in the name of civilization, and as a first measure to 
strengthen the hold of the European Joint Control at Cairo. 
On both these matters, the Commercial Treaty and Egypt, 
Dilke was most communicative, though he did not put all the 
dots upon the i's, treating the former as a special English in- 
terest, the latter as specially a French one. It was a point of 
party honour with the Liberal Government, which was essen- 
tially a Free Trade Government, to show the world that their 
Free Trade declarations did not prevent them from getting 



Mohammed el Hajrasi 123 

reciprocity from other nations, or favorable commercial terms 
from protectionist governments, and Dilke knew that it would 
be a feather in his cap if he could obtain a renewal of the 
French concessions. So eager Indeed was he about it that I 
distinctly remember saying to myself, half aloud, as we parted 
at the Gare du Nord: "That man means to sell Egypt for his 
Commercial Treaty." Nor did the event prove it otherwise 
than exactly a true prophecy. It will be seen a little later that 
to the trivial advantage of obtaining certain small reductions 
of the import duties levied on English goods in France, the 
whole issue of liberty in Egypt, and to a large extent of 
Mohammedan reform throughout the world, was sacrificed by 
our Liberal Government. But of all this in its place. 

My going at all to Cairo that winter was, as I have explained, 
somewhat fortuitous, providential I might almost say, if I was 
not afraid of giving my personal action in Egypt too much 
importance and too high a meaning. The ship which was to 
bring me out my servants and camp equipage, after nearly 
foundering in the Bay of Biscay, ran aground in the Canal 
and I was obliged to wait at Suez. I left it for Cairo, mean- 
ing to be there for a few days only. It had been reported in 
England that the Azhar Ulema had been won back from their 
ideas of reform and had adopted the Sultan's reactionary Pan- 
Islamic views. Half distrustful of the result, I sent a mes- 
sage to my first friend at the University, Sheykh Mohammed 
Khalil, and then another curious accident occurred. In answer 
to my note begging him to come and see me at the Hotel du Nil, 
where I had alighted, behold, instead of the young Alem whom 
I knew so well, another Azhar Sheykh of the same name, 
Sheykh Mohammed Khalil el Hajrasi, a perfect stranger who 
greeted me with a stranger's welcome. The newcomer had 
received my message, and, thinking it had come from a Europ- 
ean merchant with whom he had dealings in connection with 
his native village in the Sherkieh, had followed close upon the 
heels of the messenger. This Mohammed el Hajrasi, though 
a man of less intrinsic worth than my real friend, was a person 
of some importance at the Azhar, and proved to be perhaps of 
even more interest to me at the moment than the other could 
have been from the fact that he was intimate with the chiefs 
of what was then called the military party at Cairo and was 



124 Hajrasi Confidences 

personally acquainted with Arabi. This my own Mohammed 
Khalil was not, and, as I presently found, neither he nor his 
chief Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, would have served me as an 
intermediary with these, for, as already said, they had dis- 
approved of the immixture of the army in political affairs in 
September and, though rejoicing at the result, were still to a 
certain extent holding aloof. Hajrasi, however, when he had 
recovered from his surprise at finding me an Englishman and 
not the man he had expected, was nothing loath to talk of 
Arabi and his doings, and when I went on to explain my views 
to him of reform upon an Arab basis he at once became con- 
fidential and explained to me his own views which were not 
very different from mine. He was one of the principal 
Sheykhs, he told me, of the Shafeite rite, and had close relations 
with the Liberal party of reform at Mecca, who were then in 
avowed opposition to Abdul Hamid and were looking forward 
to a new Arabian Caliphate. This was a great point of sym- 
pathy between us, and it was not long before we had made a 
full exchange of our ideas; and I think no better proof could 
be given of the wonderful liberty of thought and speech which 
marked those days in Egypt than that this eminent religious 
Sheykh, who certainly a year before would have locked his 
secrets jealously in his bosom, even perhaps from a friend, 
should suddenly have thus unloosened his tongue in eloquent 
response to my questions and should have unfolded to me, a 
European and a complete stranger, his most dangerous as- 
pirations in politics. It no doubt, however, was in some part 
due to the presence with me of my learned Arabic professor, 
Sabunji, whom I had had the happy inspiration to bring with 
me from London to help out my poor resources of that lan- 
guage. 

It was thus from Hajrasi that I first learned the details of 
what had been going on at Cairo during the summer and the 
true position of the soldiers in regard to the National Party, 
facts which I soon after had confirmed to me from a number 
of other sources including my original friends, Mohammed 
Khalil and Mohammed Abdu. Sabunji, moreover, who had a 
real genius for this kind of work, was presently busy all the 
city over seeking out news for me, so fhat in a very few. days 
we knew between us pretty nearly everything that was going 



Scandals Denounced 125 

on. Nor were we long before we had made acquaintance with 
some of the fellah officers who had taken part with Arabi in 
the demonstration, especially with Ei'd Diab and Ali Fehmi, 
with whom I was pleasantly impressed. The matters being 
principally discussed at the moment were, first, the character of 
the Khedive — was he to be trusted, or was he not, to fulfil the 
promises he had given? He had promised a Constitution, but 
was this to be a real transfer of power to Ministers responsible 
to a Representative Chamber, or only the summoning of a 
Chamber of Notables with common consultative powers? 
Tewfik was mistrusted on this point, and it was generally 
believed that he was being advised to shuffle in this way out of 
his engagement by Malet who, as already said, had just come 
from Constantinople and had declared that the Sultan would 
never agree to real Constitutional government. 

The more advanced section of the Nationalists were bitter 
against the whole house of Mohammed Ali and especially of 
the branch of it to which Tewfik belonged, his father Ismail 
and his grandfather Ibrahim, a cruel and treacherous race which 
had brought untold woes upon the fellahin and had ruined the 
country morally and financially, and had, by their misconduct, 
brought about foreign intervention. Secondly, there was the 
question of reforms. Now that the Press was free, attacks 
were beginning to be made upon various gross abuses, the in- 
justice of the taxation which, under the foreign Financial 
Control, favoured Europeans at the expense of the native 
population; of the unnecessary multiplication of highly paid 
offices held by foreigners, French and English; of the hold 
obtained by these over the railway administration and the 
administration of the domains which had passed into the hands 
of representatives of the Rothschilds; of the scandal of £9,000 
a year subvention being granted still, in spite of the poverty of 
the land, to the European Opera House at Cairo. A campaign 
was being carried on, especially by the "Taif" newspaper, 
edited by a hot-headed young man of genius, Abdallah Nadim, 
against the brothels and wine-shops and disreputable cafes 
chantants which under protection of the "Capitulations" had 
invaded Cairo to the grief and anger of pious Moslems. 
There was an echo, too> of the bitterness felt by all Moham- 
medans just then on account of the French raid In Tunis where 



126 Election of the Sheykh el Islam 

it was affirmed that mosques had been profaned and Moslem 
women outraged. Nevertheless the feeling at Cairo between 
native Christian and native Mohammedan was altogether 
friendly. The Copts were as a rule wholly with the revolution, 
and their Patriarch was on the best of terms with the Ministry 
of which Butros Pasha was a prominent and respected mem- 
ber. Even the native Jews with their Chief Rabbi were all 
for the Constitutional reform. With the officers the point 
of principal concern was naturally that of the promised increase 
of the army, which they affirmed was necessary in view of 
what had taken place in Tunis, where the Bey had been found 
quite unprepared with a military force sufficient to defend his 
country. The legal maximum allowed by the Sultan's Firman 
in Egypt was 18,000 men and the army must be raised to that 
point. 

My earliest intervention in the affairs of the Nationalists 
of any active kind came about in this way. About the end 
of November my friend Sheykh Mohammed el Hajrasi In- 
formed me of an agitation which was going on among the 
students of the Azhar, especially those of the Shafeite and 
Malekite rites, to depose the actual Sheykh el Islam, or as he 
is more generally called, Shevkh el Jama, the head of the 
Hanefite rite, Mohammed el Abbasi. The reason given me for 
this was that, as a nominee of the Khedive, he could not be 
relied on to give an honest fetwa (legal opinion) as to the 
legality of constitutional government, and that it was believed 
that he would be made use of to refuse a fetwa in its favour 
and so give the Khedive an excuse for withdrawing from his 
full promise. The Hanefite rite has always been the Court 
rite in Egypt, the Turkish Viceroys, even since the time of 
Sultan Selim, having usurped the privilege of Court appoint- 
ment, and the Government has always named a Hanefite to 
the supreme religious office. At the same time by far the larger 
number of the students, who amount in all to some 15,000, 
have been and are of the other two rites, and an attempt was 
now to be made in accordance with the revolutionary ideas of 
the day to revert to the more ancient form of nomination, 
namely by general election. He had come, el Hajrasi said, 
to consult me about this because the idea was prevalent that 
Malet was behind the Khedive in the support he was giving 



/ Intervene with Malet 127 

to el Abbasi and in the plan of evading his constitutional prom- 
ise. The difficulty he thought I might be able to remove, if I 
went to Malet and used my influence with him in their favour. 
To this I very readily assented, and with the result that I 
found Malet entirely ignorant of the whole matter and quite 
ready to say that the religious disputes of the Ulema were 
outside his province, and that he should interfere on neither 
side. On the 5th of December, therefore, el Abbasi was by 
vote of the students deposed from his office and a Sheykh of the 
Shafeite rite, el Embabeh, named in his place. El Embabeh 
had not been the most popular candidate, for the majority of 
the students had been for the Malekite el Aleysh, a man of 
high courage and religious authority, who afterwards played 
a leading part during the war and died in the first months of 
the English occupation in prison, it is generally believed poi- 
soned from his outspoken evidence at the time of Arabi's trial. 
Embabeh, a man altogether his inferior, obtained the vote only 
as the result of a compromise, the Khedive having refused 
el Aleysh. Four thousand students voted at this election and 
there were only twenty-five dissentients. The little service 
thus rendered them gave my friends among the Nationalists 
confidence in my will and power to serve them, and they asked 
me to delay my departure and stay on at least some weeks to 
see them through their farther difficulties. To this I readily 
agreed, seeing in the development of a movement so congenial 
to my ideas work of the very kind that I was seeking and one 
in which I could be of real use, as interpreter of their perfectly 
legitimate ambitions, both with Malet at the Agency and at 
home with Gladstone. 

In the following few weeks I saw Malet almost daily, and 
acquired considerable influence over him. Though not un- 
sympathetic towards the Nationalists, I found him very ill 
informed as to their views and objects. He knew none of their 
leaders personally except Sherif Pasha, and depended in re- 
gard to the general drift of affairs on what Sherif and the 
Khedive thought fit to tell him. For what was passing in the 
street he had nobody on whom he could rely except his Greek 
dragoman Aranghi who picked up his news at the cafes of 
the European quarter. Thus he had little means of understand- 
ing the situation, nor was Sinkiewicz, his new French colleague. 



128 Sir William Gregory 

much better informed. Malet was also in terrible perplexity 
as to the real wishes of his own Government. Lord Gran- 
ville had just written him the well-known despatch of Novem- 
ber 4th, in which he had stated in vague terms the sympathy of 
Her Majesty's Government for reforms in Egypt. But this 
might mean almost anything, and was no guide as to the at- 
titude he should observe if any new conflict should arise be- 
tween the Khedive and the Nationalists, or between these united 
and the Financial Controllers. Above all he was in doubt as to 
Mr. Gladstone's mind in the affair of the Constitution. It 
was, therefore, a real relief to him to find in me some one who 
had a definite policy to suggest, and mine was very clearly that 
he should support the Nationalists. 

I was able, too, to assure him about Gladstone that he need 
not doubt that when the Prime Minister came to know the 
facts he must be on the Constitutional side. I received support, 
too, with Malet on this point from certain English friends of 
mine whom I found at Cairo, winter visitors, whom I was able 
to influence to my views. Among these the most prominent 
were two ex-Members of the House of Commons, Lord Hough- 
ton, who in early life had been an enthusiastic advocate of 
freedom in the East, and Sir William Gregory, an old follower 
of Gladstone's and a well-known Liberal. By the middle of 
December I had succeeded in bringing round nearly all the 
English element at Cairo to my view of the case. Even Sir 
Auckland Colvin, the English Financial Controller, who had 
three months before given the Khedive the heroic advice to 
shoot Arabi, professed himself converted and half inclined to 
come to terms with the revolution. 



CHAPTER VIII 

gAmbetta's policy, the joint note 

On the 6th of December ArabI, who up to this time had been 
in retirement at Ras-el-Wady, a military post close to Tel-el- 
Kebir, arrived at Cairo and on the 12th for the first time I 
saw him. He had hired a house close to his friend Ali Fehmi's, 
who was now wholly with him, and not far from the Abdin 
Barracks. It was in company, if I remember rightly, with 
Eld Diab, and taking Sabunji with me, that I went to him, it 
having been arranged beforehand that I should do so by some 
of our mutual friends. Arabi was at that time at the height 
of his popularity, being talked of through the length and 
breadth of Egypt as "El Wahid," the "only one," and people 
were flocking from all sides to Cairo to lay their grievances 
before him. His outer room was full of suppliants, as was 
indeed the entrance from the street, and this was every day 
the case. He had already heard of me as a sympathizer and 
friend of the fellah cause, and received me with all possible 
cordiality, especially, he told me, on account of what he had 
also heard, my family connection with Byron, whom, though 
he knew nothing of his poetry, he held in high esteem for his 
work for liberty in Greece. The point is worth noting, as it 
is very characteristic of Arabi's attitude towards humanity at 
large without distinction of race or creed. There was nothing 
in him of the fanatic, if fanaticism means religious hatred, and 
he was always ready to join hands in the cause of liberty with 
Jew, Christian, or infidel, notwithstanding his own, by no means 
lukewarm, piety. 

I talked to him long and without reserve on all the ques- 
tions of the day, and found him equally frank and plain spoken. 
Towards the Khedive he expressed his perfect loyalty "so 
long as he kept to his promises and made no attempt to baulk 

129 



130 First Talk with Arabl 

the Egyptians of their promised freedom." But It was clear 
that he did not wholly trust him, and considered It his duty to 
keep a strict eye over him lest he should swerve from the path. 
In a letter that I wrote soon after, 20th December, to Mr. 
Gladstone, when I had had several other conversations with 
him, I said of him: "The Ideas he expresses are not merely 
a repetition of the phrases of modern Europe, but are based on 
a knowledge of history and on the liberal tradition of Arabian 
thought, Inherited from the days when Mohammedanism was 
liberal. He understands that broader Islam which existed be- 
fore Mohammed, and the bond of a common worship of the 
one true God which unites his own faith with that of Judaism 
and Christianity. He disclaims, I believe, all personal ambi- 
tion, and there Is no kind of doubt that the army and country are 
devoted to him. . . . Of his own position he speaks with 
modesty. 'I am,' he says, 'the representative of the army be- 
cause circumstances have made the army trust me; but the 
army Itself Is but the representative of the people, Its guardian 
till such time as the people shall no longer need It. At present 
we are the sole national force standing between Egypt and Its 
Turkish rulers, who would renew at any moment, were they 
permitted, the iniquities of Ismail Pasha. The European Con- 
trol only partially provides against this, and makes no provision 
whatever by national education In self-government for the day 
when It shall abandon its financial trust. This we have to 
see to. We have won for the people their right to speak in an 
Assembly of Notables, and we keep the ground to prevent 
their being cajoled or frightened out of it. In this we work 
not for ourselves but for our children and for those that trust 
us. . . . We soldiers are for the moment in the position of those 
Arabs who answered the Caliph Omar when. In old age, he 
asked the people whether they were satisfied with his rule, and 
whether he had walked stralghtly In the path of justice. "O 
son of El Khattab," said they, "thou has Indeed walked 
stralghtly and we love thee. But thou knewest that we 
were at hand and ready. If thou hadst walked crookedly, to 
straighten thee with our swords." I trust that no such vio- 
lence will be needed. As Egyptians we do not love blood, and 
hope to shed none; and when our Parliament has learned to 
speak, our duty will be over. But until such time we are re- 



Arahi Explains his Position 131 

solved to maintain the rights of the people at any cost and we 
do not fear, with God's help, to justify our guardianship if need 
be against all who would silence them.' " 

This kind of language, so different from that usually used by 
Eastern politicians in their conversations with Europeans, im- 
pressed me very deeply, and I made a strong mental contrast 
between Arabi and that other champion of liberty whom I had 
met and talked with at Damascus, Midhat Pasha, altogether 
in Arabi's favour. Here was no nonsense about railroads and 
canals and tramways as nostrums that could redeem the East, 
but words that went to the root of things and fixed the responsi- 
bility of good government on the shoulders which alone could 
bear it. I felt that even in the incredulous and trifling atmos- 
phere of the House of Commons words like these would be 
listened to — if only they could be heard there ! 

With regard to the Sultan and the connection of Egypt with 
Turkey, Arabi was equally explicit. He had no love, he told 
me, for the Turks who had mis-governed Egypt for centuries, 
and he would not hear of interference from Constantinople in 
the internal affairs of the country. But he made a distinction 
between the Ottoman Government and the religious authority 
of the Sultan, whom, as Emir el Mumenin, he was bound, as 
long as he ruled justly, to obey and honour. Also the ex- 
ample of Tunis, which the French had first detached from the 
Empire, and then taken possession of, showed how necessary it 
was to preserve the connection of Egypt with the Head of the 
Moslem world. "We are all," he said, "children of the Sultan, 
and live together like a family in one house. But, just as In 
families, we have, each of us provinces of the Empire, our 
separate room which is our own to arrange as we will and 
where even the Sovereign must not wantonly intrude. Egypt 
has gained this Independent position through the Firmans 
granted, and we will take care that she preserves it. To ask 
for more than this would be to run a foolish risk, and perhaps 
lose our liberty altogether." ^ I asked him rather bluntly 
whether he had been, as was then currently asserted, In personal 
communication with Constantinople, and I noticed that he was re- 
served in answering and did so evasively. Doubtless the recol- 
lection of his conversation with Ahmed Ratib, of which I then 

^ Sir William Gregory, who saw Arabi about the same date as I did, has re- 
corded in the "Times" very similar language as used by him. 



132 The 'National Programme 

knew nothing, crossed his mind and caused his hesitation, but 
he did not allude to it. 

Finally we talked of the relations of Egypt with the Dual 
Government of France and England. As to this he admitted 
the good that had been done by freeing the country of Ismail 
and regularizing the finances, but they must not, he said, stand 
in the way of the National regeneration by supporting the 
Khedive's absolute rule or the old Circassian Pashas against 
them. He looked to England rather than to France for sym- 
pathy in their struggle for freedom, and especially to Mr. 
Gladstone, who had shown himself the friend of liberty every- 
where — this in response to what I had explained to him of 
Gladstone's views — but like everybody else just then at Cairo 
he distrusted Malet. I did what I could to ease his mind on 
this point, and so we parted. This first interview gave me 
so favourable an opinion of the fellah Colonel that I went 
immediately to my friend, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, to tell 
him how he had impressed me, and suggested that a program, 
in the sense of what Arabi had told me, ought to be drawn up 
which I might send to Mr. Gladstone, as I felt certain that if 
he knew the truth as to the National aspirations, in an authori- 
tative way, he could not fail to be impressed by it in a sense 
favourable to them. I spoke, too, to Malet on the same sub- 
ject, and he agreed that it might do good, and I consequently, 
in conjunction with Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and others of 
the civilian leaders, drew up, Sabunji being our scribe, a mani- 
festo embodying succinctly the views of the National party. 
This Mohammed Abdu took to Mahmud Pasha Sami, who was 
once again Minister of War, and gained his adhesion to it, and 
it was also shown to and approved by Arabi. This done I 
forwarded it, with Malet's knowledge and approval, to Glad- 
stone, explaining to him the whole situation and inviting his 
sympathy for a movement so very much in accordance with his 
avowed principles. "I cannot understand," I said, in conclud- 
ing my letter to Gladstone, "that these are sentiments to be 
deplored or actions to be crushed by an English Liberal Govern- 
ment. Both may be easily guided. And I think the lovers of 
Western progress should rather congratulate themselves on 
this strange and unlooked for sign of political life in a land 
which has hitherto been reproached by them as the least think- 



We Send It to the "Times*' 133 

ing portion of the stagnant East. You, sir, I think, once ex- 
pressed to me your belief that the nations of the East could only 
regenerate themselves by a spontaneous resumption of their 
lost national Will, and behold in Egypt that Will has arisen and 
is now struggling to find words which may persuade Europe of 
its existence," 

While sending this "Program of the National Party" to 
Gladstone, I also at the same time, by Sir William Gregory's 
advice, sent it to the "Times." Of this course Malet disap- 
proved as he thought it might complicate matters at Constanti- 
nople, an idea strongly fixed in his cautious diplomatic mind. 
But Gregory insisted that it ought to be published, as otherwise 
it might be pigeon-holed at Downing Street and overlooked; 
and I think he was right. Gregory was a personal friend of the 
then excellent editor of the "Times," Chenery, whose services 
to the National cause in Egypt at this date were very great. 
Chenery was a man of a large mind on Eastern affairs, being 
a considerable Arabic scholar, and had published a most ad- 
mirable English translation of the "Assemblies of Hariri"; and 
he was able thus to take a wider view of the Egyptian question 
than the common journalistic one that it was a question primarily 
concerning the London Stock Exchange — this although he was 
himself an Egyptian Bondholder. He consequently gave every 
prominence to the letters Gregory and I wrote to him during the 
next few months in support of the National movement, and to 
the last, even when the war came, continued that favour. In 
the present instance, indeed, Chenery somewhat overdid his 
welcome to our program, stating that it had been received from 
Arabi himself, an inaccuracy which enabled Malet, who knew the 
facts, to disown it through Reuter's Agency as an authentic 
document. 

It will perhaps be as well to explain here the way in which the 
London Press and especially Reuter's News Agency was at this 
time manipulated officially at Cairo and made subservient to 
the intrigues of diplomacy. Very few London newspapers had 
any regular correspondent in Egypt, the "Times" and the "Pall 
Mall Gazette" being, as far as I know, the only two that were 
thus provided. Both, as far as politics were concerned, were 
practically in the hands of Sir Auckland Colvin, the English 
Financial Controller, an astute Indian official, with the tradi- 



134 ^^^ English Press in Egypt 

tions of Indian diplomacy strongly developed in his political 
practice. He had some experience of journalism, having been 
connected with the "Pioneer" in India, an Anglo-Indian journal 
of pronounced imperialistic type with which he was still in 
correspondence. He was also Morley's regular correspondent 
in the "Pall Mall Gazette," and had through him the ear of 
the Government. The importance of this unavowed connection 
will be seen later when he made it his business to bring about 
English intervention. Lastly, on all important diplomatic 
matters he inspired the "Times," whose regular correspondent, 
Scott, depended on him for his information. With regard to 
Reuter and Havas, the Telegraphic Agencies, both were heavily 
subventioned by the Anglo-French Financial Control, receiv- 
ing £i,ooo a year each, charged on the thin resources of the 
Egyptian Budget. Reuter especially was the servant and 
mouthpiece of the English Agency, and the telegrams de- 
spatched to London were under Malet's censorship. This sort 
of manipulation of the organs of public news in the interests 
of our diplomacy exists in nearly all the capitals where our 
agents reside, and is a potent instrument for misleading the 
home public. The influence is not as a rule exercised by any di- 
rect payment, but by favour given in regard to secret and valu- 
able information, and also largely by social amenities. In 
Egypt it has always within my knowledge been supreme, ex- 
cept at moments of extreme crisis when the body of special 
Press correspondents at Cairo or Alexandria has been too 
numerous to be kept under official control. In ordinary times 
our officials have had complete authority both as to what news 
should be sent to London, and what news, received from London, 
should be published in Egypt. It is very necessary that this, 
the true condition of things, should be steadily borne in mind 
by historians when they consult the newspaper files of these 
years in search of information. 

Down, however, to near the end of the year 1881, except 
for this small difference of opinion, my relations with Malet 
remained perfectly and intimately friendly. He made me the 
confidant of his doubts and troubles, his anxiety to follow out 
the exact wishes of the Foreign Office, and his fears lest in so 
difficult a situation he should do anything which should not 
gain an official approval. He professed himself, and I think 



/ Mediate with the Soldiers 135 

he was, in full sympathy with my view of the National case, 
and he leaned on me as on one able, at any rate, to act as 
buffer between him and any new violent trouble while waiting a 
decision in Downing Street as to clear policy. Thus I find 
a note that on the 19th December I was asked by him and 
Sir Auckland Colvin, whose acquaintance I had now made and 
who affected views hardly less favourable than Malet's to the 
Nationalists, to help them in a difficulty they were in about 
the Army Estimates. 

It was the time of year when the new Budget was being 
drafted, and the Nationalist Minister of War, Mahmud Sami, 
had demanded £600,000 as the amount of the year's estimates 
for his department. It was an increase of I forget how many 
thousand pounds over the estimate of 1881, and was necessitated, 
Mahmud Sami said, by the Khedive's promise of raising the 
army to the full number of men allowed by the Firman, 18,000. 
The Minister had explained his insistence on the plea that a 
refusal would or might cause a new military demonstration, 
the bug-bear of those days; and I was asked to find out what 
sum the army would really be satisfied with for their estimates. 
Colvin authorized me to go as far as £522,000, and to tell 
Arabi and the officers that it was financially impossible to give 
more. He had no objection, he said, to the army's being in- 
creased so long as the estimates were not exceeded. He 
thought, however, the sum proposed would suffice for an In- 
crease up to 15,000 men. I consequently went to Arabi and 
argued the matter with him and others of the officers; and 
persuaded them, on my assurance that Colvin's word could be 
trusted, to withdraw all further objection. They said they 
would accept the increased sum of £522,000 as sufficient, and 
make it go as far in the increase of soldiers as it could. They 
meant to economize, they said. In other ways, and hoped to 
get their full complement of men out of the balance. They 
promised me, too, on this occasion to have patience and make 
no further armed demonstrations, a promise which to the end 
they faithfully fulfilled. Arabi's last words to me on this oc- 
casion were "men \sabber dhafer" "he who has patience conr 
quers." I sent a note the same day to Colvin informing him 
of the result, and I was also thanked by Malet for having 
helped them both out of a considerable difficulty. 



136 Malefs Complaint of Me to Foreign Office 

Nevertheless Malet, about a week later, surprised me one 
afternoon, 28'th December, when I had been playing lawn 
tennis with him, as I often did at the Agency, by showing 
me the draft of a despatch he had just sent to the Foreign 
Office mentioning my visit to Egypt and the encouragement 1 
had given to the Nationalists, and without mentioning 
what I had done to help him, complaining only of my 
having sent the Program against his wishes to the "Times." 
As we had up to that moment been acting in perfect cor- 
diality together, and nothing whatever had occurred beyond 
the publication of the manifesto, I took him pretty roundly 
to task for his ill faith in concealing my other services rendered 
to his diplomacy, and insisted that he should cancel this mis- 
leading despatch, and with such energy that he wrote in my 
presence a cancelling telegram, and also a second despatch re- 
pairing in some measure the injustice he had done me. I have 
never quite understood what Malet's motive was in this curi- 
ous manoeuvre. I took it at the time to be a passing fit of 
jealousy, a dislike to the idea that it should be known at the 
Foreign Office that he owed anything to me in the compara- 
tively good relations he had succeeded in establishing with the 
Nationalists; but on reflection I have come to the conclusion, 
as one more in accordance with his cautious character, that he 
was merely guarding himself officially against public responsi- 
bility of any kind being fixed on him for my Nationalist views, 
should these be condemned in Downing Street. It is the more 
likely explanation because his private conscience evidently 
pricked him about it to the extent of avowing to me what he had 
officially done. The Insincerity, however, though repented of, 
was a warning to me which I did not forget, and while I con- 
tinued for some weeks more to go to the Agency It was always 
with a feeling of possible betrayal at Malet's hands. I was 
ready, nevertheless, to help him, and It was not long before 
he was again obliged, by the extreme circumstances of his polit- 
ical isolation at Cairo, to resort to my good offices, and, finding 
himself In flood water altogether beyond his depth, to send 
me once more as his messenger of peace to ArabI and the other 
Nationalist leaders. 

All had gone well so far, as far as any of us knew, in the 
political situation at Cairo down to the end of the year, and 



The Chamber of Delegates 137 

during the first week of the new year, 1882. There was a 
good understanding now between all parties in Egypt, the army 
was quiescent, the Press was moderate under Mohammed Ab- 
du's popular censorship, and the Nationalist Ministers, undis- 
turbed by menace from any quarter, were preparing the draft 
of the Organic Law which was to give the country its civil 
liberties. On the 26th of December, the Chamber of Dele- 
gates summoned to discuss the articles of the promised Con- 
stitution had met at Cairo, and had been opened formally with 
a reassuring speech by the Khedive in person, whose attitude 
was so changed for the better towards the popular movement 
that Malet was able, on the 2nd of January, to write home to 
Lord Granville: "I found His Highness, for the first time 
since my return in September, cheerful in mood and taking a 
hopeful view of the situation. The change was very notice- 
able. His Highness appears to have frankly accepted the 
situation." Arabi had ceased to busy himself personally with 
the redress of grievances, and it had been arranged with the 
approval of the French and English agents that Arabi should, 
as they expressed it, "regularize" his position and accept the 
responsibility of his acknowledged political influence by taking 
office as Under-Secretary at the War Office. This it had been 
thought would be putting the dangerous free lance in uniform 
and securing him to the cause of order. 

The only doubtful point was now the attitude of the Depu- 
ties in regard to the details of the Constitution they had been 
assembled to discuss; and the majority of them, as were my 
reforming friends at the Azhar, seemed disposed to moderation. 
"We have waited," said Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, "so many 
hundred years for our freedom that we can well afford now to 
wait some months." Certainly at that date Malet and Colvin, 
and I think also Sinkiewicz, were favourably disposed to the 
claim of the Nationalists to have a true Parliament. They 
had begun to see that it was the universal national desire, and 
would act as a safety-valve for ideas more dangerous. A 
frank public declaration of goodwill at that moment on the part 
of the English and French Governments towards the popular 
hopes would have secured a workable arrangement between 
the Nationalist Government and the Dual Control, which would 
have safeguarded the bondholders' interests no less than it would 



138 WLalet Favours the Nationalists 

have secured to Egypt Its liberty. Nor did we think that this 
would be long delayed. 

On the first day of the New Year the National Program 
I had sent to Mr. Gladstone was published in the "Times," 
with a leading article and approving comments, and in spite 
of Malet's prognostication of evil had been well received in 
Europe, and even at Constantinople where it had drawn down 
no kind of thunderbolt. Its tone was so studiously moderate, 
and Its reasoning so frank and logical that it seemed Impossible 
the position In Egypt should any longer be misunderstood. Es- 
pecially in England, with an immense Liberal majority in the 
House of Commons, and Mr. Gladstone at the head of affairs. 
It was almost inconceivable that It should not be met in a friendly 
spirit — quite Inconceivable to us who were waiting anxiously 
for Gladstone's answer at Cairo, that at that very moment the 
English Foreign Office should be proceeding to acts of menace 
and the language of armed Intervention. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, though none of us, not even Malet, at the time knew it, 
the decision, adverse to the Egyptian hopes, had already been 
half taken. The program reached Mr. Gladstone, as nearly 
as I can calculate it, a fortnight too late. We were all expect- 
ing a message of peace, when, like thunder in a clear sky, the 
ill-omened Joint Note of January 6th, 1882, was launched upon 
us. It upset all our hopes and calculations and threw back 
Egypt once more into a sea of troubles. 

It is right that the genesis of this most mischievous document, 
to which Is directly due the whole of the misfortunes during the 
year, with the loss to Egypt of her liberty, to Mr. Gladstone 
of his honour, and to France of her secular position of Influence 
on the Nile, should be truly told. Something regarding It 
may be learned from the published documents, both French 
and English, but only Indirectly, and not all; and I am perhaps 
the only person not officially concerned in Its drafting who am 
In a position to put all the dots with any precision on the i's. 
In Egypt it has not unnaturally been supposed that, because 
in the event It turned to the advantage of English aggression. It 
was therefore an Instrument forged for its own purposes at our 
Foreign Office, but In reality the reverse Is true and the note was 
drafted not in Downing Street but at the Quai d'Orsay, and In 



The Joint Note Published 139 

the interests, so far as these were political — for they were also 
financial — of French ambition. 

I have told already how I travelled with Sir Charles Dilke 
from London to Paris, and of our conversation on the way 
and of the impression left on me by it that he would "sell Egypt 
for his Commercial Treaty" ; and this is precisely what in fact 
had happened. The dates as far as I can fix them were these : 
On the 15th of November St. Hilaire had gone out of office, 
and had been succeeded by Gambetta, who found himself faced 
with a general Mohammedan revolt against the French Govern- 
men in Tunis and Algeria. He was alarmed at the Pan-Islamic 
character it was taking, and attributed it largely to the Sultan 
Abdul Hamid's propaganda, and he thought he saw the same 
influence at work in the National movement in Egypt, as well 
as the intrigues of Ismail, Halim, and others. France had 
been traditionally hostile to the sovereign claims of the Porte 
in North Africa, and Gambetta came into office determined to 
thwart and deal with them by vigorous measures. He was 
besides, through his Jewish origin, closely connected with the 
haute finance of the Paris Bourse, and was intimate with the 
Rothschilds and other capitalists, who had their millions in- 
vested in Egyptian Bonds. Nubar Pasha and Rivers Wilson 
were then both living at Paris, and his close friends and advisers 
in regard to Egyptian matters, and It was from them that he 
took his view of the situation. 

He had, therefore, not been more than a few days In office 
before he entered Into communication with our Foreign Office, 
with the object of getting England to join him in vigorous ac- 
tion against the National movement, as a crusade of civilization 
and a support to the established order at Cairo of Financial 
things. In London at the same time there was a strong desire 
to get the Commercial Treaty, which was about to expire, re- 
newed with France as speedily as possible, and advantage was 
taken at the Foreign Office of Sir Charles Dllke's personal In- 
timacy with the new French Premier to get the negotiation for 
it finished. A commission for this purpose, of which Dilke and 
Wilson were the two English members, had been sitting at Paris 
since the month of May, and so far without result. Dllke's 
visit to Paris was in connection with both matters, and was re- 
solved on within a week of Gambetta's accession to power. 



140 Genesis of the Joint Note 

Reference to newspapers of that date, November 1881, will 
show that the negotiations between the two Governments about 
the Commercial Treaty were just then in a highly critical state, 
and it was even reported that they had been broken off. Dilke's 
presence, however, gave them new life, or at least prevented 
their demise. Between the 22nd of November and the 15th 
of December he passed to and fro between the two capitals; 
and at the latter date we find Gambetta (Blue Book Egypt 5, 
1882, page 21) approaching Lord Lyons, our Ambassador 
at Paris, with a proposal to take common action in Egypt. He 
considers it to be "extremely important to strengthen the author- 
ity of Tewfik Pasha; every endeavour should be made to in- 
spire him with confidence in the support of France and England, 
and to infuse into him firmness and energy. The adherents of 
Ismail and Halim and the Egyptians generally should be made 
to understand that France and England would not acquiesce 
in his being deposed. ... It would be advisable to cut short 
the intrigues of Constantinople," etc. This language Is com- 
municated by Lord Lyons to the Foreign Office, and on the 
19th Lord Granville "agrees in thinking that the time has come 
when the two Governments should consider what course had 
better be adopted," etc. Thus encouraged, Gambetta on the 
24th proposes to take occasion of the meeting of the Egyptian 
Notables to make "a distinct manifestation of union between 
France and England so as to strengthen the position of Tewfik 
Pasha and discourage the promoters of disorder." The Egyp- 
tian Chamber meets on the 26th, and on the 28th Dilke, who 
has returned the day before to Paris, has a long conversation 
with Gambetta about the Treaty of Commerce ("Times)," 
while on precisely the same day Lord Granville agrees to give 
"assurance to Tewfik Pasha of the sympathy and support of 
France and England, and to encourage His Highness to main- 
tain and assert his proper authority." 

This identity of date alone suffices to fix the connection be- 
tween the two negotiations, and shows the precise moment at 
which the fatal agreement was come to, and that my communi- 
cation of the National Program to Gladstone, which was posted 
on the 20th, must have been just too late to prevent the dis- 
aster. Letters then took a week to reach London, and Glad- 
stone was away for the Christmas holidays, and cannot have 



TFilson on the Joint Note 141 

had time, however much he may have been inclined to do so, to 
forward it on to the Foreign Office. Our Government thus 
committed to Gambetta's policy, Gambetta on the 31st (Blue 
Book Egypt 5, 1882) presents to Lyons the draft, drawn 
up with his own hand, of the Joint Note to be despatched to 
Cairo in the sense of his previous communication of the 24th — 
and, be it noted, on the same day negotiations for a renewal of 
the Commercial Treaty are announced as formally renewed. 
On the I St of January the Paris correspondent of the "Times" 
sends a precis of the Joint Note to London, explaining that he 
only now forwards it, having been instructed by M. Gambetta 
only to divulge it "at the proper moment." This is understood 
to mean the final success of Dilke's commercial mission, and the 
following day, 2nd January, he returns to London. I trace, 
nevertheless, the influence of my appeal to Gladstone in the de- 
lay of five days, still made by Granville before he unwillingly 
signs the Note, and the reservation he stipulates for on the part 
of Her Majesty's Government that "Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment must not be considered as committing themselves thereby 
to any particular mode of action," a postscript typical of Gran- 
ville's character, and, as I think too, of a conflict in ideas, after- 
wards very noticeable, between the Foreign Office, pushed on 
by Dilke, and Gladstone as Prime Minister. 

Such is the evidence which, intelligently read, can be gathered 
from the published documents of the day. I have, however, 
a letter from Sir Rivers Wilson dated a few days later, 13th 
January, in answer to one of mine, which explains in a few words 
the whole situation. "I am above all pleased," he writes, 
"at the interest you are taking in Egyptian politics. You con- 
firm what I believe to be the case in two particulars at least, 
viz., that the soldiers express the feeling of the population, 
and that Tewfik has been working with the Sultan. As regards 
the latter circumstance I must say there is nothing surprising in 
it. Six weeks ago Gambetta said to me, 'Le Khedive est aux 
genoux du Sultan.' But the reason is plain. Tewfik is weak 
and cowardly. His army is against him. The Harems hate 
him. He found no support there where he naturally might have 
looked for it, viz., at the hands of the English and French 
Governments, and so he turned to the only quarter where sym- 
pathy and perhaps material assistance were forthcoming. It 



142 French Invasion Feared 

was to remedy this state of things that the Idea of the Joint 
Declaration was conceived, whatever gloss or subsequent ex- 
planation may be now put forward, and I shall be disappointed 
if it does not produce the desired effect and cause the officers, 
Ulemas, and Notables to understand that renewed disturbance 
means armed intervention in Europe, Our Government may 
not like it, but they are bound now by formal engagement to 
France and cannot withdraw." 

This letter, coming from Wilson at Paris, holding the official 
position there he did, and being, as he was, on Intimate terms 
both with Dilke and Gambetta, is a document of the highest 
historical importance, and fixes beyond the possibility of doubt 
on the French Government the initiative In the designed Inter- 
vention, though the Yellow Books also are not altogether silent. 
These, though most defective in their information, do not hide 
Gambetta's initial responsibility. I heard at the time, and I 
believe that the form of joint intervention he designed for 
Egypt was that England should demonstrate with a fleet at 
Alexandria while France should land troops. Had that come 
to pass we cannot doubt that French Influence would now be 
supreme in Egypt. It was only frustrateed that winter by the 
accident of Gambetta's unlooked-for fall from power by an 
adverse vote on some domestic matter In the Chamber at the 
end of the month, for Gladstone at that time was far too 
averse from violent measures to have sent an English fleet 
with a French army, and the landing of troops would have been 
certainly needed. 

There is more than one moral to be drawn from this historic 
episode, and the most instructive Is, perhaps, the fact that 
neither of the two Ministers, with all their cleverness and In 
spite of their apparent success each in his own scheme, really 
efl^ected his purpose. Gambetta and Granville in the first 
weeks of January doubtless plumed themselves on having gained 
an Important object and strengthened the friendly link between 
their two Governments by a common agreement. Gambetta 
had got his note, Granville his treaty. But neither rogue was 
really able to bring home his booty. Gambetta, though he 
exerted all his influence with the Chamber to get the Commer- 
cial Treaty with England renewed, failed to obtain a major- 
ity and the treaty lapsed, and with it the Liberal argument that 



Arabics Anger 143 

Free Trade was not isolating England. On the other hand, 
though he had got Granville unwillingly to sign the Note, which 
he intended to use for the glory of France, Gambetta found 
that he had forged a weapon which he could not himself wield 
and which within six months passed into his rival's hand, while 
the friendly arrangement proved almost as soon as it was 
come to, to be the destruction of all cordial feeling between the 
two nations for close on a generation. Personally, in the dis- 
appointment of the two intriguers and the rival interest of the 
two nations, I am able to hold a detached attitude. What 
seems to me tragic in the matter is that for the sake of their 
paltry ambitions and paltrier greeds a great national hope was 
wrecked, and the cause of reform for a great religion postponed 
for many years. The opportunity of good thrown away by 
the two statesmen between them can hardly recur again in an- 
other half century. 

The effect of Gambetta's menace to the National Party was 
disastrous at Cairo to the cause of peace. I was with Malet 
soon after the note arrived, and he gave it me to read and 
asked me what I thought of it. I said: "They will take it as 
a declaration of war." He answered: "It is not meant in a 
hostile sense," and explained to me how it might be interpreted 
in a way favourable to the National hopes. He asked me to 
go to the Kasr el Nil and persuade Arabi, who had just been 
made Under-Secretary of War, to accept it thus, authorizing 
me to say, "that the meaning of the Note as understood by the 
British Government was that the English Government would 
not permit any interference of the Sultan with Egypt, and 
would also not allow the Khedive to go back from his promises 
or molest the Parliament." He also told me, though he did 
not authorize me to repeat this on his authority, that he hoped 
to get leave to add to the Note a written explanation in the 
sense just given. I know that he telegraphed repeatedly for 
some such permission, and that he wrote strongly condemning 
the note as impolitic and dangerous. Not a word, however, 
of these important protests and requests is to be found in the 
Blue Books, though the Blue Books show that Lord Granville 
must have paid attention to them to the extent of expressing 
himself willing to give some such explanation of the Note but 
being prevented from doing so by Gambetta. Sinkiewicz seems 



144 I Deliver Malefs Message 

also to have asked his Government to be allowed to explain the 
Note, but was forbidden. Sir Audkland Colvin, too, con- 
demned the Note in conversation with me quite as strongly as 
Malet had done. 

I went accordingly to the Kasr el Nil about noon on the 9th 
(the text of the Note had reached us on the 8th) and found 
Arabi alone in his official room. For the first and only time 
I have seen him so, he was angry. His face was like a thunder- 
cloud, and there was a peculiar gleam in his eye. He had seen 
the text of the Note though it had not been published — indeed, 
it had only as yet been telegraphed — and I asked him how 
he understood it.. "Tell me, rather," he said, "how you under- 
stand it." 1 then delivered my mjessagej. He said: ""Sir 
Edward Malet must really think us children who do not know 
the meaning of words." "In the first place," he said, "it is 
the language of menace. There is no clerk in this office who 
would use such words with such a meaning." He alluded to the 
reference to the Notables made in the first paragraph of the 
Note. "That," he said, "is a menace to our liberties." Next, 
the declaration that French and English policy were one meant 
that, as France had invaded Tunis, so England would invade 
Egypt. "Let them come," he said, "every man and child in 
Egypt will fight them. It is contrary to our principles to 
strike the first blow, but we shall know how to return it." 
Lastly, as to the guarantee of Tewfik Pasha's throne. "The 
throne," he said, "if there is one, is the Sultan's. The Khedive 
needs no foreign guarantees. You may tell me what you will, 
but I know the meaning of words better than Mr. Malet 
does." In truth, Malet's explanation was nonsense, and I 
felt a fool before Arabi and ashamed of having made myself 
the bearer of such rubbish. But I assured him I had delivered 
the message as Sir Edward had given it me. "He asks you 
to believe it," I said, "and I ask you to believe him." At leav- 
ing he softened, took me by the arm to lead me down and in- 
vited me still to come as before to his house. I said: "I 
shall only come back when I have better news for you," by 
which I intended to hint at a possible explanation of the Note 
such as Malet had telegraphed for permission to give. None 
however came. Nor did I see Arabi again till more than three 
weeks later, when a letter from Mr. Gladstone reached me 



I 

i 



A French Force at Toulon 145 

which I interpreted in a more hopeful sense and which caused 
us great rejoicing. 

On returning to the Residency, Malet asked me how I had 
fared. "They are irreconcilable now," I answered. "The 
Note has thrown them into the arms of the Sultan." Such 
indeed was the effect, and not with the soldiers alone, but as 
soon as the Note was published with all sections of the National 
Party, even with the Khedive. Gambetta, if he had expected 
to strengthen Tewfik's hands, had missed his mark entirely. 
The timid Khedive was only frightened, and the Nationalists, 
instead of being frightened, were enraged. The Egyptians for 
the first time found themselves quite united. Sheykh Moham- 
med Abdu and the cautious Azhar reformers from that point 
threw in their lot wholly with the advanced party. All, even 
the Circassians, resented the threat of foreign intervention, and 
on the other hand the most anti-Turkish of the Nationalists, 
such as my friend Hajrasi, saw that Arabi had been right in 
secretly leaning upon the Sultan. Arabi thus gained immensely 
in popularity and respect, and for many days after this I hardly 
heard anything from my Egyptian friends but the language of 
Pan-Islamism. It was a Roustan ^ policy over again, they said. 

I did my best to smooth down matters with them till the ex- 
planation should arrive which Malet had promised us; but I 
found my efforts useless. It was an alarming three weeks for 
us all, from the delivery of the Note till Gambetta's fall. News 
come that a French force was being assembled for embarkation 
at Toulon, and that was the form of intervention generally ex- 
pected. Indeed, I think it is not too much to say that Gam- 
betta's resignation on 31st January alone saved Egypt from the 
misfortune, even greater perhaps than what afterwards befell 
her, of a French invasion avowedly anti-Mohammedan and in 
purely European interests. 

1 Roustan was the French diplomatist at Tunis who had engineered the French 
designs on the Regency. 



CHAPTER IX 



FALL OF SHERIF PASHA 



The political crisis at Cairo, by the middle of January, was 
evidently approaching fast. Indeed it had become inevitable. 
The publication of the Joint Note happened to coincide with the 
drafting of the new Leyha or Organic Law, which was to define 
the power of the Representative Chamber in the promised Par- 
liament. In regard to this, the Financial Controllers had been 
insisting with the Ministry that the power they had been exercis- 
ing for the last two years of drawing up the yearly Budget, ac- 
cording to their own view of the economic requirements of the 
country, should remain intact, that is to say, that it should not 
be subject to discussion or a vote in the Chamber; and to this 
Sherif Pasha had agreed, and had already drafted his project 
of law without assigning to the Chamber any right in money 
matters. The majority of the delegates, however, were not 
unnaturally dissatisfied at this, arguing that the Foreign Finan- 
cial Control, having its sole status in the country as guardian o^ 
the foreign obligations, and as the interest on the debt amounted 
only to one-half of the revenue, the remaining half ought to be 
at the disposal of the nation. 

Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that the point 
would not have been conceded by them, especially as Sultan 
Pasha, who had been named their President, was with Sherif 
in considering it prudent to yield, had things remained during the 
month as they were at the beginning. It has been seen how 
readily the War Office had come to terms with the Controllers 
in the matter of the Army Estimates. Now, however, under 
the menace of the Note, the Notables wej*e no longer in a mood 
of conciliation, and met Sherif's draft with a counterdraft of 
their own, adding a number of new articles to the Leyha, largely 
extending the Parliamentary powers, and subjecting the half of 

146 



Anger of the Delegates 147 

the Budget not affected to the interest of the debt to vote by 
the Chamber. This brought the Controllers into active con- 
flict with them, M. de Blignieres taking the lead in it and bring- 
ing Colvin into line with him. The Controllers declared it 
absolutely necessary that the Budget should remain whole and 
undivided in their hands, and denounced the counter-draft as 
being a pro^ject, not of a Parliament, but of a "Convention." 
The phrase, founded on memories of the French Revolution, 
was doubtless de Blignieres', but it was adopted by Colvin, and 
pressed by him on Malet. The dispute was a serious one, and 
might lead to just such mischief as Malet feared, and give excuse 
to the French Government for the intervention it was seeking. 
Sherif having already committed himself to the Controllers' 
view, was being persuaded by them to stand firm, and the Khe- 
dive's attitude was doubtful. A quarrel between the Khedive 
and his Parliament on a financial question involving European 
bondholding interests was just such a case as the French Gover- 
nment — for Gambetta was still in office — might be expected to 
take advantage of for harm. 

In this emergency Malet — and Colvin, who though he wished 
to get his way as Financial Controller had no mind for Frenth 
intervention — joined in asking me yet once again to help them, 
and to make a last effort to induce the extreme party among the 
Notables to yield something of their pretensions, and after con- 
sultation with Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who as usual was for 
prudence and conciliation, it was arranged that I should have a 
private conference at his house with a deputation from them, 
and argue the case with them, and show them the probable con- 
sequences of their resistance — namely, armed intervention. Ac- 
cordingly, I got up the case of the Controllers with Colvin, and 
drew up with Malet the different points of the argument I was 
to use. These I have by me in a paper headed, "Notes of what 
I have to say to the Members of the Egyptian Parliament, 17th 
January, 1882." 

According to this my instructions were to represent to the 
Members of the Deputation that the existing procedure re- 
specting the Budget was an international affair, which neither 
Sherif nor the Parliament had any right to touch without 
gaining the consent of the two controlling Governments. I 
was to recite the history of the Control's establishment, and 



148 My Mediation with the 'Delegates 

show them a private Note which had been appended by Malet 
and Monge (the French Consul-General) , 15th November, 
1879, to the Decree instituting it. I was to invite the members 
to consider whether an alteration in the form of determining 
the Budget was not an international matter, and, as such, outside 
the sphere of their action. They had admitted that interna- 
tional matters must be left untouched by them. The control 
of the Budget was an international matter. Therefore it should 
be left untouched by them. I was, however, authorized by 
Colvin to say that personally he had no objection to a slight 
modification of the present arrangement, such as should give the 
Parliament a consultative voice which might later become a 
right of voting. Should they accept such a compromise, Malet 
would represent the matter favourably to his Gbvernment, 
though he had no authority to promise its acceptance by France 
or England. All other differences with Sherif they must set- 
tle with him themselves, etc., etc. 

On this basis, with Sabunji's help and Mohammed Abdu's, I 
argued the case thoroughly with them, and convinced myself that 
there was no possibility of their yielding. They agreed, indeed, 
to modify three or four of the articles which the Controllers 
had principally objected to as giving the Chamber powers of a 
"Convention," and the amendments I proposed in these were 
in fact incorporated later in the published Leyha. But on the 
Article of the Budget they were quite obdurate, notwithstand- 
ing the support Sheykh Mohammed Abdu gave me. They would 
not yield a line of it, and I returned crestfallen to report my 
failure, nor did I again undertake any mission of mediation be- 
tween Malet and the Nationalists. I had done my best to help 
him to a peaceful solution of his difficulties, but our points of 
view from this time forth became too divergent for me any 
longer to be able to work with him. Although I had done my 
very best to persuade the Notables to give way — for I was then 
firmly convinced that they were menaced with intervention — I 
could not help in my inner mind agreeing with them in their 
claim of controlling the free half of the Budget as a sound one, 
if Parliamentary Government was to be a reality for them, not 
a sham. Malet's despatches of the time show that they were 
all of one mind on this point, and even Sultan Pasha, wiho was 
a timid man and easily frightened, declared roundly that Sherif's 



I Talk with Sherif Pasha 149 

draft was "like a drum; it made a great sound but was hollow 
inside." As between Sherif and the Notables in the quarrel 
which followed, my anti-Turkish sympathies put me on their side 
rather than on his. At Malet's suggestion I had a little be- 
fore called on Sherif and had discussed the matter with him, 
and had been unfavourably impressed. 

Sherif was a Europeanized Turk of good breeding and ex- 
cellent manners, but with all that arrogant contempt of the 
fellahin which distinguished his class in Egypt. Malet had a 
high opinion of him because he was a good French scholar and 
so was easy to deal with in the ordinary diplomatic way, but 
to me he showed himself for this very reason in disa- 
greeable contrast with the sincere and high-minded men who were 
the real backbone of the National movement, and for whom he 
expressed nothing but the superior scorn of a fine French gentle- 
man. He was cheerfully convinced of his own fitness to govern 
them and of their incapacity. "The Egyptians," he told me, 
"are children and must be treated like children. I have offered 
them a Constitution which is good enough for them, and if they 
are not content with It they must do without one. It was I 
who created the National Party, and they will find that they 
cannot get on without me. These peasants want guidance." 
When, therefore, a fortnight later the quarrel became an open 
one between him and them I had no difficulty in deciding which 
way my sympathies lay. 

I was no longer at Cairo when the news of Sherif's resigna- 
tion on the 2nd of February reached me. The failure of my 
negotiation, just described, with the Notables, had depressed my 
spirits. I felt that by undertaking it I had risked much of 
my popularity with my European friends, and that they perhaps 
distrusted me for the pains I had taken to convince them against 
a course on which their hearts were set; and I had retired to a 
distance from the conflict which I could no longer control or help 
in to any good purpose. While living at the Hotel du Nil during 
the winter I had all the time had a camp with tents and cameis 
and attendant Arabs, pitched outside the city, to which I had 
occasionally gone, and now I retired to it altogether. The 
camp was pitched on the desert land between Koubba Pal^ace 
and Matarieh, then a wholly desert region at a point now called 
Zeitoun, where there were the insignificant ruins of what had 



150 / Retire to My Camp 

once been a shaduf, the sole sign of human habitation. Here 
we were completely alone, except that at the distance of a mile 
there was another camp, that of Prince Ahmed, outside Mate- 
rieh. There was no communication then by any form of pubHc 
conveyance with Cairo, and when at rare intervals we went in, 
we rode our camels to a point between Abbassiyeh and Faggalah 
where donkeys were to be hired. There was not a single house 
on the sands beyond Abbassiyeh to the north-east. For a mo- 
ment thus I was able to forget politics and to enjoy what I have 
always loved best, life in the open air. I had, however, ren- 
dered a last service to my friends by writing a warm defence of 
the Egyptian National policy in the "Times." To this I was 
urged by my friend, Sir William Gregory, who had himself sent 
more than one powerful letter in the siame sense to what was 
then emphatically the leading journal of Europe. 

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance a letter on 
any subject had in those days when published by the "Times," 
and the certainty there was, if it was on any political question, of 
its being read by the statesmen concerned and treated with full 
attention. Nor is it, perhaps, too much to say that Gregory's 
letters and mine, especially his, were largely the means of ob- 
taining a respite for Egypt from the dangers that threatened 
her. As they came back to Cairo and were reproduced in Ara- 
bic by the native Press, our Egyptian friends were reassured 
about us and their confidence in me revived. It was at the ex- 
pense, however, of Malet's goodwill. Like all diplomatists he 
hated publicity, and he was angry with us both because we, who 
had both been in the Government service, had appealed as it 
were over the head of the Foreign Office and his own to the 
Press. With the regular Press correspondents he knew how to 
deal, but he could not deal with us who were independent writ- 
ers, or exercise the smallest censorship on our opinions. There 
was an end therefore to the close intimacy I had, up to that 
point, in spite of small disagreements, had with the Agency. 
This was unfortunate, as it threw Malet, who always needed 
to lean on some one stronger than himself, into other and less 
conciliatory hands. 

On the 31st of January, the very day of the change of 
Ministry at Paris, I (find a note to the effect that I went in tlq 
Cairo and saw Colvin and had a remarkable conversation with 



Talk with Colvin 151 

him. This has become of great historical importance through 
subsequent events, for it marks the date within a few days of 
the change of the temper of the English Financial Control, and 
with it of our diplomacy towards Egyptian Nationalism, and 
also fixes upon Colvin, what is indeed his due, the chief re- 
sponsibility of the rupture which afterwards through his con- 
triving came about. I have already said something of S?r 
Auckland Colvin's character. He was a typical Anglo-Indian 
official, strong, self-reliant, hard, with the tradition of methods 
long practised in India, but which were still new to our Euro- 
pean diplomacy, endowed with just enough sympathy with Orien- 
tal character to make use of it, without loving it, for English 
purposes; but cold in manner and unattractive. I had at an 
earlier stage of affairs taken Sheykh Mohammed Abdu to call on 
him, thinking to bring about a rapprochement, and I had also 
tried to do the same with the officers. But his manner had 
repelled the Sheykh, and the officers had been too shy to come 
with me. He was sometimes astonishingly frank in speech. I 
remember his telling me, on one occasion, when we were talk- 
ing of Eastern duplicity, that it was a mistake to suppose 
that in this Orientals were our masters. An Englishman who 
knew the game, he said, could always beat them at their own 
weapons, and they were mere children in deceit when it came 
to a contest with us. 

In the present instance he was more than usually outspoken. 
The quarrel between the Notables and Sherif was at its acutest 
stage; and I asked him what he thought of the situation. He 
said he considered it most grave. It was evident that the Na- 
tionalists were resolved upon the fall of Sherif, and, if they suc- 
ceeded, he (Colvin) would have no more to do with them. He 
told me he had completely changed his mind about them. He 
had thought them amenable to reason, but he found them quite 
impracticable, and he would do his best to ruin them if ever 
they came into office. I asked him how he proposed to do this, 
or stop a movement which he had so lately approved, but which 
had gone quite beyond his or anybody's control — how, except 
by that very intervention we had all along been trying to avoid. 
He said he had changed his mind about intervention too; tha!t 
he believed it now to be necessary and Inevitable, and that he 
would spare no pains to bring It about. I expostulated with him, 



152 La Haute Politique 

urging that intervention meant only war and war meant only an- 
nexation. He said he quite understood it in that sense. The 
same thing had been seen over and over again in India. England 
would never give up the footing she had got in Egypt, and it was 
useless to talk about the abstract rights and wrongs of the Egyp- 
tians. These would not be considered. He repeated what he 
had said about ruining the National Party, and added that he 
had made no secret of his view. He should work for interven- 
tion and, if it must be so, for annexation. I am quite sure I am 
not mis-quoting this conversation in any essential feature. It 
was not merely half a dozen words spoken in haste, but an argu- 
ment which lasted half an hour; and it affected me so strongly 
that I decided to warn my Egyptian friends, to whom I had 
pledged my word for Colvin's good feeling towards them, that 
they must now expect the worst of him. They answered that 
they knew it, as they had received information already in the 
same sense about him. 

This conversation opened my eyes to a new danger. Only the 
day before I had received two letters, written the one from the 
Liberal, the other from the Tory camp in England, and both 
conveying the same warning. John Morley, in answer to a let- 
ter I had written asking his sympathy with the National cause, 
wrote: "Whether your schemes will come to much I am at this 
moment inclined to doubt, Egypt, unluckily for its people, is 
the battlefield of European rivalries; and an honest settlement in 
the interests of its population will be prevented to suit the con- 
venience of France. I don't see my way out of it. It is that 
curse of the world, la haute politique, which will spoil every- 
thing." Lytton also had written: "That small portion of the 
British public which thinks at all of foreign affairs is much pre- 
occupied and disturbed in mind by the false position into which 
we are drifting in Egypt, and almost too frightened to speak 
loudly on the subject. It seems to me, however, that their ideas 
are very hazy. In my own mind there is no doubt that this is 
only the firstfruits of a radically wrong policy which has lost 
us the co-operation of Germany and Austria, and placed us prac- 
tically at the mercy of France, a power with which we can never 
have any sound or safe alliance." Both letters had been written 
before the fall of Gambetta, and here I seemed to hear an echo 
of their words, especially Morley's words, la haute politique," 



Mahmud Sami, Prime Minister 153 

from the man who had It most in his power to spoil an honest set- 
tlement, and that to suit the convenience, not of France merely, 
but of England. I was very much alarmed. I have often re- 
gretted my last words to Colvin on this occasion. "I defy you," 
I said, "to bring about English intervention or annexation." I 
regret it because I think it added a personal as well as a politi- 
cal stimulus to his subsequent action. It had become a trial of 
strength between us. 

Two days later, 2nd February, Sherif Pasha, finding he could 
not bend the National Delegates to his will, and under the in>- 
fluence, I make little doubt, of Colvin's threat of Intervention, 
resigned office, and was succeeded, at the choice of the Delegates, 
by Mahmud Pasha Sami as Prime Minister, with ArabI as Mini- 
ster of War, a thoroughgoing Nationalist combination at which 
all Egypt rejoiced.^ I heard the news at my retreat in the 
desert with mixed feelings of jubilation and anxiety, an anxiety 
which was only relieved when on the 27th I received an answer 
from Mr. Gladstone to my letter of six weeks before enclosing 
to him the National program. The long delay in replying 
was doubtless due to the embarrassment and perplexity as to a 
policy which Lord Granville's deal with Gambetta had Involved 
him in. Gambetta's providential fall, however, had now to a 
large extent freed our Government's hands, and a passage was 
being inserted In the Queen's speech at the opening of Parlia- 
ment which conveyed something like an expression of sympathy 
with the National Egyptian hopes. This, Mr. Gladstone sent 
me later, and his letter concluded with the following reassuring 
words: "I feel quite sure," he said, "that unless there be a sad 
failure of good sense on one or both, or as I should say, on alll 

1 There were one or two weak points in the formation of the new Ministry, the 
most important being in the choice made of their Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Neither Mahmud Sami nor Arabi, nor any other of the fellah leaders, knew any 
European language, and, as a knowledge of French was essential in dealing 
with the Consulates, a man not of their own party or way of thinking was taken 
in from the outside. This was Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, a man of fairly liberal 
notions, but a member of the old ruling class, and a follower of Sherif's — the 
same who had been Ismail's A. D. C. in 1878 and had taken an unwilling part in 
the death of the Mufettish. It was his horror at this crime that had converted 
him to constitutional ideas. But like Sherif he despised his fellah colleagues. He, 
when the pinch came two months later, did these much ill-service by his weak 
or hostile presentment of their case in the official correspondence. This, as they 
could not read his notes and despatches, they were unaware of till it was too 
late to remedy. 



154 Sultan Pasha and Arahi 

sides, we shall be able to bring this question to a favourable is- 
sue. My own opinions about Egypt were set forth in the 'Nine- 
teenth Century' a short time before we took office, and I am not 
aware as yet of having seen any reason to change them." ^ 

The reference thus made to his article "Aggression on Egypt," 
was of the very highest importance, for, as already mentioned, 
the article was a scathing denunciation of just that forward policy 
of intervention and annexation which Colvin had propounded to 
me. Armed with this proof of Gladstone's goodwill I went back 
joyfully to Cairo, and was able to tell Arabi that I had not as- 
sured him of my sympathy in vain. I found him at the War 
Office surrounded by his friends, and in converse with the Coptic 
Patriarch, and with a tribe of idle sycophants as well, Levantines 
and Europeans, come to salute the rising sun. Among these the 
new Minister moved with a certain dignified superiority which 
became him well. He was no longer the mere colonel of a regi- 
ment, but a man sobered by the sense of public responsibility, a 
fellah still, and still a patriot, but also with the manner of a 
statesman. He took me aside, and I showed him Gladstone's 
letter, and we rejoiced over it together as a message of good 
omen. 

The first fruits of Colvin's hostility, nevertheless, we had not 
long to wait for. Who precisely was the originator of the lie I 
do not know, it was probably the Khedive, whose malicious jeal- 
cusy was already at work against his Ministers, but a false re- 
port was telegraphed by Reuter to Europe that the action taken 
by the Notables against Sherif was due to military intimidation. 
A story was related and was repeated at some length in the 
"Times" to the effect that Sultan Pasha, the president of the 
Chamber, had only yielded to personal menace, and that Arabi 
had drawn his sword in his presence, and had threatened to 
make the old man's children fatherless. It was a foolish tale, 
for Sultan happened to be without offspring, and at Cairo it 
was laughed at by all who knew the truth, and how close an in- 
timacy there was between the two, but it was sufficient as a 
weapon to "ruin the Nationalists," and easily passed the censor- 
ship of the Agency, being reproduced even in Malet's despatches 
of the day, as was a similar tale, which had also been telegraphed, 

1 For full text of this letter see Appendix. 



Malet Persists in the Tale 155 

that the Khedive's acceptance of Sherif's resignation had been 
extorted under a Hke pressure. 

Absurd, however, as the tale was. Sultan was offended by it, 
and, as I was now generally Jcnown to the Deputies as their 
friend, he begged me to call on him and convey to Malet his 
emphatic denial of the whole story. I consequently went to 
Sultan's house, where he had assembled a large party of Depu- 
ties and other high personages, among whom were the Grand 
Mufti el Abbasi, Abd el Salaam Bey Mouelhy, Ahmed Bey 
Siouffi, Ahmed Effendi, Mahmud, Rahman Effendi, Hamadi, and 
El Shedid Butros, a leading Coptic deputy. All these, with 
Sultan, absolutely denied and repudiated the idea that they had 
acted under any kind of pressure, and Sultan spoke with indig- 
nation of the absurdity of the tale as regarded himself. "Ah- 
med Arabi," he said, "is as a son to me, and knows what is due 
to me and due to himself. His place is at the War Office, 
mine with the Parliament. It is of me that he would ask ad- 
vice rather than venture to give me any on my own conpernis, 
and as to his drawing his sword in my presence he could only do 
so if I were attacked by enemies. These are stories which no 
one who knows us both could for an instant believe, and they are 
absolutely false. You may take it for certain that the least 
of the members present who represent the people are better 
judges of their wants than the greatest of the soldiers. We 
respect Ahmed Arabi because we know him to be a patriot and 
a man of political intelligence, not because he is a soldier.''' 
These words of Sultan Pasha's are quoted from a memorandum 
I made of them at the time. The old man also spoke bitterly 
of Malet for encouraging the newsmongers, and begged me to 
tell him the facts, and also to telegraph them to Mr. Glad- 
stone, and make them known in the London press. This I did 
to the best of my ability. I sent a full account of it to the 
"Times," though, if I remember rightly, it was, for some reason, 
never printed, and I telegraphed in the same sense to Mr. Glad- 
stone, and also wrote him a long letter giving my view of the 
general situation. 

To Malet I went straight from Sultan's house and expostu- 
lated with him warmly. But he insisted on the truth of his tale, 
which he had got, he told me first, from Sultan himself, and 
then not from Sultan but at second hand from "some one on 



156 / Resolve to Return to England 

whom he could depend," and, when I pressed him further as to 
who this was, lost temper and said I had no right to cross-ques- 
tion him. This was my last talk with him on any political 
matter. Malet's new attitude proved to me that he, like Colvin, 
had gone over to the enemy's camp, and was now no longer to 
be trusted. I saw that the situation was a very dangerous one, 
for between them they had the Press and the Foreign Office 
wholly in their hands, and though I possessed at home the Prime 
Minister's ear and a certain publicity for my views in the 
"Times," I felt that I was fighting against them at an extreme 
disadvantage. I consequently decided to delay no longer my re- 
turn to England, where I could do more for the Egyptian inter- 
ests than I could at Cairo, by word of mouth and by a personal 
appeal to Gladstone. Before going, however, I had numerous 
conversations with the leading Deputies and with my friends at 
the Azhur, to whom I communicated my design, of which they 
all approved; and I arranged with Sir William Gregory that 
after my departure he should continue to defend the National 
cause, in which he was as enthusiastic as I was, in the "Times" 
and by letter with his friends in England. My thought was to 
return to Egypt, perhaps, in a few weeks' time, and take part in 
any further developments that might arise. 

I paid a last visit to Arabi the morning of the day I left for 
England, 27th February. I had been little more than three 
months in Egypt, and it seemed to me like a lifetime, so ab- 
sorbing had been the interests they had brought me. I looked 
upon Egypt already like a second patria, and intended' to throw 
in my lot with the Egyptians as if they were my own countrymen. 
I was estranged from those of my countrymen in blood, except 
Gregory, who formed the then little English colony at Cairo. 
Following Colvin's lead they had all gone over like sheep to ideas 
of intervention, for be it noted that it was now no longer French 
intervention that was talked of, but English, and at once in 
English eyes the immorality of aggression had been transformed 
into a duty. What had been abominable when threatened by 
Gambetta now appealed to them as just and desirable and pa- 
triotic when proposed by Granville. Similarly the new Prime 
Minister at Paris, M. de Freycinet, having reversed his prede- 
cessor's policy of intervention, the French colony were for peace 
with the Nationalists, all except de Blignieres and those who had 



/ Purchase Sheykh Oheyd 157 

official posts they feared might be suppressed in the new reign of 
National economy. 

Colvin and de Blignieres were industrious in spreading trepi- 
dation among the holders of sinecure offices, and it was amusing 
to note how suddenly and completely the poet Lord Houghton 
abandoned his first attitude of romantic sympathy with Egyp- 
tian liberty when his son-in-law, Fitzgerald, who had one of 
these sinecures, represented to him that his daily bread was 
thereby threatened. It was well known, as part of the Na- 
tionalist program, that it was intended to reduce the expen- 
diture on unnecessary salaries and to suppress the duplicated 
posts. This was ascribed by Colvin not to its true cause, a 
very legitimate economy, but to "fanaticism," a convenient word 
which began now to be freely used in describing the Nat^ional 
movement. What, however, I think more than anything else 
was condemned just then by the little group of English officials 
was the "monstrous" determination which the Egyptian Chamber 
was said to have come to, if it could secure the right of voting 
the Budget, to cut down the subvention of £1,000 a year paid to 
Reuter's Agency. Without this it was felt that it would be im- 
possible any longer to know at Cairo the odds on the Obcford 
and Cambridge boat race or even on the Derby or Grand Prix. 
There was a dark hint, too, thrown out that the charge of 
£9,000 a year then figuring in the Budget as a grant in aid to the 
European Opera House might be reduced, and on this astound- 
ing proof of "fanaticism," Fitzgerald, as a patron of the ballet, 
was epecially insistent. These things, with others almost as 
trifling, were made a serious crime to the Notables and to the 
new Ministry, who were countenancing the reductions. I used 
to hear the tale of their complaints from Gregory, who was 
now in much closer touch with them than I any longer was. It 
was in answer to their threats of intervention, which were be- 
ginning to have an effect on the Stock Exchange in the lowered 
price of Egyptian Bonds and of property generally in Egypt, 
that I at this time resolved to give proof of my confidence 
in the national fortunes by buying a small estate for my 
future residence in the neighbourhood of Cairo, and the 
result was my purchase of Eheykh Obeyd Garden, a property 
of some forty acres, between Merj and Materieh. 

It will be interesting to Egyptian readers to know what the 



158 Sheykh Obeyd "Garden 

prices of land in that neighbourhood then were. There was, 
as I have said, at that time not a single house built on the des- 
ert strip between Abba^siyeh and Kafr el Jamus, and the Gov- 
ernment was willing to sell it to anybody who would buy it at 
the rate of a few piastres an acre. I thought at one moment of 
establishing myself on the land where my camp of the moment 
stood, and I made inquiry of my friend Rogers Bey, who was in 
the Land Department of the Ministry of Finance, and I find 
among my papers the draft of an application I sent in for a 
hundred acres, where now the suburb of Zeitoun stands, for 
which, at his suggestion, I offered fifteen piastres (three shil- 
lings) an acre. The same land is worth to-day, 1904, at least 
two hundred pounds an acre, ground value. But while I was 
in negotiation for it I chanced to hear that Sheykh Obeyd 
Garden was in the market, and I purchased it, so to say, "over 
the counter" from the Domains' Commission for £1,500. It 
was then the best fruit garden in Egypt, enclosed in a wall with 
a bountiful supply of water, and contained, on estimation, 70,000 
fruit trees, all in splendid order. 

The history of the garden is worth recording. It was a 
piece of good land standing on the desert edge, belonging in 
the early part of the nineteenth century to the Imam of Ibra- 
him Pasha's army during the campaign of Arabia but the Imam 
falling into indigent circumstances, the Pasha bought it of him, 
enclosed thirty-three acres with a wall, dug the sakiehs, and laid 
it out as it now is some time in the early thirties. The fruit 
trees with which it was planted were brought in part from Taif 
in the Hejaz, in part from Syria. Ibrahim had a passion to 
make it the best of its kind, and in his time and the time of his 
nephew, Mustafa, to whom it descended, the fruit from it 
brought in a yearly revenue of £800, the labour being all done by 
corvee of the fellahin of the neighbouring villages. The pome- 
granates of the garden were so large that it was a tradition 
with the gardeners there that thirty went to a camel load, and 
that they were sent yearly to Constantinople as a present to the 
Sultan. What is certain is that in the time of Ibrahim's grand- 
son, Tewfik, when in his father's reign he was living in retire- 
ment at Koubba, the ladies of his household used to be carried 
there every Friday during the spring season to spend the day. 



Last Visit to Arahi 159 

In the ruin of Ismail's fortunes it came, in 1879, to the Do- 
mains Commissioners, and was one of the smaller properties 
scheduled by them for sale, and so it chanced into the market. 
On our way to Syria the year before we had camped one night 
outside its walls and had wondered at its beauty with the apri- 
cot trees in full flower. No sooner did I hear of it as a pos- 
sible acquisition than I abandoned all other schemes of pur- 
chase; and in one of its shady walks I am writing my memoirs 
to-day. 

But to return to my farewell visit to Arabi. On this oc- 
casion we talked all the questions over which were being debated 
at the moment by the Nationalists with their plans of reforms 
and their hopes and fears at home and abroad. The few 
weeks that Arabi had been in high office had matured him and 
strengthened him, and he discussed things with me with all pos- 
sible sobriety of thought and language. He assured me em- 
phatically that he and his fellow Ministers were most anxious to 
come to a friendly understanding with the English Government 
on all matters in dispute between them and the Agency at Cairo ; 
and he begged me to convey to Mr. Gladstone a formal mes- 
sage to that effect. He complained, however, strongly of Malet 
and Colvin, whose recent action and the part they were taking 
in the campaign of misrepresentation being organized in the 
English Press proved their hostility. "There will never be 
peace at Cairo," he said, "as long as we have only these to deal 
with, for we know that they are working mischief against us in 
secret, if not openly. We shall stand aloof from both of them. 
But we do not on that account wish to quarrel with England. 
Let Mr. Gladstone send us whom he will to treat with us, and 
we will receive him with open arms." He also talked lat great 
length of the practical reforms Mahmud Sami and the other 
Ministers were contemplating, most of which have since been 
included in the list of benefits conferred on the country under 
British occupation, and which Lord Cromer has adopted as his 
own. Such were the abolition of the corvees which the rich 
Turkish pashas levied on the villagers, their monopoly of the 
water at the time of the high Nile, the protection of the fella- 
hin from the Greek usurers, who had them in their clutches 
through the iniquitous abuses of the International Tribunals, 



i6o / Finally Leave Egypt 

and even that latest remedy for agriculture distress on which 
Lord Cromer specially prides himself, an agricultural Bank 
under Government direction. 

Other questions discussed were the reform of Justice, then 
fearfully corrupt, the education of men and also of women, the 
mode of election to be adopted for the new Parliament, and the 
question of slavery. On this point he dwelt at some length, 
because the European officials of the department concerned in 
its suppression were beginning, like the other foreign officials, 
to fear that in the new National scheme of economy their sal- 
aries would be reduced, and were pretending that the Moham- 
medan revival would mean a revival of the slave trade. Arabi 
showed me how little ground there was for this pretence, that 
the only persons in Egypt who still had slaves or wished to 
have slaves were just the Khedivial princes and rich pashas, 
against whose tyranny the fellah movement was directed, that 
according to the principles of the Liberal reform all men were 
to be henceforth equal, without distinction of race, or colour, 
or religion. The last thing compatible with these was the re- 
vival of slavery. Lastly, as to the necessity of military prep- 
aration for a possible war, which as a soldier and war minister 
he had uppermost in his mind, he spoke plainly and with energy. 
The National Government would not disarm or relax its pre- 
cautions until the true Constitutional regime was firmly estab- 
lished and acknowledged by Europe. He hoped not to exceed 
the War Estimates agreed on with Colvin, or to be obliged to 
increase the number of men recruited beyond the 18,000 al- 
lowed by the Firmans. If, however, the menace of armed in- 
tervention were long continued they would adopt the Prussian 
system of short service, and so gradually bring a larger force 
as a reserve under arms. He asked my opinion of the chances 
of a conflict, and I told him plainly that from what Colvin had 
boasted to me of his intention to bring it about, and from the 
means of Press agitation he had already adopted with that end, 
I considered the danger a real one, and that it was to neutralize, 
as far as I could, the campaign of lies which had begun that I 
was going to England. My business there would be to preach 
the cause of peace and goodwill. At the same time I could not 
advise him to do otherwise than stand firmly to his ground. 
The best chance of peace was to be prepared for defence. The 



A Byron Quotation i6i 

great enemies of Egypt were not so much the European gov- 
ernments as the European financiers, and these would think 
twice about urging an armed attack if they knew that they 
could not do so without the risk of ruining their own interests 
in Egypt by a long and costly war. An armed nation resolute 
and ready to defend its rights was seldom molested. I remem- 
ber quoting to him Byron's lines, "Trust not for freedom to 
the Franks," of which he greatly approved; and these, I think, 
were our last words. I promised him that if it came to the 
worst I would return and throw in my lot with theirs in a 
campaign for independence. 



CHAPTER X 

MY PLEADING IN DOWNING STREET 

Such Is the history faithfully and fully told of the part I 
played that winter In Egypt, In telling It I have relied for the 
accuracy of my memory of the main incidents on such letters 
and short notes as I have been able to find among my papers, 
and especially on an account of it drawn up by me while the war 
of 1882 was in progress, and published in the September 
,.mmber of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of that year. Of 
this, my present memoir Is little more than an amplification. 
What follows will be comparatively new matter, for though 
most of it has long been written in a disjointed way, I have 
never found a moment suited to its completion. For dates and 
incidents, however, I am supplied with ample materials of a 
contemporary value, first in a brief diary which from the time 
)i my arrival In England I now once more regularly kept, and 
next In the many published and unpublished letters still in my 
possession, which passed between me and various public per- 
sonages with whom I had found myself in correspondence dur- 
ing the four months which elapsed between my arrival In Eng- 
land and the bombardment of Alexandria; and again after Tel- 
el-Kebir with those who on my behalf were conducting Arabl's 
trial. These form a body of evidence which I shall quote where 
needful, either In the text of my narrative or In an appendix to 
it. Taken together, with the necessary thread of explanation, 
they of themselves form an almost complete history of the 
causes of the war. 

The political situation which I found on my arrival, 6th 
March, in London, was a wonderful contrast to that which I 
had left behind me a week before at Cairo. Gladstone had 
been now nearly two years In office, and the enthusiasm for 
Eastern nationalities and Eastern liberty, which at the elections 

162 



State of English Politics 163 

of 1880 had carried him into power, had cooled down every- 
where, and in official circles had given place to ideas of imperlial 
coercion, especially in the case of the Nationalists of Ireland, 
which were by no means of good augury in regard to Egypt. 
The Cabinet was divided into two sections of opinion. The 
great Whig leaders who controlled the chief departments of 
the Administration, Hartington, Northbrook, Childers, and the 
rest were all for strong measures, Gladstone, with Harcourt and 
Bright, almost alone for conciliation, and the general feeling of 
the country was violent against all "lawlessness" everywhere. 
The Habeas Corpus Act had been suspended in Ireland, and 
Parnell and a score more of the Nationalist members of Parlia- 
ment were actually shut up, untried, in Kilmainham Gaol. 
Business in the House of Commons was being obstructed by the 
remainder of the Irish members, and the very name of National- 
ism to the Liberal Party had become a byword and reproach. 
The atmosphere of Westminister and the public offices was there- 
fore not at all favourable to my propaganda of nationalism on 
the Nile. The only persons really interested in Egypt were 
those few who held Egyptian bonds, and these had been per- 
suaded by Colvin's manipulation of the Press that Arabi and 
the National Party were a set of fanatical incendiaries who 
would burn down the Stock Exchange if they could get the 
chance, and who had already succeeded in lowering the value 
of securities and making dividends precarious. 

At the Foreign Office the position about Egypt was this. 
Granville, old and deaf and very idle, finding himself relieved 
from the incubus of Gambetta's forward policy, was following 
his instinct of doing nothing and letting things settle themselves 
as placidly as circumstances would allow him. He did not want 
to intervene or to take action hostile to the Nationalists or, 
indeed, action of any kind. He did not even give himself the 
trouble to read the despatches, and he left the work of learning 
what was going on to his private secretaries, and more especially 
to the Under-Secretary of State, Sir Charles Dilke, who was 
able to sift the news for him and set before him such facts as 
he selected, and such views as suited him. Dilke, who had been 
with Gambetta the responsible author of the Joint Note of 6th 
January, was, now that Gambetta had disappeared from the 
direction of affairs in France, become a prime mover on his own 



164 First Visit to Downing Street 

account in the policy of intervention, and was working with 
Colvin and the financiers to bring things to such a pass that his 
unwilling chief, in spite of himself, should be obliged to inter- 
vene. Though not himself a Cabinet Minister, Dilke in this 
had behind him the powerful support in the Cabinet of Cham- 
berlain, a personal friend and ally, whom on foreign matters, 
which Chamberlain did not affect to understand, he could se- 
curely count on. The two together had the reputation of be- 
ing the most advanced Radicals in the Ministry, and so carried 
great weight with just that section of the Liberal Party which 
was least inclined on principle to foreign adventures. The 
mass of the Radicals in the House of Commons knew nothing 
and cared nothing for questions in dispute so far away. 

Nevertheless I found that personally I could command con- 
siderable attention. My letters to the "Times" had been 
widely read, and there was a certain curiosity to hear what I 
had to say. Gregory and I had managed to invest Arabi with 
that halo of romance which as champion of the fellah wrongs 
was certainly his due, and on that ground, if no other, I could 
always obtain a hearing. Rumours of all kinds were afloat 
about him, ludicrous tales which portrayed him as a French- 
man or a Spaniard in Egyptian guise, as the paid agent, in turn 
of the ex-Khedive Ismail, of the pretender Halim, and of the 
Sultan — as everything in fact but what he really was. I, who 
had seen him, could explain. It was a matter not of serious 
interest with anybody, but, as I have said, of considerable curi- 
osity. And so I was listened to. 

My first visit on arrival was to 10, Downing Street. Here, 
though I did not see Mr. Gladstone himself, I found my friend 
Hamilton, his private secretary, and had with him an altogether 
satisfactory talk. I was a little doubtful, seeing that I had 
quarrelled with Malet, how I might be received. But he hast- 
ened to assure me that my "interference" with Malet's diplom- 
acy was in no way resented by his chief. On the contrary, Mr. 
Gladstone was very much obliged to me for my letters, and for 
the line I had taken in Egypt. It was a busy time for him, 
however, just then, the busiest of the official year, the weeks 
before Easter, and the thoughts of ministers were elsewhere 
than in Egypt. The Irish question was priming everything in 
Mr. Gladstone's mind. I might, however, make my own mind 



Algernon Bourke 165 

comfortable about the dangers which seemed to threaten at 
Cairo. They could not lead to serious trouble. Whatever 
might be the ideas "over the way" (meaning the Foreign 
Office), Mr. Gladstone would see that they were not put in 
practice. Armed intervention with Mr. Gladstone in power 
was an "impossibility." The mere thought of it was ridiculous. 
We would talk of it again and I should see Mr. Gladstone later. 
In the meanwhile Hamilton would let Lord Granville know that 
I was come. I left him entirely reassured. 

Another visit I paid the same morning was to my cousin, Al- 
gernon Bourke (then generally known as "Button" to his 
friends). His role in Egyptian affairs that year was destined 
to be an important one, and his name, or rather his pseudo}- 
name, constantly recurs in my diary. His position in life was 
that of a young man of fashion, closely connected with the 
official world, for he was a younger son of the Lord Mayo who 
had been Viceroy of India, and was nephew to the Rt. Hon. 
Robert Bourke (afterwards Lord Connemara), who had been 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and was now, in 1882, 
leader of the Tory opposition in the House of Commons on 
all questions of foreign politics. Button had also a position 
on the staff of the "Times," not as a writer, but a& an inter*- 
mediary for Chenery, the editor, with political personages. As 
a peer's son he had the entree to the galleries of both Houses 
of Parliament, knew everybody and everything that was going 
on there, was intimate with people about the Court, with the 
high world of finance, and generally with the wire-pullers in the 
various departments of the State. Our friendship was a close 
one, and throughout the trying months that followed he was 
my chief confidant and adviser, having more worldly wisdom 
than I then could boast, and a fertility of resource in action 
altogether admirable. To him I owed three parts of the public- 
ity I obtained for my views in the Press, and of the help given 
me in parliament. On arrival I narrated to him all that had 
happened during the past winter in Egypt as well as my plans 
for the future. His view of the position was a very different 
one from Hamilton's, for his intimacy with the Rothschilds 
made him aware of the financial strings that were being pulled 
in the City to bring about intervention, and he had a low opin- 
ion of Gladstone's ability to understand foreign questions or 



1 66 Liberal Allies 

deal with a case where the money interests of all the Stock Ex- 
changes of Europe were so largely concerned. Still he advised 
me to maintain the footing I had acquired in Downing Street, 
and use my influence there to the best of my ability, holding in 
reserve, If Gladstone should fail me, his own friends of the Op- 
position, whose assistance, in case of need, he promised me. 
For the moment the best I could do would be to talk to every- 
body I knew who was in Parliament on both sides of the House, 
and to go on writing letters to the "Times." This sound ad- 
vice I accordingly proceeded without delay to follow. 

I find in my diary that on the 9th of March I went to see 
George Howard and his wife (now Lord and Lady Carlisle), 
and succeeded in enlisting their sympathies, especially hers, to 
my plans. She was then, as now, a strong politician, and was 
an absolute believer In Gladstone, and she advised me to put 
my whole trust In him and he would certainly prevent any mis- 
chief being done to liberty. Her husband was less sanguine, 
but he readily agreed to take me to the House of Commons, of 
which he was a member, that afternoon, and introduce me to his 
friends there of the Liberal Party, such as he thought could 
help me best. And so together we went, and I made the ac- 
quaintance of Dilwyn, Bryce, and other influential members who 
had been specially interested in the affairs of Bulgaria and 
Armenia at the time of the Berlin Congress. These all 
promised me their assistance, as did that excellent man Mr. 
Chesson, with whom, and with Howard's brother-in-law, Lyulph 
Stanley, we had a long talk in the tea-room. Chesson, though 
not a Member of Parliament, was a person of considerable 
political power, as he made It his business, as secretary of the 
Aborigines Protection Society, to organize agitations on all 
questions where aggression on non-European peoples was 
threatened, and he proved throughout of the greatest assistance 
to me, as he was in daily communication with the best of the 
Radical members. Howard, however, advised me not to put 
my case into the hands of the "professional non-Intervention- 
ists," but rather to work my propaganda on an independent 
basis. I was at that time quite new and inexperienced In Eng- 
lish politics, so new that though I was forty-one years of age 
this was the first time I had ever been inside the lobbies of the 
House of Commons. I was, however, from that date a fre- 



m 



Fisit to the Foreign Office 167 

quent visitor there, across to the inner lobby being at that time 
almost free. 

The same day I had a talk with Philip Currie at the Foreign 
Office, and a long discussion about Egypt. I found him at first 
rather put out with me at what I had been doing at Cairo, the 
effect of Malet's complaints of me, and affecting to believe that 
I had been playing a "large practical joke at the expense of the 
Foreign Office." But this did not last, and I was able to con- 
vince him of the seriousness of the matter, and of my own ear- 
nestness, if not that I was right in my views, and he arranged 
that I should see Dilke the next day, and also Granville. 

I find also at this date( that I had a talk with Lord Miltown, 
an Irish peer, which shows the curious connection between Egypt 
and Ireland in the political ideas of the day. "His, Miltown's, 
account of Ireland is singularly like that of Egypt by the Euro- 
pean officials. He thinks the difficulty in Ireland got up by agita- 
tors; that the Irish fellahin are not really with the National 
Party, and that armed intervention would set things right." 

On the loth I saw Dilke at the Foreign Office, having first 
gone to his house in Sloane Street. He was in a hostile mood, 
and instead of listening to what I had to say, poured out a 
string of complaints against the new Egyptian ministry, telling 
me "that Arabics government had spent half a million sterling 
on the army since they came into office," and other absurdities. 
I knew this story could not be true, as the Nationalists had 
only been in power six weeks, and went to Sanderson, who was 
then Lord Granville's private secretary (now Sir Thomas San- 
derson and head of the Foreign Office), and made him look up 
the question of the fabulous half million, when, on referring to 
the despatch about it, we found that the sum had been spent, 
not as Dilke had told me in the last six weeks, but in tiiel last 
year. This extraordinary misstatement of Dilke's, which he 
had made to me as a matter beyond dispute, may of course 
have been only a gross blunder, but it was repeated in the news- 
papers of the day, several of which were under Dilke's inspira- 
tion, and is a good example of the way in which news, however 
absurd, prejudicial to the Egyptian Nationalists, was then being 
circulated by him. Morley was one of the channels he prin- 
cipally used, and all through the spring and early summer of 
i88'2, the "Pall Mall Gazette" (the only paper Gladstone read 



1 68 Morley's Political Position i 

attentively) was, through Dilke's influence, and Colvin's, made a 
channel of preposterous lies and the most uncompromising ad- 
vocate of intervention. Morley, I am willing to believe, per- 
suaded himself that the things they told him were true, and 
acted in good faith, but it is nevertheless certain that on him 
more than on any other journalists of the time lies the respon- 
sibility of having persuaded Gladstone to the act of violence 
in Egypt which was the chief sin of Gladstone's public career. 
Morley's position, however, was then not an independent one, 
and he was hardly the master of his own published thoughts. 
He was not yet in Parliament, but waiting for a seat, and all 
his hope of a political career lay in the patronage of his political 
friends, Dilke and Chamberlain, so that he had practically no 
choice, if he was not to sacrifice his ambition, but to follow the 
lead Dilke gave him about Egyptian affairs. He was after- 
wards sorry for the evil he had done, and has never, I think, 
liked to recall to memory the part he then played. But with- 
out doubt his responsibility for bringing on the war was great. 
The whole of the Egyptian episode in Morley's "Life of Glad- 
stone," it may be noticed, has been slurred over in a few pages 
But history is history, and his mistake needs to be recorded. 

This matter settled with Sanderson, Currie took me in to see 
Lord Granville, whom I did not as yet know, and another con- 
versation followed. Lord Granville was a man of singularly 
urbane manners, and began by inquiries after my stud of Arab 
horses, paying me a number of polite compliments about them. 
Then, turning to the subject of Egypt, he "informed me plump 
that he had certain knowledge that Arabi had been bought by 
Ismail, and that the whole thing in Egypt was an intrigue to 
restore the ex-Khedive!" This was another of the preposter- 
ous stories that were being foisted on the Foreign Office and 
the public to prejudice opinion against the Egyptian cause. It 
had reached the Foreign Office, as far as I have been able to 
ascertain, in a despatch or private letter from Sir. Augustus 
Paget, then British Ambassador at Rome, to whom the ex- 
Khedive appears to have boasted at Naples that he had "ce 
gaillard la," meaning Arabi, in his pocket. 

It is hardly necessary to inquire what motive of the moment 
Ismail may have had for making this assertion, for his word 
was never of any value, while the whole tenor of Arabi's career 



''I Must See Gladstone" 169 

proves It to have been the absolute reverse of fact. Arabi's 
attitude at the date In question was more than ever one of hostil- 
ity to the Circassian pashas, Ismail's adherents, who were 
actively Intriguing with Tewfik against him. Ismail, however, 
had purposes of his own to serve In making It appear that the 
trouble In Egypt had come about on his account. He always 
clung to the Idea that the day would come when the Powers of 
Europe would repent of having deposed him, and would return 
to him as the only possible ruler of a country distracted because 
he was no longer there to control It. At the moment I did not 
know the quarter from which the story was derived, nor could 
I do more to refute It than by telling Lord Granville how utterly 
opposed to the ex-Khedive the National fellah leader had al- 
ways been.^ This I did, and I delivered also the message ArabI 
had entrusted me with for Mr. Gladstone. His only answer 
was "Will they give up the claim of the Chamber to vote the 
Budget?" I told him that I feared It was hopeless to expect 
this, as the Deputies were all of one mind. "Then," he said, 
"I look upon their case as hopeless. It must end by their be- 
ing put down by force." I told him I could not believe thd 
English Government could really Intervene, on such a plea, to 
put down liberty. But he maintained his ground, and I left 
him much dissatisfied, resolving that I would waste no more 
time upon trying to persuade the Foreign Office, but would put 
what pressure I could on them from the outside. "I must see 
Gladstone." 

I also, the same day, saw Morley at his newspaper office, to 
try to neutralize the effect of the falsehoods with which he was 
being flooded, but I feared without success. He believed im- 
plicitly In Colvin, who was his regular correspondent at Cairo, 
and there were other Influences besides, as we have seen, at 
work upon him and which were too strong for me to combat In 
his mind. 

1 Since the above was in print I have lit on the following entry in my diary 
of 1884, which at the same time confirms and corrects what is said of Paget's 
connection with this colony: "'Vienna, Sept. 20. Dined at the Embassy. Sir A. 
Paget very amiable, talked about Egypt. He remembers Nubar Abba's dragoman. 
He asked my opinion of Arabi, and I asked him in turn whether it was true 
that Ismail had told him that Arabi was in his pay. He said he had never 
talked to Ismail about Arabi, but he remembers having heard that Ismail said, 
'ce gaillard la m'a conte les yeux de la tete.' " 



lyo / See Goschen 

On the nth I dined with Button, who had invited a party 
specially to meet me. These were Sir Francis Knollys, the 
Prince of Wales's secretary, Reginald Brett (now Lord Esher), 
who was then Lord Hartington's secretary, Clifford, a leader 
writer of the "Times," and General Sir John Adye, who was a 
friend of Wolseley's and served under him that year in the 
Egyptian Campaign, remaining, nevertheless, a warm sympath- 
izer with the Egyptians throughout, and, as will be seen, render- 
ing good service to the cause of humanity after Tel-el-Kebir. 
We had a pleasant evening, and all showed themselves interested 
in my Egyptian views, and I remained talking with some of 
them till one in the morning. Knollys I know was impressed 
by what I told him, but Brett, who was a friend of the Roth- 
schilds and other financiers who were clamouring for interven- 
tion, proved afterwards one of our bitterest enemies. He was 
working at the time for Morley in the "Pall Mall Gazette,''' 
and inspired, if he did not write, some of the articles which so 
influenced Gladstone. 

On the 13th I saw Goschen, having been sent to him by 
Hamilton, on Mr. Gladstone's suggestion, as a man who, 
though not a member of the Government, was much trusted by 
them and advised them, especially on Egyptian affairs. With 
him I went more thoroughly than with either Dilke or Gran- 
ville into the details of the National case. He affected much 
sympathy with me, more probably than he felt, and was particu- 
larly anxious to impress on me the notion that he was not tak- 
ing a financial view of the situation. This was, doubtless, be- 
cause his past connection with Egypt had been as representative 
of Ismail's creditors. I found him agreeable in manner, with 
much charm of voice, and I was with him quite two hours. His 
last words to me were: "You may be sure at least of one thing, 
and that is, that whatever the Government may do in Egypt 
they will do on general grounds of policy, not in the interests 
of the Bondholders." This was satisfactory and seemed to be 
in harmony with the situation of the moment, for that very 
morning the news had been published of de Blignieres' resigna- 
tion of his post at Cairo of French Financial Controller. The 
event had been interpreted in London as signifying a quarrel 
between the French Government and the Nationalist Ministry, 
but I knew that this was not the case. De Blignieres had been 



Lord De la JVarr 171 

even more and earlier than Colvln a worker for intervention, 
and I read his resignation for what it really was, a sign that his 
Government had thrown him over. If Colvin at the same time 
had been made to resign — and things, I believe, were very near 
it — all the subsequent trouble might have been avoided. Col- 
vin, however was too strongly backed up by Dilke just then to 
be displaced. 

I went on from Goschen's to lunch with Button, and found 
him with Lord De la Warr, a very worthy Tory peer and 
country neighbour of my own in Sussex, who had been the year 
before in Tunis, and had there imbibed, during the French in- 
vasion, a certain sympathy v/ith the Arabs. Later we worked 
a good deal together on the Egyptian question, and he proved 
of considerable assistance when things came, in July, to a crisis. 
I was at that time urging that a Commission of Inquiry should 
be sent to Cairo, and it seemed that he, perhaps, might fill the 
post. 

The same afternoon I saw Hamilton in Downing Street. A 
violent article, headed "Smouldering Fires in Egypt," had just 
appeared in the "Pall Mall," which was little better from be- 
ginning to end than a tissue of the old malicious stories, with 
some new ones prejudicial to the Nationalists. To these Hamil- 
ton pointed as a convincing proof, seeing they were in the "Pall 
Mall," that I must be wrong, "Or why," he said, "should Mor- 
ley, who is so good a Liberal, take such a very illiberal Hne?" 
I explained to him Colvin's position in regard to Morley, which 
I had not yet done, and urged him again to let me speak with 
his chief. Up to this point, from a feeling of loyalty to meil 
who had been my friends, and with whom I had acted during 
the earlier stages, I had refrained from making complaints 
against them, though Malet had not scrupled to complain of 
me. But now I saw that further silence on my part would be 
only mischievous, and I was resolved to tell Gladstone all the 
truth about them. Morley had the day before warned me of 
the impending article as one to which I would not assent, and 
had invited an answer to it. But I was too angry to reply, ex- 
cept with a short private note, which I followed next day by 
a visit to Northumberland Street, where I reproached him with 
printing the malicious nonsense. The evil, however, had been 
done, for the publication had immediately preceded a motion 



172 Talk with Wolseley 

In the House of Commons brought forward by Sir George 
Campbell in regard to Egypt where the defamatory tales had 
been made use of. I was present at the debate on the motion, 
in which the principal speaker for the Government was Gos- 
chen, who adopted a conciliatory attitude, but less than a quite 
friendly one to Egyptian Nationalism. My conversation with 
him in the morning may have saved us from a worse pronounce- 
ment. Still there was no definite declaration made favourable 
to liberty. 

My diary for 14th March notes a talk with Sir Henry Raw- 
linson, the former Minister to Persia, a distinguished Oriental 
historian, his views being of the strongest Anglo-Indian official 
type. The Egyptians had always, he said, been slaves, and 
slaves they would remain. Their country would be absorbed 
with the rest of Asia by England or Russia. He knew Asiatics 
too well to believe they had any taste for self-government. 
Also another talk with Walter, the proprietor of the "Times," 
whom Button had suggested I should see. He conversed in 
platitudes for half an hour, and In the end, promised he would 
send a special correspondent to Cairo for Independent news. 
(This, however, was not done, Macdonald, the manager, ob- 
jecting on the score of needless expense.) 

On the 15 th I went to see Sir Garnet Wolseley at the Horse 
Guards, and had with him a conversation which needs special 
mention. "After a little talk about Cyprus, we got upon Egypt 
and the chance of resistance on the part of the Nationalists in 
the case of intervention, and he asked me my opinion. I said, 
of course, they would fight, and not only the soldiers but the 
people also, and afterwards, perhaps, use other methods. He 
refused to believe that the army would fight at all. But I 
maintained the contrary, and told him If they sent him out to 
conquer Egypt in its present mood, he must be prepared to take 
with him at least 60,000 men." In this I no doubt exaggerated 
the case, for my object was to represent It as a very difficult 
one, which the Government should think twice about before at- 
tempting. "He volunteered the information that he had been 
consulted two or three times during the winter with a view to 
immediate occupation. He assured me, however, that nobody 
wanted to Intervene, that the occupation of Egypt would be 
most unpopular with the army, and that he himself should be 



Wolseley's Plan of Campaign 173 

very sorry to have to go there. He would far rather the Egyp- 
tians should disband their army and trust to European pro- 
tection. But I told him I could not advise them to do that, 
and that people were not often attacked who really meant 
fighting. He said, 'Well, of course there Is no such thing as 
honour In war, and if there were really any question of fight- 
Inb, they ought not to trust us more than other people.' " He 
then talked about the various military routes to Cairo, Bona- 
parte's, by the left bank of the Nile, and especially the desert 
way between the Suez Canal and the Delta, so that I felt pretty 
sure that If troops were landed It would be on that side. But 
I was careful to give him no Information which could be of 
the least use to him, and I only laughed when he half seriously 
asked me whether I would go with him and show him the way 
if it came to a campaign. My impression of Wolseley was 
of "a good smart soldier, an Irishman, with a rough touch of 
brogue, good humoured, and I should fancy enterprising. But 
he does not Impress me as a man of genius — what Napo^leon 
used to call a 'general a dixmille homines.' " It Is worth not- 
ing that in writing to Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, through my se- 
cretary, Sabunji, soon after this conversation, I alluded to the 
danger there might be, In case of intervention, of their being 
attacked from the Ismailia side, and I believe it was In con- 
sequence of this hint that the lines of Tel-el Keblr were begtm 
to be traced by Arabi's order. 

The same day I saw Lyall, whom I found just starting for 
India, where he had been namel Lieutenant-Governor of the 
North-West Provinces. I found him much less sceptical about 
the National Party in Egypt than was the case then with most 
Anglo-Indians. In the evening I dined with Hamilton and 
Godley, Gladstone's two private secretaries, and showed them 
the draft of a letter I had written to Lord Granville, In which 
I had formally delivered Arabi's message of goodwill to the 
English Government, and also his complaint against Colvin and 
Malet, which I had not mentioned to him, for the reason al- 
ready given, when I saw him at the Foreign Office. Of this 
draft the two secretaries highly approved, and especially God- 
ley, who was the senior of the two, and he made me strike O'ut 
a phrase I had introduced of apology for my Interference in 
this important public matter. He said emphatically, "Your 



174 Godley's Sympathy 

interference needs no excuse." Godley was a singularly high- 
minded man, representing the better and more enthusiastic side 
of Gladstone's public character, the large sympathy with what 
was good in the world and the scorn of what was base. Ex>- 
cept that he had great practical ability for his official work, he 
was absolutely unlike the men usually found in our public offices, 
and throughout the Egyptian crisis he gave me his warmest sup- 
port and sympathy. Hamilton, though also sympathetic, was 
more so because he was my personal friend than from any 
natural enthusiasm for the kind of cause I was defending. My 
letter ended with a suggestion that something in the nature of 
an official inquiry should be sent to Cairo to examine into the 
facts in a spirit friendly to the Egyptians. They both urged 
me to send in the letter, and I consequently did so four days 
later, under the date 20th March. Its importance justifies my 
giving it here in extenso: 

"London, March 20th, 1882. 

"The kindness with which your Lordship was good enough 
to listen to me on certain points of the political situation iil 
Egypt, encourages me to offer you the following suggestions for 
your further consideration : 

"If I rightly understood your Lordship, Her Majesty's 
Government are not desirous of precipitating matters in that 
direction, but would be willing to accept a peaceable solution, 
could such be found, of the question in dispute between the 
Control and the Egyptian Government, and would only resort 
in the last instance to force were the political interests of Eng- 
land to be seriously impaired, or international engagements 
actually broken by the National Party now in power. 

"Now, I am sufficiently well acquainted with the views of 
that party, or, at least, of their most prominent leaders, to be 
able to speak positively to the fact that there is nothing nearer 
to their wishes than a good understanding with Her Majesty's 
Government. Indeed, I have the authority of Arabi Bey to 
assure your Lordship that, if addressed in a friendly manner, 
he will use his utmost influence with his party, and it is very 
great, to allay the bitter feelings which have arisen between the 
Egyptians and the English and other officials employed in the 
country, and that he would meet half-way any negotiations 



Letter to Lord Granville 175 

which may be entered into with a view to a peaceable arrange- 
ment. He has begged me, however, to lay before you the dif- 
ficulties of the position in which he is placed by the attitude of 
personal hostility displayed towards him by the English Con- 
troller-General, and to a certain extent also by Her Majesty's 
Minister. 

"Sir Auckland Colvin, as your Lordship is well aware, has 
taken a prominent political part in the various ministerial 
changes, and in what it is perhaps necessary to call the revolu- 
tion, which the last six months have witnessed in Egypt(. On 
the 9th of September it was he who advised the Khedive to 
arrest and shoot this very Arabi Bey, now Minister of War; 
and he has taken no pains to conceal the fact, having himself, a^ 
I understand, communicated the details of what then happened 
to the English newspapers. It is also well known to the Egyp- 
tians that he has been and still is in communication with the 
press in a sense hostile to the National Party, and especially to 
the army, and that on the occasion of Sherif Pasha's resignation 
he unreservedly stated his intention to 'use every means in his 
power to ruin the National Party and bring about intervention.' 
If these things were known only to Arabi, he might, he assures 
me, overlook them; but, unfortunately, they are matters of 
public notoriety, a fact which makes it impossible for him to 
show himself on terms of intimacy with their author. 

"Of Sir Edward Malet he has expressed himself less de- 
cidedly, but still partly in the same sense. It has been a mis- 
fortune of Sir Edward's position with the Egyptians that his 
visit to Constantinople closely coincided with the strong advo- 
cacy of Turkish intervention which the English press displayed 
last autumn, and I am myself convinced that the French Govern- 
ment are responsible for the belief, which is ineradicable in all 
minds at Cairo, that he has at various times suggested military 
action. I know, myself, that this is untrue, and that Sir Ed- 
ward has, on the contrary, deprecated any such solution of his 
difficulties; but certain facts remain, which lend a colour to the 
idea. Thus to the very date of the assembling of the Egyptian 
Chamber he refused to recognize the National demand for 
Constitutional Government as a serious matter; again, he joined 
Sir Auckland Colvin in displaying a marked partisanship for 
Sherif in his quarrel with the deputies; and he has since given 



1^6 A Commission of Inquiry 

offence by expressing his belief in a story, wholly unfounded and \ 
peculiarly irritating to those deputies, namely, that their Presi- 
dent, Sultan Pasha, a man universally respected, had been 
personally insulted by Arabi. 

"Be this as it may, it is certain both Sir Edward Malet and 
Sir Auckland Colvin, instead of being in a position to advise 
and restrain are practically 'in Coventry' with the Egyptian 
Government. They are shut out from all true sources of in- 
formation regarding their plans, and are compelled to leave the 
field open to intriguers of other nationalities who have no in- 
terest in advising moderation or desire to avert a rupture. 

"If your Lordship should find that there is any reason in my 
argument thus stated, I may perhaps be permitted to make the 
following suggestion. 

"The National Ministers are now engaged in preparing a 
series of grave complaints against the working of the system 
established by England and France and sanctioned by the Con- 
trol, some of which complaints are certainly well founded. 
They are willing to approach the inquiry in a moderate and 
friendly spirit, but they will certainly approach it in a hostile 
one if the Control and diplomacy continue hostile. The matters 
in dispute are largely matters of fact which, if justice is to be 
observed and an undoubted moral standing ground acquired by 
Her Majesty's Government, should be examined in an absolutely 
impartial mood and on the evidence no less of the Egyptians 
than of the Europeans. That evidence, I submit, it is out of 
the reach of Her Majesty's representatives, diplomatic and 
financial, to procure, and that impartiality will certainly be 
suspected in their case by the Egyptians. Would it not then be 
advisable, during the six months which must elapse before the 
Egyptian Parliament reassembles and the conflict be engaged, 
to send something in the nature of a commission of inquiry to 
examine into the facts complained of in a friendly spirit, the 
only spirit which can possibly avert disaster." 

To continue from my diary I find that on the i6th I wrote, 
with Sabunji's help as scribe, a long letter to Arabi, telling him 
that I was asking for a Commission to be appointed and that 
I was in good hopes, but entreating him to be cautious; and 
also to Gregory, who was still at Cairo. The situation in 



Situation in Egypt I77 

Egypt then was that the Chamber of Delegates, having insisted 
upon the right they had claimed to vote that half of the Budget 
which was not affected to the payment of the interest on the 
debt, a new Leyha, or organic law, granting a Constitution on 
European models had been signed, as we have seen, by the Khe- 
dive and published. The Ministers had also presented to the 
Chamber of Deputies a list of practical reforms, all of which 
were much needed and most of which have since, after many 
years, been carried out. Which done, the Chamber had been 
adjourned till the autumn. Absolute tranquillity had mean- 
while prevailed throughout the country, and the sole cause of 
quarrel with Europe was the financial one of the vote, a dispute 
which could not become acute for at least six months, when the 
next new budget would be framed. There is not the smallest 
doubt that if Colvin had been induced to join his French col- 
league, de Blignieres, in retiring from Egypt, and my suggestion 
of the Commission had been adopted, things in Egypt would 
have quieted down and all cause for armed intervention would 
have disappeared. The Egyptian Ministry desired nothing 
more than to live at peace with the whole world and to dome 
to an understanding with the Dual Governments on all disputed 
questions. 

On 20th March I lunched at Button's to meet his uncle, 
Robert Bourke, who was to bring forward the Egyptian ques- 
tion next week formally in Parliament. With him was another 
Tory member, Montague Guest, who had interested himself 
in the cause of Tunis. These were among the second strings 
to my bow, if Gladstone should fail me. Then I attended a 
meeting of the Asiatic Society, to which I had just been elected, 
and in the evening dined with Rivers Wilson. With Wilson 
I "quarrelled fearfully about Egypt." He told me he had 
helped to draw up a new Note, at the Foreign Office, which was 
now being despatched to Malet, "insisting on the fulfilment of 
all International engagements," a Note intended to be a new 
menance to the National Party, but which I think was never sent, 
or perhaps cancelled, as it does not appear in the Blue Book. 
My letter to Granville may have been the cause of its sup- 
pression. Wilson Insisted that the whole National movement 
was an Invention of Ismail's, and that "if the ex-Khedive were 
to land to-morrow at Alexandria, every Egyptian would come 



ty^ Jt Last I See Gladstone 

to him on his hands and knees." From this dinner I went on 
to a party at Lady Kenmare's, where I met Lady Salisbury, 
who took me aside, and cross-questioned me with much appear- 
ance of sympathy about the Egyptian cause, and I laid it before 
her to the best of my abihty, knowing that what I said would be 
repeated to her husband. Of course there could be no real 
sympathy in any of the Tories, especially in Lord Salisbury, for 
my views on Egyptian liberty, but it suited the Opposition to 
take me up to just the extent that would help them to bring the 
Government into discredit, Salisbury himself was throughout 
a thoroughgoing advocate of intervention. I walked home that 
evening with Hamilton, whom I had found at the party, and 
told him of Wilson's boast about the new Note, and entreated 
him to get me immediate audience of his chief, and he urged 
me to send in my letter at once to Granville, and also a copy of 
it to Gladstone. This I did the following morning, entrusting 
both to Hamilton for delivery. He had already, 21st March, 
arranged an interview for me with his chief for the next day. 
A dinner in the evening at Robert Bourke's, General Taylor, the 
Opposition Whip, Lady Ely, and a number more Tories. 

March 22. — This was a most important day. I had now 
been a full fortnight in England, and, though I had certainly 
not let any grass grow under my feet, I had neverthless failed 
as yet to get speech of the Prime Minister. To-day, however, 
made me ample amends. I went a little before the hour ap- 
pointed to Downing Street, so as to have time for a few wordls 
with Hamilton, who told me his chief had read my letter; and 
at twenty minutes past eleven I was received by him. Mr. 
Gladstone I found looking far better and younger than when I 
had seen him last, nearly two years before. Then he had 
seemed on his decline, but now he seemed vigorous and singu- 
larly alert in mind and body. He received me very kindly. 
My letter to Lord Granville was before him on the table, and 
he was evidently prepared and eager for what I had to say. 
He told me to tell him all, and, without talking much himself, 
listened. His manner was so encouraging and sympathetic 
that I spoke easily and with an eloquence I had never had before, 
and I could see that every word I said interested and touched 
him. He let me speak on for perhaps a quarter of an hour, 
only from time to time interjecting some such words as "you 



Gladstone's Sympathy with Egypt 179 

need not tell me this, for I know it," as when I would prove 
the reality of the National feeling in Egypt. His sympathy 
was obviously and strongly with the movement. 

Then he asked me a question about the position of the army 
and the reason of the prominent part taken by it in public affairs. 
Of this he was suspicious. I explained the history to him and 
assured him that the interference of the soldiers had been 
greatly exaggerated, and the stories of their intimidation of the 
Deputies were quite untrue; that the sole reason for the present 
military preparations was the dread of foreign intervention. 
I explained the feeling of the Party towards the Sultan and the 
Viceregal family — towards Tewfik, the ex-Khedive, and Halim. 
He asked me whether I had told all this to Lord Granville. I 
said: "He stopped me at the outset by telling me that Arabil 
had been bought by Ismail! What could I say?" Just at that 
moment somebody looked in and told Mr. Gladstone that Lord 
Granville was in the house and had sent up his name, and I was 
terribly afraid Mr. Gladstone was going to let him in, which 
would have prevented me from telling my full story. But with 
a look of annoyance he went out for an instant, and sent Lord 
Granville away, and then came back with a sort of skip across 
the room and rubbing his hands as one might do on having got 
rid of a bore. The gesture was an extraordinary encourage- 
ment to me, and he at once made me go on. 

I delivered all Arabi's messages about the Slave Trade and 
the other prqjects of reform, and then went on to explain Col- 
vin's position and Malet's. He said, almost pathetically, 
"What can we do? They are esteemed public servants and 
have received honours for their work in Egypt." He insisted 
upon the word honours. He then asked me to tell him some- 
thing about the civilian leaders of the National Party, and I 
explained the position of some of them, Mohammed Abdu, 
Ahmed Mahmud, Saadallah Hallabi, Hassan Sherei', and others 
of the Deputies, and, lastly, Abdallah Nadim, journalist and 
orator. This designation at once excited Mr. Gladstone, and 
the account of his eloquence, and he took down his name upon a 
slip of paper. Thus time slipped away till It was twelve o'clock, 
and he had another appointment. I had been with him forty 
minutes — a very fast forty minutes too. As I was going out 
I turned and asked him, witli a sudden thought, whether T might 



i8o Gladstone's Message to Arabi 

not send Arabi some message from him in answer to his mes- 
sages. He thought an instant and said, "I think not." And 
very slowly and deliberately: "But you are at liberty to state 
your own impression of my sentiments," and then in a sort of 
House of Commons voice, which was in strange contrast with 
the extremely personal and human tone in which he had been 
conversing: "If they wish to judge of these, let them read wfiat 
we say in Parliament, especially what I say, for I never speak 
lightly in Parliament. In our public despatches we are much 
hampered by the opinion of Europe, which we are bound to con- 
sider, and this is not favourable to Liberal institutions in Egypt. 
But they should read our speeches." He had turned to the 
table, for we were half-way across the room, and took up a 
paper which was on it, a despatch already signed, and which I 
felt sure was that which Wilson had told me he had helped to 
draft, and seemed on the point of showing it to me — and then 
refrained and put it down again. Once more his manner be- 
came natural and intimate. He thanked me again for my 
letters and all that I had told him, and begged me to let hjim 
hear if any new combination arose. His extreme kindness as 
he shook hands with me moved me greatly and I was near shed- 
ding tears, and went away feeling that he was a good as well 
as a great man, and wondering only how any one with so good 
a heart could have arrived at being Prime Minister. ''El 
hamdu I'lllah. El hamdu I'lllah," I kept repeating to myself, 
"El nasr min Alah, wa fathon karibon." 

Such was the Gladstone I saw unveiled for a moment that 
day — a man of infinite private sympathy with good, and of 
whom one would affirm it impossible he should swerve a hair's 
breadth from the path of right. But, alas, there was another 
Gladstone, the opportunist statesman, who was very different 
from the first, and whom I was presently to see playing in public 
"such fantastic tricks before high Heaven as make the angels 
weep." I will attempt a character, drawn from my observation 
of him, which was a close one, during the next ten years, of 
this very remarkable personality. 

Gladstone, as I have said, was two personages. His human 
side was very charming. He had an immense power of symn 
pathy, and what I may call a lavish expenditure of enthusiasm, 
for such things as attracted him, and he had also a certain hu- 



Gladstone's Character i8i 

mility of attitude, often towards persons far inferior to him- 
self, which compelled their affectionate regard, as did certain 
little human weaknesses which have found no place in any" 
memorial of him that has yet been published. All this made 
him beloved, especially by the young, by the women who knew 
him well, both those who were good and those who were less 
good. This was the happy, the consistent part of him. His 
public life was to large extent a fraud — as indeed the public life 
of every great Parliamentarian must be. The insincerities of 
debate were ingrained in him. He had begun them at school 
and college before he entered the House of Commons, and by 
the time he was thirty he had learnt to look upon the "Vote of 
the House" as the supreme criterion of right and wrong in 
public things. In deference to this he had had constantly to 
put aside his private predilections of policy, until towards the 
end of his life his own personal impulses of good had assumed 
the character of tastes rather than of principles. They were 
like his taste for music, his taste for china, his taste for bric-a- 
brac, feelings he would like to indulge, but was restrained from 
by a higher duty, that of securing a Parliamentary majority. 
This was his ultimate reason of all action, his true conscience,' 
to which his nobler aspirations had constantly to be sacrificed. 
His long habit, too, of publicity, had bred in him, as it does in 
actors, a tendency to self-deception. From constantly acting 
parts not really his own, he had acquired the power of putting 
on a character at will, even, I believe, to his inmost thoughts. 
If he had a new distasteful policy to pursue, his first object was 
to persuade himself into a belief that it was really congenial to 
him, and at this he worked until he had made himself his own 
convert, by the invention of a phrase or an argument which 
might win his approbation. Thus he was always saved the too 
close consciousness of his insincerities, for like the tragedian in 
Dickens, when he had to act Othello, he began by painting' 
himself black all over. I believe this is not an unfair estimate 
of Gladstone's public character. Certainly it is the light in 
which his actions showed him to me in his betrayal that year of 
the Egytian cause. 

As yet, however, I had no misgiving, and in the next few 
days wrote letters to my friends at Cairo detailing the good 
news. With Gladstone on our side, what more was there to 



1 82 Message from Rothschild 

fear? Only I prayed them to be patient till the Commission 
I had asked for should arrive. That some attempt was made 
by Lord Granville to carry out my suggestion is clear from the 
Blue Books. But Granville's heart was also as clearly not in 
it, or he was thwarted by Dilke or others in the Foreign Office. 
He wrote me a note on the 24th asking me to luncheon, when 
I should have an opportunity of discussing the question of the 
Commission, but by an accident, which was probably not an 
accident, the note did not reach me till too late, a manoeuvre 
which was repeated with the same result a week later. The 
Blue Books record a little abortive negotiation with France for 
a special inquiry, but it was soon dropped, and Lord Granville's 
favourite method of dawdling things out is responsible for the 
rest. Before many weeks had passed, the intriguers at Cairo 
had effected their purpose of a new disturbance, and the dif- 
ficulties of conciliation had become enormously increased. 

The rest of the short session before Easter in London may 
be briefly told. I went down for a few days to Crabbet to see 
after my private affairs, but that did not prevent me from writing 
to my friends in Egypt, Arabi and Mohammed Abdu and 
Nadim, telling them of my success with Gladstone and imploring 
their prudence. On the 26th I received a letter from Button, 
enclosing a note from a person in a very responsible position, 
which I find still among my papers. It is so short and instr'uo 
tive that I give it as it stands: 

"'22«J. I am very anxious that Mr. Wilfrid Blunt should 
meet and see Natty Rothschild, whose Egyptian interests re- 
quire no explanation. He goes to Lord Granville and the 
Foreign Office so constantly, and in this matter, like St. Paul, 
'dies daily.' To bring them to an intelligent understanding on 
this vexed question would be a real service. I am desired to 
ask if you could bring W. Blunt to luncheon at New Court on 
Friday next at i P. M. Do if you possibly can. It will be 
useful in many ways." 

Here, of course, was the real crux of the situation, the nine 
millions of the Rothschild loan supposed to be in danger in 
'Egypt, half of which. Button told me, was still held by the 
Rothschilds themselves. I consequently went up to London on 
the morning of the 27th, the day named, and under Button's 
wing to the City, but by misfortune only to find that "Natty"' 



An "Intelligent Understanding" 183 

had been called that morning abroad on account of the illness 
or death of a near relation, I forget which. We consequently 
did not see him, but he had left a message instead, begging me 
to write him my views. I regret the accident which prevented 
the meeting, for it would have been interesting, though I do not 
suppose it would have effected any good. I have often won- 
dered since what would have been the nature of the "intelligent 
understanding" so much desired; and I have sometimes sus- 
pected that the common financial argument might have been 
tried with me in the shape of shares to bring about an arrange- 
ment with Arabi for the betrayal of his political trust. Some 
such, it seems, was tried upon Arabi two months later through 
another channel. Nothing, however, came of the visit, except 
that I wrote my memorandum, too long a one here to quote, 
the object of it being to recommend, as a matter of policy, that 
financiers who had interests in Egypt should accept the revolu- 
tion that had occurred and make the best of it, and predicted 
that bondholders would lose more by a war than by conciliation. 
I have since been told that Rothschild, who, after great tribula- 
tion and anguish of mind at the time of the bombardment of 
Alexandria and nearly in despair thinking he had lost his millions 
eventually recovered the value of all, resented my prediction of 
evil as that of a false prophet. But that does not greatly con- 
cern me. My memorandum was drawn up not in his interest 
as creditor but in that of his Egyptian debtors. 

Another curious entry, 28th March, gives a hint of the ideas 
current in Printing House Square. This was the first time I 
had been to the "Times" ofiice, and Button was again my 
cicerone. We saw there Macdonald, the manager, with the 
object of trying to get him to send out a new correspondent to 
Cairo, who should give the "Times" independent news, and 
Mackenzie Wallace had been thought of for the purpose. But 
Macdonald, with Scotch caution, would not go to the expense. 
He was quite satisfied from a business point of view, he said, 
with the kind of news Scott, their correspondent at Alexandria, 
was sending them. English people, he said, had only two in- 
terests in Egypt, the Suez Canal and their bonds, if they held 
any, and Scott's views on these two matters were what they 
wanted. Beyond this they did not care in any special way about 
the truth. He complimented me all the same on my own let- 



184 I Meet the Prince of Wales 

ters, which as I was not paid for them they were obliged to me 
for, and they would always be glad to print whatever more I 
had to say. But a special correspondent just then was not 
needed. 

I was in correspondence about this time with Allen, the 
Secretary of the Anti-Slave-Trade Society, a very worthy man 
but of extremely narrow views. Sir William Muir had taken 
me to task in the "Times" for having asserted in one of my 
letters that it was part of the National program in Egypt 
to suppress what remained of slavery in Egypt, and he had been 
at the pains to prove by chapter and verse from the Koran, that 
slavery was and must always be an institution of a religidus 
character with Mohammedans. Allen, too, I found indignant 
at the idea of Arabi's being actively in favour of its suppression, 
which he, Allen, seemed to consider was the sole business of the 
Society's anti-slavery agents at Cairo. His anger was very 
much what a master of foxhounds might express at the unauthor- 
ized destruction of foxes by a farmer. Mohammedans, he con- 
sidered, had no business to put down slavery on their own 
account, or what would become of the Society, This at least 
was the impression his argument left on me. 

Lastly, I find a note of having been asked, ist April, to meet 
the Prince of Wales, who wanted to see me, at dinner, en partie 
carree. My host on this occasion was Howard Vincent, who 
was at that time on intimate terms with H. R. H. I was stu- 
pid enough not to go to the dinner, which would have been In- 
teresting. But I unfortunately had a previous engagement for 
the same day to meet Princess Louise of Lome at the Howards, 
and did not like to break my engagement, which was also an 
important one. I went, however, in the evening to Vincent's 
and had some talk with the Prince of Wales about Egypt, 
though not on the subjects connected with it that most interested 
me. 

Here the first Act of my English campaign may be said to 
end. Up to this point all, in spite of huge difficulties, had gone 
well with my propaganda. My preaching of the National 
Egyptian cause had been almost everywhere well received, and 
the talk of intervention had subsided. At one moment my 
hopes were very high, for Button had ascertained that the Com- 
mission I had asked for was to be sent, and he named to me 



The Beginning of the End 185 

even the person said to have been chosen. But, alas, it proved 
a vain rumour. Then everybody went out of London for the 
Easter recess, and before they returned the news of the Cir- 
cassian plot was upon us. It was the beginning of the pitiful 
end. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE CIRCASSIAN PLOT 

How fair the prospects in Egypt still were in the first week 
of April, notwithstanding the many rumours of disturbance 
there which were being spread through Europe, may be judged 
from the following two letters written to me at that time by 
Arabi, and still more by a third which I received at the same 
time from Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, Sheykh Mohammed 
Abdu's high character throughout his life for the strictest ver- 
acity and the exalted position he now holds as Grand Mufti of 
Egypt, give to his testimony a historical value which can hardly 
be exaggerated, and may well be placed in accepted contradic- 
tion of the multiform falsehoods of the Blue Books. His 
functions that spring as Director of the Official Journal and 
Censor of the Press at Cairo put him, moreover, in a position 
of knowledge as to what was passing in the counsels of the Na- 
tional Ministry, which neither Malet nor Colvin nor any Euro- 
pean in Egypt could at all pretend to. I draw the special 
attention, therefore, of historians to these convincing documents : 

"Cairo, April 1st, 1882. 
"To our respected, sincere, and free-minded friend, Mr. Wilfrid 
Blunt, may God prosper ihis best projects. 

"After offering praise to God, the conqueror of the strong 
and the upholder of truth, I beg to say that your letter dated 
March loth has reached me, and caused me an immense pleas- 
ure. Without doubt it will please every free man to see men 
free like you, and truthful in their sayings and doings, and de- 
termined to carry out their high projects for the benefit of man- 
kind generally, and the advantage of their own country in 
particular. 

"The contents of your letter prove that you are enamoured 

186 



Arahi's Letter 187 

of the freedom of mankind, and that you are trying your best 
to serve the interests of your English nation, being aware that 
those interests In the East, and especially in Egypt, can only be 
made secure forever by helping the Egyptians to be free and 
thus gaining their affection. Free Englishmen should surely 
help those who are striving for the independence of their coun- 
try, for its reform, and for the establishment of an equitable 
Government. Your praiseworthy endeavours will, we do not 
doubt, secure for you an honourable name with your countrymen, 
when they shall come to discover in what way you have laboured 
to remove the veil of untruth which interested men have spread 
before their eyes. 

"As to ourselves, we thank you for your good services as 
they concern both Egypt and England, which country we hope 
will be the most powerful friend to assist us in establishing good 
order on a basis of freedom, and an Imitation of civilized and 
free nations. Please God, we shall soon see the success of your 
endeavours, and we therefore consider your safe arrival home 
a good omen of success. 

"With regard to the advice you kindly gave us we have to 
thank you for it, and beg to say that we are trying our best to 
keep things quietly and In order, because we consider it one of 
our most important duties to do so, and we are endeavouring to 
succeed. We can assure you that all Is now tranquil. Peace 
reigns over the country; and we and all our patriotic brethren 
are with our best will defending the rights of those who dwell 
in our land, no matter of what nation they may be. All treaties 
and international obligations are fully respected; and we shall 
allow no one to touch them as long as the Powers of Europe 
keep their engagements and friendly relations with us. 

"As to the menaces of the great bankers and financial people 
in Europe, we shall bear them with wisdom and firmness. In 
our opinion, their threats will only hurt themselves and injure 
those Powers who are misled by them. 

"Our only aim is to deliver the country from slavery, injus- 
tice and ignorance, and to raise our people to such a position as 
shall enable them to prevent any return of the despotism which 
In time past desolated Egypt. 

"These words which I write to you are the thoughts of 
every thoughtful Egyptian and free-minded lover of his country. 



1 88 Arabics Views in April 

"Please remember me kindly to your good lady, and oblige 
your sincere friend, 

"Ahmed Arabi.'' 

"Cairo, April 6th, 1882. 
"To our true friend, Mr Wilfrid Blunt. 

"After returning thanks to God for the freedom and re- 
forms with which He has been pleased to bless us, I beg to say 
that I received your second letter after having sent you thd 
reply to your former letter. I avail myself of this fortunate 
occasion to repeat my sincere thanks for your good endeavours. 
I consider it to be my duty, and the duty of every pure con- 
science, even the duty of all men, to thank you for your good 
services. In acknowledging benefits the ties of friendship are 
strengthened, and so between nations. We are extremely anx- 
ious to come to an understanding about the friendship and mu- 
tual interests of ourselves and the Powers with whom we are un- 
der engagements, for it is only through friendship that those who 
have the rights in our country can enjoy the fruit of treaties and 
contracts, which we consider it our duty to respect and defend. 
If any rupture should take place, it would affect not us only or 
principally, but all other Powers, and principally Great Britain. 
No large-minded Statesman can fail to foresee the advantage 
which must result to England from befriending us, and helping 
us in our struggle. 

"As to the Control, you may rest assured it will not be 
hindered in the discharge of its duty, according to the rights 
guaranteed it by international treaties. It has never been our 
intention, or the intention of any in this country to touch the 
rights of the Controllers, or to trespass on any international 
treaty. 

"Should the representatives of the Powers in this country be 
faithful to their duty, and to the interests of their own countries, 
they cannot do better than help us in our truly National enter- 
prise, and prove in acts what they promise us in words. 

"We have made up our mind to do all we can to give our 
nation a position among civilized nations by spreading knowl- 
edge through the country, maintaining union and good order, 
and administering justice to every one. Nothing will make us 
go back an inch from this determination; threats or menaces 



False Reports Refuted 189 

will not deter us from it; we yield only to friendly feelings, and' 
these we appreciate immensely. 

"As to the tranquillity of the country, it is not disturbed. 
We are endeavouring to efface the bad traces left behind by 
former Governments. 

"As to the questions which you put to us, we have already 
sent their replies through Sheykh Mohammed Abdu by tele- 
graph. Truly all the rumors spread in Europe about the 
excessive military expenditure are void of foundation. The 
military budget has neither increased a para, nor decreased a 
dirhem. It stands just as it was fixed on 21st December, 1881, 
in the time of Sherif Pasha. Hence you may rest assured that 
the rumours you took the trouble to mention are spread only by 
unscrupulous persons. We regret to see falsehood thus finding 
continually its way into the newspapers of civilized Europe. 

"Let us pray God that He may guide the thoughtful statesmen 
of Europe to find out the truth, and better learn the condition of 
our country. So they will render service to their own countries 
as well as ours by strengthening the ties of good feeling. May 
God grant us all to enjoy the blessing of peace and a friendly 
understanding. 

"Ahmed Arabi." 

These letters, written in answer to mine conveying my "im- 
pression" of the Prime Minister's friendly sentiments, and 
which I forwarded at once on receiving them, in translation, to 
Mr. Gladstone, would, I feel sure, have received his attention 
had not he been just then away from London and occupied with 
what was to him a far more absorbing and important affair — > 
for it was threating the existence of his Government — the con- 
dition, almost one of revolution, in Ireland. Nor had I any 
opportunity of seeing either him or Hamilton till the Easter 
recess was over at the end of the month. In the meanwhile' 
events in Egypt had again become most critical through what is 
historically known as the Circassian plot, the news of which 
reached London in the third week of April. I did not pay it! 
much attention at the time, looking upon it as only one of the 
many false rumours being printed. But it soon turned out to 
be serious enough, not only in itself, but especially as giving our 
diplomacy the opportunity it had been waiting for of setting the 



190 Colvin's Influence on Malet 

Khedive in open quarrel with his Ministers. Malet was by this 
time completely subjugated by Colvin, and was henceforth 
guided in his action to the end by Colvin's Anglo-Indian sug- 
gestions. 

The author of the conspiracy was without question the ex- 
Khedive Ismail. I know this, among other sources of informa- 
tion, from his then secretary, Ibrahim Bey Mouelhi. The 
ex-Khedive from his retreat at Naples was still pulling the 
strings of his party at Cairo, and giving advice through them to 
his son. His chief agent was one Ratib Pasha, whom I remem- 
ber hearing of in the previous autumn as among the worst 
enemies of the Nationalists, and it was through him that the 
plot was worked. The idea was to get up among the Circassian 
officers of the army a reactionary movement against the fella- 
hin. Arabi and the chief fellah officers were to be assassinated, 
and a counter-revolution brought about, which Ismail hoped 
might in the whirligig of things lead to his own restoration. I 
am convinced that there was never at any time the least chance 
of this, but it will be remembered that Rivers Wilson believed 
in it as possible, and had, perhaps, even come round to thinking 
it financially desirable as an alternative to the utter weakness 
of Tewfik and his inabihty to support the Control. Tewfik, 
as usual, was halting between two courses, that of going on with 
the Constitutional Ministry and Arabi, of whom he was now 
profoundly jealous, and that of joining the Turkish reaction at 
the risk of bringing back his father. Sherif and Malet were 
working together, and Sherif's house had become a centre of 
the diplomatic intrigue against the Ministry inspired by Colvin. 
I do not say that either Colvin or Malet, or even, perhaps Sherif, 
were cognizant of the intended blow, but it was well known that 
they would favour any party which should succeed in overthrow- 
ing the Ministry, and that gave confidence to the conspirators. 
The plot, however, was betrayed to Arabi before it had time 
to come to a head, though not until an unsuccessful attempt had 
been made on Abd-el-Aal Bey, and the conspirators were 
promptly arrested and imprisoned. The details of the plot 
will be found, with other interesting matter, in the following 
letter I received at the time from Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, 
dated April 25th: 



Hatred of the Turks 191 

"As to the promotions of the officers, of which European news- 
papers are making so much talk, allow me to explain the facts. 
In the first place, the promotions were not made by Arabi 
Pasha's sole will and pleasure, nor were they a bribe to gain 
the officers' affections towards Arabi. They were made in con- 
sequence of the new military law, which prescribes that offi- 
cers, after a certain age, or sick, or infirm, or disabled, should 
retire from active service with a pension. In Sherif Pasha's 
time this military law began to take effect, and accordingly 558 
officers were put on the retired list. Next 96 officers were 
sent a year ago to the frontier of Abyssinia, Zaila, and else- 
where, while 100 officers left the army and took civil employ. 
The total number thus retired is 754. It was thus natural that 
promotions should be made to fill up vacancies. There are still 
fifty vacancies reserved for the cadets of the Military School. 

"Arabi's title of Pasha was not forced on him by the Sultan, 
but by the Khedive, who insisted that all his Ministers should 
hold that rank. 

"Let me now dispel from all minds, once for all, the false 
idea that Arabi, or the Military party, or the National party, 
are tools of the Turks. Every Egyptian, whether he be a 
learned man (of the Ulema) or a fellah, an artisan or a 
merchant, a soldier or a civilian, a politician or not a politi- 
'cian, hates the Turks and detests their infamous memory. No 
Egyptian can Ipok forward to the idea of a Turk landing in[ 
his country without feeling an impulse to rush to his sword 
to drive out the intruder. 

"The Turks are tyrants who have left calamities behind them 
in Egypt which still make our hearts sore. We cannot wish 
them back, or wish to have anything more to do with them. 
The Turks have footing enough with their firmans in Egypt. 
They must stop there, and try nothing further. But if any at- 
tempt of this kind comes to our knowledge, we shall hail it as 
a not altogether unwelcome accident. We have had already 
some presentiment about this, and it has been the cause of our 
preparations. We shall make use of the event, if it happens, 
to recover our full independence. Our clearest minded states- 
men are now watching every movement of Turkish policy in 
this country to check it the moment it oversteps its limits. I 



192 The Circassian Plot 

do not deny that there are Turks and Circassians in Egypt who 
advocate the cause of the Porte, but they are few — nothing to 
those who love their country. 

"With regard to the Circassian conspiracy against Arabi 
Pasha's life, it is not really a serious danger. 

"The ex-Khedive Ismail, the greatest enemy Egypt ever had, 
and one still envious of her happiness, has long been mining 
us with plots to destroy (blow up) our present Government, 
thinking in so doing to prepare the way for his return. But 
God Almighty has scattered to the wind his hopes, since every 
Egyptian knows that Ismail's return means the ruin of Egypt. 
The tyrant (Faraoun)^ however, hoping against hope, sent to' 
Egypt one of his followers, Ratib Pasha, who had been ban- 
ished; and he, by underhand means in Sherif Pasha's time, re- 
ceived admission to Egyptian soil, where he joined his brother, 
Mahmud Effendi Talaat Bcg-bashi, and later secured to his 
service Yusuf Bey Najati, Mahmud Bey Fouad, Kosrow Pa- 
sha's nephew and Otheman Pasha Rifki (all these are Cir- 
cassians). These worked to make converts to their plan, which 
was to destroy the actual Ministers, and kill the superior offi- 
cers of the army, beginning with Arabi Pashi. Through their 
efforts, about forty of the inferior officers joined their plan, 
swearing alliance, but at first put off its execution f(or want 
of a pretext. This was found in the discontent of nine Cir- 
cassian officers, who objected to being ordered for service to 
the Soudan. Ratib's party became aware of what was going 
on among them, and took advantage of it to suggest to the 
nine Circassians that they should refuse to go except with pro- 
motion. 

"The Ministry has long had a suspicion of the mischief 
which was impending. As long ago as when Ratib first re- 
turned to the country, Mahmud Sami, the present Prime Mini- 
ster when Minister of War, requested Sherif Pasha, in the 
Khedive's presence, to expel Ratib. He suspected something 
wrong in the fact that Ratib had left the ex-Khedive so sud- 
dently at Naples. But Sherif refused, although Mahmud Sami 
warned him that he would be held responsible for all that 
might one day happen. This because Ratib was Sherif's son- 
in-law, and, as is thought, also perhaps his accomplice in the 
design o^f restoring Ismail. 



Mohammed Ahdu on Slavery 193 

"It happened, however, that Ratib's party invited a certain 
Circassian officer, Rashid Effendi Anwar, to join them, and that 
this officer refused to have anything to do with their plan, and, 
leaving the conspirators where they were, came straight to 
Arabi and disclosed the plot. Thus they were arrested, and 
brought to trial by court-martial. 

"The event has caused little excitement among the common 
people. Every one knows that Arabi's life is exposed as other 
men's, to dangers daily. Nor is it possible for a man, however 
great he be, that all should wish him well. But we should only 
laugh if it were stated publicly that Engand was on the verge 
of anarchy because a madman, sodier or civilian, had tried to 
shoot your Queen. 

"The Circassians in the army number in all eighty-one per- 
sons, and no one in his senses need be alarmed at the chance 
of so small a number of men succeeding against the Govern- 
ment. 

"Now, as to the Slave Trade. The present Ministry is 
trying hard to suppress domestic slavery. The Mohammedan 
religion offers no obstacle at all to this; nay, according to Mo- 
hammedan dogma Moslems are not allowed to have slaves 
except taken from infidels at war with them. In fact, they 
are captives or prisoners taken in legal warfare, or who be- 
longed to infidel peoples not in friendly alliance with Moham- 
medan princes, nor protected by treaties or covenants. But 
no Moslem is allowed to be taken as a slave. Moreover, if a 
person is an infidel, but belongs to a nation in peaceful treaty 
with a Mohammedan prince, he cannot be taken as a slave. 
Hence the Mohammedan religion not only does not oppose abol- 
ishing slavery as it is in modern time, but radically condemns 
its continuance. Those learned gentlemen in England and else- 
where who hold a contrary opinion should come here and teach 
us, the Sheykhs of the Azhar, the dogmas of our faith. This 
would be an astonishing spectacle. The whole Mohammedan 
world would be struck dumb when it learned that a Christian 
had taken upon him the task, in the greatest Mohammedan 
University in the world, of teaching its Ulema, professors, and 
theologians the dogmas of their religion, and how to comment 
on their Koran. 

"A Fewta will in a few days be issued by the Sheykh el Is- 



194 Malet Takes Action 

lam to prove that the abolition of slavery is according to the 
spirit of the Koran, to Mohammedan tradition, and to Mo- 
hammedan dogma. 

"The Egyptian Government will endeavour to remove every 
obstacle in the way, and will not rest till slavery is extirpated 
from Egyptian territory. 

"Mohammed Abdu." 

The plot thus on the 25th of April seemed to be frustrated, 
nor would it have led to any more serious complications but 
for the action taken by Malet in regard to it. Instead of sup- 
porting the Ministry against whom it had been directed, his 
official sympathies were given wholly to the conspirators. These 
had been tried by court-martial and condemned to the not over- 
whelming punishment of being banished to the White Nile, a 
penalty constantly enforced in Egypt even in the time of the 
Dual Control. Malet, however, wrote home that the sentence 
was a monstrous one, equivalent to death, while the "Times" 
correspondent was allowed to publish the story, an altogether 
false one, that Arabi had privately visited the prison and there 
had had the conspirators tortured under his eyes. That there 
was no truth in this tale it is hardly necessary to affirm. Yet 
Malet gave it a certain countenance in his despatches to the 
extent of mentioning it as a report prevalent, and that cries 
had been heard issuing at night from the prison. What is cer- 
tain is that it was made a pretext with him for encouraging the 
Khedive to quarrel with his Ministers by taking the case out of 
their hands into his own, and commuting their sentence into 
one of simple exile, an act which according to the new Con- 
stitution was beyond his right. 

To go back to my journal in London, I find that on 28th 
April I went to Downing Street "rather wroth" about noth- 
ing having been done for Egypt, but Hamilton bade me be 
patient and said that my idea of a Commission had been taken 
up. Also, the next day. Button congratulated me on my suc- 
cess. "He tells me there has been a fearful crisis about Egypt; 
that the Sultan was for sending troops there, deposing Tew- 
fik, setting up Halim, and hanging Arabi. The English and 
French Governments, however, have prevented this, and Arabi 
is to be supported and a Commission sent." On Tuesday there 



Arahi and the Sultan 195 

was to be a declaration of their Egyptian policy In the House 
of Lords by the Government. This news of the Sultan's In- 
tervention seems, in fact, to have been a crisis of the moment 
brought on by the Rothschilds with the support of Bismarck. 
The relations between Constantinople and the National Party 
in Egypt had become strained in the last few weeks through 
various circumstances which it is time now to explain, as well 
as the peculiar communications which passed in the month of 
February between the Sultan and ArabI, communications which 
are of the greatest possible Importance In estimating Arabi's 
growing position of political power In Egypt superior to that 
of his fellow Ministers. 

It will be remembered that when the Sultan's Commission- 
ers visited Egypt In the autumn of 1881 Ahmed Pasha Ratib 
(not to be confounded with Ratib Pasha, the ex-Khedive's 
agent) , who was one of them and the Sultan's A. D. C, met 
Arabi in the train on his way to Suez and Mecca, and that they 
had Interchanged Ideas and made friends, and that the Pasha 
had promised to represent him favourably to his master as a 
good Mohammedan and one loyal to the Caliphate. This had 
led to correspondence between them, of which I have in 
my possession the originals of the following two Important doc- 
uments. They came Into my hands, with a mass of other 
papers, at the time of Arabi's trial. The two letters were writ- 
ten within three weeks after the Government of Mahmud SamI 
was formed, in February, 1882, In which Government Arabi 
was Minister of War. The first Is from Ahmed Ratib, the 
second from Sheykh Mohammed Zafir, one of the great reH- 
glous sheykhs of Constantinople, who at that time was charged 
with the Sultan's secret correspondence; and both were written 
at the Sultan's personal command, 

"To THE Egyptian Minister of War, Ahmed Arabi Bey 
"I related to His Majesty the Sultan the conversation we 
had on the railway between the stations of Zagazig and Mahda 
on my return to Constantinople, and It caused great pleasure to 
His Majesty, and he ordered me to communicate to you his 
Imperial compliments. I related to His Majesty all the kind 
treatment I received at your hands and the courtesy my eyes 
witnessed while I was at Cairo, and His Majesty was ex- 



196 The Sultan's Letters 

tremely gratified thereat, so that the satisfaction he felt in 
your devotion and fideUty was increased manyfold. People had 
made him think that you were acting, I know not how, contrary 
to right, and had succeeded in perverting His Majesty's idea 
about you, but now as I have exposed the true state of the case to 
him, I swear to you that His Majesty deeply regrets ever having 
paid any attention to these false and lying statements about 
you; and as a good proof of this His Majesty has commanded 
me to write this letter, and to express to you the sentimen'ts 
which follow: 

"It matters nothing who is the Khedive of Egypt. The 
thoughts of the ruler of Egypt, his intentions and his conduct 
must be governed with the greatest care, and all his actions 
must tend to secure the future of Egypt and to uphold intact 
the sovereignty of the Caliph, while he must show the most 
perfect faith in upholding the faith and the country's rights. 
This will be required of him of the persons who have been 
on the Khedivial Throne. Ismail Pasha and his predecessors 
gave bribes to Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Midhat Pasha and their 
representatives of the Sublime Porte, traitors; and, after shut- 
ting the eyes of the officials, dared to overtask and oppress the 
Egyptians. And, in addition to this, they made heavy debts 
and brought the Egyptians under a grievous yoke. And to- 
day, in the eyes of the world, their state has specially appealed 
to our pity, but the whole position is an extremely delicate 
one which calls for the necessity of finding a speedy and sure 
remedy. Therefore it behooves you above all things to pre- 
vent anything that might lead to foreign intervention, and 
never to stray from the just and true path nor to listen to any 
treacherous falsehoods, but in every way with watchful care to 
hinder the seditious projects of foreigners. This is the great 
hope of the Sultan. 

"And, since we two shall correspond in the future, you must 
take necessary precautions to prevent our letters from falling 
into strange hands. For this the easiest way at present, and 
there is no safer channel you can find, is to submit your corre- 
spondence to the true and trusty man who carries this letter and 
that of Sheykh Mohammed Zafir. 

"I would also add that it is indispensable that you should 
send secretly some officer who knows well what is going on in 



Arabi Charged to Protect Egypt 197 

Egypt, and who is a trusted friend of yours, to present at 
the footstool of His Majesty the reports on the state of the 
country in true detail. 

"I beg you to send the answer by the man who brings this 
letter. 

Ahmed Ratib, Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan. 
"^th Rebi ul Akhar. 22nd Feb., 1882." 

''To His Excellency the Egyptian Minister of War. 

"I have presented your two faithful letters to His Majesty 
the Sultan, and from their contents he has learnt all your sen- 
timents of patriotism and watchfulness, and especially have the 
promises you make of your efforts to guard faithfully and truly 
His Majesty's interests been a cause of lively satisfaction to 
His Majesty, so much so that His Majesty ordered me to ex- 
press his pleasure and his favour to you, and further bade me 
write to you as follows, viz. : — As the maintenance of the in- 
tegrity of the Caliphate is a duty which touches the honour 
of every one of us it is incumbent on every Egyptian to strive 
earnestly after the consolidation of my power, to prevent Egypt 
from passing out of our hands into the rapacious grasp of for- 
eigners as the Vilayet of Tunis has passed, and I repose all 
my confidence in you, my son, to exert all your influence and to 
put forth every effort to prevent such a thing happening. And 
you are to beware never for one moment to lose sight of this 
important point, and to omit none of the precautionary measures 
which are called for by the age in which we live, keeping all 
ways before you, as a perpetual goal, the defence of your faith 
and of your country; and especially you are to persist in main- 
taining your confidence and the ties which bind you, 

"That country (Egypt) is of the highest importance to 
England and France, and most of all to England, and certain 
seditious intrigues in Constantinople, following in the path of 
these Governments, have, for some time past, been busy with 
their treacherous and accursed projects, and, since they have 
found it to their profit zealously to promote these intrigues 
and seditions In Egypt, it is the especial desire of His' 
Majesty that you should keep a very careful eye on these 
persons (or things?). And, according to the telegrams and 
news sent by the Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, one of this party, we 



198 N^o Confidence in Tewfik 

see that he is weak and capricious; and also it is to be re- 
marked that one of his telegrams does not corroborate another, 
but they are all in contradiction (wound each other). In ad- 
dition to this I may tell you that Ali Nizami Pasha and Ali 
Fuad Bey have spoken to His Majesty most highly in your 
favour, and Ahmed Ratib Pasha also has repeated to His Ma- 
jesty the substance of the conversation he had with you in the 
railway carriage between the stations of Zagazig and Mahda, 
and as His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed 
Pasha, His Majesty desires me again for this to express his 
trust in you, and to say that as he considers you a man of the 
highest integrity and trustworthiness he requires of you, above 
all things, to prevent Egypt from passing into the hands of 
strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for inter- 
vention there, 

"The orders which Ahmed Pasha Ratib will receive on this 
head will be separately communicated to you. Both my letter 
and that of Ahmed Pasha Ratib, by order of His Majesty, 
have been written by one of His Majesty's own private secre- 
taries, and after we have affixed our seals to the letters; we 
also put an extra seal on the envelopes. 

"And, in a special and secret manner, I tell you that the 
Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik. But the 
man who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the 
ties which bind her to the CaHphate; who pays due respect to 
His Majesty and gives free course to his firmans; who assures 
his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere; who 
does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials; 
who does not deviate one hair's-breadth from his line of duty; 
who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our Euro- 
pean enemies; who will watch against them and ever preserve 
his country and his faith intact — a man who does this will hd 
pleasing and grateful, and accepted by our great lord the Sul- 
tan. 

"If I have not entered into any further details in this letter 
of mine, I beg you to excuse me because Ahmed Ratib Pasha 
only arrived three days ago, and yet in that time, owing to his 
declarations of your fidelity and true intentions. His Majesty 
has expressed his full confidence in you. I only received the 
message I have just given you yesterday. I hope to be able td 



Arahi and the Caliphate 199 

send you by next week's post a more detailed letter. In every" 
case be careful not to let any letter you send fall into strangd 
hands but try to get a special messenger, and, as for this time; 
It would be better if you would send your answer by the hand 
of the man who brings this letter. 

"Your Servant, MaHAMMED Zafir. 
'[^th Rehi ul Akhar, 22nd Feb., 1882." 

These two letters are records of such high historical import-, 
ance that if ever my memoirs come to be printed they should 
be annexed to them in facsimile. They explain much of what 
happened later in June at the time of the Dervish Mission, and 
they prove that if Arabi took upon himself then and during 
the months of the war the position in some degree of dictator in 
Egypt, it was not without ample justification from a Moham- 
medan point of view, in the commands of the Caliph as head of 
his religion to protect the province against Christendom. They 
show, too, why it was that in the month of August Abdul Ha- 
mid was so loath to proclaim him a rebel, and how absurd was 
the charge of rebeUion brought against him at his trial. 

Nevertheless, it must not be assumed from this that Arabi 
had made himself the Sultan's tool in anything that concerned 
the administrative independence of his country. His position 
on this point was a firm one.. He hated the Turks, and would 
certainly have resisted in arms any attempt from Constantino- 
ple at military intervention. Of this Sheykh Mohammed Ab- 
du's letter is ample proof, and it is in harmony with all that 
Arabi has himself told me. His position, therefore, at the Cali- 
phal Court was a changing and precarious one. He had strong 
friends there in Ahmed Ratib and Mohammed Zafir, but he also 
had strong enemies. Sabit Pasha, the Khedive's Turkish sec 
retary, was especially one of them, and reported to Yildiz 
everything he could find against him. Thus, when the arrest 
of the Circassian conspirators occurred, among whom were 
Osman Pasha Rifki, and other important Turks, it is quite pos- 
sible there was a wave of anger against Arabi in the Sultan's 
mind. But it does not seem to have lasted, and from the mo- 
ment when it became once more a question of resisting Europe, 
Arabi again had the Sultan's approval. As between Tewfik, 
the puppet of the Anglo-French Control, and Arabi the defender 



200 The Sultanas Intervention 

against the two Christian Powers of the independence of a 
Moslem state, there could be no hesitation in the Caliph's sym- 
pathies. 

I think it is to be regretted that the Sultan's wish to depose 
Tewfik and set up Halim was not carried out. Though Arabi 
did not belong to the party of Halim in Egypt, he would cer- 
tainly not have opposed it after Tewfik had gone over to the 
Enghsh against him, and it would have been accepted by a con- 
siderable number of respectable men in Egypt who knew Ha- 
lim to be both more intelligent and more liberal in his views 
than the other. The Sultan's intervention, therefore, would 
have been a peaceable one if he had refrained from sending an 
army to enforce it. On the whole it was probably the best solu- 
tion. The French Government, however, were strongly opposed 
to the immixture of the Sultan in Egyptian affairs, and our di- 
plomacy at Cairo was pledging itself more and more every day 
to Tewfik. All that came oT the idea of Turkish intervention 
and of the commission I had asked for, and which had been al- 
most promised, was an absurd compromise of the two things, 
in the shape of a proposal made, but not insisted on, by Lyons 
to Freycinet at Paris, that a French, an English, and a Turkish 
general should be sent to Egypt to "restore discipline in the 
Egyptian army." Lord Lyons, be it remarked, had a special 
reason for taking Malet's view of the situation in Egypt in 
the fact that Malet had been for years his private secretary 
and devoted servant in the profession. 

Nothing, therefore, was really done of what I had been told 
at Downing Street to expect, not even those few words of good- 
will in Parliament which Gladstone had begged Arabi to wait 
for. By a synchronism, tragic for Egypt, the crisis at Cairo, 
so long worked up to, coincided exactly with that other crisis 
which had also been impending in Ireland. There a regime of 
threats and coercion under Forster, the Chief Secretary, had 
been tried all through the winter. Members of Parliament 
had been Imprisoned without trial, and the arts of police des- 
potism had been put into more rigorous practice than for many 
years, and without any result of pacification. Gladstone had 
persuaded his Cabinet to try conciliatory measures. According 
to a secret arrangement made with Parnell, the Irish leader, 
while he was in gaol at Kllmainham, and known as the Kilmaln- 



Trouble in Ireland 201 

ham treaty, Parnell and his political friend, Dillon, had b'een re- 
leased; and, as a consequence, Forster on the 2nd of May re- 
signed his office and attacked the Government for their pusilla- 
nimity in the House of Commons. The very same day, 2nd 
May, had been fixed for a Ministerial statement about Egypt, 
on a motion rnade by Lord De la Warr in the House of Lords, 
and I find the following entry in my journal: 

"May 2. — Met Lord De la Warr at the House of Lords. 
He took me in, and I expected to hear the promised statement 
about Egypt, but heard Instead Lord Granville's announcement 
of Mr. Forster's resignation In Ireland. A good deal of ex- 
citement. Lord Granville seemed rather shy and badgered. 
Lord Salisbury Interrupted once or twice. ... I heard Rose- 
bery say a few words In a very Impressive and dignified manner, 
etc., etc. Egyptian affairs are put off as of no importance." 
Ireland for the next few weeks drove out all English interest In 
Egypt, so much so that when on the 6th I took Mohammed 
Abdu's Important letter, explaining the Circassian plot, to Mor- 
ley, he refused to publish It on the ground of its length, and 
that "nobody cared about Egypt." 

This, however, was but the first act of the coming tragedy. 
On the 7th Lord Frederick Cavendish, a brother of Lord Har- 
tlngton and an intimate friend of Gladstone's, who had been 
appointed Chief Secretary In Forster's place to carry out the 
new policy of conciliation, was assassinated at Dublin with Mr. 
Burke, the chief permanent official, by members of an Irish 
secret society, known as the "Invlncibles." These were in real- 
ity quite unconnected with Parnell's Parliamentary party, but 
the public did not discriminate between the two, and the result 
was a universal cry for strong measures against all forms of re- 
bellion. For a moment Gladstone battled against this, and it 
was proposed to Dilke, who, as an advanced Radical, was with 
Chamberlain at that time friendly to the Parnellites, that he 
should take the post of danger at Dublin and continue, as Cav- 
endish's successor, the task of conciliating Ireland. But Dilke 
did not like the look of things, and refused the post. It was 
found difficult to get any one to accept It. What, however, de- 
cided the abandonment of the policy of conciliation was 
the attitude of Hartlngton. He took the matter of his 
brother's death, which he felt deeply, as a personal wrong to 



202 Assassinations in Dublin 

be avenfred, and from that moment became the most deter- 
mined enemy of Irish Nationalism. Gladstone had to choose 
between resignation and the abandonment of his policy, and, see- 
ing a majority of his Cabinet against him, he chose the latter. 
Trevelyan was sent to Dublin and new coercive measures were 
resolved on. And so, too, as to Egypt. Up to this point, ir; 
spite of the unconciliatory views of the Foreign Office, Gladstone, 
supreme in the Cabinet, had been able to put a veto on any ac- 
tive form of armed intervention. But now he found himself 
out-voted, and Egypt, too, was thrown to the wolves. "Look," 
his colleagues seem to have said to him, "where your policy of 
conciliation has led us in Ireland." If I have been rightly 
informed, a policy of coercion in Ireland and of intervention in 
Egypt was decided on at one and the same Cabinet in the second 
week of May. I quote some extracts from my Diary in illus- 
tration of the double situation.* 

''May 8. — In consequence of the ugly look of things in Egypt 
I have written an ultimatum to Gladstone begging him to re- 
lieve me of the dilemma I am in, caused by the Government's 
silence. I have said that I must speak the whole truth if Lord 
Granville won't. All the world, however, is agog about Ire- 
land. Yesterday came the astounding news of Lord Frederick 
Cavendish's and Mr. Burke's murder at Dublin. At first it 
seemed as if the Government would have to resign, but to-day 
Parnell has written to disown all connection with the crime, and 
I think Gladstone will be the stronger for it. On Friday when 
I was in the lobby of the House of Commons Artie Brand (the 
Speaker's son), who was there, pointed me out 'the three Irish 
conspirators' talking together. Parnell is a tall, good-looking 
man of about 32, with nothing of the murderer about him. 
Dillon is tall and very pale and dark, and would do for Guy 
Fawkes in a cloak and dagger. They looked very much like 
gentlemen among the cads of the lobby. 

"May II. — There is bad news from Egypt. The Khedive 
having refused to sign the Circassian sentences, Arabi has con- 
voked the Chamber and they talk of deposing Tewfik . I went 
at once to Downing Street and saw Godley, on whom I urged the 
necessity of Gladstone giving me an immediate answer. Glad- 
stone is away at Lord Frederick's funeral, and I have agreed to 
wait till to-morrow for an answer; but Godley saw I was in earn- 

* See Lord Eversley's letter quoted in the Preface. 



Promise of a Liberal Policy 203 

est and promised it should be given. It is, of course, an unfor- 
tunate moment." I have a vivid recollection of Godley's sym- 
pathy on this occasion. I was myself deeply moved. It seemed 
to me so tragic a thing that the whole fate of a nation and of 
the best hopes of reform for a religion, both historic in the 
world, should depend on the possibility of securing the atten- 
tion of one old man for half an hour, for I felt sure I 
could again persuade him. I did not, of course, know the 
exact position of the Cabinet, but Godley must have known, 
and he seemed almost as much to feel it, as myself. I know he 
all along disapproved the Foreign Office policy in Egypt, and I 
think he felt deeply the disgrace of Mr. Gladstone's share 
in it when, in spite of his Midlothian speeches, he came for- 
ward as the apologist of a war against Oriental freedom in 
the interests of finance. Very shortly after his chief's change 
of policy he left his service for a permanent post elsewhere, 
and I have always fancied it was more or less in protest. 

"May 12. — Freycinet has declared he will not let the Turks 
intervene, so I feel easier. . . . Rode to George Howard's 
who approved my plan (of publishing the whole truth). I 
have all ready now . . . and the 'Times' will publish. It ap- 
pears that Rothschild has been working hard with Freycinet 
to get the French Government to set up Halim instead of 
Tewfik. ... In the meanwhile all that has actually been done 
is to order a fleet to be ready in a fortnight at Plymouth. . . ., 
Saw Eddy Hamilton. He promises the answer to-night. The 
Howards are very angry with Dilke because he has refused 
the Chief Secretaryship for Ireland. 'He will lose caste by 
this.' They looked upon it as the shirking of a post of dan- 
ger, but it is quite possible that Dilke was better pleased to re- 
main where he was, at the Foreign Office, pulling the strings 
for Granville in Europe. It would have been well for Egypt if 
he had accepted. 

"May 13. — Gladstone's answer has come; he cannot tell me 
any details, but Lord Granville will speak on Monday, and he 
begs me to wait till then. He only promises that the Liberal 
policy shall be in accordance with Liberal doctrines. So I am 
satisfied. I have written (to Gladstone) to offer to go out as 
mediator between Arabi and the Khedive. I have sent the fol- 
lowing telegram to Arabi: 'I entreat you have patience. Do 



204 The Crisis at Cairo 

nothing rashly or without Parliament sanction. Delay action 
against the Khedive, I am working hard for you, but must 
have time. There is real danger.' At five o'clock I received 
an answer from Gladstone to say that he supposed my last 
letter was written before the arrival of recent news. I can- 
not understand what he means by that, as there is nothing iri 
the evening papers. . . . Late at night an answer from Arabi : 
'Mai 13. Je vous remercie de vos conseils. Differend de- 
fere aux delegues. Tranquillite complete. Certainement au- 
cune crainte pour Europeens. Ahmed Arabi.' " 

The true history of the crisis which had taken place that first 
fortnight of May at Cairo, as I afterwards learned it, was 
this. On the second, the Khedive finding himself pressed by 
Arabi, his Minister of iWar, to sign the sentences of exile on, 
the Circassian officers, some of whom were His Highness's 
personal friends, called Malet to his counsels and received from 
him the advice, fortified by a promise of English support, that 
he should refuse his signature; and this must be considered the 
moment at which Tewfik first resolved to throw himself espe- 
cially upon English protection in his quarrel with his Ministers. 
Malet thereupon wrote an important despatch which is pub- 
lished in the Blue Books, extolling in high terms the character 
of the Khedive, as one deserving the full confidence of Her Ma- 
jesty's Government. The Khedive, therefore, refused to sign, 
though constitutionally his signature to the decision of the court- 
martial could not be withheld. 

The refusal, aggravated by the fact, which at once became 
known, that it had been suggested by a foreign Consul, angered 
the Nationalist Ministry, and letters were addressed by thej 
Prime Minister, Mahmud Sami, to the members of the National 
Parliament requesting their attendance at Cairo. This was 
no doubt an irregular proceeding, inasmuch as the Parliament 
could only be legally summoned by the Khedive, and it gave um- 
brage to some of the members who were also annoyed at being 
called again to Cairo from their country homes at an incon- 
venient season of the year. Nevertheless, a large proportion of 
them came in answer to Mahmud Sami's letters, and though 
they had no formal sitting, decided at a meeting held In Sul- 
tan Pasha's house to support the Ministers, and it was resolved 
by forty-five to thirty, that, if Tewfik persisted in intriguing 



Sultan Pasha and the Chamber 205 

with the English and French Consuls against them, there was no 
other way than to Impeach and depose him. Malet, however, 
having by this time received a telegram of approbation from 
the Foreign Office, and finding the Khedive wavering, Informed 
him that the English and French fleets had been ordered to 
Alexandria on a plea of protecting European subjects. Upon 
this the Khedive sent for Sultan Pasha, the President of the 
Chamber, and exposed the situation to him, and so worked 
upon his fears, and upon a certain personal jealousy which he 
knew to have grown up in the Sultan's mind toward ArabI, 
that he persuaded him to take part with him, and trust to 
European support rather than run the risk of war. Sultan then, 
at a new informal meeting of the Deputies, declared himself 
on the Khedive's side against the Ministers, and obtained the 
adhesion of six other Deputies to his view, though the large 
majority of them remained faithful to the Ministry. It was 
at this juncture that my telegram to Arabi was received at 
Cairo, and It seems to have had some effect with Sultan, to 
whom it was doubtless shown. But the English papers of the 
thirteenth asserted that the Chamber had joined the Khedive 
against ArabI, and on the fifteenth that Mahmud Sami had re- 
signed. The following is from my journal. 

"May 14. — Sunday, at Crabbet. I see in the 'Observer' 
that Sultan Pasha went yesterday to the Khedive to make terms 
between him and Arabi; so I conclude my telegram came just In 
time. The papers all say that he and the Chamber have sided 
against Arabi with the Khedive, but I will not believe that till I 
hear further. What is hkely Is that Sultan Pasha has been put 
out at the Chamber being Invoked without a legal summons, and 
at an inconvenient time of the year. The army has had too 
much influence In the Ministry not to have made itself enemies. 
There is probably jealousy, but I do not believe in more. The 
whole thing has doubtless been fostered by Colvin and Malet. 
and the Circassians have been encouraged by the Idea of Tur- 
kish Intervention. They have ordered ships to Alexandria, 
which. If I am not mistaken, will have the effect of uniting all 
once more against the Europeans. 

"In the afternoon a perplexing telegram from Abdu, 'II n'y 
a pas discorde entre Sultan Pasha et le Parlement. Le loup 
(meaning the ex-Khedive Ismail) dont participation dans le 



2o6 A New Disappointment 

complot Circassian est suppose dans ma lettre a Sabunji, est en 
effet complice. Differend principal est defere aux delegues. 
Tranquillite publlque n'est pas menacee,' " 

Van Benningsen, the distinguished Dutch judge, author, un- 
der the title of "Un Juge Mixte," of one of the most valuable 
works about Egypt under the Dual Control, was staying with 
me at Crabbet at the time, and I found him an ardent sympa- 
thizer with the Nationalists. 

The next day, 15th May, was that of the long promised 
explanation by the Government of their Egyptian policy, and 
I went up to London in high hopes of something good, being 
fortified by the telegram I had received. I was doomed, how- 
ever, to a new disappointment. Though the matter of Egypt 
was discussed In the House of Lords, Granville had nothing 
better to promise the Egyptians than a repetition of the ol4 
menace of Gambetta's Joint Note, and the statement, which 
I felt certain was untrue, that the Deputies at Cairo and the 
whole country were supporting the Khedive In his quarrel with 
his Ministers. This, then, was the famous "Liberal policy" 
Hamilton had promised me. I felt myself absolved from all 
obligation of reticence towards Gladstone, who seemed to have 
played with and deceived me. I left the House of Lords as 
soon as I had heard the speech, in great anger, and resolvedi 
henceforth to act without further reference to prudence on myl 
part or the Government's convenience. After thinking the mat- 
ter over during the night in much perplexity, I decided upon a 
bold step. I was resolved to defeat the intrigue I knew was 
going on. As soon as the telegraph offices were open In the 
morning, i6th May, I sent the following message to Cairo: 

"To Arabi Pasha, Minister of War. Lord Granville states 
In Parliament that Sultan Pasha and the Deputies have joined the 
Khedive against you. If untrue, let Sultan Pasha telegraph me 
contradiction. United you have nothing to fear. Could you 
not form a Ministry with Sultan Pasha as Prime Minister? But 
stand firm." 

"To Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies. I 
trust that all who love Egypt will stand together. Do not quar- 
rel with Arabi. The danger Is too great." 

Also to each of the following Deputies: "Butros Pasha, Abu 
Yusuf, and Mahmud Pasha Falaki. Parti national, est II actuel- 



Telegrams 207 

lement content d' Arabi ? Le Gouvernement Anglais pretend le 
contraire. Si vous vous laissez desunir de I'annee, I'Europe 
vous annexera." 

And I sent the same last telegram to Mohammed Abdu, to 
Sheykh el Hajrasi, and to Abdallah Nadim, the orator. All 
the eight telegrams were signed with my name, and I knew that 
in thus sending them I was sure to incur the anger of the Foreign 
Office, if not of Mr. Gladstone, for it could hardly be unknown 
to the Agency at Cairo, as messages sent by the Eastern Tele- 
graph Company were at that time pretty well common property 
there. I was resolved, however, to run the risk of this, my 
only doubt being how to express succinctly the nature of the 
danger against which I warned the Deputies. The words, 
"Europe will annex you," seemed to me to do this best, for 
though, perhaps, our Government had no immediate thought 
of annexation nor yet the French Government, the ultimate end 
seemed certain, and Colvin's words rang in my ears; nor do I 
think that the event so far has otherwise than justified me. 
Then, having fired my shot, I went back to the country repose 
of Crabbet to wait for what should happen. The answer came 
sooner than I at all expected, and that very evening, as I was 
sitting down to dinner, I received the following from Sultan 
Pasha : 

"Le differend qui existait entre le Khedive et les Ministres 
completement disparu. Nous sommes tous d' accord a main- 
tenir le repos et la tranquillite et a appuyer le Ministere actuel. 
Sultan." 

In delight I telegraphed it at once to Gladstone, and to the 
"Times" for publication. 

"May 17. — -To London again in the highest spirits, and on 
my way received new answers." 

From the Sheykh el Islam, el Embabeh : 

"Le differend entre le Khedive et le Ministere est applani. 
Le Parti National est content d'Arabi. Le nation et I'armee 
sont unies." 

Another unsigned, but no doubt from one of the Deputies : 

"Tout le pays avec Arabi and le Ministere Sami. Fellahs, 
Bedouins, Ulemas, tous sont unis. II n'y a qu'un seul_d'entre 
nous qui soit contre la liberte Egyptienne et qui tache de fausser 
I'opinion publique." 



2o8 A Sharp Reverse 

And a third of like character from Mohammed Abdu. 

Moreover, in confirmation of the glorious news, the morning 
papers announced that in the afternoon of yesterday the Khe- 
dive, through Sultan Pasha's mediation, had forgiven the Minis- 
try. It was clear that I had won a first diplomatic victoi'y. 
With such powerful proofs in my hand, I went with a light 
heart to Downing Street and showed my telegrams, and found 
Hamilton and Godley, who congratulated me on my success. 
I told them the telegrams I had sent had cost me £20, and 
Hamilton said they ought to be repaid me out of the Secret 
Service Fund. Though this was, of course, said jokingly, it 
proves that, at least on Mr. Gladstone's side of Downing Street 
the result I had gained against the Foreign Office was cordially 
approved. Moreover, as I had not seen Gladstone himself, 
Hamilton and Godley advised me to write him another formal 
letter and press home my point against the Foreign Office, on 
the ground of their false information, and I agreed to do so, 
and spent the night at this work, having first arranged with But- 
ton that, if need should be, the letter should be published in the 
"Times," and in the meanwhile I sent Sultan a telegram beg- 
ging him to congratulate the Khedive. 

The morning, nevertheless, was to bring me a sharp reverse, 
if not yet a defeat. At a very early hour, having slept in Lon- 
don at my then town house, 10, James Street, Buckingham Gate, 
I sent for the morning papers, and found in all of them a 
Reuter's telegram from Cairo giving the text of my telegram 
to the Deputies, the one ending "Europe will annex you," as 
having been addressed by me to the Sheykh el Islam, and stat- 
ing that the Sheykh el Islam had since recanted the telegram 
he had sent me in reply. Also in the "Standard" there was a 
telegrarn from its correspondent at Cairo saying that he was 
authorized by Sultan Pasha to contradict the telegram from 
him which had been published in the "Times" of yesterday, the 
same having been written under military intimidation. I con- 
sequently at once wrote a second letter to Gladstone, and sent 
him the two by the same messenger before noon, with a note 
to Hamilton saying, that I considered it necessary both should 
be published. I had found Button at home, and had shown 
him the letters, which he promised should appear in the mor- 



Hamilton Reassures Me 209 

row's "Times." He was delighted with them, and assured 
me they would make a sensation. ^ 

Nevertheless, though they had already been put in type, for 
I had left copies of them with Button, the two letters were not 
published. The reason for this is given in my diary. At six 
o'clock I found a note from Eddy Hamilton saying he would 
be at home all the afternoon, so I went to him. He said he 
thought the telegram to the Sheykh el Islam an unfortunate 
one, and advised me strongly not to publish. "I asked him 
what assurance he could give me that nothing violent was in- 
tended at Alexandria. He said he understood that the fleet 
going there only meant the securing of the lives of British sub- 
jects. He did not think it at all likely there would be any de- 
mand made for the disbanding of the Egyptian army or any 
disembarkation of troops. Also he assured me that a Com- 
mission, such as I had proposed, would be sent to Egypt. I 
am quite satisfied with this, and have sent David (my servant) 
to the 'Times' office to stop the publication of the letters.'" 

I do not doubt that the assurances given me in Downing 
Street on this occasion were given in good faith, but they were 
soon belied by the Foreign Office, and my silence as to the tele- 
grams did me, from that time forth, an injury with the public. 
The "St. James's Gazette" spoke of me that very evening as 
an "incendiary," and other journals, seeing I did not reply, 
followed suit. Their language re-acted on the Government, 
and doubtless also on Gladstone, though he knew the truth, 
which the public as yet did not. I continued, it is true, my 
communications and visits to Downing Street, but they became 
inevitably on a less and less intimate footing. For this reason 
I regret that I allowed myself to be persuaded, and that the 
letters did not appear, as had been arranged that night, in the 
"Times." Had they done so I cannot help thinking that the 
fatal ultimatum of 25th May would not have been Issued. 

1 These two letters are practically embodied in my letter subsequently pub- 
lished on June 20. See Chapter XIV. 



CHAPTER XII 

INTRIGUES AND COUNTER INTRIGUES 

The history of the next six weeks in Egypt, from the arrival 
of the English and French fleets at Alexandria to the bombard- 
ment of the city is that of a desperate attempt by our diplomacy 
one way or another to regain its lost footing of influence, and 
failing that to bring about a conflict; and of a no less desperate 
and unscrupulous attempt by the Foreign Office at home to force 
Gladstone's hand to an act of violence. In all this there was 
far less of statemanship, or even financial intrigue, than of 
personal pique. The tone neither in the Chancelleries of 
Europe nor of the Stock Exchange was so urgent as to make 
a peaceful treatment of the case impossible. France, under 
Freycinet, had withdrawn entirely from Gambetta's aggressive 
designs, and would readily have made the best at any moment 
of a political situation by no means hopeless at Cairo, while 
Germany and Austria, representing the financial interests, es- 
pecially of the Rothschilds, were for a repetition of the remedy 
found efficacious in 1879, ^^e Sultan's intervention in the form 
of a new firman, substituting Halim for Tewfik. This would 
have been an easy solution of the quarrel which had arisen be- 
tween Tewfik and his Ministers, and though not the ideal to 
which the Nationalist leaders looked, would have been accepted 
by all parties as an ending of the crisis. The other countries 
of Europe were for the most part in sympathy with the Nation- 
al movement, Switzerland and Belgium strongly so, while Italy 
was so enthusiastic that at one time, in spite of the Govern- 
ment, which supported English policy, a corps of volunteers was 
being enrolled under Menotti Garibaldi to help Arabi. It was 
only in England that public opinion, worked upon systematically 
through the Press primed by our diplomacy, was at all excited 
or called for vigorous action. 



Foreign Office Manoeuvres 211 

The personal element in the struggle is easy to understand. 
Malet and Colvin had committed themselves at the time of 
the change of Ministry in February to an attitude of uncom- 
promising hostility to the Nationalists, and any solution of 
the crisis which should leave these in power at Cairo they knew 
would mean their own disgrace. Colvin would certainly have 
had to follow his French colleague, de Blignieres, into retirement, 
and Malet would have been removed to some minor post in the 
service where his blundering would have been of less grave con- 
sequence. The Foreign Office, too, had its own amour propre 
to save. Dilke was an ambitious man, and did not mean to 
fail, and even old Granville, fond as he was of his ease, had 
his public phrases to make good. Thus from the middle of 
May to the nth of July, the date of the bombardment, we 
have the spectacle of a series of diplomatic manoeuvres wholly 
indefensible by any valid plea of necessity, absolutely at vari- 
ance with all the avowed principles of Mr. Gladstone's Mid- 
lothian policy, and so cynically unscrupulous that I doubt if 
in the annals of our Foreign Office anything comparable to them 
exists. 

On the other hand, in native Egypt, we see the National 
Party just at the moment when it had secured for the country 
the right of self-government and an existence of personal and 
civil freedom which it had never before in all its history en|joyed, 
when its Parliament had met, and after a first happy session had 
adjourned, when its mind was busy with projects of reform and 
when the general desire was to rest and be thankful, at peace' 
with all the world, hurried from its attitude of calm into a sea' 
of apprehension from without, and of treachery, backed by 
foreign intrigue, from within. Three letters written to me at 
the beginning of the crisis, the first two from Arabi himself,' 
the third from that gallant old Swiss gentleman, John Ninet,' 
who alone of the European sympathizers with the National fel- 
lah cause remained on in Egypt and took part with the army 
during the war, will show what the earlier feeling in native 
Cairo was. 

"Cairo, May 15, 1882. • 
"To my dear and sincere friend Mr. Blunt. 

"Praise be to God, your letter of the 20th April duly reached 



212 Arabics True Official Position 

me. We have read it with great pleasure. Let us hope that 
the fruit of your endeavour will soon be gathered. Indeed, 
every sound-minded lover of freedom bears witness to your' 
philanthropic efforts. My pleasure was increased by learning 
from you that my two letters reached you in a favourable hour. 
May God in his mercy give peace to our minds, and better the' 
condition of affairs, and lead us to what he thinks for the good 
of our country. 

"As to the publication of my two letters I only wished to re- 
fute the attacks made upon me by my enemies, those who ac- 
cused me of being a man extravagant in his ideas and seeking 
after despotic power. These are mere calumnies, as you know* 
full well. I like better to remind you that as a member of the 
Egyptian Government I am responsible as Minister of War 
for the acts of my office, as we all are responsible for our de- 
partments. I have but one voice in the Cabinet, and I act ac- 
cording to the policy imposed upon me by the Prime Minister, 
as shown in the letter he presented to the Khedive when he first 
formed the Ministry. You may reply upon my truthful word 
that we are all of us in anxious watch over our country, and 
trying to rule it according to just principles, and we have made 
up our minds, by God's help, to overcome all difficulties. If 
any among the European nations, who love mankind and love' 
civilization, will take us by the hand and help us in our struggle,' 
we shall be infinitely grateful to them. If not we have to' 
thank God only, who has been our support from the beginning. 

"As to the state of the country, it is in perfect peace. Our 
only perplexity is caused by the lies published by unscrupulous; 
men in the European press. This is a gratuitous hostility, but 
we hope that soon the veil of prejudice will fall from their eyes. 

"Ahmed Arabi." 

"Cairo, May 21, 1882. 
"After offering to you our best salutations and compliments, 
we tender you our thanks for your endeavours, and for the in- 
terest you take in the welfare of our country, and for your con- 
stant inquiries, either by telegrams or by letters, after the events 
which have been taking place, and we have already replied, as 
the rest of us did, explaining the true state of things. We now' 
add these few further explanations. 



John Ninet 213 

"All the people in the country are grieved at the despatch 
of the French and English ships, and they look on this as a sign 
of evil intentions on the part of the two Powers towards the 
Egyptians, and as an intrusion into our affairs, without necessity 
and without reason; and truly the Egyptians have made up their 
minds not to give in to any Power which wishes to interfere 
with our internal administration. They are also determined 
to keep their privileges confirmed to them by the treaties of the 
Powers. And they will never allow a tittle of these to be taken 
from them as long as they have life. And they will also try 
their best to watch over European interests and the lives of 
European subjects, their property and honour, as long as these 
keep within the limits prescribed to them by law. 

"We all endeavour to do our duty, and we trust in God in 
defending our rights, and through His help we hope to obtain' 
our purpose. This is the welfare of our country and the peace 
of those who live in it. We also trust in the justice of Europe 
that the Powers shall not begin the attack upon us, but on the 
contrary that they may behave wisely with us. Because this' 
will really be better for the success of their own wishes, and 
their interests in our country. 

"It will be better for Great Britain if she does not rely on 
her representatives in this country, because they are persons' 
who have private motives, which they wish to serve. And we 
think that even if they succeed it will be for the disadvantage' 
of their Government. 

"This is enough now of the present state of things, and the 
future will tell the rest. 

"Herewith I send you a letter addressed to Sir William 
Gregory, and beg you to be kind enough to hand It to him. 

"Please present my compliments to Mr. SabunjI and Lady 
Anne Blunt, and may God preserve you all. 

"Ahmed Arabi."* 

Ninet's letter is of especial value from Its date, 19th May, 
the last day of Egypt's peaceful enjoyment of self-government. 
It says : 

"My heart of an old Swiss patriot bleeds now at the most 
unjust of all international Interventions. The country Is en- 
tirely united in favour of its honest leader, sprung, like the 



214 ^^^ Testimony to Tranquillity 

fellahin, from the limon du Nil (the black mud of the Nile). 
The Egyptian people has loyally accepted its debt contracted 
for it by an unscrupulous despot, one who in sixteen years' 
squandered more than three hundred millions sterling to fill 
his own pockets, the pockets of the diplomacy, high and low, and 
of the Semitic and Nazarene usurers. ... A peaceful revolu- 
tion has been accompanied by and with the will of the nation. 
Not a single act unbecoming a scrupulous government has taken 
place during the great change effected. But Europe, interested 
more in the dealers in stocks and shares than in the aspirations' 
of a people, sends her fleets. Why? Because the Chamber 
of Representatives found it proper to claim the right of dis- 
cussing the Budget! Where is the crime? . . . Suppose a 
Minister of your Queen, having a disagreement with her, were 
to receive news that a powerful combined fleet of the Catholic 
Powers would go to Ireland and pacify it? Even so the anal- 
ogy is not complete. Egypt is quiet. Not a European or 
Christian can complain. Would not the position be intoler- 
able? . . . Arabi is wise and tranquil, awaiting the future 
like a sage of ancient times. The army, the country, the towns 
are with him. The French Consul-General has been a silent 
member. Sir E. Malet has been cassant, parti pris inconciliant, 
sowing fear in Cairo, instead of reassuring the people. You' 
have no idea, my dear sir, of the abominable lies every day tele- 
graphed to the 'Times,' 'Standard,' 'Daily News,' by the tele- 
graphic agencies. . . . Well, never a word, not an insult from 
the population — we have been and are as quiet here as an Eng- 
lish congregation on a Sunday in Regent's Park. The fleets 
are expected to-morrow." 

Other letters of a later date will show it in its later stages. 
The supreme injustice of the attack being made on them by 
England, the country above all others which had been associated 
in their minds with a traditional love of liberty and of those 
humanitarian doctrines of which she had been the apostle, re- 
volted men's minds and roused in them feelings of anger foreign 
to their natural attitude. Under constant threat of violence, 
now from England, now at English instigation from the Sultan, 
and knowing not whom to trust and fearing everywhere be- 
trayal, it is not surprising that wild ideas prevailed even among 



Arahfs Attitude 215 

those who had been soberest hitherto in their expression. At 
the same time it is not a little remarkable what few mistakes 
were made in action by the leaders under circumstances of such 
extreme and constantly changing difficulty, and the closer one 
examines these the more they redound to their credit. Nothing 
but the desperate shifts of our agents, when one after another 
their treacherous expedients had failed them and they found 
themselves faced with a disgraceful diplomatic defeat, to bring 
about a violent solution through the guns of the fleet, forced 
the Egyptians at last from their calm attitude and enabled our 
Foreign Office to claim a victory. 

This may be affirmed without attributing either to Arabi or 
to any other of the leaders qualities of a first-class kind. They 
were neither diplomatists nor administrators nor soldiers at all 
to be compared with their opponents, and they were most of 
them quite inexperienced in the arts of government and the' 
subtleties of international usage. Arabi's best quality, I think, 
was a certain dogged determination not to be driven from the 
position he had originally announced, namely, that, while ready 
to be friends with all the world, it was his duty to defend his' 
country against all hostile comers. In this he rendered in 
those weeks an incalculable service to his fellow countrymen, 
which it is right they should be reminded of. Nothing is more 
certain than that, if Arabi had been less obstinate than he was 
in refusing either for threat or bribe to leave Egypt, and if 
thereby the Egyptians had not fought, the fellahin would still 
be the double slaves they were in 1880, slaves to their Turkish 
masters as well as slaves to Europe. What does any patriot 
suppose would have resulted from Arabi's compliance? Lib- 
erty In any form? A continuance of self-government? For- 
eign rule less strenuous than now? Certainly, none of these 
things. What would have come to pass is very clearly shown 
by the regime established at Cairo immediately after the war. 
It would have been one of police despotism, espionage, and 
secret punishments, unmitigated by any further interest taken in 
Egyptian nationality by the moral sense of Europe. It is pos- 
sible that as a matter of form a Chamber of Notables might 
have been allowed to remain in existence for a few sessions as 
what is called a consultative body, but it would have been one 
wholly powerless and wholly discredited of patriotism. The 



2i6 Effect of my Telegrams 

Turco-Circassian rule would have been ruthlessly re-established, 
and the Financial Control, reinforced with new political powers 
and exercised entirely in financial and European interests, 
would have had neither the will nor the power to enfranchise 
the fellahin from their Turkish masters, themselves the slaves 
of Europe. The whole legend of fellah nationality would have 
vanished in a disgraceful smoke, for a nation which has never 
dared fight for its existence is justly despised. The native 
press would have been reduced to the condition we find it in in 
Tunis. There would have been neither civil nor personal 
liberty, nor any regard paid to native rights. It would be still, 
in fact, what Egypt was in 1883, a land where no man could 
speak above his breath or count on his next door neighbour not 
to betray him. Arabi at least saved his countrymen from this, 
and, if when it came to the point of actual warfare he was found 
incapable as a soldier, they still owe him as a patriot much. 
He prevented them from incurring the supreme disgrace of 
not having fought at all on the only occasion in all their history 
when the chance was theirs to stand up for their freedom. 

Having said this much, I will return to my story. The true 
history of the telegrams, as I afterwards learned it, at Cairo 
was this. They had arrived at a most critical moment when 
the attitude of the Deputies and of some among the weaker- 
kneed of the other civilian leaders was exceedingly doubtful. 
Malet had persuaded the Khedive to take heart and quarrel 
with his Ministers, and the Khedive had persuaded Sultan Pasha 
to join him partly by working on his jealousy of Arabi, for he 
was disappointed at not having been included by Mahmud Sami 
in the Ministry of February, partly by informing him that the 
English and French fleets were on their way to Alexandria. 
And Sultan, in his turn, had persuaded thirty, as against forty- 
five, of the Deputies. So that Malet had been able to telegraph 
to the Foreign Ofiice that the Chamber was supporting the 
Khedive. My telegrams, however, had given new heart to 
waverers and had put such pressure upon Sultan that he had 
gone at once to the Khedive (who was engaged in drawing up a 
new list of Ministers under the Presidency of Mustafa Pasha 
Fehmi, the colourless Minister of Foreign Affairs) and effected 
a reconciliation between him and Mahmud Sami. The minis- 
terial crisis was considered by everybody at an end. Hardly, 



The Ultimatum 217 

however, was the arrangement made than it was undone. 
Malet, having got wind of the telegrams, sent for Sultan Pasha, 
and partly by threats about the fleet, partly by promises, once 
more persuaded him to take sides with the European Control. 

Sultan Pasha, who afterwards deeply regretted his defection 
from the National cause at this critical moment, always affirmed 
that Malet, to win his support, gave him his word of honour 
that day that the rights of the Egyptian Parliament would be 
respected; and I have been told by his friends that Sultan died 
reproaching himself that he had been fool enough to believe 
him. Nevertheless, with the exception of Sultan, nobody of any 
importance among the Deputies allowed himself again to be 
detached from the National cause. All who had received my 
telegrams believed me rather than Malet, and Arabi's hands 
had been immeasurably strengthened when ten days later the 
next great crisis came. Malet's coup with the fleet had been 
discounted, and it ended in a complete fiasco. The sending of 
the fleet had been intended by Lord Granville as a hrutum fuU 
men, which was to effect its purpose without real violence, a! 
method in which he greatly believed and of which his success 
the year before at Dulcigno in the matter of the Greek frontier 
had specially enamoured him — indeed, it was one of his maxims 
that "a threat is as good as a blow." Malet also, who knew 
Lord Granville's mind, counted at that time on a bloodless 
victory. He throughout miscalculated the power of the Na- 
tional sentiment; and it was only when he saw that he had failed 
diplomatically that, following Colvin's lead, he prepared for 
force. The dates are: May 17th, Malet finally secures Sultan 
Pasha. It demands the resignation of the Ministry and Arabi's 
Alexandria. May 25th, Malet and Sinkiewicz issue their ulti- 
matum, stating that it has been suggested to them by Sultan 
Pasha. It demands the resignation of the ministry and Arabi's 
retirement from Egypt. May 27th, the Mahmud Sami Minis- 
try resigns. May 28th, Cairo rises and insists upon Arabi's 
reinstatement as Minister, and Arabi is reappointed Minister of 
War with something like dictatorial powers. 

In England during all this crisis the outlook for me was a 
black one, made darker by the unfortunate defection, just at 
the moment when his support was most needed, of my fellow 
champion of the Egyptian cause in London, Sir William 



21 8 / Meet Granville at Hursthourne 

Gregory. Gregory had committed himself quite as deeply 
to the National Party in its earlier stages as I had, and had 
written a number of powerful letters in support of Arabi in the 
"Times," and his influence stood far higher than mine in official 
quarters and with Chenery, the "Times" editor. The prospect, 
however, of possible hostilities in connection with the arrival of 
the fleets alarmed him, and he had latterly begun in his letters 
to doubt and qualify his published opinions. Since leaving 
Egypt in April he had been travelling on the Continent and I 
had been hoping daily for his arrival in London to reinforce 
my pleadings with the Government. Instead of this, I found 
to my dismay that. If not exactly against us, he was doing us 
little service. We were to have gone together to an anti- 
aggression meeting but now he refused to go. I find In my 
journal: 

"May 19. — Gregory has failed us. He dined last night with 
Chenery who has frightened him, and he refuses now to go to 
the meeting. I went to the meeting and made my speech and 
answered a number of questions put to me, giving the tru'e 
history of the telegrams, and I got Dilwyn, the chairman, to 
vote my conduct patriotic. 

"May 20. — I hear Lord Granville is furious with me about 
the telegrams." 

On Sunday, 21st May, the very next day, after this entry, 
I had an embarrassing meeting with Granville. I had been 
asked with my wife some time before by her cousin, the present 
Lord Portsmouth, to spend that Saturday to Monday at Hurst- 
bourne, and the Granvilles had also been asked and several 
other persons more or less political. I fancy Granville had 
wished to meet me, as it is called "accidentally" In diplomatic 
parlance. But in the interval grave events had taken place, 
and I was not a little disturbed when I found him staying thlere, 
for I had not myself been told of It. The moment was an un- 
fortunate one, for that morning we had brought down with u9 
the "Observer" newspaper which contained an account of the 
first rebuff given to the fleet at Alexandria. "We arrived with 
Lowell, the American Minister, and found the house empty, 
every one gone to morning church. On their return I per- 
ceived to my horror, for I was not expecting it, Lord Granville 



Lowell and Henry Cowper 219 

and La^y Granville walking back with the rest of the party. 
Things however went off well, for I had the sympathy of most 
of the party with me, especially as we had brought news down 
with us that the arrival of the fleets at Alexandria had been 
resolutely answered by Arabi by a call to arms, and that 4,000 
of the Redifs (reserve men) had responded to it. His Lord- 
ship looks worried, so I argue well for the Nationalists. I had 
a deal of conversation with him on every subject in the world 
except Egypt. Lord Granville is very pleasant company, a 
raconteur of the old-fashioned type, each story being neatly and 
concisely got up, not always apposite to the moment but almost 
always good. With the rest of the party Egypt was gaily and 
sympathetically discussed. Henry Cowper was charming — 
Lowell and Stuart Kendall most sympathetic — the last, that is, 
when Lord Granville was out of hearing. ... It was a lovely 
day and we sauntered about the park and gardens, Henry 
Cowper telling good stories, amongst others one, a propos of 
the Eastern Question, of Disraeli. He had heard him say 
'Tancred is a book to which I often refer, not for amusement 
but for instruction.' " Lowell, as already said, was the whole 
of that summer a strong believer in the National Party, and 
always gave me support in conversation about it when we met. 

It is worth noticing in connection with this visit to Hurst- 
bourne that Lord Granville two days later, 23rd May, sent the 
fatal telegram authorizing Malet to "act as he thought fit," with 
the result that the Ultimatum was issued on the 25th. The 
view of the case in Egypt as printed at that date by John Morley 
in the "Pall Mall Gazette," runs thus: "Affairs still remain in 
a very critical condition at Cairo. Ourabi ^ persists in main- 
taining an attitude of defiance. He is playing his last card. 
The reserves are being brought up from the villages — in chains 
— troops are being hurried to the coast to resist a landing and 
artillerymen are being sent to the ports at Alexandria, the guns 
of which, such as they are, surround our ironclads. All this, 
probably, is only a game of brag, intended to extort better terms 
for himself." "The experiment," says Morley, "of vigorous 

1 This French spelling of Arabi's name used by the P. M. G. was due origi- 
nally, I believe, to Colvin's French colleague, de Blignieres, and was adopted 
by him and by Baron Mallortie who, with Colvin, was Morley's principal cor- 
respondent that year at Cairo. 



220 The Ultimatum Refused 

representations emphasized by ironclads at Alexandria has been 
fairly tried, and there seems to be no doubt that it has com-i^ 
pletely failed." 

''May 22. — To London. Harry Brand, whom I met at the 
Club, tells me Dilke tells him 'it must end in intervention^' 

"Old Houghton sent to say he wished to consult me about 
Egypt, and I had a long talk with him in the Lobby of the 
House of Lords. ... J advised him, if he was pushing the 
Government to land troops in Egypt, to send at once for his 
daughter home. ' , 

"May 23. — Lord Granville in the Lords has made a jocular 
answer to demands for information about Egypt. 

"May '26. — Gladstone has spoken about Egypt, a long rig- 
marole of which the only thing remarkable is that he expresses 
his confidence in a peaceful solution. . . . The Consuls have 
dehvered an Ultimatum stating that their object is to restore 
the Khedive's personal authority and demanding the exile of 
Arabi. 

"May 27. — Sultan Pasha denies having suggested the terms 
of the Ultimatum. . . . The Ultimatum Is refused . . . Saw 
Gregory. We think the Egyptians will have to fight now, and 
I feel I ought to go out and join them. . . . Telegram in the 
evening papers that Arabi's Ministry has resigned. 

"May 28. — Sunday at Crabbet. Things all seem gone to 
ruin in Egypt. I suppose the Khedive's personal authority 
under the Control will now be revived. If Arabi leaves the 
country and the army is disbanded, or reorganized under Cir- 
cassian officers, Egypt may bid good-bye to liberty. She will 
share the fate of Tunis. Vicisti O Colvine I 

"May 29. — I could not sleep but began roaming about soon 
after 3. It tormented me to think I did not go to Egypt im- 
mediately on hearing Lord Granville's speech. I might have 
saved matters. . . . Now all is bright again. By an extraor- 
dinary transition the papers announce that Cairo has risen and 
has demanded Arabi's recall as Minister of War, the Khedive 
acquiescing. The news seems too good to be true, but it cannot 
be doubted from the anger of the newspapers. This shifts 
things back Into more than their old place, and now there is 
nothing to fear except from the Porte. I have made up my 
mind to go at once to Egypt. Went up to London, saw 



/ Propose to Go to Egypt 221 

Gregory, lunched with the Howards, and wrote a letter to 
Eddy Hamilton announcing my intention. Mrs. Howard ad- 
vises me to trust all to Gladstone, and in my letter to Hamilton 
I have done so implicitly. Only it is a wrench to leave Eng- 
land in June and face the turmoil and the heat of Cafiro. I 
am happier though, feeling that at least I am doing all I can 
do and doing my duty. Anne will go with me." 

My letter to Hamilton, written under the influence of the 
Gladstonian atmosphere of Palace Green, runs thus: 

"May 29?/^, 1882. 
"Dear Eddy, 

"Though Mr. G. is, I fear, displeased with me for the tele- 
grams I sent to Egypt a fortnight ago, I do not wish to take 
any important step without his knowledge. I am convinced that 
some day he will forgive me for what I have done, and approve 
what I intend to do; and I have perfect confidence in him that 
he will act towards Egypt on the Liberal grounds you spoke of, 
as soon as he is certain of the truth. I believe, also, that I may 
still be of use to England as well as to Egypt in circumstances 
which may occur; and with that idea, I am going, unless any- 
thing unforeseen occurs, next Friday to Cairo. , 

"I will tell you exactly what I shall advise the Nat^ional 
leaders. I shall urge them, first of all, to sink all petty differ- 
ences in the presence of a great danger. I shall urge them, as 
I have always done, not to quarrel with the Khedive; and if 
I have an opportunity I shall urge the Khedive not to allow 
himself to be persuaded by the Consuls to quarrel with the 
people. I shall fortify Arabi in his determination to retain 
the full direction of the army in his hands by remaining Minis- 
ter of War, but shall advise him to leave all other officesi of 
State to civilians, and especially to members of the Chamber. 
I shall urge the Egyptians to keep on the best terms they can 
with the Sultan, short of admitting his soldiers into their coun- 
try, and on the best terms with the European Powers short of 
yielding their constitutional rights. At the same time, I shall 
advise them strongly, as I advised them last January, to yield 
something to the Controllers of their present claim regarding 
the Budget — that is to say, to postpone their rights at least for 
this next year. I shall explain to them the position, as far as 



222 My Idea of a Policy 

I understand it, of the English Government, anxious not to 
destroy their independence, yet bound by ties contracted by their 
predecessors; of the French Government, traditionally inclined 
to push its powers in the Mediterranean, and forced on by the 
financiers; of the German Government, willing to divert the 
French from home affairs and dissolve the English alliance; 
and, lastly, of the Sultan, with his Caliphal dreams, a matter 
which they probably understand at least as well as I do. 

"I do not propose myself to take any part in military opera- 
tions, should such occur, except in the last necessity, against the 
Turks, for I know nothing of military matters, and have a 
horror of war. But I shall urge the Egyptians to resist in- 
vasion, from whatever quarter, and, if vanquished, to pursue a 
persistent policy of refusing taxation not sanctioned by their 
laws — whereas, if unmolested, I would have them pay their 
debt to the last farthing. I shall have no need to repress 
fanaticism, for they are not fanatics; but I shall join my voice 
to Arabi's in favour of the humanest interpretation of the laws 
of war. I also wish to be at hand in case of need, to protdct 
European residents at the first outbreak of hostilities. 

"I do not think I am acting unadvisedly in telling you this. 
My idea of a policy for the Egyptians is, that they should act 
by a rule diametrically opposite to the common Oriental ones. 
I would have them tell the truth, even to their enemies^ — ^be 
more humane than European soldiers, more honest than their 
European creditors. So only can they effect that moral refor- 
mation their religious leaders have in view for them. 

"I am, yours affectionately, W. S. B." 

The "Pall Mali' utterances of this date are again worth 
quoting, as they show the absurdly unreal view of the situation 
in Egypt put forward at that time by the Foreign Office, Colvin, 
Diike, and the rest. Malet'(S despatches had led the Foreign 
Office to believe that Arabi had behind him no popular follow- 
ing outside the army, that the Khedive was in reality beloved 
by his subjects, and it was thought that it only needed now a 
little additional show of outside help from Constantinople being 
at hand to bring about a manifestation in Tewfik's favour which,' 
if it did not force the army to submisjsion, would lead to civil 
war demanding intervention. 



Tale of Bedouin "Loyalty^' 223 

The "Pall Mall Gazette," 26th May, says: "The Ultimatum' 
which England and France have addressed to the Egyptian 
Ministry is to be accepted or rejected in twenty-four hours. 
This afternoon, therefore, the crisis ought to be over and the' 
order despatched to Constantinople for the Ottoman gens^ 
d'armes who are to restore the authority of the Khedive undef 
the control of England and France." Again, on 27th May:' 
"A few hours may decide whether the crisis in Egypt is to be 
solved peacefully, or whether the country is to be the scene of 
civil war and foreign occupation. The Ministry has resigned, 
and iso far the terms of the Anglo-French Ultimatum have been 
complied with. . . . On the other hand it is at least likely that 
Ourabi . . . may throw off the mask and declare boldly against 
his head." The kind of civil war expected is explained next day, 
28th May: "Last night the Khedive slept at the IsmaTlia 
palace surrounded by twelve thousand loyal Bedouins. The 
presence of these children of the desert in the Capital of Egypt 
constitutes a material safeguard against a new pronuncia mento. 
No doubt it is a fearful prospect, that of a civil war in the streets 
of Cairo between the Bedouins and the regular army; but its 
possibility is a security for a pacific solution of the crisis. . . . 
Ourabi's position is no longer what it was. Even the power of 
the sword is no longer exclusively in his hands. If the Khedive 
with the swords of the Bedouins, the ironclads of England and 
France, and the support of the Chamber of Notables cannot 
reduce Ourabi to submission, the position must be more hope- 
lessly complicated than any one has hitherto ventured to affirm." 

What a fantastic account ! Twelve thousand loyal Bedouins 
camped round the palace of Isma'ilia ! The Chamber of Depu- 
ties devoted to the Khedive ! Arabi standing alone intimidating 
them all ! Yet it was with these lies, of which honest John 
Morley was made the popular mouthpiece, that Gladstone was 
being persuaded to apply the astonishing remedy for unruly 
Egyptian Nationalism of bringing in on it the "unspeakable 
Turk," the "Bashi-bazouk," fresh from his "Bulgarian atroc- 
ities," and the "man of sin" himself. Sultan Abdul Hamid. 
The illusion of the Khedive's popularity only lasted forty-eight 
hours. Then we read in the "Pall Mall Gazette" of 30th 
May: "The time has at last come for immediate action in Egypt. 
The Khedive is a prisoner in his palace. The twelve thousand 



224 Rosebery and the Rothschilds 

Bedouins who were reported to be encamped around; their 
sovereign have vanished Into thin air," etc., etc. 

Meanwhile I was awaiting an answer from Downing Street, 
and making my preparations for an immediate start for Egypt. 
Mr. Gladstone was out of town, staying with Lord Rosebery 
at the Durdans, in my eyes an ominous circumstance. I knew 
Rosebery's view of the Egyptian question, for a few weeks 
before I had found him at Downing Street with Hamilton, and 
had walked with them both by the little garden exit through St. 
James's Park. On the way I had asked him his views about 
Egypt, and he had answered very briefly, "I have no views at 
all but those of a bondholder." He was, in fact, through his 
wife, a Rothschild, largely interested in the financial aspect of 
the case; and I looked upon Gladstone's visit to him just then 
as an evil symptom. Rosebery was not as yet In office, but had 
influence with Gladstone, and I knew through Button that he 
was being pushed forward by the Rothschilds to do their politi- 
cal work for them. This continued for some years, and his 
mission to Berlin in 1885 was suggested and made successful 
by the Rothschilds, and later at the Foreign Office he worked con- 
sistently in their interests on Egyptian questions, though I have 
heard that before taking office he got rid of his Egyptian stock. 

"May 30. — No answer from Eddy. I see Mr. G. is out of 
town at the Durdans. All however is going on well in Egypt, 
ArabI the acknowledged master of the situation. ... I found a 
note yesterday from Houghton asking again to see me, and I 
went to him at his house in Mayfair, and told him of my plan 
of going to Egypt. By his manner I am convinced that he has 
been commissioned by Lord Granville to sound me. ... I have 
told Glyns (my bankers, Messrs, Glyn, Mills, and Currie) to 
get me £1,000 In French gold, the sinews of war. I feel very 
loath 'to go, but happy, being sure that I am doing whalt Ds 
right. . . . Sabunji will go too. . . . 

"May 31. — To London early and found another note from 
Houghton saying 'surely I won't go.' I am certain this is an 
unofficial hint.^' Houghton's note was characteristic: "My dear 
Blunt, assuredly you had better not go to Egypt just now. 
Whatever you say or do there will be exaggerated and probably 
misinterpreted. The alliance between the Military Party and 
the Porte seems complete, and that won't suit your views. You 



New Assurances Given Me 225 

could let me know if you hear anything precise. My daughter 
is still at Alexandria, but I am anxious for Fitzgerald, who must 
be obnoxious to the army from his military economies. I am 
yours very truly, Houghton. Bring your friend (Arabi) back 
with you if you do go, and come and dine here with him." 

"Also a telegram from Eddy. 'Your letter received. I im- 
plore you to do nothing till after seeing me. Shall be back this 
evening.' He is at Salisbury. ... At half past five found 
Eddy in Downing Street. He implored me not to go, as my 
position in Egypt, and my known connection with Gladstone 
would be misunderstood, and make a terrible row. He prom- 
ised me there would be no landing of troops or intervention at 
all. On this assurance I consented not to go. I told him, how- 
ever, that I hoped they would not consider me responsible for 
accidents which might occur, and which it was my main object 
in going to prevent. He said they would not. 

"A large card has come from Lady Granville inviting us to 
the Foreign Office on the 3rd to celebrate the Queen's birthday. 
I shall keep this as an answer to Harry Brand's charge of 
treason. . . . Now I am quite contented. Sabunji is to go 
instead of me, and will do just as well. He has telegraphed by 
my orders to Arabi in answer to a letter I have received from 
him: 'Letter received. Do not fear the ships. No interven- 
tion. Issue public notices in every town for the safety of 
Europeans.' This in accordance with a suggestion of Eddy's. 

"June I. — Everything seems going on beautifully. Arabi 
acknowledged master of the situation in Egypt. The Sultan 
supposed to be so at Constantinople. Button thinks the 'Times' 
will pay for my telegrams Sabunji may send them. If so, so 
much the better. I have agreed to give Sabunji £30 a month 
and his expenses. . . . Went to the House of Commons with 
Nigel Kingscote (the Prince of Wales's equerry), who got me 
into the Speaker's Gallery. Gladstone was giving his announce- 
ment of a conference at Constantinople as the upshot of it all. 
No troops are to be mobilized in India, and no troops to be 
landed in Egypt. He considers such a course would endanger 
European lives. McCoan, an M. P., formerly editor of the 
'Levant Herald,' asked whether it was true I was 'about to pro- 
ceed to Egypt to put myself at the head of the insurrection.' 
Dilke answered that he believed I had 'relinquished my inten- 



226 Gladstone At Last Speaks 

tion.' Gladstone then made the astounding statement that 
Arabi had 'thrown off the mask,' and had threatened to depose 
the Khedive and put Halim on the throne of Egypt. This is 
too absurd, but it is playing into my hands, because the state- 
ment must be at once disproved, and the fact of its having been 
made will show how ignorant the Foreign Office are. Glad- 
stone will now probably be angry with Malet for having led him 
into such a blunder. Frank Lascelles, however, who walked 
home with me from the House, tells me he has seen Malet's tele- 
gram respecting this, and all it says is that the Khedive told him 
this, and he does not vouch for its truth. So are things done!" 

Malet's telegram, as it stands in the Blue Book (Egypt, No. 
II, 1882), says even less than this. It runs thus: "The Khe- 
dive sent for M. Sinkiewicz and me this morning and informed 
us that it had come to his knowledge that the military intended 
this afternoon to depose him and proclaim Halim Pasha as 
Khedive of Egypt. . . . The Khedive said he hardly believed 
the truth of this information." Yet on such a slender rumour 
Gladstone, who had declared to me that he never spoke lightly 
in Parliament and had bidden me wait for his spoken word in 
the House of Commons as a message of goodwill to the Egyp- 
tians, fires off, to give point to his speech, this quite untrue 
announcement, his first definite utterance since I had seen him 
on Egypt. It is a curious comment on the ways of Ministers 
and the processes of the Gladstonian mind. The immediate 
effect on me of the Prime Minister's speech was a complete and 
lasting disillusion. Never after this did I place the smallest 
trust in him, or find reason, even when he came forward as 
champion of self-government in Ireland and when I gave him 
my freest support, to look upon him as other than the mere 
Parliamentarian he in truth was. I do not say that on that won- 
derful 22nd of March he was not for the moment in earnest 
when he spoke to me so humanly, but it was clear that his sym- 
pathies with the cause of right, however unfeigned, were not 
the law of his public action, which was dictated, like that of all 
the rest of them, by motives of expediency. The discovery 
destroyed for me an illusion about him which I have never re- 
gained. 

"June 12. — Lord De la Warr, Gregory, Brand, and Button 
met at my house, and all but Brand seemed highly pleased at 



Sabunji in Egypt 227 

the situation. Harry still calls me a traitor, and declares that 
Arabi has made a gigantic fortune, and that he must and will be 
suppressed out of Egypt. Button then drew up with Sabunji 
a code of signals for him to telegraph us news; and I gave him 
£100 for his expenses, for which he will have to account. The 
telegrams are to be sent to me and I am to communicate them to 
Button for the 'Times.' I have given Sabunji my instructions, 
of which the two most important are that Arabi is to make peace 
with Tewfik and on no pretence to go to Constantinople. Now 
we have packed him off, anxious only lest he should be stopped 
at Alexandria. Button tells me that if I had persisted in going, 
orders would have been given to Sir Beauchamp Seymour to 
prevent my landing. . . . My mind is at rest." 

If I had heard Gladstone's speech before agreeing with 
Hamilton to renounce my journey to Egypt I probably should 
have persisted in my intention, but, as things turned out, I doubt 
if it would have resulted in any good. Even if I had not been 
prevented from landing I could hardly have used more influence 
personally with Arabi and the other leaders than I succeeded 
in exercising through Sabunji. Sabunji was an admirable agent 
in a mission of this kind, and it is impossible I could have been 
better served. His position as ex-editor of the "Nahleh," a 
paper which, whether subsidized or not by Ismail, had always 
advocated the most enlightened views of humanitarian progress 
and Mohammedan reform, gave him a position with the Azhar 
reformers of considerable influence, and he was, besides, heart 
and soul with them in the National movement. As my repre- 
sentative he was everywhere received by the Nationalists with 
open arms, and they gave him their completest confidence. Nor 
was he unworthy of their trust or mine. The letters I sent him 
for them he communicated faithfully, and he faithfully reported 
to me all that they told him. These letters remain a valuable 
testimony, the only one probably extant, of the inner ideas of 
the time, and a precis of them will be found at the end of this 
volume. Sabuqji landed at Alexandria on the 7th of June and 
remained till the day before the bombardment.^ 

1 Sabunji remained in ray employment till the end of 1883. Then he left 
me and visited India, where he had relations, and after many vicissitudes of 
fortune drifted to that common haven of Oriental revolutionists, Yildiz Kiosk, 
where he obtained the confidential post with Sultan Abdul Hamid of translator 
for the Sultan's private eye of the European Press, a post which 1 believe be 
still holds, 1907, 



CHAPTER XIII 

dervish's mission 

I have now come to a point in the history of this wonderful 
intrigue where, if I had not semi-official published matter in 
large measure to support me, I should find it hopeless to con- 
vince historians that I was not romancing. It seems so wholly 
incredible that a Liberal English Government, owning that 
great and good man Mr. Gladstone as its head, should, for any 
reason in the world financial, political, or of private necessity, 
have embarked on a plan so cynically immoral as that which I 
have now to relate. John Morley in his published life of 
Gladstone slurs over the whole of his astonishing Egyptian ad- 
venture that year in a single short chapter of fifteen pages, out 
of the fifteen hundred pages of which his panegyric consists, and 
with reason from his point of view, for he could have hardlyl 
told it in any terms of excuse. It is necessary all the same that' 
historians less bound to secrecy should have the details plainly* 
put before them, for no history of the British Occupation will 
ever be worth the paper it is written on that does not record 
them. 

By the I St of June it was generally acknowledged that the 
policy of intimidation by mere threat, even though backed by 
the presence of the fleets, had ignominiously failed. Mahmud 
Sami's Ministry indeed had resigned, but the initial success had 
been immediately followed only by a more complete discom- 
fiture. The Ultimatum had expressly demanded that Arabi 
should leave Egypt, and not only had Arabi not obeyed, but 
the Khedive had been obliged by the popular voice to reinstate 
him as Minister of War, with even larger responsibilities than 
before, and in even more conspicuous honour. Our Foreign 
Office, therefore, found itself in the position of having either to 
eat its empty words in a very public manner, or to make them 

228 



Dervish Pasha 229 

good against one who was now very generally recognized in 
Europe as a National hero. Its colleague in the matter, France, 
had long shown a desire to be out of the sordid adventure, and 
Mr. Gladstone's Government was left practically to act alone, if 
it insisted on going on, according to its own methods. The 
method resolved on was certainly one of the most extraordinary 
ever used by a civilized government in modern times, and the 
very last which could have been expected of one owning Mr. 
Gladstone as its chief. It was to beg assistance from the Sultan 
and persuade him to intervene to "get rid of Arabi," not by a 
mere exercise of his sovereign command nor yet by openly bring- 
ing in against him those Ottoman ffens d'armes which had been 
talked of, but by one of those old-fashioned Turkish acts of 
treachery which were traditional with the Porte in its dealings 
with its Christian and other subjects in too successful rebellion 
against it. 

A first hint of some such possible plan may be found in the 
"Pall Mall Gazette," in one of its little inspired articles, as 
far back as the 15th May, in which John Morley, explaining 
with satisfaction the Government policy of "bottle holding" the 
Khedive, adds that "Ourabi may before long be quietly got rid 
of." The full plan is of course not divulged in the Blue Blooks, 
but it is naively disclosed a Httle later in the "Pall Mall," where, 
without the slightest apparent sense of its impropriety, the dots 
are put plainly on the i's. The idea as I learned it at the time 
was that the Sultan should send a military Commissioner to 
Egypt, a soldier of the old energetic unscrupulous type, who, by 
the mere terror of his presence, should frighten the Egyptians 
out of their attitude of resistance to England, and that as to 
Arabi, if he could not be lured on ship-board and sent to Con- 
stantinople, the Commissioner should invite him to a friendly 
conference, and there shoot him, if necessary, with his own 
hand. The suggestion was so like the advice Colvin had given 
to the Khedive, and had boasted that he gave, nine months 
before, that there is nothing improbable in its having been again 
entertained. A Commissioner was consequently asked for at 
Constantinople, and one Dervish Pasha was chosen, a man of 
character and antecedents exactly corresponding to those re- 
quired for such a job, and despatched to Cairo. 

The excellent Morley, in an enthusiastic paragraph describing 



230 Dervish's Antecedents 

the arrival of this new Ottoman deus ex machina, grows almost 
lyrical in his praise. 

"The Egyptian crisis," he says, "has reached its culminating 
point, and at last it seems that there is a man at Cairo capable 
of controlling events. There is something very impressive in 
the calm immovable dignity of Dervish Pasha, who is emphatic- 
ally the man of the situation. After all the shiftings and tw'ist- 
ings of diplomatists and the pitiful exhibition of weakness on 
the part of the leading actors in this Egyptian drama, it is an 
immense relief to find one 'still strong man' who, by the mere 
force of his personal presence, can make every one bow to his 
will. Nothing can be more striking than his assertion of 
authority, and nothing more skilful than his casual reference to 
the massacre of the Mamelukes, Dervish is a man of iron, and 
Arabi may well quail before his eye. One saucy word, and his 
head would roll upon the carpet. Dervish is quite capable of 
'manipulating' Arabi, not in the Western but in the Eastern 
sense of that word. In this strong resolute Ottoman it seems 
probable that the revolution in Egypt has found its master." 

And again, 15th June: "The past career of Dervish Pasha 
is filled with incidents which sustain the impression of vigour he 
has laid down at Cairo. He Is at once the most vigorous and 
unscrupulous of all the Generals of the Ottoman army. Al- 
though he is now seventy years old, his age has not weakened 
his energy or impaired his faculties. His will is still as iron as 
it was of old, and he is quite as capable of ordering a massacre 
of the Mamelukes as was Mehemet All himself. . . . His early 
military experience was acquired fighting the Montenegrins, who 
always regarded him as the most dangerous Commander whom 
they had had to meet. In one of the last acute fits of hostility 
(about 1856) between the Porte and Montenegro, Dervish 
penetrated to Grakovo, the northernmost canton of the Vladi- 
kate, as it then was; and the Voivode of the district, cut off from 
retreat to the South, took refuge in a cave, the habitual hiding- 
place of the people against sudden raids, it being so situated that 
the usual expedient of attack, smoking out by fires kindled at the 
mouth, was Inapplicable. The attempts of the Turks to force 
a passage were easily repulsed, and Dervish entered into negotia- 
tions, the result of which was a surrender on condition of the 
lives, liberty and property of the besieged being respected. The 



Morley's Strange Approval 231 

Turkish engagements were kept by the extermination of the 
entire family of the Voivode. The prisoners were marched off 
to Trebinji and thrown into the dungeon of the fortress, tied 
back to back, one of each couplet being killed and the survivor 
not released for a moment from the burden of his dead com- 
rade. . . , Dervish's modus operandi during the late Albanian 
campaign is not generally understood. He went into Albania 
to enforce the conscription in which he utterly failed, though he 
had very slight military opposition, most of the battles he re- 
ported being purely mythical. But he was very successful in 
another plan of operation, which consisted in quartering him- 
self on the Estates of the principal Beys, and extorting from 
them the last pound which could be squeezed out, when he 
moved on to the next one. He sent quantities of coin to Con- 
stantinople, but no recruits. If any prediction of the latest 
result of Dervish's mission may be based upon the history of 
those in which he was formerly engaged, we should say he would 
succeed with Arabi as he succeeded with the Lazis and Albani 
ans. . . . Egyptians are less warlike than Albanians and Lazis, 
but even in Egypt the Gordian knot may have to be severed 
with the sword." 

These are pretty sayings which, if he remembers them, should, 
I think, sometimes make John Morley a little ashamed of the 
part he was persuaded by his Foreign Office friends to play that 
summer as apologist of their iniquities. No wonder he has 
dismissed the whole Egyptian episode from his history in a few 
pages. Pretty doings, too, for Gladstone to explain to his non- 
professional or even his professional conscience 1 The shade 
of Disraeli may well have smiled! 

The Sultan's new mission, nevertheless, was not, as arranged 
by Abdul Hamid, quite so simple a piece of villainy as our 
Foreign Office imagined. The Emir el Mumenin had no real 
idea of knding himself as the mere cat's paw of the Westera 
Powers to do their evil work for them. He was pleased to 
intervene, but not blindly, and he was much in the dark as to 
the real situation in Egypt, and desired to be prepared for all 
contingencies. Arabi still had friends at Court who represented 
him as championing the faith at Cairo, and in Tewfik, Abdul 
Hamid had never had any kind of confidence. He still desired 
to replace him with Halim. Following, therefore, the method 



232 The Sultan's Real Policy 

usual with him of checking one agent by another agent, he 
added to his appointment of Dervish as chief commissioner a 
second commissioner more favourable to Arabi, Sheykh Ahmed 
Assad, the religious Sheykh of one of the confraternities 
{tarikat) at Medina, whom he had at Constantinople with him, 
and ¥/as in the habit of employing in his secret dealings with his 
Arabic speaking subjects, consulting him on all matters con- 
nected with his Pan-Islamic propaganda. Thus it happened 
that on its arrival at Alexandria the Ottoman mission in reality 
bore a double character, the one of menace in the person of 
Dervish, the other of conciliation in that of Assad. This 
Sheykh had it for his special present business to inform the 
Sultan of the tone of Arab feeling in Egypt, and especially of 
the Ulema of the Azhar, and he was provided with a private 
cipher, unknown to Dervish, with which to correspond with his 
imperial master. Arabi and his intimates gained knowledge of 
this and were consequently prepared beforehand to receive the 
mission as one not wholly unfavourable to them, and the spec- 
tacle was witnessed of both parties in the state showing pleasure 
at its arrival — the Turks and Circassians at the appearance of 
Dervish, and the Egyptians at that of the Medina Sheykh. 

Both the Khedive as head of the State, and Arabi as head 
of the Government, sent their delegates to Alexandria to receive 
the mission, Zulfikar Pasha on the part of the Khedive, Yakub 
Pasha Sami, the Under-Secretary for War, on that of the Min- 
ister, and both were well received. Arabi, too, had commis- 
sioned Nadim the Orator to go down some days before to 
prepare public opinion to give the envoys a flattering reception, 
and at the same time to protest aloud against the Ultimatum 
delivered by Malet and his French colleague. Consequently, 
when the procession was formed to drive through the streets to 
the railway station, the two envoys in their respective carriages, 
having with them each a delegate, there was general acclama- 
tion on the part of the crowd. "Allah yensor el Sultan," was 
shouted, "God give victory to the Sultan"; and at the same) 
time "El leyha, marfudha, marfudha," "The Ultimatum, re- 
ject it, reject it!" "Send away the fleet!" These cries had 
their effect at once upon the Chief Commissioner, and madei 
Dervish cautious. Both at Alexandria and at Cairo deputations! 
waited on him at his levees from the Notables, merchants, and 



Dervish and Ulema 233 

officials. To all alike Dervish gave a general answer. The 
Sultan will do justice. He, Dervish, was come to restore order 
and the Sultan's authority. Only to the Turks he announced 
Arabi's speedy departure forTonstantinople, to the Egyptians 
the as speedy departure of the fleets. Sheykh Assad mean- 
while in private reassured Arabi, declaring to him that the 
Sultan meant him no evil. 

As to the fire-eating attitude attributed by our Foreign Office 
to Dervish, and alluded to by Morley with so much praise In 
the passage already quoted, It was not In reality of a very de- 
termined kind. Dervish was old and was far more intent on 
filling his pockets than on engaging in a personal struggle 
with the fellah champion. Tewfik had managed to get together 
£50,000 for Dervish as a backshish, and that with ^25,000 
more In jewels secured him to the Khedive's side, but he made 
no serious attempt at any coup de main against Arabi. A single 
unsuccessful attempt at brow-beating the Nationalists showed 
him that the task would be a dangerous one. On the Friday 
after his arrival at Cairo he made a round of the mosques and 
expressed his annoyance at the boldness of certain of the 
Ulema, who, on his leaving the Azhar, presented him with 
a petition, and still more clearly in the afternoon when the main 
body of the religious Sheykhs called and stated their views to 
him with a freedom he was unaccustomed to. All these, with 
the exception of the ex-Sheykh el Islam, el Abbasi, of the Sheykhs 
BahramI and Abyarl and the Sheykh el Saadat, who had es- 
poused the Khedive's cause, declared themselves strongly in 
favour of Arabi and urged him to reject the Ultimatum, and 
especially that part of it which demanded Arabi's exile. Der- 
vish upon this told them to hold their tongues, saying that he 
had come to give orders, not to listen to advice, and dismissed 
them, at the same time decorating with the "Osmanieh" the 
Sheykh el Islam and the other dissentients. 

Popular feeling, however, immediately manifested itself in 
a way he could not mistake. The Sheykhs returned from their 
audience in great anger, and informed every one of the turn 
things were taking, and the very same evening messengers were 
despatched by the Nationalist leaders by the evening trains to 
the provinces to organize remonstrance. Private meetings of 
a strong character were held during the night at Cairo, de- 



234 Dervish and Arabi 

nouncing the Commissioner, and the next morning, Saturday, 
a monster meeting of the students, was held in the Azhar mosque, 
to protest against the insult offered the Sheykhs. There Na- 
dim was invited to address the meeting from the pulpit, and hd 
did so with the eloquence habitual to him and with its usual 
effect. The report of this shook Dervish's self-confidence, andi 
within a few hours of its reaching him he sent for Arabi, whom 
he had hitherto refused to see, and Mahmud Sami, and ad- 
dressed them both through an interpreter in terms of concilia- 
tion, Sheykh Assad being with him and supporting him in Ara- 
bic. At this meeting, though no coffee or cigarettes were offered 
(an omission remarked by them) Dervish adopted towards 
them a tone of friendliness. He made the Nationalist Chiefs 
sit beside him and expounded the situation with apparent frank-> 
ness. "We are all here," he said, "as brothers, sons of the 
Sultan. And I with my white beard can be as a father to you. 
We have the same object in view, to oppose the Ghiaour, and to 
obtain the departure of the fleet, which is a disgrace to the Sul- 
tan and a menace to Egypt. We are all bound to act together 
to this end, and show our zeal for our master. This can best 
be done," addressing Arabi, "by your resigning your military 
power into my hands — at least in appearance — and by your go- 
ing to Constantinople to please the Sultan." To this Arabi 
replied that he was ready to resign his command. But that, as 
the situation was very strained, and as he had assumed the great 
responsibility of keeping order he would not consent to any half 
measure; if he resigned, he would resign in fact as well as name, 
but he would do neither without a written discharge in fulL 
Moreover, he would not be held responsible for things laid 
already to his charge of which he was innocent. He had been 
falsely accused of tyrannical acts, of malversation and other 
matters, and he would not leave office without a full discharge in 
writing from all complaints. Also he would defer his voyage 
to Constantinople till a time when things should be more set- 
tled, and then go as a private Moslem to pay his respects to 
the Caliph. Dervish was not prepared for this answer and he 
did not like it. His countenance changed. But he said, "Let 
us consider the matter as settled." Then, alluding to the ex- 
citement there was at Alexandria, he added, "You will tele- 
graph at once to Omar Pasha Lutfi [the Governor of Alex- 



Riot at Alexandria 235 

andria] and the commander of the garrison at Alexandria to 
say you have resigned your charge on me, and that you are act- 
ing as my agent, and on Monday there will be a meeting of the 
Consuls and the Khedive, and we will give you your discharge." 
Arabi, however, refused to do this, declaring that until he had 
received his written discharge he should retain his post and his 
responsibility. And so, without a definite understanding hav- 
ing been come to between them, he and Mahmud Sami with- 
drew. 

Such is the account, I believe a true one, told by Ninet and 
confirmed by others who should know of this important inter- 
view. It took place about noon on Saturday, the loth of 
June, and is of importance in many ways and especially for its 
bearing on what follo.wed the next day, as is notorious, a riot, 
originating in a quarrel between an Egyptian donkey boy and 
a Maltese, broke out there about one o'clock in the forenoon 
and continued till five, with the result that over two hundred 
persons lost their lives, including a petty officer of H. M. S. 
"Superb,"^ and some two hundred more Europeans. Also 
Cookson, the English Consul, was seriously hurt, and the Ital- 
ian and Greek Consuls received minor injuries, the disturbance 
being only quelled by the arrival of the regular troops. It 
was the first act of popular violence which, during the whole 
history of the year's revolution in Egypt, had been committed, 
and the news of it, spread throughout Europe by telegraph, 
produced, especially in England, a great sensation. 

As the responsibility for this affair, so unfortunate for the 
National cause in Egypt, was afterwards laid upon the person 
it had most injured, Arabi, and as the incident was made use of 
by our Foreign Office and Admiralty, with other excuses not 
less unjust, to bring about the bombardment of Alexandria and 
the war that followed, the plea being that Egypt was in a 
"proved state of anarchy," it will be well here, before we go 
any further, to place upon the right shoulders what criminality 
there was in the whole incident. When I heard of it in Lon- 
don my first instinct was that, if not the accident the papers 
said it was, it was part of the plot I knew to have been' designed 
through Dervish Pasha at the Foreign Office to entrap and be- 
tray Arabi, but it was not till after the war that I came into pos- 
session of the full particulars concerning it, or had it in my 



236 Omar Lutfi's Responsibility 

power to refute the false accusations made a little later against 
the Nationalists of having themselves devised and brought it 
about. The very contrary to this was then shown to be truth. 
As we now all know, who are in the secrets of that time, the 
riot, though perhaps accidental in its immediate origin, had for" 
some weeks previously been in the designs of the Court party 
as a means at the proper moment to discredit Arabi as one cap- 
able of preserving order in the country. 

The position of things at Alexandria was this: Alexandria, 
more than any other town in Egypt, was in large part a Euro- 
pean city, inhabited, besides the Moslem population, by Greek, 
Italian and Maltese colonists, all engaged in trade and many 
of them money-lenders. At no time had there been much love 
between the two classes and the arrival of the fleets, avowedly 
with the intention of protecting European interests, greatly in- 
creased the ill-feeling. It needed much loyalty, firmness, and 
tact on the part of the Governor of the town to preserve order, 
and great discretion on the part of the fleet. Unfortunately 
the Governor, Omar Pasha Lutfi, was a man entirely opposed 
to the Nationalist Ministry. He was a Circassian, a mem- 
ber of the Court party, and a partisan of the ex-Khedive Is- 
mail's, and at the time of the Circassian plot had done service 
to Tewfik by entering into communication with the Western 
Bedouins to gain them to the Khedive's side. He had, there- 
fore, rather encouraged than repressed the element of disorder 
in the Mohammedan population. The Greeks, on the other 
hand, had proceeded to arm themselves, with the assistance of 
the head of their community, Ambroise Sinadino, a rich banker, 
who was also agent of the Rothschilds in Egypt; and the Mal- 
tese, a numerous community, did likewise through the conni- 
vance of Cookson, the English Consul. Things, therefore, 
were all it may be said, prepared for a riot as early as the, last 
week of May, in expectation of that "civil war" which, it will 
be remembered, the "Pall Mall Gazette" foresaw as an ap- 
proved alternative, should the Nationalist Ministry refuse to 
resign and Arabi to accept suppression. 

There is no doubt that disturbance, as a proof of anarchy, 
was a thing looked forward to by our diplomacy at Cairo as 
probable, and even not undesirable in the interests of their "bot- 
tle-holding" policy. That Omar Lutfi had a personal interest 



Arahi's Guarantee 237 

in the suppression of Arabi is also easil}* proved. In the tele- 
grams of the day, when the Ultimatum was about to be launched, 
a list is given of the purely Circassian and Khedivial Ministry 
which it was intended should succeed that of Mahmud Sami, 
and Omar Lutfi is named in it as the probable successor of 
Arabi at the War Office. Nor was this announcement un- 
founded, for a few days later we know that Omar Lutfi was, 
in fact, sent for by the Khedive to the Ismailia Palace and of- 
fered the post. ^ The Ultimatum was delivered on the ist of 
June, and the Ministers resigned on the 2nd, having waited a 
day because the Khedive had told them he would first telegraph 
for advice to Constantinople, though on the following morning, 
when they again came to him, he informed them that his mind 
was made up to accept the Ultimatum notwithstanding that he 
had received no answer. When, therefore, on the 3rd the Khe- 
dive had been obliged, through the popular demonstration in 
Arabi's favour, backed by the German and Austrian Consuls, 
who saw in Arabi the man best capable in Egypt of maintain- 
ing order, to rename Arabi Minister of War, the disappoint- 
ment to Omar Lutfi is easily understood, and the temptation 
he was under of creating practical proof that the German Con- 
suls were wrong. We have, besides this, evidence that on the 
5th of June the Khedive, who, no less than Omar Lutfi, had re- 
ceived a great rebuff, sent him a telegram in the following 
words: "Arabi has guaranteed public order, and published it in 
the newspapers, and has made himself responsible to the Con- 
suls ; and if he succeeds in his guarantee the Powers will trust 
him, and our consideration will be lost. Also the fleets of the 
Powers are in Alexandrian waters, and men's minds are excited, 
and quarrels are not far off between Europeans and others. 
Now, therefore, choose for yourself whether you will serve 
Arabi in his guarantee or whether you will serve us." On this 
hint Omar Lutfi immediately took his measures. As civil gov- 
ernor he was in command of the Mustafezzin, the semi-mili- 
tary police of Alexandria, and through them directed that quar- 
ter-taves, (nabuts) should be collected at the police stations 

1 The "Pall Mall" of 28th May, has the following: "Cairo, 27th May, Omar 
Pasha Lutfi, Sherif Pasha, Ragheb Pasha, and Sultan Pasha, President of the 
Chamber of Notables, assembled at noon to-day at the Ismailia Palace. . . . The 
Presidency of the Council will probably be held by Sherif Pasha or Omar Pasha 
Lutfi. . . . Omar Pasha Lutfi will be Minister of War." 



238 Origin of the Riot 

to be served out at the proper moment, and other preparations 
made for an intended disturbance. Ample proof may be found 
in the evidence printed in the Blue Books of the complicity of 
the police in the affair, though a confusion is constantly made 
by those who give the evidence between these and the regular 
soldiers by speaking of the police, as is often loosely done in 
Egypt, as soldiers. The regulars were not under the civil, but 
the military governors, and took no part in the affair until 
called in at a late hour by Omar Lutfi when he found the riot 
had assumed proportions he could not otherwise control. It 
is to be noted that the chief of the Mustafezzin, Seyd Kandil, 
a timid adherent of Arabi's, refused to take part in the day's 
proceedings, excusing himself to Omar Lutfi on the ground 
of illness. 

The disturbance was therefore prepared already for execution 
when Dervish and his fellow Commissioner landed on the 8th 
at Alexandria. It was probably intended to synchronize with 
the plot of Arabi's arrest, and to prove to the Sultan's Commis*- 
sioner, more than to any one else, that Arabi had not the po*wen 
to keep order in the country that he claimed. I am not, how- 
ever, at all convinced that Dervish was in ignorance of what 
was intended, and I think there is a very great probability that 
he had learned it before his interview with Arabi, and that if 
he had succeeded in getting Arabi to resign his responsiibility 
the riot would have been countermanded. As it is, there is 
some evidence that the outbreak took place earlier than was 
intended. It is almost certain that the immediate occasion of 
it, the quarrel between the donkey boy and the Maltese, was 
accidental, but probably the police had received no counter- 
orders, and so the thing was allowed to go on according to the 
program. What is certain is that the Khedive and Omar 
Lutfi, the one at Cairo, the other at Alexandria, monopolized 
telegraphic communication between the two cities, that Omar 
Lutfi put off on one and another pretext, from hour to hoijr', 
calling in the military, who could not act without his orders as 
civil governor in a case of riot, and that the occurrence was re- 
garded at the Palace as a subject of rejoicing and by Arabi and 
the Nationalists as one to be regretted and minimized. Also, 
and this is a very important matter, the committee named to 
inquire into the causes of the affair by the Khedive was com- 



English Responsibility 239 

posed almost entirely of his own partisans, while he secured its 
being of no effective value as throwing light on the true authors, 
by appointing Omar Lutfi himself to be its president. The 
connection of Omar Lutfi and the Khedive, moreover, is dem- 
onstrated in the fact that, while given leave of absence when 
suspicion was too strong against him among the Consuls, he 
nevertheless reappeared after the bombardment and, joining 
the Khedive, obtained the post he coveted of Minister of War, 
a post which he held until May, 1883, when Lord Randolph 
Churchill having brought the case against him and the Khe- 
dive forward in Parliament, he at the end of the year retired 
into private life. Fuller proof of their complicity will be found 
in the Appendix. 

One point only in this sinister affair is still a matter for me 
of much perplexity, and that is to determine the exact amount 
of responsibility assignable in it to our agent at Cairo and Alex- 
andria. There are passages in Malet's despatches which seem 
to show that he was looking forward, about the time when the 
disturbance was first contemplated, to some violent solution of 
his diplomatic difiSculties, and there is no doubt that it had been 
for some time past part of his argument against the Nationalist 
Government that it was producing anarchy. Also it is cer- 
tain that Cookson had connived at the arming of the Maltese 
British subjects at Alexandria. Still, from that to complicity 
in a design to create a special riot there is a wide difference', 
and everything that I know of Malet's character and subse- 
quent conduct in regard to the riot convinces me that he did n'ot 
know this one at Alexandria was intended. Malet honestly 
believed in Tewfik as a trustworthy and amiable prince, and 
accepted whatever tales he told, and his undeception about 
him after the war I know to have been painfully complete. 
With regard to Colvin much the same may be said. He was 
probably as ignorant of the exact plan as he had been of the 
Khedive's true action the year before at Abdin, though it is 
diflicult to understand that either he or Malet should not have 
soon afterwards guessed the truth. They had both allied 
themselves to the party of disorder, and when disorder came 
they accepted the Khedive's story without any close inquiry 
because it suited them to accept it, and they made use of it as an 
argument for what they wanted, the ruin of Nationalist Egypt 



240 Arabics Opportunity Missed 

and armed intervention. That is all the connection with the 
crime I personally lay at^their doors. 

What followed may be briefly sketched here before I return 
to my journal. The immediate effect of the riot was not exactly 
that which the Khedive and his friends intended. It had been 
allowed to go much farther than was in their plan, so much 
farther that the regular army had been obliged to be called 
in, and intead of discrediting Arabi it so seriously frightened 
the Levantine population of Alexandria, who were a chicken- 
hearted community, that they began to look to him as their 
only protector. Even the Foreign Consuls, all but the Eng- 
lish, came round to this view of the case, and the perfect ordqr 
which the army from this time on succeeded in maintaining, 
both there and at Cairo, largely increased his prestige. I be- 
lieve that then, late though it was in the day, Arabi, if he had 
been really a strong ruler, which unfortunately he was not, 
and if he had been a better judge of men and judge of oppor- 
tunity — in a word, if he had been a man of action and not what 
he was, a dreamer, he might have won the diplomatic game 
against his unscrupulous opponents. For this, however, it was 
necessary that he should denounce and punish the true authors 
of the riot; and that he should have proved with a strong arm 
that in Egypt he was really master, and that any one who dared 
disturb the peace should feel the weight of it. Then he would 
have appealed to Europe and to the Sultan in the words of a 
strong man and they would not have been disregarded; nor 
would our Government in England, who, after all, were no pal- 
adins, have stood out against the rest. Unfortunately for 
liberty Arabi was no such strong man, only, as I have said, a 
humanitarian dreamer, and with little more than a certain basis 
of obstinacy for the achievement of his ideals. He was abso- 
lutely ignorant of Europe, or of the common arts and crafts of 
its diplomacy. Thus he missed the opportune moment, and 
presently the Europeans, frightened by Malet and Colvin, who 
were playing a double game with him, getting him to preserve 
order while they were preparing the bombardment, lost con- 
fidence in him and his chance was over. From that moment 
there was no longer any hope of a peaceful solution. A wolf 
and a lamb quarrel was picked with him by Sir Beauchamp Sey- 
mour, who had sworn to be revenged on the Alexandrians for 



Lord Stanley of Aldertey i^t 

the death of his body-servant, a man of the name of Strackett, 
who had been killed in the riot; and the bombardment fol- 
lowed. A greater man than Arabi might, I say, have possibly 
pulled it through. But Arabi was only a kind of superior fel- 
lah, inspired with a few fine ideas, and he failed. He does not 
however, for that deserve the blame he has received at the 
hands of his countrymen. Not one of them even attempted to 
do better. ^ 

Now to return to London and my journal: 

"June 3. — To Lady Granville's party at the Foreign Office. 
All the political people there. Everybody connected with the 
Foreign Office ostentatiously cordial. Talked about the situa- 
tion to Wolseley, Rawlinson, the American Minister (Lowell) 
and others. Also had a long talk with Sir Alexander and Lady 
Malet, who were very kind in spite of my political quarrel with 
their son. People seem relieved at the crisis in Egypt being 
postponed. But Wolseley tells me the Sultan has refused the 
Conference. The Khedive's cousin, the fat Osman Pasha, was 
there, and the Princes of Wales and Edinburgh and Prince 
Leopold and the Duke of Cambridge and other bigwigs. I 
was surprised to find Henry Stanley, too, quite cordial. He 
said he had a great admiration for Arabi as champion of the 
Faith, and that they would promote him, and both he and 
Tewfik remain at Cairo. So, as he represents Constantinople 
views, I conclude there is no danger from that quarter. The 
game seems won now, barring new accidents." 

This last reference, which is to Lord Stanley of Alderley, 
is of importance. He was a very old and close friend of mine, 
but we had hitherto differed about Egypt, and on this ground. 
He had been many years before, in the time of Lord Stratford 
de Redclijffe, Attache to our Embassy at Constantinople, and 
had imbibed there the extreme philo-Turkish views then in 
fashion with Englishmen. In i860, while travelling in the 

1 Arabi was probably deterred from taking open action against Omar Lutfi, in 
part by the strong solidarity there is among Moslems in all quarrels with non- 
Moslems, in part by his suspicion of the Khedive's complicity, which at first was 
a suspicion only. He was extremely loath to quarrel with Tewfik at that moment, 
as he had just been reconciled to him, and only a few days before had sworn to 
protect his life as he would his own. He preferred therefore, in his language at 
the time, to attribute the chief blame to Cookson and Sinadino, who truly on their 
side were not without blame. This will be seen in Sabunji's letters and other 
documents concerning the riot printed in the Appendix. 



242 Lady Gregory 

East Indies, he had become a Mohammedan, and I had first 
made his acquaintance in a rather singular way. I was on my 
way in the autumn of that year from Athens and Constantino- 
ple to England, and was travelling up the Danube when there 
came on board our steamer at one of the Roumanian ports the 
family of an ex-hospodar, and with them an Englishman of no 
very distinguished appearance, and of rather plain, brusque 
manners, whom I took to be their tutor or secretary. As our 
journey lasted several days, I made friends with my fellow 
traveller, and found him interesting from his great knowledge 
of the East, but he did not tell me his name. On our arrival, 
however, at Vienna, he proposed to go with me to the Embassy, 
and I then discovered who he was, and we travelled on to- 
gether to Munich, where his younger brother, Lyulph Stanley, 
a Balliol undergraduate, was learning German, and in this way 
I became acquainted little by little with all his family. I came 
to know him very well, and I take this opportunity of saying 
that, though he was undoubtedly eccentric in his ideas, he re- 
mained through life one of the sincerest and least selfish men I 
have known. As a Moslem he was entirely in earnest, and 
in many ways he sympathized with my views, but he would not 
hear of my preference of the Arabs to the Turks, whom he 
considered the natural leaders of Islam. In London he was 
always in close relations with the Ottoman Embassy, and his 
view of the position as between the Sultan and Arabi — the 
Dervish mission was already in the air — has on this account 
considerable historical value. 

"June 4. — Sunday at Crabbet. The first day for weeks I 
have not thought about Egypt. I consider the whole matter 
settled now, and have played tennis all the afternoon with a 
light heart. The Wentworths, Noels, Frank Lascelles, Henry 
Cowper, Molony, and others came down from London. 
Lovely weather. 

"June 5. — To London again. . . . Lady Gregory tells me 
they are displeased now with Colvin — consider him not suited 
to his place in Egypt — this from Lord Northbrook. Lord 
Granville has sent to consult him (Sir William Gregory)." 
Lady Gregory, be it noted, had remained more staunch than 
had her husband to the National cause; and later they both 
rendered once more important services to Arabi, especially at 
the time of his trial. The London newspapers at this time 



Derbish "Quite Unscrupulous" 243 

were beglnnning to take a more intelligent interest in Egyp- 
tian affairs, most of them having sent special correspondents to 
Cairo or Alexandria, among them the "Daily Telegraph," whose 
correspondent became a strong Arabist. 

"June 6. — The 'Daily News' is already preparing itself for 
a renewal of the status quo ante ultimatum, and the other pa- 
pers seem likely to follow suit, — all but the 'Times' and 'Pail 
Mall," just the two papers which had the truth preached to 
them and which rejected it. English opinion, hoVever, is 
hardly now a straw in the balance. ... I had another long 
talk with Lascelles, and hope that I have more or less con- 
verted him. In the evening I rode with Bertram Currie, who 
offers to wager Arabi will have been extinguished in a fortnight." 
{N. B. — Bertram was the elder brother of Philip Currie, a 
banker, and strong practical supporter of Gladstone, with whom 
he was personally intimate. His opinion, no doubt, reflects 
that of Downing Street at the moment.) 

"June 7. — Lady Gregory came in and gave me news. She 
tells me that Lord Granville told her husband that all their 
hopes now rested on Dervish's mission from Constantinople. 
'Dervish,' Lord Granville said, 'is quite unscrupulous, and he 
will get rid of Arabi one way or other.' I suppose this means 
by bribing;^ indeed. Lord Granville seems to have said as 
much, but it may also mean by 'coffee.' I do not, however, 
fear the latter. The Sultan's object will be to get Arabi to 
Constantinople, not to kill, but to keep him as a hostage. I 
am anxious all the same Sabunji should arrive. I cannot help 
fancying they may try and prevent his landing, knowing his 
connection with me. A note has come from him written in the 
train, with additions to our code of signals which are rather 
amusing. . . . Later saw Gregory, who confirms all his wife 
told me of his interview with Granville. He thinks Colvin 
and Malet must be recalled. . . . Pembroke writes to John 
Pollen that the Foreign Office is unbounded in its anger against 
me. Never mind. ... I met Austin Lee, Dilke's secretary, 
at the Club, and he asked me the latest news from Eg)''pt. I 
said, 'I hear you are sending a barrel of salt to put on Arabi's 

1 My diary of 1888 records: "Dec. 22, Cairo. To breakfast with Zebehr Pasha. 
. . . He spoke highly of Arabi, and said that he had been present at a conversation 
between him and Dervish Pasha, in which Dervish had offered Arabi ££250 a 
month if he would go to Constantinople. Bu<: Arabi had said that, even if he were 
willing, there were ?q,ooo men would, stand between him ^nd the sea." 



244 Frederic Harrison 

tail.' 'No,' he answered with some readiness, 'the salt is 
to pickle him.' . . . Rode in the evening with Cyril Flower 
(who had married a Rothschild) advised him to sell his 
Egyptian Bonds. . . . Dined with Bertram, whom I found 
much more humane. He believes in Gladstone, and the even- 
tual independence of Ireland. 'Only,' he says, 'Gladstone has 
the misfortune of being a generation before his age. We shall 
all believe in attending to our own affairs in another twenty 
years.' 

"Frederic Harrison has written to protest in the 'Pall Mall' 
against intervention in Egypt." This was a powerful article 
headed "Money, Sir, Money," which was followed by other 
letters. I have always regretted that I had not earlier be- 
come acquainted with the writer, the soundest and most coura- 
geous man on foreign policy then in the Liberal Party, and 
by far their most vigorous pamphleteer. Had we met a month 
or two before, I feel sure that he might have prevented the 
war, for though not in Parhament, he wielded great influence. 
The misfortune of the public position that Spring was that 
there was not a single man of great intellectual weight in 
the party, Harrison excepted, free from official bondage. . . . 
"Party at Lady Salisbury's. Talked with Miltown, who was 
rather angry, I thought, at my handiwork in Egypt, and not 
quite polite about my telegrams. Also with old Strathnairn, 
who would like 'to go out with 10,000 men and hang Arabi.' 
Also with Osman and Kiamil Pashas, the Khedive's cousins, 
though not about politics. . . . The Sultan's Commission has 
arrived in Egypt. 

"June 8. — A telegram from Sabunji at Alexandria announc- 
ing his arrival. Now I feel relieved from anxiety. He says 
the Turkish Commission has gone to Cairo. . . . Harry Brand 
refuses to come to my lawn-tennis party at Crabbet till he sees 
how things go at Cairo. I fear he has much of his money 
in Egypt and will lose it. 

"June 9. — There Is another letter from Frederic Harrison 
in the 'Pall Mall.' Wrote to propose to show him my corre- 
spondence with Gladstone. Saw the Gregorys. The Com- 
mission is hailed with a great flourish of trumpets at Cairo, 
but we fancy this is only to herald a compromise. Sabunji 
t.elegraphs that Ar^bl has declared publicly he will resist the 



Khedivial Princes at Crahhet 245 

landing of Turkish troops. He is still at Alexandria, which 
disquiets me. He ought to be in Cairo. Dined at Wentworth 
House to meet Sir Bartle Frere, a soft-spoken, intelligent man. 

"June 10. — Luncheon with Mr. and Mrs. Green, very su- 
perior and sympathetic about Egypt." (A^. B. — This was Green 
the historian. He was already in failing health. I have a 
clear recollection of his emotional sympathy with me and with 
the cause I was pleading. His loss to an honest understanding 
of statesmanship was a great one.) "I am anxious about 
things there for the first time for a fortnight. The evening 
papers announced that Dervish has won — bought over — a part 
of the army and has proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief, 
summoning Arabi to submit. Unless he stands firm now all is 
lost. After much consideration I have sent the following tele- 
gram to Sabunji : '7 p. m. Arrest Commission. Fear not but 
God.' This partly in cipher. My trouble is lest Sabunji should 
not have gone to Cairo. Or why does he not telegraph? Can 
he have come to grief ? . . . Dinner at Lyulph Stanley's where, 
besides others, we met Bright. I found him most humane 
about Egypt, and spoke a few words with him, I hope, in sea- 
son. I spoke my mind pretty freely. It is now a question of 
boldness on the part of the National Party. I fancy Dervish's 
orders have been to test this, and. If he finds them deter- 
mined, to support them. He will crush them, if he can, through 
the Circassians. But I trust they may crush him, or at any rate 
frighten him. The Sultan dares not put them down by force. 

''June II, Sunday. — By early train to Crabbet. I was very 
nervous looking into the papers lest some coupe de main should 
have been made. But the 'Observer' shows that nothing has 
yet happened. There are the same stories of Dervish's swag- 
ger to the Ulema and the officers. But that is nothing. . . . 
At 2 o'clock the Princes Osman and Kiamil and their cousin 

and their alem Aarif Bey and an English bear-leader, one 

Lempriere, came down to see our horses. While we were 
showing them these a telegram came in cipher from Sabunji 
as follows: 'Cairo, 12 p.m., June 10. I have just had an in- 
terview with Arabi. He is supported by the Parliament, the 
University, and the Army, all except Sultan Pasha and the 
Sheykh el Islam. The nation is decided to depose the Khe- 
dive. The Porte dislikes the proposals of Europe. Arabi In- 



^ 



246 Aarif Bey 

sists there will be no peace while Malet and Colvin are here. 
Arabi will resist a Turkish invasion. He will not go to Con- 
stantinople. Sheykh Aleysh has been made head of the Azhar. 
The Porte has decided to depose the Khedive. Malet has 
urged the proposals of Europe on the Commission. Abdallah 
Nadim at a public meeting of 10,000 spoke against these pro- 
posals and against the Khedive.' If the Khedive's cousins 
whom we were entertaining could have read it, it would have 
spoiled their appetites. We have talked the matter over and 
are going to telegraph them to proclaim a republic in case 
they depose Tewfik. I am relieved of all anxiety now that I 
know Sabunji is with them. 

In what I here say of Princes Osman and Kiamil I do them 
less than justice. They had no love for Tewfik, their father 
Mustafa having been driven out of Egypt and despoiled of 
much of his possessions by Ismail, and they also had a con- 
siderable amount of patriotism. At least they gave proof of 
it during the war when they were among Arabi's strongest 
adherents. Their sister, Nazli Hanum, did much to help us 
at the time of the trial. Aarif Bey was a young man of great 
ability, a Kurd by birth but with Arab blood, well edu'cated 
and of high distinction. He afterwards became Secretary to 
Mukhtar Pasha at Cairo, and edited a literary newspaper, 
but lost himself in intrigues of all kinds and has disappeared. 
The fourth person on this occasion was a Europeanized Turk 
and member of the Sultan's household, but his name in my 
diary is not recorded. We talked Eastern politics, though not 
Egyptian, freely at dinner, politics of a Pan-Islamic kind which 
included the hope that France as well as England would sooner 
or later be driven out of North Africa. 

I may here insert a letter I wrote to Sabunji on the 9th, and 
one I received from him of the same date as his telegram just 
given. 

"10, James Street, June 9, 1882. 
"Your telegram announcing your landing in Egypt relieved 
me of much anxiety. I hope by this time you are at Cairo 
and in communication with our friends. I think they cannot 
do better just now than keep on the best possible terms with 
the Commissioners. Only I would have them beware of trust- 



Advice to Arabi 247 

Ing them. I know that great hopes are placed by the enemies 
of Egypt on Dervish as a man quite unscrupulous in his mode 
of dealing with rebels. Every effort will be made to get Arabi 
to go to Constantinople. But this he must not do. They will 
try to bribe him and persuade him that his going will be for 
the good of the country. He must not be deluded. It is pos- 
sible even they may try to arrest or poison him, though I do 
not think that likely. When, however, they see he stands firm 
and has got the country with him, they will not quarrel with 
him. My strong advice to him is that he should make his sub- 
mission at once to Mohammed Tewfik as the Sultan's viceroy, 
on condition of retaining his place as Minister of War. If he 
does this the English and French Governments will have no 
just cause of quarrel with him; and the European Conference, 
if it assembles, will not sanction their further Intervention. I 
am sure that our Government will not Insist on their Ultima- 
tum as regards Arabi leaving the country. But they and the 
French are bound to support Tewfik as nominal sovereign of 
Egypt. It would be very dangerous at the present moment 
for Arabi to quarrel either with Tewfik or the Sultan. Only 
let him hold his ground as practical ruler of the country. . . . 
People are very angry here with me, but I do not care, so lonig. 
as Egypt gets her liberty." 

I give a letter, somewhat condensed, which was written to 
me by SabunjI from Cairo on the day of the Alexandrian riot, 
but before news of it had reached him. 

"Cairo, June 11, 1882. 

"On my arrival I called on Arabi Pasha, Mahmud SamI and 
others who are of the party. They received me with enthusi- 
asm and inquired after you. Mohammed Abdu Informed me 
that he had been told you had been advised by some Influential 
people not to come to Cairo. Arabi overwhelmed me with 
joy when he saw me. A week before my arrival he addressed 
a large audience and read them a letter I had written. In which 
I dwelt upon the necessity of perfect union among them- 
selves. . . . 

"The situation at present stands thus: In my telegram I 
told you how we had talked of all that had happened from 



248 Attitude of the Ulema 

the discovery of the Circassian plot down to the present date. 
Now Sheykh Aleysh, the great holy man of the Azhar, has is- 
sued a fetwa in which he states that the present Khedive, hav- 
ing attempted to sell his country to the foreigners by following 
the advice of the European Consuls, is no more worthy of 
ruling over the Moslems of Egypt. He must therefore be 
deposed. All the Sheykhs of the Azhar, who consider Sheykh 
Aleysh as their spiritual head, have accepted the fetwa. . . . 
Sheykh Mohammed Khodeyr of the Azhar went with twenty- 
two Notables to meet Dervish Pasha, and presented him a 
petition signed by 10,000 persons in which they requested him 
to reject the proposals of the Powers and depose the Khedive. 
There are fourteen moudiriehs in Egypt. Only three mudirs 
are personally opposed to Arabi. The Copt and Arab ele- 
ment of the fellahin unanimously supports him. . . . Emba- 
beh (Sheykh el Islam), being afraid of both the Khedive and 
the National Party, keeps aloof, and avoids politics under 
plea of ill-health. Arabi told me 'he will never yield either to 
Europe or Turkey. Let them send European, Turkish, or In- 
dian troops, as long as I breathe I will defend my country; and 
when we are all dead they will possess a ruined country, and 
we shall have the glory of having died for our native land. 
Nor is this all. A religious war will succeed the political one, 
and the responsibility of this will fall on those who provoke 
it.' He is determined to resist and will not go to Constantino- 
ple; Arabi is now supported by the majority of the nation. 
Nine only of the Deputies are against him. Sultan Pasha has 
deserted him and joined the Khedive, being frightened by Malet 
and the arrival of the fleet. He and the Khedive are now 
looked upon by all the Arab element as traitors. . . . Depu- 
tations from all the provinces came to Dervish requesting the 
deposition of the Khedive, a fact which it Is Impossible to ex- 
plain on the supposition that Arabi compelled them. . . . 
Ninety thousand persons have signed petitions to Dervish to 
reject the proposals of Europe and keep Arabi In oflSice. 

"All the Azhar Sheykhs except Embabeh, el AbbasI, and 
the Sheykh el Saadat are supporting Arabi, also Abd-el-rah- 
man Bahrawi. Nadim held a large meeting of about 10,000 
persons In Alexandria, and spoke against the proposals of 
Europe, and proved the unfitness of the Khedive to reign. He 



Mahmud Sami Described 249 

brought proofs from the Koran, the Hadith, and modern his- 
tory to prove his case and persuade his hearers. Arabi also^ 
in an animated speech denounced all the misdeeds of the reign- 
ing dynasty from Mohammed Ali down to Tewfik. I have 
spoken to Abdu, Nadim, and others about soliciting letters 
and signatures from Notables, Ulema, fellahin, merchants, and 
others, to be sent to you to prove the reality of the National 
movement. They agree to get the documents in ten days and 
T shall send them to you. 

I have found out that we formed an erroneous idea of Mah- 
mud Pasha Sami. I have had many conversations with Tiim 
and have got information about him even from his opponents. 
I find he is one of those who first planned the National move- 
ment as long ago as in Ismail's time. He suffered a great deal 
for his liberalism yet stuck to his principles. Several of the 
leaders of the party, Nadim, Abdu, and even Arabi, confess 
that they owe their power to his help and constancy. He was 
tempted by Ismail to give up the party, but he refused all money. 
He spends all his income in doing good to the party, and his 
house is like a caravanserai. His private life is that of a phil- 
osopher, spending little on himself and satisfied with his lot and 
all that comes. He is not an ignorant man. He is well versed 
in Arabic literature, better than Arabi, and if he is hated by 
the Turks it is a proof of his patriotism. He is going to write 
a letter to Lord Granville to prove the existence of a real Na- 
tional Party in Egypt, and to avow their friendship to England, 
which they look upon as the champion of liberty, and as a na- 
tibn which has always taken by the hand people who were 
struggling for their freedom. I suggested that similar letters 
from Arabi and Embabeh to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone 
would be of use, and I promised to translate the letters and 
send them to their destination. 

When it was rumoured that the Sultan intended sending 
Dervish to urge Arabi to accept the Powers' Ultimatum, Na- 
dim went to Alexandria and held a meeting of about 10,000 
persons and spoke for two hours against the Note and sug- 
gested that every one in the Assembly should protest against it. 
Nadim, the new Oracle of Delphi, was cordially obeyed. 
When the men returned home they taught their wives and 
children to join them in protesting against the Note. In fact. 



250 DeriJish and the JJlema 

when Dervish landed, the children were heard shouting in the 
streets 'el leyha, el leyha' 'the note, the note,' and from the 
windows the women called out, 'marfudha, marfudha/ 'reject it, 
reject it.' Dervish took a lesson from this and changed his 
colours. . . . 

"Embabeh, who for a few days showed himself hostile to 
the National Party for having openly sanctioned the deposi- 
tion of the Khedive, yesterday made peace with them. But Sul- 
tan Pasha has disappointed every one. He has joined the 
Khedive bhndly, frightened by the thought of an European 
intervention, and being assured by Malet that Arabi would not 
be suffered to remain in office. Thus the poor old fellow fell 
into the same snare with Sherif. He is no longer popular, and 
has got nothing for his change of policy. 

"Another curious event took place yesterday. When Der- 
vish summoned the Ulema to consult about the best measures 
to be taken for an honourable peace, two of the Ulema only 
took the Khedive's part. All the rest pleaded the National 
cause. Dervish was vexed and dissolved the Assembly, dec- 
orating the two dissenting Sheykhs, Bahrawi and Abyari. 
When the result was published in the papers it created a revolu- 
tionary movement in the Azhar. I was present at several of 
the meetings of the Ulema and other persons, and there was 
general indignation. The Koran and the Hadith were freely 
quoted, showing the unfitness of Tewfik to rule over a Mus- 
sulman community. They were not satisfied, however, with 
private meetings, but in my presence insisted upon holding a 
public meeting in the Azhar to protest against the insult in- 
flicted on them. Accordingly the meeting was held in the Az- 
har Mosque, in the very place where the prayers are made; 
and Nadim was ordered by the Ulema to address the Assembly, 
which exceeded four thousand persons. The effect produced 
by Nadim's oration I have no time to describe. You have 
seen Nadim and know how eagerly people hear him and how 
excited they get by his eloquence." 



CHAPTER XIV 



A LAST APPEAL TO GLADSTONE 



Such was the state of feeling in the inner circle of the 
Nationalists at Cairo when the Alexandrian riot occurred. The 
next day I went up to London in high spirits, carrying with me 
Sabunji's telegram of the loth to show to Hamilton. The 
news of the riot met me at the station. 

"June 12.—. . . Another scare. Riots at Alexandria, 
Cookson hurt, an officer of the Superb killed, and fifty or sixty 
Europeans. This has caused great excitement. I am not 
sure whether it will be for Arabi's advantage or not. It will 
show he is master of the situation; unless, indeed, it be a trap 
laid for him by Dervish to get him to go to Alexandria where 
he might arrest him. ... I went to Eddy Hamilton and 
told him I was now in possession of indisputable knowledge 
that Arabi commanded the country, also that Tewfik was in 
great danger of being deposed by the feeling of the country, 
and that, if they did not want a violent solution of the diffi- 
culty, they had better come speedily to terms with him. He 
promised to repeat all I said to Gladstone. It is evident to 
me now that they would catch at any compromise which should 
leave Tewfik on the throne. 

"Went down to the House of Commons. Harry Brand 
asked his father, the Speaker, for a ticket of entrance for the 
'rebel Blunt,' and he said, 'he does not deserve one,' but gave 
it. Dilke answered various questions about Egypt, assuming 
that Dervish and the Khedive were having it all their own way. 
This has rather frightened me, for there is a report that Arabi 
has gone down with Dervish to Alexandria (this proved un- 
true), and I fear treachery. Sabunji, too, has sent a new tele- 
gram as follows : 'I have just seen Arabi. Your message de- 
livered. All quiet. Abdallah Nadim addressed four thou- 
sand persons at the Azhar, attacking the Turkish Commission 

251 



252 Lady Malet^s Reproaches 

and the Khedive. The Commission has withdrawn the pro- 
posals of Europe, and I hope for peace. The Circassians are 
intriguing. The Sheykh el Islam has rejoined, Sultan Pasha 
has not. The riot is nothing.' To this we composed an 
answer coming down in the train, and sent it from Three 
Bridges: 'Dervish means mischief, bribery, perhaps murder. 
Call a public meeting under Nadim and Abdu and the Azhar 
University, a hundred thousand persons. Let them insist on 
Dervish's departure. If this is refused let him be arrested 
by the police and sent away. Make terms with the Khedive. 
Be careful the Consuls are not molested. Let Nadim be the 
mover in action. Arabi and the army must stand aloof.' I 
am far from easy in my mind. 

"Had a long conversation before leaving London with 
Frederic Harrison, who has written again on Egypt to the 
'Pall Mall.' I have shown him my letters to Gladstone. He 
will be of valuable assistance. . . . Just as we were leaving 
James Street Lady Malet rushed In wildly, demanding of me 
the truth of what I had been doing in Egypt. I told her 
pretty nearly. She said my honour was at stake In clearing 
myself of the charge of intriguing against my country. She 
besought me, too, to calm down things there; and I promised 
to send a message to Arabi not to touch a hair of her son's 
head. I shall write by to-morrow's mail, and In the mean- 
while my telegram will suffice. I do not think he runs the 
slightest danger. Poor Lady Malet ! I am very sorry for 
her. She told me people said I had been in a conspiracy with 
Gladstone against her son's policy In Egypt. I assured her 
that Gladstone was guiltless of my telegrams, and that I ac- 
cepted the full responsibility of all I had done. She made me 
promise to come and see her; but — such are the miseries of 
political life — she looks upon me as Edward's murderer. 

''June 13. — I was very nervous all night, expecting to hear 
that Arabi had been arrested or murdered. But the papers 
show him to be quite master of the situation. The Khedive 
is forming a new Ministry, In which Arab! Is to be Minister 
of War as ever. I trust, therefore, he has followed my advice 
about making terms with Tewfik. Now they have only to 
get Dervish away, and all will go smoothly." 

So thought the majority of the London papers, the "Pall 



Arabi and the Rothschilds 253 

Mall" almost alone dissenting from this view of a peaceful 
solution having been arrived at, and its comments, prompted 
by the Foreign Office, show the animus of our officials and 
their determination there should not be peace on any terms 
which should leave the Nationalists in power. Morley thus 
writes: "It would be difficult to make a greater mistake than 
that into which the 'Times' has fallen this morning, when it 
mistakes the temporary and provisional arrangement, entered 
into by the Khedive, the Consuls-General, Dervish, and Arabi 
for the preservation of order, for the final settlement of the 
Egyptian difficulty. The excitement in Egypt is so great that 
Europeans are in danger of their lives. The only restraining 
force in the country that can hold the mob in awe is the army, 
and the army is in the hands of Arabi. For the moment, then, 
Arabi must be made use of to prevent massacre. But because 
Dervish holds Arabi responsible with his head for the pres- 
ervation of order, it no more follows that he has abandoned 
the intention to re-establish the status quo than that England 
and France have come to terms with Arabi because they In- 
sisted he should use his troops to suppress the rioting in Alex- 
andria." We were, however, taken in in England, just as 
Arabi was taken in at Cairo, by the treacherous truce Malet 
and Colvin had agreed to, and did not suspect its hollowness. 
Arabi on that occasion gave his word of honour to Tewfik that, 
come what might, he would defend his life like his own, and 
this promise the Khedive, who had nothing but treachery to- 
wards him in his heart, accepted and abused to the end. 

To continue my journal of that day I find: "Button told me 
yesterday that Rothschild had offered Arabi £4,000 (one hund- 
red thousand francs) a year for life if he would leave Egypt. ^ 

■• Arabi, in answer to a question of mine as to this matter, told me many years 
afterwards that he had never heard of any offer of a pension as made him by 
the Rothschilds. He said, however, that soon after the ultimatum of 26th May, 
he received a visit from the French Consul, who, having asked what was the 
amount of his then pay, had offered him the double — that is to say, ££500 a 
month — from the French Government, if he would consent to leave Egypt and go 
to Paris to be treated there as Abd-el-Kader had been treated. He refused, 
however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it was his business if 
necessary to fight and die for his country, not to abandon it. I have a note of 
this conversation but without date. Compare also the "Pall Mall" of i8th May: 
"Ourabi is said to be thinking of visiting Europe to recruit his health — a 
commendable intention, and no harm would be done if he were alotted a handsome 
travelling allowance on condition that he did not return." 



254 General Goldsmid •' 

... As we went up to London they gave us the following 
telegram: 'Cairo, June 12th, 1 1 a. m. I have just seen Arabi, 
he sends you his salaams. He thinks the European proposals 
have disappeared and peace is concluded. Arabi master of 
the situation. Dervish gone. Khedive went to Alexandria. 
Arabi led him by the arm to the station. National Party 
triumphant. I worked hard but have triumphed.' ... I have 
been between laughing and crying ever since. I went at once 
to Downing Street, and told Eddy Hamilton and Horace Sey- 
mour what had happened. They seemed to think that now, 
even at the eleventh hour, Gladstone might acknowledge his 
errors, or rather Malet's errors, and make peace with Arabi. 
Button thinks this possible too. But the Foreign Office will 
harden its heart. . . . Dined at home and went to a party at 
the Admiralty. Found the Gregorys and Sir Frederick Golds- 
mid there, and had some conversation on Egypt with Lord 
Northbrook. I spoke my mind to him pretty freely. I said, 
'It depends entirely upon you now whether there is bloodshed 
in Egypt or not.' 

"June 14. — I am quite worn out. Mrs. Howard, whom I 
met in the Park, said I looked altered. And in fact I have 
not had Egypt, sleeping or waking, out of my head since the 
crisis began. ... I spent the morning and breakfasted with 
Goldsmid, who is going this evening on a special mission to 
Constantinople, and primed him well with my views, showing 
him all my Gladstone correspondence." (A^. B. — This General 
Goldsmid was afterwards employed as chief of the Intelligence 
Department by Wolseley in his campaign. He was a soft- 
spoken man, whom I had known the year before at Cairo.) . . . 
"Had luncheon with Lascelles, who seems to agree with my 
views about Egypt." (There was some thought, I believe, at 
that time at the Foreign Office of his being sent out to Cairo to 
replace Malet, as he already knew Egypt; and on a mission of 
conciliation he would have done well. Only, unfortunately, 
none such was decided on.) . . . "There is confirmation of 
Sabunji's news in to-day's 'Daily Telegraph.' The other papers 
look upon the Khedive's and Dervish's flight as caused by their 
desire to restore order at Alexandria. They say Dervish will 
put himself at the head of 12,000 men who have been massed 
there and march against Arabi, who is now alone at Cairo ( !). 



Chamberlain Presses for War 255 

I have telegraphed to Arabi : 'Praise God for victory and 
peace.' " 

This was the last point at which it seemed to me possible 
that the long game I had been playing against Colvin could be 
won and war averted. Henceforth it was a losing battle, 
though I fought it out to the end. The determining cause with 
Gladstone, in whom alone salvation lay, was, I believe, about 
this date when certaifi industrial towns of the North of Eng- 
land protested against the dilatory character of the Govern- 
ment treatment of the Egyptian case, on the ground that the 
long continuance of the crisis there was injjuring trade. This 
was used upon him as a means of coercion by Chamberlain, 
egged on by Dilke, in the Cabinet. 

"June 15. — I am anxious about the state of things at Alex- 
andria, but suppose Arabi can depend upon his men. There is 
a general stampede there and at Cairo. Malet, I am thankful 
to say, has left Cairo. Dervish still hangs on at Alexandria. 
He and the Khedive have gone to Ras-el-Tin Palace, where 
they are under the guns of the fleet. . . . Another telegram 
from Sabunji as follows: 'The Khedive's departure has aroused 
suspicion. Agitation. Activity in army preparations. Na- 
dim, Abdu and the army openly defy the Porte. Arabi is 
moderate and vigilant. A plot to murder Nadim. There is 
danger of serious disturbance on European side. Dervish de- 
clines retiring till the fleet is withdrawn. Recall Malet for 
God's sake. All curse and will murder him if he continues.' 
I went at once to Eddy Hamilton and implored him to get 
Malet ordered on board ship" (this was done) "and afterwards 
sent him (Hamilton) a letter warning the Government not to 
count on Turkish troops. We then sent an answer to Sabunji: 
'Turkish Commissioner demands troops from Constantinople. 
They are not Hkely to be sent. But prepare. Keep order at 
all costs. Another riot would be fatal. Malet leaves soon. 
Patience.' . . . Dined at Lord De la Warr's. . . . On coming 
home found the telegraph to Cairo interrupted, by the flight, 
I suppose, of the Eastern Telegraph clerks. This alarms me 
a little. 

"June 16. — ^Went to see Button, who is very hopeful. But 
I am losing my faith in Gladstone and think the EngHsh Gov- 
ernment means mischief. I gave my Gladstone correspondence 



256 European Panic at Cairo 

yesterday to Kegan Paul to put in print, so as to have it ready 
in case of the worst. . . . My telegram has gone after all. . . . 
In low spirits. Another telegram from Sabunji: 'New Com- 
missioner with unknown instructions arrived. Nation and army 
in counsel daily to devise defensive plans. They distrust the 
double Commission. Inform me of Gladstone's policy and of 
Lord Granville's. Arabi is firm. All the journals closed ex- 
cept the "Wattan" and the "Official Journal." Panic among 
foreigners. The Khedive has thanked Arabi for keeping order. 
All is quiet. Nadim has been stopped from caUing public meet- 
ings.' 

"Yesterday when I saw Eddy he told me I had better not 
return to Downing Street as my visits there were remarked on, 
but to write him any news I might receive. Now I have written 
him yet another letter to try and find out what Gladstone's policy 
really is. Eddy's answer, however, is very unsatisfactory. 
There is a sensational announcement in the 'St. James's Ga- 
zette' of British troops ordered to Egypt. Home to Crabbet 
in a very nervous state. I see that a hurried meeting of the 
Cabinet was called yesterday in Mr. Gladstone's private room. 
Can this ordering of troops have been the consequence? I can- 
not help thinking they mean to push on an intervention. The 
French, however, have apparently made their peace with Arabi." 

Not the French only, but the other European Powers, 
especially Germany and Austria, were at that moment in a mood 
to come to terms with him and to sacrifice Tewfik, for the pres- 
ervation of order's sake. The "Pall Mall Gazette" of i6th 
June says: "The German Powers are supposed to advocate an 
arrangement with Arabi on the basis of Tewfik's abdication in 
favour of his son with a regency. . . . There are many points 
in its favour, though 'the solemn obligations of England and 
France' may make it impossible for them to do otherwise than 
stand by the man who has implicitly followed their counsels — 
especially those of the English Representative — it is perfectly 
conceivable that the practical failure of Tewfik, personal as well 
as political, may have impressed the other Powers with the ex- 
pediency of by and by finding some more capable substitute." 
Compare, too, Malet's despatch of June 14: "The Agents of 
Austria and Germany have telegraphed to their Governments 
that the effect of any armed intervention, not excepting Turk- 



Waterloo Day 257 

ish, will place the lives of their countrymen in danger. They 
consider the political question as a secondary matter compared 
with the security of their fellow subjects. With this object they 
are in favour of leaving the matter entirely in the hands of the 
Porte, and they believe that the only means of avoiding the 
most serious calamities is the departure from Alexandria of the 
fleet and myself." Poor Malet at this date, I have heard, 
spoke to his friends of his professional career as ruined. All 
depended for him and Colvin on bringing on hostilities. 

"June 17. — Very troubled night. But there is no confirma- 
tion of the news about the troops in to-day's papers; and the day 
is so fine, I feel again light-hearted. The Sultan dares not in- 
terfere. That is proved. The French have made their terms 
with Arabi, and it is hinted that Germany and Austria are doing 
likewise. So England does not matter. 

"The following is our party at Crabbet: Ebrington, Lyming- 
ton. Granny Farquhar, Eddy Hamilton, Dallas (of the Foreign 
Ofllice), Nigel Kingscote (junior). Button Bourke, and Walter 
Seymour. News of despatch of troops contradicted. All 
seems going well. We have agreed to talk nothing about 
Egypt. But we cannot help it. 

'June 18. — Sunday, Waterloo day, and never did England 
look more foolish. I got a telegram at breakfast announcing 
a new Ministry under Ragheb and Arabi, evidently consented 
to by the German Powers and Turkey. We are consequently 
singing Hallelujahs." 

Here I may as well insert three more of Sabunji's letters, 
which he wrote in these last days. They throw a valuable light 
on what was passing in the Nationalist mind at Cairo: 

"Cairo, June 14, 1882. 
"I called to-day on Arabi Pasha just a few minutes after he 
received your telegram. We talked for about an hour and a 
half. I asked him why this panic in the country if he and the 
Khedive had already come to terms. He said: 'As far as I am 
concerned I believe the Khedive would be sincere in his dealing 
with me, if left alone and far from Sir E. Malet's advice. He 
has by this time become convinced that there is nobody in his 
Government who could control the country and preserve peace 
except the man whom European statesmen despise, Ahmed 



258 Arahi's Warning 

Arabi, The Khedive has now made peace with me, and in the 
presence of the Representatives of the six European Powers and 
of Dervish Pasha, has asked me to take on myself the responsi- 
bility of public safety. I have accepted his order, and pledged 
my word and sworn to defend his life and the lives of all who 
inhabit Egypt, of every creed and nation; and, as long as I 
live and my jurisdiction is not interfered with, I will keep my 
word. But, if this peace is looked upon by others as a ficti- 
tious and fraudulent peace, that is the Khedive's lookout. For 
myself, I am sincere in my dealing with all who deal honestly 
and sincerely with me; but with those who deal dishonestly I 
pay them with their own coin, and with the fraudulent I am; 
doubly fraudulent. Time and Ismail, in spite of us, have 
trained us to Turkish deceit. As we make use of the arms, 
guns and ammunition they left us, so we make use of their de- 
ceit, mhen the Turks force us to do so. We will not be the 
aggressors, but we will resist all who attempt to attack us. We 
are a sincere nation, and grateful to those who take us by the 
hand and help us to reform our country. We wish for nothing 
except reforms' (he uttered that with emphasis). 'But those 
who would cheat us will find us the very roots of fraud, sudar et 
ghish. Europe, and especially England, looks upon us as bar- 
barians. They can crush us, they say, in twenty-four hours. 
Well, if they are willing, let them try it, but they will lose their 
80 millions of public debt and the 20 millions the fellahin pri- 
vately owe to the bankers. The first shot fired will release us 
from these engagements; and the nation on this account wishes 
nothing more than war.' 

"I hear much the same language from every one. Great 
preparations are going on. Vast stores of rifles and ammuni- 
tion have been found, laid up by Ismail when he intended to 
make himself independent of the Porte. These they will make 
good use of. But I tell them I hope there will be no occasion.! 
They say they can resist for years, for God has blessed therrt 
with a crop this summer twice as great as in ordinary fertile 
years. 

"I sounded Arabi about Halim. I found him to prefer 
Halim to Tewfik, but he says that if Tewfik will only free him- 
self from Malet's influence all will go well. Malet, he says, 
has been misled by Colvin, and has done immense harm to his 



Embabeh Sheykh el Islam 259 

own country, as well as Egypt, by their misrepresentation of 
facts. 

"June 17. — Last night I went to ShereT Pasha's, where Arabi, 
Mahmud Sami, Abd-el-Aal, Ali Fehmi, Nadim, Hajrasi and 
many others were being entertained at dinner. After they had 
dined and we were smoking and talking politics, an officer came 
in with a letter from an English lady asking protection, as she 
had been advised to leave Cairo. I was begged to write her 
an answer at once to assure her there was no danger, and that 
if there should be trouble Arabi would protect her life as his 
own. Arabi has become a hero with many of the European 
ladies, whom I have heard praising him for the protection he 
has given. When he drives through the town all rush to the 
windows and balconies. I make converts to the National 
Party, all I can, among the Europeans I meet. 

"June 18. — Yesterday at noon, on Ragheb being telegraphed 
as Prime Minister, I went to see Arabi, who read me a telegram 
just received from the Khedive requesting him to co-operate 
with Ragheb as Minister of War. After coffee had been served 
he wrote a telegram of thanks to the Khedive and handed it to 
me. It was very politely worded. A few minutes afterwards 
he said : 'Let us go for a drive through the town to inspire con- 
fidence in the minds of the people.' He and Ali Fehmi drove in 
one carriage, and I and Nadim in the other. We went through 
Faggala, preceded by heralds. We alighted at Embabeh's 
house (the Sheykh el Islam's), and Arabi said, 'Come in, I will 
introduce you to our Pope.' On entering the reception room 
Arabi took off his boots, and turning to me said, 'We consider 
this place as the holy abode of our Sheykh.' Accordingly I did 
the same. On entering, the Sheykh, who was sitting on a low 
divan, rose and advanced a few paces towards Arabi, who sa- 
luted him and kissed his hands. I only shook hands with him, 
and he invited us to take seats. There were several of the 
Azhar Sheykhs with him, among them the son of Arusi. At 
first they talked about the situation and the new Ministry. 
Then the conversation turned on Embabeh's dealings with the 
Khedive during the late events. From all I saw I conclude 
that the report of a coolness having taken place between Em- 
babeh and Arabi was not true. While Embabeh was conclud- 
ing his narrative coffee w^s served, and Arabi introduced me 



iSo Nationalist Dinner 

formally to him, and explained that I was a friend of Mr. 
Blunt. Embabeh then explained to me all about the telegram. 
He had written the answer, he said, with his own hand, think- 
ing the telegram addressed to him; but he had never apologized 
to the Khedive about it. He believes Sir E. Malet heard of it 
originally through Sultan Pasha, or some of the Khedive's ad- 
herents. 

"Next Arabi showed Embabeh a proclamation he had made 
guaranteeing the lives and properties of all the inhabitants of 
Egypt, whatever their creed or nation, and Arabi begged him to 
write a similar one, showing, as Sheykh el Islam, that the Mo- 
hammedan religion, far from allowing, forbids Moslems to hurt 
Christians, Jews, or others, and commands the faithful to pro- 
tect them. Embabeh agreed to this, and, in my presence and 
that of the other four Sheykhs, prayed God to help him to suc- 
ceed in reforming the country. He also promised to help him 
in fostering peace between Mohammedans and others, inasmuch 
as all were brothers notwithstanding the diversity of creeds. 

"We then went on to Artin Bey's, where also we were enter*- 
tained with great honour, and afterwards drove through the 
Clot Bey Road, the Mouski, and other parts of the town, while 
the people stood on both sides saying, 'May God exalt you.' 

"At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited to 
dine with Seyd Hassan Akkad, and took me with him, with all 
the pashas, officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host's large 
house was crowded; Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, 
Nadim, and I were in the principal sitting-room, where we re- 
cited poetry, making or composing elegies and satires, and 
amusing ourselves at Ragheb's expense. Arabi composed a 
satire, Abdu two, Nadim made four, and Sami two. At dinner 
I sat by Arabi. The courses were about thirty different Arab 
dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes, sweetmeats and 
fruit. 

"After dinner we talked freely about politics, and about dif- 
ferent plans and forms of government. The republican form 
was preferred; and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great knowl- 
edge and Ingenuity, endeavoured to show the advantage of a 
republican government for Egypt. He said: 'From the begin- 
ning of our movement we aimed at turning Egypt into a small 
republic like Switzerland — and then Syria would have joined — ' 



Abdul Hamid Denounced 261 

and then Hejaz would have followed us. But we found some 
of the Ulema were not quite prepared for it and were behind 
our time. Nevertheless we shall endeavour to make Egypt a 
republic before we die. We all hope to see the "Saturnia 
regna" once more.' 

"June 19. — Abdu, Nadim, Sami, and I were talking the night 
before last about the peaceful means to be taken to tide over the 
Egyptian difficulty. Abdu said that he has made up his mind 
to get together all the documents he has in his possession, with 
others concerning Egyptian affairs, and go to England and de- 
pose them himself before Mr. Gladstone and the English Parla- 
ment. He would take also with him a worthy person as repre- 
sentative of the leading merchants of the land; and another 
who would represent the liberal fellahin. Mahmud Sami ap- 
proved the idea, and said he also wished he could go to Europe 
on such a mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the jour- 
ney. So Is Nadim and Seyyid Hassan Moussa el Akkad, the 
leading Arab merchant of Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, 
influence, and patriotism. 

"Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being 
Turkish nobody is pleased with him except the Circassians. 
People suspect some Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are 
very uneasy. I am trying to calm their minds and tell them to 
keep quiet. 

"The last events have increased the hatred in the Arab heart 
against the Turks, Circassians, and the Sultan himself. I heard 
Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the Sultans and all the Turkish 
generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu and down to Abdul 
Hamid. They are preparing the nation for a republican form 
of government. A large party is already formed and disposed; 
crescit eundo. They will seize upon the first occasion which 
presents itself. They expect the armed intervention of Turk- 
ish troops with pleasure in this last crisis. It would have been 
the signal for a complete independence from the Porte. But 
the cunning Turk saw the danger and abstained. Nadim told 
me yesterday, while we were coming from Shubra, that he must, 

before he dies, crush down the Sultan's throne. said: 

'This is my aim too — may God help us to succeed.' 

"I must tell you that I have been received here with such 
honour, respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. All 



262 Anger Against Malet 

the pashas, colonels, sheykhs, merchants receive me with open 
arms, and lavish upon me their kindness and hearty thanks. 
We have arranged with Nadim to give a dinner party to all the 
leaders of the National Party in your honour, and to thank you 
for the help given them in their struggle." 

"Cairo, June 22. 

"Last night I went to Mahmud Sami's house, where I met 
all our friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. 
We talked politics all night, and I communicated to them the 
contents of your letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also 
gave them a summary of the English newspapers you and Lady 
Anne had sent me. Afterwards I presented to Mahmud Sami, 
in the presence of Nadim, a petition on the part of the National 
Party, in which they ask Mr. Gladstone to send to Egypt a 
Consul who understands the affairs of their country. Sami 
approved the petition and said they will have it signed when 
Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr. Glad- 
stone through you. At the end of the soiree I was informed 
that Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to ar- 
rest Abdu, Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself. 

''June 23, — Ah soon as Ragheb Pasha was confirmed by the 
Khedive as Prime Minister, his first act and order was to call me 
to Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night the Under- 
Secretary sent his carriage to my hotel with his man, who in- 
formed me that Hassan Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and 
had sent his carriage. I went with Nadim, not trusting myself 
to go alone. When we got there we were received courteously, 
and afterwards he informed me that Ragheb Pasha had charged 
him with a message that he wished me to go and meet him at 
Alexandria at the Divan of the Administration. I replied 'very 
well,' and Nadim said he, too, would go with me. And so we 
left the house with the firm intention of having nothing to do 
with Ragheb. 

"Thus at the very time I was telegraphing to you, 'for God's 
sake save Malet or he will be murdered by fanatics,' he was 
urging the Khedive to arrest me. Often, when hot-headed 
young Egyptians were discussing Malet and Colvin's death, I 
endeavoured to convince them of their folly, and that no pos- 
sible good result could come of it to the National cause. 

"June 24. — Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted the 



Gladstone Hardens his Heart 263 

National cause on account of his not having received a place 
in Mahmud Sami's Ministry, has now been reconciled and has 
received from Arabi the post of Minister of Public Works." 

(Sabunji then describes the crisis preceding Mahmud Sami's 
resignation, Arabi's appeal to the Sultan, Dervish's mission and 
Osman Bey's mission, and how they flattered Abdul Hamid with 
professions of zeal for the Caliphate.) "As to their real con- 
victions, however, they care for Abdul Hamid as much as they 
would care for a man in the moon. They would make use of 
him as long as he can be useful to them and until they are strong 
enough to declare themselves an independent republic. This 
has been the basis of their program from the beginning. But 
they have prudently chosen to proceed by degrees. Mahmud 
Pasha Sami assured me in Nadim and Abdu's presence that be- 
fore they die they must declare themselves independent of the 
Porte, and Egypt a republic. Nadim's efi^orts are employed 
to instill this idea in the minds of the young generation. Since 
I came here I and Nadim have been together night and day. 
We sit talking and devising plans till one or two every morning. 
We mix in every society. Sheykhs, Ulemas, Notables, mer- 
chants, and officers receive us with open arms, and we talk to 
them of your endeavours and of the service which you have ren- 
dered to the National cause. They all long to see you and 
present you with their hearty thanks. Indeed, people so good 
and sincerely kind deserve every attention and help." 

I am not able to fix an exact date to the moment when Glad^ 
stone finally hardened his heart against the Egyptians and re- 
solved on military operations — he persuaded himself that it 
would not be war — but it must have been some time between the 
20th June and the end of the month. The considerations that 
seem to have decided him were, first, of course, parliamentary 
ones. His Whig followers were on the point of a revolt, and 
Chamberlain was pressing him with tales of the impatience of 
the provinces. The diplomatic defeat of the Foreign Office was 
becoming too plain to be concealed. Granville, with his little 
maxims of procrastination and using a threat as if it were a 
blow, had "dawdled it out" in Egypt till England had become 
the laughing-stock of Europe. On the Stock Exchange things 
were looking badly and trade was suffering from the long crisis. 



264 Revolt in India Feared 

What were called the "resources of civiliz/ation," that Is to say, 
lying, treachery and fraud, had been tried by the Foreign Office 
to more than their extreme limit, and one and all had proved; 
absolutely of no use against the Nationalist obstinacy. Arabi 
had been ordered by all the majesty of England to leave Egypt, 
and he had not gone. On the contrary he had gained an im- 
mense reputation throughout the Mohammedan East at Eng- 
land's expense. It seemed to many that there would be a 
Pan-Islamic revolt in India. England, as I had said on Water- 
loo day, had never looked so foolish. Serious officials were 
alarmed at this, and all the jingoism of the Empire, asleep since 
Disraeli's parliamentary defeat in 1880, was suddenly awake 
and crying for blood. Mr. Gladstone hardened his heart and 
let his conscience go, not, I think, by any deliberate decision 
saying that this or that should be done, but simply by leaving 
it to the "departments," and to the "men on the spot," that is 
to say, the Admiralty, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and Colvin 
(for Malet had been withdrawn) to work out a solution their 
own way. We had won our diplomatic game against the For- 
eign Office too thoroughly. It was to be the turn now of 
England's fighting forces. 

''June 19. — A Stock Exchange scare of Bright and Chamber- 
lain having resigned" (a scare which showed the ignorance of 
the public as to Chamberlain's position, classing him still with 
Bright). 

"June 20. — A more reasonable article in the 'Daily News.' 
Frederic Harrison strongly advises me to write Gladstone a 
public letter and have it printed. He is prepared to answer 
for its effect in the provinces. I have accordingly begun one. 

"June 21. — Finished my letter and took it to the Howar'ds 
for approval. He (George Howard) made me modify some 
sentences, so as not to compromise Gladstone personally. She 
warmly approved. Frank Lascelles was there; I then ar-* 
ranged with Button to publish it tomorrow, or Friday at latest, 
and sent it in to Gladstone. 

"June 22. — To Button early. We think they mean mischief 
after all. Harry Brand writes that if the French hold out on 
the Note the Government mean to act in Egypt, notwithstanding 
Germany. I doubt, however, if France is prepared for this. 
I shall follow up my letter (to Gladstone) with other letters, If 



My Public Letter to Gladstone 265 

necessary. I am certain that if England lands troops anywhere 
in Egypt, the Sultan will proclaim- a Jehad and that the Mussul- 
mans will rise in India. Things are in a pretty pass." 

My letter to Gladstone appeared in the "Times" on the fol- 
lowing day, 23rd June, the very day the Conference met at 
Constantinople. It created a great sensation. It stands thus: 

"Sir, "June list, 1882. 

"The gravity of the present situation in Egypt, and the 
interests of honour and advantage to the English nation which 
are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the sub- 
ject of the diplomatic steps which have led to this imbrog^lio, 
and to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new 
departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference, 
should not be lost sight of. 

"You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was 
engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but important 
negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir 
Auckland Colvin on the one hand, and the chiefs of the Na- 
tional Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I 
engaged my personal honour to the loyalty of Her Majesty's' 
agents; also that I have been in close communication with those 
chiefs since my return to England, and that I am consequently 
in a position to speak with certainty and authority as to the 
character and intentions of the popular movement in Egypt.' 
You know, moreover, that I have from time to time warned 
Her Majesty's Government of the danger they were running' 
from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have repeatedly 
urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid understanding 
with those in whose hands the guidance of the movement lay. 
Finally, you know that in the interests of right and justice, and 
in accordance with a promise made by me to the Egyptians, I 
have counselled them to the best of my ability in the recenlt 
crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that settle- 
ment of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, 
at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon 
myself a great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event 
has already justified. 

"The main points in the past which I would state are these: 

"i. In the month of December last I assisted the National 



266 Recapitulation of Events 

Party to publish a program of their views, which was just and 
liberal, and to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this 
time, and down to the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th 
of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with Eng-/ 
land or the English, Neither had they any real quarrel with 
the Khedive or the Control, trusting in these to permit the 
development of political liberty in their country in the direction 
of Parliamentary and constitutional self-government. Their 
aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a 
nation, the redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. 
They trusted then, as now, to the army, which was and is their 
servant, to secure them these rights, and to their Parliament to 
secure them these ends; and they were prepared 'to advance 
gradually, and with moderation, in the path they had traced. 

"2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta with the 
view of making England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy 
and understood by the Egyptians as the first step in a policy an- 
alogous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence 
into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of awing them. 
It precipitated their action. It caused them to Insist upon the 
resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the design 
to betray them, and to assist with the Khedive in summoning a 
Nationalist Ministry to office. This Insistence, though repre- 
sented by the English journals as the work of the army, was, in' 
fact, the work of the nation through their representatives the 
Notables. Of this I can furnish ample evidence. 

"3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the 
execution of the threat of armed intervention implied by the 
Dual Note. Nevertheless, a plan of indirect Intervention was 
persisted in. The English and French Controllers-General pro- 
tested against the Constitution granted by the Khedive on the 
6th of February, and the English and French Governments care- 
fully withheld their assent to it, signifying only that the Article, 
giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that half 
of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the 
Debt, was an Infringement of International engagements. 
Their argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Porte, 
and certain decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied 
by the Egyptians. 

"4, Acting, It must be presumed. In accordance with their 



The Circassian Plot 267 

instructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three 
months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolu- 
tion counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted! to 
them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, though 
a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to 
take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has spared 
no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his Min- 
isters. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the 
Ministers as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, count- 
ing, it would seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men 
new to office, and noting these in silence. The English press 
correspondents, hitherto held in check by the Resident, have 
been permitted full license in the dissemination of news injurious 
to the Ministry, and known to be false. I will venture to re- 
call to you some of the scares reported at this time and dissemi- 
nated through Europe — the scare of banditti in the Delta ; the 
scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt in the Soudan;' 
the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge military ex- 
penditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the 
resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of the, 
irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Canal; the scare of 
Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismail, 
of Halim, and of the Sultan. 

"For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed 
in fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever. 

"On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by* 
Arabi Pasha's request, on this subject, and pointed out to him 
the danger caused to peace in Egypt through the attitude of the 
English agents urging that a Commission should be sent to 
Cairo to examine into Egyptian grievances. 

"In the month of April advantage was taken by the English 
and French Consuls^General of the discovery of a plot to' 
assassinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to an^ 
agent of Ismail Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself 
in open opposition to his Ministers. Those implicated in the 
plot and condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks 
and Circassians, and as such of the same race and society witb 
the Khedive and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence, and 
suffered himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This 
led to the rupture which the previous diplomatic action of the 



268 My Public Letter to Gladstone 

Consuls-General had prepared. A summons was then sent by 
Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo and 
decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Depu- 
ties came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused 
to preside at any formal sitting; and advantage was again taken 
of the circumstance by the Consuls-General to encourage all who 
were in" opposition to the National Party to rally round the 
Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbance, 
sided with the Circassians, and the Consuls-General, deceived by 
appearances, ventured a coup de main. An ultimatum, dictated 
by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resigna- 
tion of the Ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the coun- 
try. The step for an instant seemed to have succeeded, for 
the Ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately ap- 
parent that the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by 
our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, 
returned next day to power. 

"I cannot understand that the action of our Consul^General 
in this matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; 
it has certainly not been justified by success. 

"6. When the Fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeav-- 
oured to convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon 
all I had witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian 
people, that the presence of English men-of-war at that moment 
in the port of Alexandria, especially if their crews should be 
allowed on any pretence to land, would be exceedingly likely to 
provoke a serious disturbance and it was my intention to go 
myself to Egypt to do what I could towards mitigating what I 
feared would be the results. 

"7. About the same time the English Government consented 
to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was 
supposed that the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt 
that obedience would be shown to whatever orders his repre- 
sentative might bring, or that, at any rate, little opposition 
would be offered. In any case, the Porte was authorized to 
act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is lament- 
able to record that the English Foreign Oflnice at that time seems| 
to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man notoriously 
unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have 
reason to know that what was expected of him was, that he 



Egypt Appeals to England 269 

should summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing 
this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the ex- 
treme resort, he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as 
a mutineer with his own hand. Whether these were really 
Dervish Pasha's instructions or intentions I will not argue. 
The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Ma- 
jesty's Government were for the strength of the National 
feeling in Egypt; and only the union and courage shown by the 
people would seem to have convinced the Sultan that methods 
such as those formerly used by Dervish against the Albanians 
would here be out of place. Humaner counsels have in any 
case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the 
Khedive and his people. 

'Such, sir, is shortly the history of England's diplomatic 
action in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the 
most deplorable our Foreign Office has to record. The future, 
however, in some measure remains to us, though, when the 
Conference assembles, England's will be only one of many 
voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest 
the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to 
express my conviction that if Her Majesty's representative then 
comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, 
and a declaration of England's sympathy with Egyptian free- 
dom, England will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just 
anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been 
played upon them by our Foreign Office, they believe that a 
more generous feeling exists in the body of the English nation, 
which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be committed 
as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood interest 
in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Canal. They have, over 
and over again, assured me, and I know that they speak, truly, 
that their only aim is peace, independence, and economy; and 
that the Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as 
for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian 
people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friends- 
ship be held out to them freely, and at once, and we shall still 
earn their gratitude. 

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant, 

"Wilfrid Scawen Blunt." 



CHAPTER XV 

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 

We now come to the bombardment of Alexandria, a quarrel 
deliberately picked by Admiral Seymour and Colvin acting in 
concert, for the removal of Malet only put the diplomatic power 
more entirely into Colvin's hands. Malet was replaced, not 
as I had hoped by Lascelles, whose independence of character 
and knowledge of Egypt might have enabled him to take a 
line of his own, but by a simple Foreign Office clerk named) 
Cartwright, who, ignorant and helpless, was a mere passive 
tool directed by the Controller, I have not much to add to 
the public records of those last three weeks at Cairo and 
Alexandria, but my diary will give an idea of what was go- 
ing on in London. My public letter to Gladstone called down 
a storm of abuse upon my head from Malet's and Colvin's 
friends, and generally from the Jingo and financial elements in 
the Press and Parliament. 

''June 24. — There is an angry letter from Henry Malet 
(Edward Malet's elder brother) in to-day's 'Times.' . . . 
Lord Lamington, too, has given notice of a question as to my 
'unofficial negotiations' in the House of Lords for Monday. 
The more talk the better. . . . A party of people (at Crabbet) 
for Sunday, Lascelles among them. 

"June 25. — Wrote an answer to Henry Malet and sent it to 
the 'Times.' A soft answer turneth away wrath." (I was 
loath to quarrel in this way with old friends, and I was re- 
solved not to hit back except on compulsion.) 

"June 26. — A long letter has come from Sabunji (that al- 
ready given in the last chapter) . They are giving a public 
dinner in my honour at Cairo. . . . Met Lords De la Warr 
and Lamington (they were brothers-in-law) at the House of 
Lords, and got the former to ask for Malet's despatch of 

27Q 



Granville Acknowledges 271 

December 26th (that which Malet had said he had cancelled). 
Lord Lamington was going to have based his speech on Henry 
Malet's letter, but I showed him what nonsense this was. All 
the same he made a very strong speech in an indignant tone: 
about me. Lord Granville looked white and uncomfortable, 
but admitted the fact of my having acted on one occasion to, 
pacify the army, a point gained. (This had been denied by 
Henry Malet.) He could not remember about the despatch 
of the 26th, but would look for it." (The reason of the 
great embarrassment of the Government on being questioned 
about my "unofficial negotiations" was that they had got into 
similar difficulties in their Irish policy by making use of Mr: 
Errington the year before as a means of communicating unoffi-' 
cially with the Pope about the attitude of the Irish clergy. )i 
"Dined with Henry Middleton at his club early, and went 
with him to a meeting of the Anti-Aggression League in Far- 
ringdon Street. Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in the chair was excel-) 
lent. He is the pleasantest speaker I have listened to. Also 
Sir Arthur Hobhouse was good. Frederic Harrison read ai 
lecture in which he stated the Egyptian case fairly." A''. B. — * 
Henry Middleton had been much in Egypt and was intimate; 
there with the Coptic community. A letter written to him du,r-i 
ing the war by the Coptic Patriarch has been published. It is! 
Interesting as showing how entirely the Copts were with Arabi 
at that time. ' 

"June 27. — Dinner at Pembroke's. All the Wilton Club 
there, some forty people. I sat next to Harry Brand and had 
a grand row with him about Egypt. After dinner healths were- 
drunk, my own among the number, and I had to make a^ 
speech. I felt myself in rather an unfriendly atmosphere 
politically, as most of those present Were Jingoes, but I was 
specially complimented for my public services by Eddy Hamil- 
ton, who proposed my health. I said in reply that some served 
thfeir country in one way and some in another, but that as long" 
as one served it and did one's duty, it did not much matter^ 
what one did." (These speeches, of course, were not serious, 
as the Wilton Club was only a convivial gathering of LorVi 
PJembroke's personal friends who came together at his house 
two or three times a year to dine and make merry.) 



272 Talk with Bright 

''June 28. — Rode to George Howard's, and showed him 
Sabunji's letter and my Gladstone correspondencje. Sabunji 
states that the National leaders are thinking of going to Eng- 
land to lay their case before Mr. Gladstone, and I have asked 
Howard to gfet me, if he can, an interview with Mr. Bright. 
Bright is more amenable, I fancy to reason than the rest, and per- 
haps it might do good to see him. There is no doubt that war 
preparations are being made, for whatever purpose it may be. I 
don't believe, all the same, that they are intended as anything 
more than strengthening Dufferin's hands at the Conference!. 
I have sent a telegram to Sabunji saying that nothing is yet 
decided about sending troops, and begging patience. 

"June 29. — Called on Bright at his house in Picadilly. He 
talked in a friendly tone, but less sympathetically than Glad- 
stone and less intelligently. The upshot, however, is very sat- 
isfactory. He assures me that no active steps have yet been 
taken for hostilities, and he does not believe they will be taken.; 
He considers the Suez Canal to be of little strategical value to 
us, preferring, with Gladstone, the Cape route for military 
communication with India. I explained to him my idea of a 
Mohammedan reformation and how little the movement in 
Egypt had in common with the Sultan's fanatical ideas. I 
think my visit may do good by strengthening the peace party" 
in the Cabinet." {N. B. — Bright scouted more strongly than 
this entry would suggest the idea of hostilities at Alexandria. 
He bade me make my mind quite easy about them. And I| 
am sure he was speaking truly according to his knowledge. 
But the poor man, whose principles were absolutely opposed 
to warfare, was kept in complete darkness as to what was go- 
ing on at the Admiralty and the War Office, and, as he himself 
afterwards told me, was persuaded that, even when the threat 
of bombardment was decided on in the Cabinet, it woulE re-; 
main like all the other threats, a hrutum fulme'n. The theory 
laid before the Cabinet by the Foreign Office was that the mass 
of the Egyptians were with the Khedive, not with Arabi, and 
that on the first shot being fired by the British fleet the populace 
of Alexandria would rise and bring Arabi, who was alone in 
his intention of resistance, a prisoner to their sovereign's feet. 
Bright, when he found how he had been cajoled into consent-i 
ing to the bombardment which had led to the burning of Alex- 



Colvin Contradicts 273 

andria and the necessity of a regular war, was very angry and 
resigned his place in the Cabinet, nor did he ever forgive Glad- 
stone for his share in the deception practised on him or the 
abandonment of their common principles.) 

"Called on Lady Gregory, who has written a paper on the 
Control of Egypt, which is amusing. Dinner at the Howards^.' 
She (Mrs. H.) is enthusiastic about my plans. 

"June 30. — Colvin contradicts flatly through the 'Times'' 
correspondent that either he or Malet have ever made use of 
my services as mediator or intermediary on any occasion. This 
puts him in my hands after Lord Granville's admission of the 
fact on Monday." (A^. B. — This denial in plain terms by 
Colvin of things it is impossible he should have forgotten 
need not be characterized by me. The matter was not made 
better by a private letter he wrote me, 6th July, in which he 
repudiated in part his responsibility for the "Times" telegram. 
I accepted his explanation at the time as genuine, but when a 
little later I asked him to repudiate the telegram publicly, he 
declined to do so, and in terms which were merely a repetition 
and aggravation of the untruth.) 

"Breakfasted with De la Warr to meet Broadley, the 'Times' 
corespondent at Tunis." {N. B. — This is the same Broadley 
whom, at Lord De la Warr's recommendation I afterwards en- 
trusted with the defence of Arabi. He had been practising as 
lawyer in the Consular Courts at Tunis, and latterly as "Times''' 
correspondent there. He was a man of great ability and had 
made himself serviceable to De la Warr in many ways, giving 
him the information about Eastern affairs which were De la 
Warr's hobby, and preparing, when in England, his speeches 
for him on such subjects in the House of Lords. At the time 
of the invasion of Tunis by the French he took a strong part' 
in the "Times" in favour of the Mohammedan rising and pub- 
lished a useful book about it afterwards called "The Last 
Punic War.") 'He says all are waiting in Tripoli and Tunis 
for the Sultan to come forward. Otherwise el Senoussi will 
read the Mohammedan revival. . . . Wrote a letter to the 
'Times' in answer to Colvin which ought to smash him. Lunch- 
eon at the Gregorys. 

"Eddy writes a friendly letter saying that Mr. Gladstone 
will not go back from his expressions of sympathy with Egyp- 



274 ^^ Brocket 

tian Independence, if what I have told him proves true. Thi^ 
must be owing to Bright." The letter here referred to is an 
important one as bearing on thesettlement afterwards made 
in Egypt, and the promise of independence and liberal institu- 
tions made at Gladstone's suggestion by Lord Dufferin in his 
celebrated despatch. But for the hold I had acquired over 
Gladstone on this point, I have no manner of doubt that after 
Tel-el-Kebir Egypt would have been annexed to the British 
Empire. The Whigs in the Cabinet all intended it. 

"July 2. — At Brocket. This, after Wilton, is the most 
charming country place I have seen. All in it is exactly as it 
was fifty and sixty years ago in the days of Caroline Lamb and 
Lord Melbourne. Lord Palmerston died here. Henry Cow- 
per, whose it is now, is to me very sympathetic. Our party 
consists of Henry Brand and his wife, the American Minister, 
Lord Houghton, Lymington, and Frederick Leveson Gower, 
Lord Granville's brother and secretary. Great wrangling 
about Egypt but all friendly enough, even Leveson. And the 
American is on my side. ... I had a little talk with Leveson 
after we had played lawn tennis. He spoke very despondingly 
of the British Empire, but thought England might last without 
revolution at home. At Brocket such talk Is melancholy. . . . 
There Is another fierce attack on me in the 'Observer.' 

"July 3. — At Brocket. I fancy If there Is to be any inter- 
vention at all it Is to be Italian — at least, if intervention is or- 
dered by the Conference. This I should greatly dislike, for at 
present the Italians seem sympathetic, but If launched on con- 
quest they would be brutal in their methods. Besides, the Ita- 
lians are not assailable at home, as we and the French are." 
(A^. B. — The Italian Government was being asked at this date 
to join us In armed Intervention In Egypt, but they wisely de-^ 
clined. It would have been very unpopular with the Liberals 
In Italy where Menotti Garibaldi was organizing a force to^ 
help Arabi.) "Drove over to Knebworth to luncheon. Lyt- 
ton has been building and making a new drive into the Park, 
certainly a great improvement; we talked about the British 
Empire, on which subject he Is as despondent as I am. He; 
thinks my policy in Egypt might have succeeded, or any policy 
but that of trusting to chance. Now he foresees a Moham-' 



Sir Wilfrid Lawson 275 

medan rebellion in India, go things how they may. ... In 
the evening to Temple Dinsley where the Brands are. 

"July 4. — To London; found a telegram saying that Arabi 
certainly would not go to Constantinople, also a letter from! 
Sabunji, which has made me uneasy. It has evidently been 
opened in the post, and the contents may have compromised the 
National leaders at Constantinople. There are telegrams, too, 
in the papers about a renewed quarrel as to the fortifications 
at Alexandria ; and Lady Gregory, who came to James Street, 
has heard from Sir Erskine May that Beauchamp Seymour 
has orders to bombard Alexandria to-morrow." (Sir Erskine 
May, was I believe, the Chief Permanent Official of the 
Admiralty. The earliest correspondence referring to a bom- 
bardment in the Blue Books occurs on 26th June, when the' 
Admiralty telegraphs to Sir Beauchamp Seymour: "If Egyp- 
tian troops are making preparations to attack, communicate 
with French Admiral and bring ships into position." This 
telegram shows the wolf and the lamb argument that was being 
used to excuse our own intended attack. We know from Pal-^ 
mer's journal, to which reference will be made later, that Sey- 
mour had resolved to bombard at least as early as 4th July. 
Among the determining causes with Gladstone and the Cabi- 
net at this time was, I believe, the bogus report of a massacre 
atBenha, a wholly fabulous incident which was largely made' 
use of to infuriate English opinion against Arabi.) "She [Lady 
Gregory] has also heard that Colvin has resigned and his res- 
ignation been accepted." I don't know whether there was 
any foundation for this report, but it is too late already for his 
recall to have made any difference in the result. It was prob- 
ably altogether a false report. 

"'July 5. — I am very uneasy in my mind now about these 
threats of bombardment. At twelve I went to the House 
of Commons and heard Dilke announce that the fleet had orders 
'under certain circumstances to act in a certain way.' Had 
luncheon with Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who is a really charming 
man, and read him Sabunji's letter describing his dinners and 
conversations with the National Chiefs. He and others with 
him will do what they can. But there is nothing now to do. 
My letters to Gladstone are printed, but I dare not publish 



276 "Avoid Meddling with the Fleet" 

them until I see what line the Porte takes. . . . Dined at 
Lady Rosamund Christie's. Knowles was there and says that 
the bombardment is to begin to-morrow morning. Fawcett 
takes my side. My fear is lest the Nationalists should stake 
all on an artillery duel with the fleet, in which they cannot help 
being beaten, and so be discouraged. They ought, I think, to 
abandon Alexandria, and make an entrenched camp out of 
reach of the guns of the fleet. But I dare not advise."' 
(About this time Button informed me that the Admiralty plan 
was to effect a landing during the bombardment with the 
idea of cutting off Arabi's retreat. This news, if I remember 
rightly, influenced my telegram next day and my letter of the 
seventh.) 

"July 6. — Admiral Seymour has sent in an ultimatum, and 
I have telegraphed to Sabunji as follows : 'Avoid medd;ling 
with the fleet. Send Abdu with a message to Gladstone. Pa- 
tience.' I am not sure whether I am doing right, but pru- 
dence is certainly on the right side. Besides, Arabi will judge 
independently of my opinion, and he has never yet been wrong. 
I have sent copies of my correspondence with Downing Street to 
Cardinal Manning and Knowles (and also to Lord Dufferin). 
After luncheon went to see Hill, the editor of the 'Daily 
News.' He is now all on our side, it being too late to do. any 
good. ,He promises, however, to write what he can. ... In 
the evening a telegram from Sabunji saying that all is quiet,: 
so I suppose the difficulty is staved off. ... I wrote to-day, 
to Eddy proposing to show him Sabunji's letters (those already 
given). It is a desperate remedy, but the circumstances are 
desperate. 

"July 7. — Went to see Stanley of Alderley and urged him 
to see Musurus, so as to prevent any split between Arabi and 
the Sultan. I told him pretty nearly the facts of the case, but 
made him understand this was not a moment for Mohamme- 
dans to dispute, and that the Turks and Egyptians could settle 
their domestic differences later. He seems quite to agree with 
me. . . . Then wrote a letter to Sabunji recommending them' 
not to quarrel with the fleet, but to make an entrenched camp 
out of reach of the guns. I still think that no English expedi- 
tion will be landed in Egypt, but that they will have to fight 
the Turks or possibly the Italians. . . . The papers announce 



Lascelles on the Situation 277 

a pacific settlement of the difference between Arabi and the 
fleet, which is satisfactory so far. 

''July 8. — At Crabbet. The second post has brought a let- 
ter from Eddy Hamilton which seems to imply that Gladstone is 
still open to conviction. This is more than I expected" — ^(andi 
more, too, than the letter implied. What Hamilton wrote 
was, "I hope it goes without saying that it has been the desire of 
the Government all along to get at the truth, but that, appar- 
ently, has not been so easy.") "I have accordingly been prepar- 
ing a precis of Sabunji's letters. In the Evening Lascelles and 
others arrived. 

"July 9. — Sunday. I have consulted Lascelles about sending 
Sabunji's letters to Gladstone, but he thinks It Is too late. 
Hartlngton has told him that they Intend occupying Egypt and 
probably annexing it, on the principle j'y suis, j'y reste. Cham- 
berlain has said: 'We have got the Grand Old Man Into a 
corner now, and he must fight.' I shall, therefore, wait events. 
The 'Observer' announces a new threat or Ultimatum. This 
time I shall leave Providence to decide." (What I record here 
as having been told me by Lascelles is of historical importance. 
He was In a position to know what was going on more than 
any of my friends. As a former Charge d'affaires in Egypt 
he was consulted at the Foreign Oflfice, and as Lord Harting- 
ton's first cousin he had his confidences about what was going 
on In the Whig section of the Cabinet.) 

"July 10. — A new Ultimatum is announced, this time In terms 
which Arabi cannot accept. They want him to surrender the 
forts. The French, however, refuse to take any part In this 
act of piracy. M. P., who knows naval people, assures me 
that Beauchamp Seymour is in a terrible fright; that the 'In- 
vincible' Is the only ship with really sound armour plates, and 
that the fleet is In a most critical position." (There was some 
truth, I believe, in this. The ships, as they were moored In the 
harbour, lay directly under the fire of the forts at short range. 
If the Nationalists had been as unscrupulous as our people were, 
they might have taken the ships at a disadvantage and perhaps 
sunk them. But Arabi was not the man for a coup of this kind, 
and he was, besides, a stickler for the common Mohammedan 
rule of not firing the first shot In war. The quarrel, too, was 
none of his seeking, and all he was bent on was to avoid all 



278 Harrison's Letter to Gladstone 

excuse for a collision. He consequently allowed Seymour to 
move his ships away and choose his own distance.) "Arabi 
may then be in the right in accepting the duel. At any rate, 
it is forced on him in such a way that he cannot refuse'. 
Strangely enough, I am in high spirits. My idea is that this 
bombardment and bloodshed, however it terminates, will pro- 
duce a revulsion in public feeling here and stop further pro- 
ceedings. Nobody really wants war or annexation, except the 
financiers. And these would soon go to the wall if the public 
spoke. The Powers, too, will probably be angry at this act of 
violence in the middle of the Conference. For England the 
outlook seems very bad. It will probably lead to a war with 
France and the loss of India. . . . To London and saw Lady 
Gregory, who wants me to send a copy of my Gladstone letters 
to Gibson, as Gibson is the coming man of the Conservanves, 
and the Conservatives will soon be in power. Gladstone was 
beaten on Friday on an important vote. . . . Harrison has 
written Gladstone a scathing letter, telling him his action in 
Egypt will ruin his moral character forever in history. This 
is certain, and I will take care it does so. . . . Lunched with 
George Currie, who, as a bondholder, is now pleased at the 
firmness of the Government. They were afraid, he says, at 
one time that Gladstone would have thrown them over. 

"To the House of Commons, where I saw Lawson. He asked 
me what could be done. I said, 'Nothing.' Dilke made a 
statement confirming the Ultimatum. ... Lord De la Warr 
called at six to ask whether I would not telegraph to advise 
an arrangement. But I told him I could not do this any longer, 
for the Egyptians could not give up their forts honourably. 
Home to Crabbet. 

"July II. — At Crabbet. I settled this morning in my mind 
that if the weather was fine things would go well in Egypt — 
and behold it is raining! ... I shall stay here now till all 
is over, except on Thursday, when I have been asked to Marl- 
borough House, to have the honour of meeting Her Majesty. 
. . . We shall know all in a few hours. ... It rained heavily 
till 2, then cleared. I remained indoors in a nervous state, un- 
able to do anything. ... At half-past four David brought 
a 'Globe,' with news showing that the bombardment began at 
7 and was still going on at half-past 11. At 5, Anne came from 



Alexandria in Flames 279 

London with the 'Pall Mall' and 'St. James's,' showing it was 
not all over at 1.40. It is evident that the Egyptians fought 
like men, so I fear nothing. They may be driven out of the 
forts and out of Alexandria. But Egypt will not be conquered. 
The French fleet has gone to Port Said, and it is impossible 
there should not be an European war. I have sent my Glad- 
stone correspondence to the Prince of Wales. 

"July 12. — The forts are silenced, but the Egyptians show 
no sign of yielding, and the newspapers announce another bom- 
bardment for to-day. This is a monstrous thing. The Sul- 
tan, I am glad to see, stands firm; and a religious war is in- 
evitable, succeeding, as Arabi said it would the political one. 
The prophecy about Gladstone will thus come true. His con- 
science must be a curious study just now, the conscience of a 
Eugene Aram, and I believe him capable of any treachery and 
any crime. I can do no more, and shall stay here. Went 
fishing in the forest, a bright warm day, with a slight threaten- 
ing of thunder about noon. The evening papers talk of a flag 
of truce and a heavy swell which has prevented the ships from 
firing. 

"July 13. — Saw Button, who tells me an occupation is in- 
evitable. Old Edward Blount was in the train. He tells me 
the French are in no condition to fight. Their navy is so ill- 
found he doubts their having the ammunition. He thinks there 
will be a revolution in a few months. . . . Found Sir Wil- 
frid Lawson at home in Grosvenor Crescent and had much dis- 
course with him, but he agrees it is hopeless doing anything 
with the Government. . . . Had luncheon with the Howards. 
She is staunch, he doubtful. . . . Coming back by under- 
ground railway I read the news of Alexandria being in flames, 
of the evacuation of the town, and of a new massacre by roughs. 
This is nothing but what must have been. I am glad of one 
thing only, and that is the army has got safe out of that mouse- 
trap. I have had it on my mind ever since Arabi went to Alex- 
andria that he would be caught there in some way by his en- 
emies. Now he seems to have done just what I recommended, 
retired to a fortified position out of reach of the g-uns of the 
fleet. People, or rather the newspapers, are very angry be- 
cause he retired under flag of truce, but I am not military man 
enough to see where the treachery was, especially as Admiral 



2 8o At Marlborough House 

Seymour had announced that he would understand a white flag 
to mean the evacuation of the forts." (This charge of having 
violated the white flag was made a special count against Arabi 
at his trial, and absurdly insisted upon by Gladstone, because 
he, Gladstone, had committed himself to a statement that to 
retire while under the white flag was a violation of the laws of 
war. This was persisted in after other graver charges were 
abandoned, until it was discovered that in Lord Wolseley's 
"Soldier's Pocket Book," a text book in our army, it is distinctly 
laid down that the contrary is the rule.) 

"I was in two minds about going to Marlborough House, 
but decided it would be best to show loyalty. So went. Every- 
body cordial enough except old Houghton, who all but cut me. 
The Malets were there — poor old people — ^but I did not ven- 
ture speaking to them. Robert Bourke came to me in great 
glee at the mess the Government found themselves in. Such 
are the amenities of party political life. Everybody else nearly 
was there that I had ever seen. The Prince of Wales shook 
hands with me, but he said nothing. Her Majesty was looking 
beaming — I suppose elated at her bombardment. Gladstone is 
said to have announced in the House that he would not send 
an army to Egypt. He declares he is not at war with anybody. 
However Button, with whom I dined, assures me troops are 
going and that they mean annexation. Dined with him and 
Lord Bective. 

"July 14. — Breakfasted with De la Warr. I showed him 
Arabi's letter to Gladstone, and he advised me not to send it, 
but offered to propose to the Prince of Wales to speak to me 
about it. I think this will be a good plan. I dare not let the 
Government have such a document in their hands until it is 
settled what form intervention is to take." 

The letter here referred to is one that Arabi dictated to 
Sabunji at Alexandria and sent to me, desiring me to communi- 
cate it to Gladstone as from him. It was not signed or sealed 
by him, and was sent by Sabunji in English, not in Arabic; for 
which reason Arabi afterwards, when charged with having writ- 
ten it, among other charges made against him at the time of 
his arrest, denied having written at all to Mr. Gladstone. I 
was consequently taunted by my enemies with having forged 
the letter, though I had stated that it was "dictated" in my 



Arahi''s Letter to Gladstone 281 

enclosing letter of two days later. The letter as sent to Mr. 
Gladstone was as follows: 

"Alexandria, July 2, 1882. 
"Sir, 

"Our Prophet in his Koran has commanded us not to seek 
war nor to begin it. He has commanded us also, if war be 
waged against us, to resist and, under penalty of being our- 
selves as unbelievers, to follow those who have assailed us with 
every weapon and without pity. Hence, England may rest 
assured that the first gun she fires on Egypt will absolve the 
Egyptians from all treaties, contracts, and conventions; that 
the Control and debt will cease; that the property of Europeans 
will be confiscated; that the Canals will be destroyed; the com- 
munications cut; and that use will be made of the religious zeal 
of Mohammedans to preach a holy war in Syria, in Arabia, and 
in India. Egypt is held by Mohammedans as the key of Mecca 
and Medina, and all are bound by their religious law to defend 
these holy places and the ways leading to them. Sermons on 
this subject have already been preached in the Mosque of Dam- 
ascus, and an agreement has been come to with the religious 
leaders of every land throughout the Mohammedan world. I 
repeat it again and again, that the first blow struck at Egypt 
by England or her allies will cause blood to flow through the 
breadth of Asia and of Africa, the responsibility of which will 
be on the head of England. 

"The English Government has allowed itself to be deceived 
by its agents, who have cost the country its prestige in Egypt. 
England will be still worse advised if she attempts to regain 
what she has lost by the brute force of guns and bayonets. 

"On the other hand there are more humane and friendly 
means to this end. Egypt is ready still — nay, desirous to come 
to terms with England, to be fast friends with her, to protect 
her interests and keep her road to India, to be her ally; but 
she must keep within the limits of her jurisdiction. If, how- 
ever, she prefers to remain deceived and to boast and threaten 
us with fleets and her Indian troops, it is hers to make the 
choice. Only let her not underrate the patriotism of the Egyp- 
tian people. Her representatives have not informed her of 
the change which has been wrought among us since the days of 



282 Burning of Alexandria 

Ismail's tyranny. Nations, in our age, make sudden and 
gigantic strides in the path of progress. 

"England, in fine, may rest assured that we are determined 
to fight, to die martyrs for our country, as has been enjoined on 
us by our Prophet, or else to conquer and so live independently 
and happy. Happiness in either case is promised to us, and a 
people imbued with this belief, their courage knows no bounds. 

"Ahmed Arabi." 

"Went to see Gregory. He is frightened at Alexandria's be- 
ing burnt, and will have it that Arabi did not order it. I say 
he ordered it, and was right to do so. This is the policy of 
the Russians at Moscow, and squares with all I know of their 
intentions. I cannot think it will do any harm in the long run, 
and it will get more completely rid of the Greeks and Italians. 
Of course, he was not responsible for the massacre, which is 
doubtless exaggerated. To fire the town, cut off the water sup- 
ply and take up a strategical position on the railway Is what any 
determined general would have done." (And so I say still. 
The burning of Alexandria gave Arabi just the time to entrench 
himself at Kafr Dawar. If he had carried out the other part 
of his program and blown up and blocked the Suez Canal, 
he might have made a good and long fight of it, and even pos- 
sibly have won the campaign. I will return to this, however, 
when I come to treat of the war.) 

''July 15. — Button writes that the Prince of Wales wants a 
copy of Arabi's letter, and I have sent word to say I shall be 
happy to read it to His Royal Highness. I will not let it out 
of my hand as yet. . . . Sir Donald Currie came to see the 
horses. He is sensible about Egypt, as many people are Indi- 
vidually. But the newspapers are raising a universal howl. I 
am depressed in mind, thinking of the future. Egypt can 
hardly not be ruined, and it is little consolation to think that 
the Europeans there and the bondholders will be ruined too. 
Still, there Is a God in heaven for those who trust Him. 

''July 16. — It seems as if the Turks had at last consented to 
send troops. Button gave me the conditions yesterday. They 
are to come and go and catch Arabi, all In a month'. The 
thing is absurd. If they go, they will go to stay. They will 



Bright Resigns 283 

also make terms with Arabi, and all England will have gained 
will be that the Sultan will declare war. All things considered, 
this is the best solution I could have expected. Otherwise it 
must have been annexation. . . . Wrote letter enclosing 
Arabi's letter for Gladstone. 

''July 17. — Went to London and saw Button. I have agreed 
to send the letter to Gladstone and to the Prince of Wales,, and 
have accordingly done so. . . . I wish Gladstone to be warned 
of all the consequences of his action in Egypt, as on Saturday 
he stated that the destruction of Alexandria was a result which 
it was impossible to foresee, of bombarding it! Now, if Cairo 
is destroyed, he will be without excuse. Bright has resigned. 
At least he is an honest man. He made his statement to-night 
saying he considers the bombardment a breach of international 
law and the moral law." '^ i(I have some reason to believe that 
Gladstone had shared Bright's delusion that the Alexandrian 
forts could be bombarded without serious consequences of blood- 
shed, conflagration, and war. The difference between the two 
men was this: that Bright, when he saw he had betrayed his 
principles by consenting to it 'went out and wept bitterly' ; Glad- 
stone stifled his remorse and profited as largely as he could 
by the popularity which war always brings to the Ministry that 

1 1 met Bright more than once in later years, and his language was strong to 
me as to the way he had been misled into complicity with the bombardment of 
Alexandria. I find the following in my journal of 1885: 

"June 9. — To the Howards. She (Mrs. Howard) dined last night with Hart- 
ington and Granville and Bright. . . . Bright told her that he was at the Cabi- 
net which decided on the bombardment of Alexandria, but Lord Granville had 
assured him it would not really take place, and it had long ago been settled 
that he was to leave the Cabinet on the first shot fired in any war. It had been 
a cause of grief and tears to him to watch the slaughter which had since oc- 
curred, but he had not had the heart to stand up and denounce his former friendsi 
He had, however, written to Mr Gladstone after the war to say that if he 
allowed Arabi to be tried by the Egyptian Government it would be a lasting 
infamy." 

"March 16. — At night to dine with the Howards. It was a very interesting 
dinner, John Bright, John Morley, Frederick Leveson, and Mr. Wright, etc. . . . 
At first we were all rather stiff. . . . However, Wright broke it up by asking 
Bright a propos of boots, who it was that caused the bombardment of Alexandria. 
Whereupon Bright broke in denouncing the war strongly and the injustice of 
keeping Arabi a prisoner in Ceylon. He also explained that Beauchamp Seymour 
had telegraphed to ask permission to bombard some time before but had been re- 
fused. At last it was Chamberlain who had insisted on his being allowed to do 
it. . . . Hartington, Bright said, had not urged it." 



284 End of My Diary 

makes it.) ". . . Home late and in low spirits. I have done 
what I could to avert this war, and war is now the only solu- 
tion." 

Here, unfortunately, my diary of 1882 ends. ^ 

^ The allusions to an expected Mohammedan rising in India, here and else- 
where quoted from my diary, seem now, in the light of 4'vents, somewhat ex- 
aggerated. They were, however, justified by the ideas prevalent at the time; 
and the dread of a general conflagration in the East is perhaps the best excuse 
that can be made for our Government's action in pressing on in July an imr 
mediate violent solution of its difficulty in Egypt. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE CAMPAIGN OF TEL-EL-KEBIR 

It now remains for me to give an account of the chief in- 
cidents of the brief campaign in which for two months native 
Egypt stood up in arms against her English enemy. No true 
description of it will be found in the works of any English 
writer, and still less are the French versions of the story true. 
The reign of terror, which under the protection of the Engi- 
lish garrison for a year or more followed the re-establishment 
of the Khedive and the Turco-Circassian regime at Cairo, ef- 
fectually stopped the mouths of native Egyptians as to what 
had happened there during the Khedive's absence, and though a 
momentary light was shed on the facts by the publicity of 
Arabi's trial, no organ of the vernacular press was found bold 
enough to allude to them otherwise than according to the official 
version; while later, when under French protection the organs 
of native opinion had gained courage, time had been given for 
certain legends to grow up which still to a large extent influence 
the educated Egyptian mind. 

The first point to make clear, for it is denaturalized in the 
Blue Books and has been ignored by all English writers, is the 
essentially National character of the defence offered by native 
Egypt to the English invasion. The official version, of course, 
is that it was the army alone that offered resistance to Seymour^s 
impossible demands at the time of the bombardment, and after- 
wards to Wolseley's land invasion. This was merely a con- 
tinuance of the diplomatic fiction which had been built up at 
the Foreign Office to excuse its determination to intervene in 
financial interests, and may be read in its most grotesque form 
of untruth in Lord Dufferin's opening speech to the European 
Conference at Constantinople. According to the English Am- 
bassador, Egypt — and this was before the bombardment — was 

28s 



286 Dufferin's Speech at the Conference 

in a state of anarchy, where neither life nor property was se- 
cure and where massacres were taking place, through the action 
of the army headed by Arabi and other mutinous colonels, 
which was making it impossible to carry on the government or 
secure order and financial stability. How gross an exaggera- 
tion this statement of the political case was, and how it had 
beer^ gradually put together on a basis of lies and inventions, 
I have already sufficiently shown. What needs still to be ex- 
plained is the precise share of responsibility for the acceptance 
of Seymour's challenge to the artillery duel at Alexandria, which 
commenced the war, assignable to Arabi, on whom the whole 
of it has been unjustly laid. ^ 

That Arabi had been, from the date of the publication of 
the Joint Note of 6th January, a chief advocate of self-reliance 
and preparedness for war is undoubted, but at the same time 
he had always been for conciliation, if possible, rather than war. 
Resistance had always been his political platform, but on it he 
by no means stood alone, and the arrival of the fleets at Alex- 
andria in May had immensely strengthened his position with' 
all sections of civilian opinion. With the example of Tunis 

1 "It is no exaggeration," Lord Dufferin asserted, "to say that during the last 
few months absolute anarchy has reigned in Egypt. We have seen a military 
faction, without even alleging those pretences to legality with which such per- 
sons are wont to cloak their designs, proceed from violence to violence, until in- 
subordination has given place to mutiny, mutiny to revolt, and revolt to a usurpa- 
tion of the supreme power. As a consequence the Administration of the country 
has been thrown into confusion; the ordinary operations of the merchant have 
come to a standstill; the fellahin, no longer finding purchasers for their produce, 
are unable to pay the land-tax, and the revenues of Egypt are failing. This 
state of things has placed in extreme jeopardy those commercial interests in 
which the subjects of all the Powers are so deeply concerned. Not only so, but 
those special engagements into which the Governments of France and England 
had entered with Egypt have been repudiated; the officers appointed to carry 
them into effect have been excluded from the control they were authorized to exer- 
cise, and the system which had begun to work so greatly to the advantage of the 
industrious cultivators of Egypt has been broken up and overthrown. 

"But these effects form only a portion of the deplorable situation which has 
excited the anxiety of Europe. It is not merely the public creditor who has 
suffered extensive damage. The life and property of every individual European 
in the country have become insecure. Of this insecurity we have had a most 
melancholy and convincing proof in the brutal massacre by an insolent mob of a 
number of unoffending persons at Alexandria, and in the sudden flight from 
Cairo and the interior (a flight which implies loss to all and ruin to many) of 
thousands of our respective citizens. 

"It is evident that such a condition of affairs requires a prompt and energetic 
remedy." 



Council of War of July lo 287 

before Mohammedan eyes it was indeed impossible not to see 
what was being prepared for Egypt by the European Powers, 
the creation of a fictitious condition of anarchy and rebellion 
which should justify intervention for the protection of the 
life and property of Europeans, the seizure by persuasion or 
constraint of the person of the ruler on the plea that he needed 
protection from his rebellious subjects, and the forced accep- 
tance by him of a military protectorate. This had been effected 
by the French army in Tunis. It was to be repeated now ex- 
actly on the same lines by the English in Egypt. Egtyptian 
patriotism, therefore, was not difficult to persuade that at last, 
with the dire alternative before them, it was a less ignoble fate 
to yield after a defeat than at once, at the first summons. 

Arabi's voice was an important element in the decision ar-^ 
rived at on the loth of July to reject the admiral's demands', 
but it had no need of his insistence and still less of being im,- 
posed by menace. All the members of the general Council con- 
vened to consider the answer declared themselves equally of 
opinion that it was beyond the legal power of the Khedive to 
yield any portion of Egyptian territory to the demand of a for- 
eign commander without striking a blow or at least without 
direct orders to that effect having been received from the Sultan. 
Nor was the Khedive himself of any other opinion. It included 
many representative men besides the members of the Govern- 
ment — and the spectacle was witnessed of all alike pressing the 
view that the forts must be defended, and of the Khedive taking 
a specially prominent part in the patriotic talk and being sup- 
ported in it by Sultan's representative. Dervish Pasha. No 
Moslem present, not even Sultan Pasha, who had definitely 
thrown in his lot with the English, dared make the public dec- 
laration that another answer than refusal was possible to Sey- 
mour's demands. 

Arabi, as the result of their unanimous decision, received 
from the Khedive precise orders as Minister of War and Ma- 
rine to prepare the forts for action and to reply with their artil- 
lery as soon as the English fleet should have opened fire, while 
urgent instructions the same evening, of the loth, were sent to 
the Under-Secretary of War at Cairo to proclaim throughout 
the provinces that war had been resolved on, and to hasten the 
calling in of the reserves and the formation of new battalions 



288 The Khedive's Tactics 

of recruits. It may be said that the Khedive was insincere in 
the warlike attitude he adopted at the Council. Of course he 
was insincere. No public action of his life showed Tewfik 
otherwise than a double dealer. In all probability both he and 
Sultan Pasha, who had spoken in the same sense, had agreed to 
make this show of patriotism so as to cover themselves with 
public opinion in case it should so happen that the forts should 
prove stronger than the fleets, nor must it be forgotten that the 
Sultan's envoys were present at the Council, and the avowed 
policy of the English Government at the moment was still to get 
the Sultan to intervene. Tewfik, therefore, as usual was play- 
ing for the double chance, and was resolved clearly on one thing 
only, to side with the strongest party. 

There is a curious despatch in the Blue Books which shows 
what he said to his English advisers. As early as the 6th of 
July he was made acquainted with Seymour's intention to bom- 
bard, and had apparently been urged to place himself for safety 
on board one of the English ships. But this did not suit his 
personal fears or the waiting game he was resolved on, and he 
sent to Colvin to acquaint him with what his plan was in regard 
to his safety during the firing. He could not do otherwise — 
so we read — than remain in Egypt. He could not desert those 
who had stood by him faithfully in the crisis, or abandon Egypit 
when attacked by a foreign Poller, merely, as it would be said, 
to secure his personal safety. He would, therefore, retire to a 
palace on the Mahmoudieh Canal with Dervish Pasha. And 
he remarked that the more rapidly the whole affair was con- 
ducted, the less would be the danger to himself personally. 
And this was the program he adhered to, except that he 
finally decided on retiring, not to the Mahmoudieh Palace, but 
to his country palace at Ramleh, eight miles farther from Alex- 
andria, as a still safer place from the chance firing of Seymour's 
guns. 

Shortly after the war I had a curious confirmation of Tew- 
fik's indecision from no less authoritative a source than Lord 
Charles Beresford, who had commanded the Condor at the bom- 
bardment and had acted as Provost-Marshal in Alexandria 
after it, and who told me that in a moment of unusual frank- 
ness the Khedive had one day explained to him the reason of 
his remaining ashore during the fight, as being nothing else 



Beresford's Evidence 289 

than his extreme perplexity as to which of the combatants 
would prove the better fighter. The general belief in Egypt 
had been that the English ships would be sunk, and he had been 
in a state of panic doubt all day at Ramleh, running every half 
hour to the roof of the palace to see how it fared with thehi> 
It was only when he discovered in the evening that they re- 
mained intact, while the forts had been silenced, that he finally 
made up his mind to place himself under Seymour's protection. 
Beresford's experience of the weeks he had then spent at Alex- 
andria, I may explain, had given him a profound contempt 
of Tewfik, and a certain sympathy with Arabi and the fellahin 
who had carried on the war in spite of their prince's defection. 

Be this, however, as it may, the conduct of the Khedive at 
the Council and the fact that he had given his name to the orders 
issued for a war a oiitrance imposed a perfectly legal aspect on 
the subsequent National defence, and invalidated, according to 
all Mohammedan rule and practice, the Khedive's counter or- 
ders when he had passed over to the enemy's side. This must 
be remembered if we are rightly to understand the Nationalists' 
legal case, and the view taken of the position by plain patriotic 
minds when their prince's perfidy gradually became known. 
The Mohammedan view about war is a simple one. When 
blows have been struck and war publicly announced by the Chief 
of the State, it is his duty and the duty of all his people to con- 
tinue it until some definite victory has been achieved or reverse 
sustained. A prince made captive during the war by the enemy 
is by the fact incapacitated from giving any further valid orders, 
and a fortiori a prince who has turned traitor; and it was in 
this light that Tewfik was considered by his subjects until 
brought back by the force of English arms as their restored, but 
unloved lord to Cairo. Nothing of this aspect of the case will, 
of course, be found in any Enghsh narrative, but, in place of it, 
absurd laudations of a prince to be admired as "loyal" for the 
sole illogical reason that he showed himself loyal to England 
and served her through the war as her unashamed accomplice. 
But I will return to these matters later. 

A second point which it is necessary should be insisted on is 
the proper apportionment of responsibility for the maintenance 
of law and order throughout Egypt, and for the strategical 
conduct of the war, between Arabi and the other Nationalist 



290 At Cairo 

leaders who worked with him during those eventful two months. 
The facts as I have been able to ascertain them are these!. 
With regard to the government of the country, as soon as it 
was clearly demonstrated at Cairo that the Khedive could be no 
longer looked upon as Chief of the State, exercising freely his 
right of issuing orders, a General Council was assembled to con- 
sider the position of affairs and decide what should be done. 
In this the lead was taken by the religious and other civilian 
dignitaries, rather than by the military element. Arabi was not 
himself present at the general meeting, being absent with the 
army at Kafr Dawar, nor did he once during the war pay any 
visit to Cairo or intervene personally in the management of 
affairs there. The Council, however, was very fully attended, 
there being present, besides the great religious sheykhs, the 
Turkish Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, the Sheykh el Islam, 
and the heads of the four orthodox sects. All the most repre- 
sentative Moslems of the country were there, including four 
princes of the Viceregal House who had openly espoused the 
National cause, many of the provincial Governors who had been 
expressly summoned to Cairo for the occasion, and the chief 
country Notables, and also, representating the non-Mussulman 
population, the Patriarch of the Copts and the Chief Rabbi. 
The Council was, therefore, fully entitled to any claim of valid- 
ity in its decisions which universality can give, for it comprised 
all sections of political opinion and class divergency. Many of 
the chief men were of Circassian origin, but endowed with suf- 
ficient patriotism as Moslems to see that, now it had come to 
fighting against a European invader, no honest choice was left 
but to defend Egypt against him irrespective of party feuds. 

It was, accordingly, resolved by the Council, without a dis- 
sentient voice, that the Khedive was no longer in a position 
legally to command, and that his decrees, while he remained in 
English hands, were from that very fact invalid. Tewfik's first 
announcement of his new attitude had been to dismiss Arabi 
from his post of Minister of War. The Council resolved that 
Arabi should be maintained in it, and instructed him as such 
to continue the defence of the country. A permanent Council, 
or rather it should perhaps be called "Committee of Defence," 
was named to assist him in his work, and this under the able 
presidency of Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under-Secretary for War, 



Order Kept During the War 291 

continued throughout the campaign to organize the details of 
recruitment, provisioning and the supply of military material. 
Similarly, with regard to the civil administration of the country 
it was resolved that in the absence of Ragheb and the othei* 
Ministers at Alexandria — for these had been detained more or 
less under compulsion by the Khedive and his English guard — < 
the business of government should be carried on by the separate 
departments without any change in the ordinary routine, nor 
did this lead to the smallest confusion, seeing that the Ragheb 
Ministry had never been a working one. Indeed, the Admin- 
istration gained considerable in efficiency, and it may safely be 
said that no Egyptian Government was ever better managed in 
its details than was the National one during the campaign. 
The Ministry of the Interior fell to the charge of the Under- 
Secretary, Ibrahim Bey Fawsi, and the police, in its most 
important section, to Ismail Eff. Jawdat, both very able admin- 
istrators, who, in spite of the excitement of the time, succeeded 
in maintaining perfect order throughout the country. Two or 
three Circassian Mudirs, who had sought to ingratiate them-- 
selves with Tewfik by imitating Omar Lutfi and inciting to 
disturbance, were by them arrested and detained in prison to 
the end of the war, and after this no further rioting occurr'ed. 
Such Europeans as remained at Cairo were carefully protected, 
and all who wished to leave were forwarded under police escort 
to Port Said. 

Nothing could have been more untrue than Lord Dufferin's 
repeated assertions at the Conference at Constantinople that 
massacres of Christians were occurring daily in Egypt. And 
so, too, with the other departments. There was no interrup- 
tion in the regular gathering in of the taxes, or in the regular 
distribution of civil expenditure. At the end of the war the 
Treasury showed a perfectly clean balance, without the smallest 
deficit, when its coffers were delivered over to the Khedive's 
officers after Tel-el-Keblr. No smallest sum had been extracted 
and the books were in their usual order. The ordinary course 
of justice had been regularly maintained, and there was no 
visible sign of the country having passed through any unusual 
crisis. Four months' provision for the army remained in the 
magazines of the War Office when Wolseley took possession of 
them. 



292 Arahi's Conduct of the War 

As to Arabi, his position continued to be essentially a politi- 
cal one, and it was as Minister of War that he worked with 
the supreme direction of the forces and as popular leader till 
Wolseley's advance on Tel-el-Kebir hurried him suddenly from 
the scene. His great prestige with the country sheykhs and 
the fellahin of the Delta made it easy for him to inspire these 
with enthusiasm for the war, and at his pleading supplies flowed 
in gratuitously from all sides, and also volunteers for the army. 
In this respect he proved himself of great service to the national 
defence, and he was probably well advised in making no at- 
tempt from first to last to take any personal part in handling 
troops in the field. His abstention on this head has been attri- 
buted by his detractors to physical cowardice, and it is difl[icult 
to avoid the conclusion that there was some truth in this. Arabi 
was too pure and unadulterated a fellah to have any of the 
strong fighting instincts which are found in some races but are 
conspicuously absent in his own. His courage was of another 
kind than that which prompts to daring action in war, and in 
spite of his soldier's training he had never been present at any 
actual battle. He was probably conscious of his deficiency on 
this head as he certainly was of his complete lack of all the 
higher scientific knowledge which modern warfare requires. 
He was absolutely without military education of a modern 
type, or experience beyond that of the common barrack-yard 
routine, and he would, I imagine, have been quite unable to 
manoeuvre a division had he been called upon to do so even on 
parade. The true explanation, however, of his personal in- 
action, I think, is that Arabi, being for the moment practically 
Head of the State, was not expected to lead the army in persoin. 
This does not, however, excuse him altogether in my eyes, nor 
has it excused him in those of his fellow countrymen who rightly 
blame him for not having personally crossed swords with the 
enemy, at least in the last days of the campaign. 

With regard to the actual military operations I do not pro- 
fess to have full knowledge, but nevertheless will venture a 
short account of them as I have been able to obtain them from 
Egyptian, and not English, sources. My admirable correspon- 
dent, Sabunji, had unfortunately left Egypt with the other fugi- 
tives just before the bombardment, and I remained without 
knowledge of what was passing in the country till the end of 



The Artillery Duel 293 

the war. Nor do the documents of the trial throw much light 
on this. What I have been able to learn has been gathered 
piecemeal in after years from those who took part in them, and 
accounts of this kind are never very accurate as to dates or figures. 
The only European present with the army was that excellent 
Swiss patriot and friend to Egyptian freedom, John Ninet, who 
was in a position to know much of what went on, as he spent 
the first month of the war with Arabi at Kafr Dawar, helping 
him with his foreign correspondence; and with Ninet I have had 
many talks. But his enthusiastic character injures him as a 
quiet safe historical witness, and the book he published in 1884 
is so carelessly written and so controversial in its style that it 
is impossible for one to have full confidence in regard to the 
details he records. Moreover, Ninet had ceased to be at head- 
quarters before the real campaign began, having remained on at 
Kafr Dawar when these were transferred to Tel-el-Kebir. 
Such knowledge as I have of the war I will nevertheless briefly 
give. 

On the day of the bombardment the Egyptian artillerymen 
fought well, and for a far greater number of hours than either 
Sir Beauchamp Seymour or any of his officers had thought pos- 
sible. They were, however, at a terrible disadvantage through 
the antiquated character of the forts they were called upon to 
defend. These dated from the reign of Mohammed Ali and 
were faced as the fashion had then been with stone, a most 
dangerous material for their defenders when exposed to modern 
shell fire, as the stone work splinters and so increases th'e 
explosive effect of the hostile missiles. The defect had not been 
foreseen even by so able an engineer as was Mahmud Fehmi, 
and the loss among the defenders was great. The total Egyp- 
tian garrison of Alexandria is given in the Blue Books as from 
8,500 to 9,500 men, and this figure corresponds fairly well 
with native accounts, while a thousand has been named as the 
number of the killed and wounded. If the figures are anything 
near correctness the proportion is a very large one. The hon- 
our of the garrison was in any case amply saved, and was the 
beginning of a reaction of opinion against the war in England 
which in the following weeks became more and more pronounced. 
Arabi's part in the defence was as on subsequent occasions not a 
prominent one. He remained during the day at the Ministry 



294 The Khedive Deserts 

of Marine which is not far from Ras-el-Tin and so within the 
range of the enemy's fire, but he made no personal inspection 
of the defences until the bombardment was over, and contented 
himself with being at hand to receive the news of the fight and 
give the necessary orders. In the evening he went to Ramleh 
to announce the result to the Khedive, where Tewfik, to hide 
his satisfaction, made a fool's quarrel with him because he had 
not brought with him a detailed report of the day's fight in 
writing. 

It is difficult to understand that Arabi should not have seen 
which way the Khedive's mind was already set. In all prob- 
ability he did so, and the danger there was of treachery, for in 
the morning he sent a strong guard nominally for the Khedive's 
protection, but really to keep him under surveillance, with a 
message informing him that as Seymour threatened a renewal 
of the bombardment he should have to withdraw the garrison, 
and inviting him to retire with them beyond range of the Eng- 
lish guns and so to Cairo. Arabi without doubt ought to have 
gone himself a second time to see that the invitation was not 
on any pretext evaded and have carried Tewfik, if necessary, 
by force as a prisoner away with him, for the example of the 
Bey of Tunis was before him, and he had sufficient experience 
of the Khedive's craft to make it impossible to trust anything 
to his honour. Arabi's negligence in this matter was a fatal 
error. Arabi was, however, apparently too occupied that morn- 
ing in arranging the miHtary evacuation to give the time neces- 
sary for another visit to Ramleh, and in the course of the 
afternoon, by dint, according to Tewfik's account to his English 
friends, of bakshish and a liberal distribution of orders, he 
managed to slip away from his guards to Alexandria in the 
train sent to convey him to Cairo, and there placed himself, 
without any more disguise, under Seymour's protection. He 
carried away with him, too, as all were in the same train, both 
Dervish and his Ministers, and so secured them as in some 
measure partners of his treachery. Once at Ras-el-Tin with 
a guard of seventy English bluejackets the whole party were 
practically prisoners. Dervish, five days later, having a swift 
steam yacht of his own, and having received peremptory orders 
from Constantinople, put an end to the disgrace for himself of 
the situation, and managed to evade the EngHsh fleet which tried 



Lines of Kafr Dawar 295 

to stop him. But Ragheb and his fellow Ministers, hopelessly 
compromised, ended by accepting the situation and remained 
on at Ras-el-Tin as Tewfik's servants till such time as having 
served their purpose as a simulacre of legal government, they 
had to make room for a stronger and more decidedly English 
administration. Arabi, in the meanwhile, ignorant how he had 
been befooled, was wholly engrossed in the business of with- 
drawing the troops from their position of danger, and taking up 
a new and better line of defence at Kafr Dawar. 

The choice of this very strong post upon the Cairo railway, 
lying as it does flanked by the shallow lake of Mariut and a 
series of marshes, was due, I believe, to Mahmud Fehmi's en- 
gineering skill, and Arabi could not have done better than he 
did by adopting it as the site of his new camp. It layl well 
beyond the reach of Seymour's guns, and could not be ap- 
proached by a hostile army, except along the narrow causeway 
of the railway line, and so was practically impregnable from the 
side of Alexandria, while on the land side all the Delta lay 
open to the troops, with its inexhaustible supplies and free com- 
munication with Cairo. Here the Egyptian army was able to 
hold its own against the English successfully for nearly five 
weeks, repulsing all attacks, and even harassing the enemy with 
counter attacks almost to the gates of Alexandria. Had there 
been no other gate of entry into Egypt than Kafr Dawar the 
National game would have been won. 

With regard to the burning of Alexandria I have never been 
able to make up my mind exactly what part, if any, the Egyp- 
tian army took In it. Arabi has always persistently denied 
having ordered it, and an act of such great energy stands so 
completely at variance with the rest of his all too supine conduct 
of the war that I think it may be fairly dismissed as improbable. 
At the same time it is equally clear that he could not but regard 
it as a fortunate circumstance, for without it it is very doubtful 
whether he could have made good his retreat to Kafr Dawar;. 
His army was a beaten army, and though not exactly demoral- 
ized might easily have become so, had even a very small force 
been landed from the fleet to hold the railway line and bar 
their retreat. It certainly was In the English plan to entrap the 
army if possible, and only the unexpected valour of thje defence, 
and perhaps the ruse of the white flag seems to have prevented 



296 Plunder of Alexandr^ia 

some attempt at a landing with this purpose from being made 
by Seymour. As it was, the burning of Alexandria made it 
possible for Arabi to establish himself quietly at Kafr Dawar 
and gain those few days' breathing time needed by his army to 
recover completely its morale, 

Ninet, who was present at the whole affair, attributes the 
conflagration primarily to Seymour's shells, and this is probably 
a correct account, for without it it would be difficult to account 
for the panic which on the 12th of July, made the whole popula- 
tion of Alexandria abandon their homes and fly from the city. 
Had the artillery attack been restricted, as was pretended, to 
the forts this hardly would have been the case, and it is qMitd 
certain that it was not so restricted. Whether by intention or by 
mistake the city received its share of the shell fire, and N'inet 
speaks as an eyewitness in regard to its destructive effect. At 
the same time it is equally certain that the conflagration was in- 
creased, and especially in the European quarter, with purpose 
and intention, and that this was the work to some extent of the 
rearguard of the army, which left Alexandria in a state of 
disorder and shared in the plunder, already begun by the Bed- 
ouins of the city. Nor is it less certain that Suliman Pasha 
Sami, who commanded the rearguard, was called to account in 
no way by Arabi for what his men had done. I do not consider 
the question of any great importance as affecting the mor'al 
aspect of the case, it being clearly a military measure which any 
commander would be justified in adopting, thus to cover his re- 
treat and make useless, as far as in him lay, the enemy's base of 
operations on shore. Historically, however, it is of importance, 
and I therefore say that on a balance of evidence I am of 
opinion that the retreating army had its share in it, not in con- 
sequence of any order, but as an act of disorder. As there was 
a strong wind blowing at the time, the conflagration soon spread, 
and by midnight the whole city was in a blaze. The fact, how- 
ever, in no way lessens the prime responsibility of our Govern- 
ment for the destruction, every detail of which, but for the 
gross miscalculation of our agents, might have been easily fore- 
seen and ought certainly to have been provided for. 

Once established at Kafr Dawar, which was occupied on the 
13th, the Egpytian army was in clover and could wait events. 
Arabi established his headquarters at Genjis Osman, one station 



Khedive Dismisses Arahi 297 

farther on in the direction of Cairo, and Mahmud Fehmi laid 
out the lines of defence, and all worked heartily and confidence 
was restored. The mass of the Alexandrian fugitives were 
gradually despatched by train to the interior, where for awhile 
they gave great trouble, being in a state of fanatical anger and 
despair, and ready to revenge their troubles on any European 
or native Christian who might cross their path. At Tantah 
especially, where the Circassian Mudir, Ibrahim Adhem, was an 
adherent of the Khedive, and who knew that disturbances be- 
tween Mohammedans and Christians had been looked on 
favourably by the Court, something which was almost a mas- 
sacre occurred, and but for the timely intervention of the great 
local magnate and friend of Arabi's, Ahmed Bey Minshawi, 
who put it down in spite of the Governor with a band of his 
fellah adherents, the disorder might have spread to other places. 
But the Mudir was summarily arrested and sent a prisoner to 
Cairo, as were two other Mudirs equally untrustworthy, and 
the trouble ended, nor was internal peace again disturbed dur- 
ing the whole of the war. 

On the evening of the 14th, a first communication reached 
Arabi from the Khedive, the text of which is given by Nti.net, 
but which will not be found in the Blue Books. It is a valuajble 
document, dictated evidently by Colvin or some other of Tew- 
fik's English advisers, as it is based in every phrase on the 
English official view of the situation. It begins by stating the 
cause of the quarrel, that the bombardment was the simple con- 
sequence of a refusal to comply with the English admiral's de- 
mand for the dismantling of the forts, and that he, the admiral, 
had no intention of imposing a state of war on Egypt, that he 
now wished to renew friendly relations with the country, and 
was ready to hand back the city to any Egyptian army which 
should be disciplined and obedient, and in default of such to 
Ottoman troops. In order to make the necessary arrange- 
ments for their transfer, the Khedive invites his Minister of 
War to return at once to Ras-el-Tin, there to confer with Rag- 
heb Pasha and the rest of his colleagues, and in the meanwhile 
to suspend all warlike preparations, now become useless. We 
know from the Blue Books that this friendly invitation to Arabi 
was merely a trap to lure him back into English reach, and so 
secure his person, for on the 15th Cartwright telegraphs to 



298 Trap Laid for Arah'i 

Granville, "The Khedive has summoned him [Arabi] here. If 
he comes he will be arrested, if not, declared an outlaw." The 
incident shows how entirely Tewfik had already made himself 
the unresisting mouthpiece of English policy, and how entirely 
the English Government had adopted as its own the treacherous 
methods of the Ottoman Government in dealing with "rebels.'* 
Arabi's answer was to remind the Khedive that it was His 
Highness himself and Dervish Pasha who had urged that the 
admiral's demands should be rejected and that his menaces, if 
followed by acts, should be answered with war; that as a matter 
of fact a state of war existed, and that until the British fleet 
should have left Alexandria it was impossible that the army 
could return to the city. The refusal was followed a few days 
later by the receipt, at Kafr Dawar, of a number of printed 
proclamations bearing the Khedive's signature, in which it was 
announced to the various Mudirs, Notables, and others whom 
it might concern, that Arabi, having refused to obey the Khe- 
dive's order to go to Alexandria and confer with him, he was 
deprived of his functions as Minister of War. It was the 
publication of these three documents at Cairo, whither Arabi 
forwarded them, that led to the summoning of the Great Na- 
tional Council already described, with the result we have seen. 

The month that followed was one full of hope and enthusiasm 
for the Egyptians. Relieved by his strange defection to the 
enemy from all doubt as to their allegiance to the Khedive, the 
citizens and country Notables were able to display their patri- 
otism without disguise, and the whole country was aware that it 
was a war now In which, as Moslems, they were concerned no 
less than a war for liberty. With the mass of the fellahin so 
deeply In debt, it was understood besides as a war against their 
Greek creditors, and there Is no doubt that this was the chief 
motive power that sent volunteers to the standard, and that 
unloosed the purse strings of the Notables. A very few days 
proved that in establishing the army at Kafr Dawar a wise 
choice had been made, for the English, under General Alison 
who had landed with several thousand men, though often attack- 
ing It, were always repulsed, and It was fondly hoped that the 
resistance might thus be Indefinitely prolonged. 

At Genjis Osman, Arabi, now the chief personage in the 
state, though still holding rank only as War Minister, held dally 



Princess Nazli on Arahi 299 

a kind of court, to which the provincial magnates, the Cairo 
Ulema, and the great merchants thronged. A huge tent, for- 
merly belonging to the Viceroy Said, received them, Said's 
widow having presented it to her husband's once A, D. C. as a 
national offering, while Nazli Hanum and others of the princely 
ladies showed also their enthusiasm by gifts to the hero of the 
day.^ It cannot be denied that Arabi's head was somewhat 
turned by these flatteries, and that they were the occasion of 
military jealousies which proved detrimental to the cause when 
soon after the pinch came. If Arabi should succeed in repelling 
the English attack to the point of their having to come to terms 
with him, it was felt that he would remain master of Egypt; 
and officers far better educated than himself, and with a better 
knowledge of the art of war, and who knew Arabi for what he 
was — a very poor soldier — felt aggrieved at the thought of his 
future fortunes and his present pre-eminence. Arabi himself 
was doubtless quite unaware of this, and in his dreamy way 
followed where fortune led him, and with an ever-growing 
superstitious belief in his high destiny and his providential mis- 
sion as saviour of his people. His religious tastes led him to 
surround himself especially with holy men, and much of the time 
which he should have given to the secular duty of organizing 
the defence was wasted with them in chaunts and recitations. 
This seems to have been continued by him to the very end. 
What his ultimate military plan was it is difficult to determine. 
According to Ninet his calculation was that if he could prolong 
the resistance for a few months, Europe would be obliged to 
come to, terms with him. The Conference was sitting at Con- 

1 The following is from my journal of 1887: "January 31, Cairo. — 'Called 
on Princess Nazli. She is at least as clever as she is pretty Her conversation 
would be brilliant in any society in the world. She told us a great deal that 
interested us about Arabi, for whom she had, and I am glad to see still has, 
a great culte, talking of his singleness of mind and lamenting his overthrow. 
'He was not good enough a soldier,' she said, 'and has too good a heart. These 
were his faults. If he had been a violent man like my grandfather, Mehemet Ali, 
he would have taken Tewfik and all of us to the citadel and cut our heads off 
— and he would have been now happily reigning, or if he could have got the 
Khedive to go on honestly with him he would have made a great king of him. 
Arabi was the first Egyptian Minister who made the Europeans obey him. In 
his time at least the Mohammedans held up their heads, and the Greeks and 
Italians did not dare transgress the law. I have told Tewfik this more than 
once. Now there is nobody to keep order. The Egyptians alone are kept under 
by the police, and the Europeans do as they like.' " 



300 Lesseps and Arahi 

stantinople, and the Sultan was being urged on all sides to iriter- 
vene, and the worst that could happen was that Ottoman troops 
would be landed, who were as likely as not to fraternize with 
his own. He knew himself to be regarded throughout the 
Mohammedan world as the champion of Islam, for the pilgrims 
just returning from Mecca had brought the news, and it would 
be difficult for the Sultan to take real part with England against 
him. He had, too, a remnant of his trust in Gladstone, and of 
the traditional belief in Englishmen's sympathy with liberty, 
which he believed might still prevail if only the truth could be 
brought home to them by the spectacle of Egyptian patriotism 
— dreams, of course, and most delusive ones, but shared in by 
many others, and not altogether inexcusable, considering the 
events of the past six months. 

Nevertheless, on the i6th August, Wolseley, with the first 
instalments of the British land expedition, disembarked at Alex- 
andria, and, as it was not to be supposed that he would confine 
himself to the thankless task of bombarding the impregnable 
lines of Kafr Dawar, it became urgent with the military com- 
mittee sitting at Cairo to decide on providing new lines of 
defence on the far more easily assailable side of the Suez Canal. 
An Eastern army under Ali Fehmi was consequently got to- 
gether at Cairo, which occupied the Canal in force; and the 
Knes of Tel-el-Kebir, which, in spite of the warning I had sent 
through Sheykh Mohammed Abdu in April, had never been 
more than traced, began to be dug in earnest. It became also 
a question of imminent importance to block the Suez Canal 
towards its northern extremity, lest British ships should be 
beforehand with the defence and should land at Isma'ilia. The 
opinion was unanimous among the military chiefs that this was 
a strategic necessity, and that at any cost of quarrel with the 
French Canal authorites it should be done. Arabi, however — 
and this was his second great mistake — could not make up his 
mind to the act. His hesitation was due to French influence. 
M. de Lesseps had arrived at Alexandria towards the end of 
July and, having learned something of the English design of 
using the Canal for an attack on Egypt, became alarmed for 
its safety, and he had gone on to Port Said and set himself to 
work to prevent, as far as in him lay, this design by appealing 
to Arabi's sense of honour. De Lesseps was a man of great 



Arahi is Misled by Lesseps 301 

self-confidence, and believed himself able, by the mere fact of 
his presence, to intimidate our Government, and represented 
that the Canal was neutral ground and excluded from the opera- 
tions of belligerents. After the war, when I was carrying on 
the defence of Arabi, I wrote to M. de Lesseps to obtain f'rom 
him what evidence he might be able to give in the prisoner'^ 
favour as a humanitarian and friend of progress, and he placedi 
in my possession copies of the letters he had received from' 
Arabi in relation to this matter, though not of those he had 
himself written.^ From this it is clear how Arabi was misled. 

After some preliminary correspondence, we find Arabi on the 
4th of August giving his decision plainly. Several English men- 
of-war, under the command of Admiral Hewett, were in the 
Canal between Ismailia and Suez, and Lesseps had written to 
complain that they were giving orders and issuing proclamations 
to the inhabitants on shore. Their right to do this Arabi 
repudiates, saying, that it is by direction of the Council that he 
sends him the answer, and adds, apparently in reply to some 
further appeal made to him personally by Lesseps, to respect 
the Canal's neutrality: "As I scrupulously respect the neutrality' 
of the Canal, especially in consideration of its being so remark- 
able a work, and one in connection with which your Excellency's 
name will live in history, I have the honour to inform you that 
the Egyptian Government will not violate that neutrality, ex- 
cept at the last extremity, and only in the case of the Eng'lish' 
having committed some act of hostility at Ismailia, Port Sai'd, 
or some other point of the Canal." Here the principle is 
clearly and well laid down, but the weak point of it is to be. 
perceived in its leaving to the enemy to commit the first act of 
hostility instead of forestalling and preventing him. 

Nevertheless we have Ninet's assurance, which has been con- 
firmed to me from other quarters, that every preparation was 
made secretly for the blocking of the Canal at a certain pointi 
between Ismailia and Port Said, and that it was only due to 
Arabi's extreme personal unwillingness to sign the final order 
that, in opposition to the opinion of all his colleagues in the 
Council, the hour of grace was allowed to slip by. Lesseps, on 
the arrival of the British fleet at port Said conveying Wolseley 
and the army, had sent Arabi a last bombastical telegram, which 

^ See Appendix, 



302 Wolseley Occupies IsmaUia 

Ninet quotes as follows: "Ne faites aucune tentative pour inter- 
cepter mon Canal. Je suis la. Ne craignez rien de ce cote. 
II ne se debarquera pas un seul soldat anglais sans etre accjom- 
pagne d'un soldat frangais. Je reponds de tout." This oc- 
casioned a final council of war at Kafr Dawar on the 20th at 
which all but Arabi were resolved to disregard Lesseps' mes- 
sage. Arabi, however, suffered himself to be deceived still by 
the boast about the French troops, and argued against it, and 
though orders were given that evening for the "temporary" 
destruction of the Canal, the delay caused by the discussion had 
already been fatal, and Wolseley had steamed through the 
Canal before they had been executed. Arabi's weakness in this 
matter is a most serious blot on his strategic fame, and stamps 
him also with political inefficiency. Wolseley alluding, long 
after, to it in a speech made by him in connection with thef 
proposed Channel Tunnel between England and France, said. 
"If Arabi had blocked the Canal, as he intended to do, we 
should be still at the present moment on the high seas blockad- 
ing Egypt. Twenty-four hours delay saved us." 

The date of Wolseley's occupation of Ismailia was the 21st 
of August, and from this point the defence of Egypt entered 
into a new and practically hopeless phase, though the campaign 
was not so wholly a walk over for the English as has been pre- 
tended. The British army was over 30,000 strong, and though 
probably of no great fighting value had it been opposed to 
European troops, was sufficient to deal with the scanty fjorces 
at Arabi's command. The whole strength at Kafr Dawar had 
never been more than 8,000 regulars, with 80 Krupp guns, nor 
in all Egypt could it be counted at more than 13,000 disciplined 
men, while the new levies got together within a month were un- 
fit as yet for any service except that of manual labour at the 
trenches. Wolseley, therefore, had a comparatively easy job 
before him when once he found himself ashore with no obstacle' 
between him and Cairo, except the unfinished lines of Tel-el- 
Kebir. The English intelligence department had, however, to 
make assurance doubly sure, already taken secret measures for 
success of a kind which is always employed in modern warfare 
but never avowed, and which it is right that I should here put 
on record, having by a curious accident the details of the most 
important of them in my possession. That Wolseley's advance 



Bribing the Bedouins 3^3 

was helped by bribery has always been indignantly denied by 
Enghsh writers, but it is time the truth should be authoritatively 
told. 

The attack on Egypt from the side of the Suez Canal -had 
been resolved on by our War Office and Admiralty early in 
the year, and it was determined about the middle of June to 
prepare the way betimes by a large operation of bribery, espe- 
cially among the Eastern Bedouins. The credit of the particu- 
lar modus operandi belongs personally to Lord Northbrook, 
who, as I heard at the time of its first supposed sucoess from 
Gregory, took a special pride in it, and the more so because 
it was based upon a hint I had originally thrown out, with no 
thought when I did so that it might be ever seriously acted, upon 
or used against any who were to be my friends. It will be re- 
membered that in the spring of 1881 I had travelled through 
the desert east of the Canal, and had interested myself in cer- 
tain unfortunate Sheykhs of the Teyyaha and Terrabin tribes 
held in captivity at Jerusalem, and that in order to persuade our 
Embassy at Constantinople to solicit their release I had repre- 
sented that it might one day be found of importance to havie 
these Bedouins friendly to England. Lord Northbrook had 
heard of this, and, now that I was in such disfavour with the 
Government, thought it would be amusing to "hoist me with my' 
own petard," and by using my name in addition to more solid; 
inducements to get the help of these Arabs against Arabi. 

At that time hardly any Englishman could speak a word of 
Arabic, and it was difficult to discover an emissary capable and 
willing to undertake the job. Northbrook consequently called 
into his counsels the then professor of Oriental languages at 
Cambridge, Edward Palmer, a distinguished Arabic scholar, 
who also had some personal acquaintance with the district in- 
tended to be operated in, as he had been connected at one time 
with the Palestine Exploration Society. Palmer was then living 
in London, an impecunious man, making a poor living by jour- 
nalism, and weighted in his struggle for life by a recent mar- 
riage. When, therefore, on the 24th of June he received an 
invitation, through Captain Gill, R. E., of the Intelligence De- 
partment, to breakfast the next morning with Lord Northbrook 
at the Admiralty, and was met there with an offer from Lord 
Northbrook that he should undertake the task, represented to' 



304 History of the Palmer Mission 

him as an honourable and patriotic one, of ascertaining the 
bribable character of the Bedouins east of the Canal, and se- 
curing their services for the British Army, and with it the further 
offer of £500 down for preliminary expenses, and promises of 
large pecuniary reward in case of success, poor Palmer did not 
hesitate and agreed to start at once. Just before his departure, 
however, on the 26th, he called on me, representing himself to 
be on his way to Alexandria, where he had been appointed corre- 
spondent of the "Standard" newspaper, and asking introductions 
to my Nationalist friends there for whom he felt, he said, a 
strong sympathy and would favour in his writings. This, of 
course, was a cover to his real business, as to which he was 
silent, and inclined me to granting his request, and, though I did 
not trust his countenance, which was far from sincere, I gave 
him introductions to Sabunji and one or two others, though not, 
I think, to Arabi. 

Palmer's true programme traced out for him at the Admiralty 
was to go first to Alexandria, where he was to discuss his plans 
with Admiral Seymour, and then without delay to proceed to 
Jaffa where he should assume an Eastern disguise and visit 
the desert south and west of Gaza, and put himself into com- 
munication with precisely those Teyyaha and Terrabin tribes 
whose interests I had espoused eighteen months before. His 
journals, portions of which have been published, are on this 
point very instructive. In them the details of his arrangement 
with Lord Northbrook are constantly alluded to. He describes' 
going on board Admiral Seymour's yacht at Alexandria, where 
he was told to proceed at once to the desert and begin work, 
the Admiral giving him "a revolver, a rifle, and plenty of cart-* 
ridges," and where he finds it "expected there will be war at 
once, and perhaps it may begin tomorrow." "I am glad," he) 
says, "there is really to be fighting, because, though I shall be' 
a long way off, I shall be able to get a great deal of good out of 
it and do something towards winning it for our side. . . . The 
Admiral said to me he "congratulated the country on finding so 
able a man to undertake such a difl^icult task." Palmer also 
sees "Sir Sidney Auckland {^sic~\ the political agent"; and we 
learn later in the journal that the Admiral told him Alexandria 
was to be bombarded soon. Then he goes, much elated, in the 
Admiral's steam launch, on board the steamer for Jaffa, with 



Palmer Proceeds to Gaza Desert 305 

the British flag flying, and "two sailors to carry the gun anid' 
revolver." 

At Jaffa he lodges with the British Consul, the Jew Shapira, 
who sends his son down to Gaza to help his preparations for the 
desert journey and find an Arab to go with him, and he buy's 
himself Arab dress and other things he may require. He 
laments the heat and the difficulty of his mission, but consoles 
himself with dreams of rich rewards and possible honours. On 
the 15th, just before leaving for the desert, he hears secretly 
of the bombardment, and decides to go through to Suez where 
he writes for a ship's boat to take him off at a safe place. 

On the 1 6th he sees a number of the Terrabin tribe: "They 
were very curious to know who I was and what I wanted. My 
man said I was a Syrian officer on the way to Egypt. Of course 
I am dressed in full costume like a Mohammedan Arab of the 
towns. I found out more about them than they did about me. 
I now know where to find and get at every Sheykh in the desert, 
and I have already got the Teyyaha, the most warlike and 
strongest of them all, ready to do anything for me. When I 
come back I shall be able to raise 40,000 men. It was vlery 
lucky that I knew such an influential tribe. ... I get on capi- 
tally with my mission, and am longing to get instructions from 
Suez and know if our troops have landed. I did not expect 
to find out as much as I have done this first trip. I think our 
fortune will be made." On the i8th "I had an exciting time, 
having met the great Sheykh of the Arabs hereabouts. I, 
however, quite got him to accept my views." 

And again, 19th July, "It is wonderful how I get on with 
them. I have got hold of some of the very men Arabi Pasha 
has been trying in vain to get over to his side, and when they 
are wanted I can have every Bedawi at my call from Suez to 
Gaza. ... Of course I know nothing of what has been done 
in Egypt since I left, except that Alexandria was bombarded 
as the Admiral told me it would be soon. But I hear from the 
Arabs that the Egyptian mihtary party are still in arms, so I 
suppose our troops must have landed by now." On the 20th 
"The Sheykh, who is the brother of Suliman, is the one who 
engages all the Arabs not to attack the caravan of pilgrims 
which goes to Mecca every year from Egypt, so that he is the 
very man I wanted. He has sworn by the most solemn Arab 



3o6 Palmer's Plan of Bribery 

oath that, if I want him to, he will guarantee the safety^ of 
the Canal even against Arabi Pasha, and he says that if I can 
get three Sheykhs out of prison, which I hope to do through 
Constantinople and our Ambassador, all the Arabs will rise 
and join me like one man." 

On the 2 1 St, I am anxious to get to Suez, because I have 
done all I wanted by way of preliminaries, and as soon as I 
can get precise instructions I can settle with the Arabs in a fort- 
night or three weeks and get the whole thing over. As it is, 
the Bedouins will keep quite quiet and will not join Arabi, but 
will wait for me to give them the word what they are to do. 
They look upon Abdallah Effendi, which is what they call me, 
as a very grand personage indeed!" On the 22nd, "I hear 
from a Bedouin, who has just come on from Egypt, that Arabi 
Pasha has got 2,000 horsemen from the Nile Bedouins and 
brought them to the Canal. But when they get to Suez they 
will soon go back, for my men know them, and if fair means 
won't do I shall send 10,000 of the Teyyaha and Terrabin 
fighting men to drive them back. I have got the man who 
supplies the pilgrims with camels on my side, too, and as I 
have promised my big Sheykh £500 for himself, he will do any- 
thing for me. I am very glad that the war has actually come 
to a crisis because now I shall really have to do my big task, 
and / am certain of success. I shall know almost directly 
what I am to get. Lord Northbrook told me I was to have 
the £500 for this first trip, and that as soon as I began nego- 
tiations with the Arabs they would enter on a fresh arrange- 
ment with me. I shall save at least £280 out of this, which is 
not a bad month's work! . . . I don't think they can give me 
less than £2,000 or £3,000 for the whole job. . . ." And again 
on the 26th, "I find it is possible to get to the ships near Suez, 
and I start to-morrow, and hope to be on board in four or 
five days. I have been so successful that I shall write for 
more money, saying I have been obliged to spend all mine on 
presents — a few hundred pounds is a great deal to us and 
nothing to the Government, who would, I know, have given 
thousands for what I have already done — of course I shall 
make the most of the difficulties and they have been really 
great. I will send you a hundred or so as soon as I get the 
chance from Suez. ... I have had to give away a great deal. 



He Arrives at Suez 307 

but have still nearly £300 left after paying my journey to Suez ! 
That is better than newspaper work, £300 in a month 1" "I 
have had a great ceremony to-day, eating bread and salt with 
the Sheykhs in token of protecting each other to the death !" 
On the 28th, "I have got the great Sheykh of the Haiwath 
Arabs with me now, and get on capitally with him. In fact I 
have been most wonderfully successful throughout. I have 
been sitting out in the moonlight repeating Arabic poetry to 
the old man till I have quite won his heart." 

At last Palmer reaches Suez, August i. "I am safe on 
board the P. and O. boat," he writes, "and have got your let- 
ter. I got here by going to a part of the coast above Suez, 
and got on board at midnight. It cost me a lot of money, 
nearly £10, but I escaped the Egyptian sentries. The troops 
are coming on Thursday, and this is Tuesday 1 ... I have just 
seen the Admiral. He is delighted v/ith the result of my work 
and has telegraphed to Lord Northbrook. He had three boat 
crews watching the coast for me, but I got here by myself." 
August 2, "I am off again to the desert for a short trip in 
about two days. I have been asked to go to the coast and cut 
the telegraph wires and burn the poles on the desert line so as 
to cut off Arabi's communications with Turkey! Captain Gill 
arrived at Port Said yesterday and will be here this morning. 
Yesterday I had a most interesting day. I called on the cap- 
tains of all the men-of-war and met with a most pleasant recep- 
tion. They all insisted upon my drinking iced champagne with 
them, and in the evening the Admiral gave a dinner party on 
board the flagship in my honour. It was a beautiful dinner 
and I did not get back to my ship until one this morning." 
August 4, "On Monday I was ordered to accompany the com- 
manding officer and take Suez. We landed with three guns and 
500 men. The Egyptian soldiers ran away, so we had no 
fighting to do. I was in the first boat which landed. We then 
made the Governor give us up the town and £50,000 which he 
had, and we took possession. The day before yesterday Lord 
Northbrook telegraphed to the Admiral to congratulate me on 
my safe arrival, and informing me that I was appointed 'Inter- 
preter in Chief to Her Majesty's Forces in Egypt,' and placed 
on the Admiral's Staff. I am here [Suez] in great state at 
the hotel at Government expense, and have all my meals with 



3o8 A Dream of Gold and Glory 

the Admiral. I am going up to IsmaTlia the day after to-mor- 
row on a gunboat, and the Admiral here said, 'Don't let the 
other Admiral keep you — you are on the books of the "Eurya- 
lus," his flagship.' I have got a staff of about forty men work- 
ing under me. The Admiral told me the other night that I 
was sure of the Egyptian medal and the 'Star of India.' They 
won't let me go to the desert, for the present at least, as they 
want me here. ... I am one of the Chief Officers of the Ex- 
pedition and an awful swell. The 72nd regiment are coming 
to-morrow and I have got to see about camels for them. . . . 
The pay is to be what I suggest, but I haven't settled it yet." 
And then suddenly the splendid climax, "Captain Gill has just 
come, and placed twenty thousand pounds at my disposal for 
the Arabs." 

The rest is a mere dream of gold and glory. August 6, 
"Suez ... I start to-morrow for a few days in the desert to 
buy camels. Captain Gill and the Admiral's Flag Lieutenant 
go with me, and we shall be all safe and jolly. My position 
seems like a dream. The Admiral said as I preferred leaving 
the Government to settle my pay, that in the meantime I might 
draw to any amount for private expenses — so I will send you 
another £500 as soon as I come back. I could do it now, but 
do not want to look hard up. I have got £260 left, after pay- 
ing all expenses of my journey, etc., in hard money in my des- 
patch box, and to-day twenty thousand pounds in gold were 
brought by ship and paid into my account here! I have carte 
blanche to do everything. I give passes to the sentries. If I 
see a dozen horses I buy them off-hand. Yesterday I found 
thirty camels and gave a man £360 for them by just writing 
on a slip of paper. To-night I have been interpreting while 
the Governor dined with the Admiral. I have servants, clerks, 
and interpreters at my beck and call, and in short I could 
not be in a higher position. We are very securely entrenched 
here and the enemy is eighty miles off, and to-morrow the In- 
dian troops are coming. Of course it is war time, but as I 
am on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, I am not likely to 
get into risky places. I have seen active service though, having 
been one of the first to land when Suez was taken. The Ad- 
miral is such a nice man, and I am told he never forgets his 



Palmer's Death 309 

officers, but pushes them on to promotion. He told me I should 
get the 'Star of India' ! good-bye." 

This is the last pathetic entry in a very human document. 
The next day Palmer started with Gill and Charrington for 
Nakhl in the eastern desert, Gill's mission and Charrington's 
being to destroy the telegraph wire between Egypt and Syria, 
for which purpose they took with them a box of dynamite, 
while Palmer's mission was announced as that of "buying cam- 
els." The two officers, like Palmer, were dressed in Arab 
costume, but they had with them uniforms to add dignity to 
their proceedings when they should reach the friendly tribes. 
The amount of money taken with them out of Palmer's £20,000 
has been variously stated at £3,000 to £8,000. Gill has re- 
corded his dissatisfaction at the nature of the mission on which 
he was called to serve. It cannot have been the purchase of 
camels, an official euphemism which now that Palmer had be- 
come a high officer of Her Majesty he seems to have adopted, 
but beyond a doubt to carry out his original avowed purpose 
and fulfil his promises to his Bedouin friends, by paying them 
the large sums agreed on. He would have taken all the £20,000 
for his 40,000 fighters but that the Admiral expostulated. 

The party, however, was foredoomed to disaster. The Bed- 
ouin escort, men of the Haiwat and Howeytat, got scent of 
the gold they were carrying, and were determined to be before- 
hand with the Teyyaha, for whom it was intended — the Egyp- 
tian governor of Nakhl, an isolated fort halfway between Suez 
and Akabah, there is good reason to believe, being their acl- 
complice and instigator. They had hardly therefore, got more 
than a fe-^ miles on their way before they were attacked, made 
prisoners, despoiled, stripped and bound, and finally shot at the 
edge of a ravine in the Wady Sudr. And so poor Palmer's 
dreams of fortune ended. The catastrophe was too conspicuous a 
one to save the Government from questions asked in Parliament, 
and that worthy gentleman. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
as Under-Secretary, was put up in the House of Commons to 
give answer and to deny roundly the whole affair of Palmer's 
secret mission, or of any dealings on his part with the Bedouins, 
except as buyer of camels. 

Nor does Professor Palmer's journal stand alone as docu- 



3IO Captain Gill 

mentary evidence. Captain Gill also left a diary amply con- 
firming the main facts. His business under the Intelligence De- 
partment was of the same nature west of the Suez Canal as 
Palmer's had been east of it. The diary begins at Alexandria 
and the writer speaks of having gone to see Sir Frederick Golds- 
mid, the head of his department, and he expresses his hope 
to be soon at work among the Bedouins west of the Canal. He 
describes having received, in the Khedive's own handwriting, a 
list of the principal Sheykhs between the Canal and the culti- 
vation, of whom he mentions two by name, Saoud el Tihawi at 
Salahieh, and Mohammed el Baghli at Wady Tumeylat. He 
understood the Bedouins to be waiting to side with whomever 
they found it their best interest to follow. At Port Said Gill 
hears from the ex-Governor that these Bedouins can be bought 
at from £2 to £3 per man. On 4th August he mentions read- 
ing Palmer's report to Sir B. Seymour. He says, "Had I 
known the report would go direct to the Admiral, I would 
have asked Hoskyns whether he had the money for Palmer." 
He adds, "Palmer says he can buy fifty thousand Bedouins for 
£25,000, and I shall certainly urge that the money be given 
him." He mentions a report of his own as to blocking the Ca- 
nal, which he says could only be effectively done by the Egyp- 
tians at one point, which he names, and gives as his reason the 
want of stones elsewhere to sink the barges with. He talks of 
Lesseps as having it in his power to do real mischief, as he has 
all the dredges and boats belong to the Canal at his disposal. 
August 5th: Gill goes down the Canal with another oflScer to 
Suez, taking with them £20,000 in gold for Palmer. They stop 
at Ismailia, and he sees there Mr. Pickard, with whom he dis- 
cusses the best route to choose for cutting the telegraph. He 
says there are three ways: (i) from the coast near el Arish, 
which both agree would be dangerous, (2) from Gisr or Kan- 
tara, objectionable as violating the neutrality of the Canal, and 
(3) from Suez, the only practicable route. He does not seem 
to trust Pickard, and decides to cut the wire himself from Suez. 
August 6th: He mentions the fact that he is glad to get rid 
of the £20,000 on its being made over to Palmer. He talks 
of going with Palmer to a great meeting of Shekyhs he is to 
attend at Nakhul, and remarks that if he goes so far with him 
he shall be able to judge how far "Palmer's rather rose-col- 



Bribery of Bedouins West of the Canal 311 

oured expectations" are justified. These two documents between 
them amply prove the reality of the bribery resorted to before 
Tel-el-Kebir. 

I was much connected with this affair at the time it occurred, 
as I was applied to by members of the families of all the three 
victims of it, to aid in their researches, and to make the mat- 
ter public and in one instance to obtain from the Government 
a proper recognition of services rendered and as yet unac- 
knowledged. The case, after being denied in the House of 
Commons, was at my instance brought on by my brother-in-law. 
Lord Wentworth, in the House of Lords, and was the occasion 
of much anger among the Ministerial peers, and an astonishing 
display of untruth. Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook, and 
their colleagues, got up one after the other and roundly denied 
the whole story of Palmer's mission, and of his having re- 
ceived any money for the purpose of bribery among the Arabs. 
It is a curious fact that Lord Salisbury, to whom I went just 
before the debate to try to enlist his aid in opposition to the 
Government, excused them in some measure to me on the ground 
that in cases where secret service money was concerned, it was 
conventionally permitted to Ministers to lie. He nevertheless 
aided Lord Wentworth to the extent of securing him a fair 
hearing, which the others would have prevented. 

Palmer's and Gill's were nevertheless but crude dealings, and 
would by themselves, I think, have done little to further Wolse- 
ley's objects but for the far more efficacious intervention in 
support of them given by the Khedive. Saoud el Tihawi was 
the only Arab Sheykh who systematically or at all efficiently 
betrayed Arabi, and it was the Khedive who procured his de- 
fection. Saoud received in payment for his work as spy in 
Arabi's camp 5,000 Austrian crowns, and betrayed him through- 
out, from the date of the removal of the Egyptian headquarters 
from Kafr Dawar to Tel-el-Kebir. Saoud was an Arab of a 
naturally superior type, and with a good head on his shoulders, 
but he had long been perverted by his association with Les- 
seps and the French, having his land and permanent camp within 
a day's journey only of the Suez Canal, and had been accustomed 
to hunt the gazelle with them, and play the part of fine gentle- 
man, which is the ruin of Bedouin morality. That he did in- 
deed play the part of spy and traitor in the English interest I 



312 Osman Bey Rifaat 

have his own half admission, for passing by Salahleh In the spring 
of 1887, I stopped a night at his tents, and he seeing me to be 
English, and knowing nothing of my political sympathies, spoke 
of his doings during the war in terms there was no mistaking. 
Acting as scout for Arabi, It was easy for his men to pass from 
camp to camp, and so convey intelligence. There was nothing 
specially to be ashamed of In this treachery, according to Bed- 
ouin morals, for to the Arab tribes Egyptians and Turks and 
Franks are equally outside the sphere of their allegiance, and in 
serving them It is merely a question of what suits their interest 
best. On the east of the Nile the Bedouins have exceedingly 
little religious feeling to prevent their siding with the infidel, 
if their advantage lies that way, and no love was ever yet lost 
between Bedouin and Fellah. 

What did Arabi Infinitely more harm than this and facili- 
tated the rapidity of Wolseley's advance, was the tampering 
with his officers through the Instrumentality of certain emissaries 
despatched In disguise to Cairo and Tel-el-Keblr, who, armed 
with money and promises of promotion and advancement when 
the "rebellion" should have been put down, succeeded in de- 
taching not a few from their loyalty. This was not done 
directly by Wolseley or the English intelligence Department, 
though, perhaps the funds were furnished by them, but by the 
Khedive, who was far better aware whom to approach with 
success than any Englishman could be. His most intelligent 
and active agent in this work was his A. D. C, Osman Bey 
Rifaat, who knew well the temper of most of the officers, and 
the jealousies which inspired them. To these, especially to 
those of Circassian origin, he represented the futility of the 
National resistance and the advantage there would be for them 
in being beforehand In reconciling themselves to the Khedive 
instead of awaiting the punishment which would certainly fol- 
low. Wolseley and the English were only acting as the Khe- 
dive's servants and in concert with the Sultan, who also was 
about to send troops, having declared Arabi a rebel. With 
the Circassians this line of argument naturally had weight, 
and with the baser class of Egyptian officers the money argu- 
ment was added. Arabi, for the reasons already stated, al- 
though enthusiastically followed by the rank and file of the 
army, had incurred no little jealousy among the superior offi- 



Sultan Pasha's Treachery 313 

cers, who judged themselves to be all better soldiers than he, 
and his procrastination in the matter of blocking the Canal had 
still further increased their dissatisfaction. All confidence in 
his military leadership was destroyed among them from the day 
of the landing of the English at Isma'ilia without the promised 
opposition of the French, and without adequate preparations to 
oppose them on that side having been made. 

With the civilian chiefs of the Nationalists another agent was 
employed, also not without effect. This was none other than 
the old leader of the fellah movement. Sultan Pasha, who, hav- 
ing thrown his lot in now wholly with the English, was not 
ashamed to lend himself to the work of spreading disunion 
among those who still retained their patriotism. To the new 
generation of the Egyptians it seems difficult to understand 
how a man of such initial high conduct as a lover of his country 
should have sunk to so mean a pass. But I think it is not really 
difficult to explain. Sultan was a proud man of great wealth 
and importance, and used to being given the first place every- 
where — the "king," as he was called, of Upper Egypt, the first 
and foremost of the great fellah proprietors — and with what 
seemed to him a natural right to leadership in the fellah party. 
Arabi he had patronized as a younger man and one of no social 
standing, who might help him in his ambitions, but who should 
never have presumed to supplant him in the popular affections. 
He was disappointed on the formation of the Sherif Ministry 
in September, 1881, that he was given no place in it, and was 
only half consoled with the presidency assigned him of the 
new Parliament. Still less was he pleased when on the forma- 
tion of the more purely fellah administration of February, 1882, 
he was again left out, and the lack of what he considered the 
due consideration shown him caused him to drift gradually into 
opposition. Then came the arrival of the fleets at Alexandria, 
and, as we know, he was partly cajoled, partly frightened by 
Malet into declaring himself in favour of the English demands, 
and threw in his lot finally with the Court party against his 
former associates. There is nothing difficult to understand, 
more than in the Khedive's case, in the downward grade he 
was obliged to follow. It became with him, I imagine, a matter 
of obstinacy rather than any longer of ambition, and his patri- 
otic scruples had been allayed by the promise made him that the 



314 Sultan Receives £10,000 

English intervention was intended only to restore the condition 
of things previous to the Mahmud Sami Ministry, and that 
Egypt should still have her claim to Constitutional government 
respected. In this sense he addressed letters to his numerous 
former friends at Cairo, putting forward the explanation that 
the alliance between the Khedive and the English was a merely 
temporary necessity, as the English troops would not stay irl 
Egypt when once the Khedive's authority had been re-estab- 
lished; and that Arabi had lost the confidence of the Sultan, 
and that the continued resistance at Cairo was generally con- 
demned by Moslems. These letters, distributed carefully, were 
not without their influence, and money again played its power- 
ful part. Sultan indeed seems to have advanced the money out 
of his own pocket, for the very first financial act of the restored 
Khedivial Government after Tel-el-Kebir was to make him a 
public present of £10,000 under the title of an indemnity for 
losses sustained by him during the war, while he also received 
an order of English knighthood. The sums actually given away 
by Sultan were not, as far as I can learn, very large, being 
supplemented with more considerable promises, which after the 
war remained unfulfilled, and very likely the £10,000 more than 
covered the sums Sultan actually disbursed. Be this as it may, 
there is no question that with the Khedive's help Wol&eley's 
path of victory was made a very easy one.^ 

In spite, however, of all these disadvantages of internal in- 
trigue, the National defence might still have been prolonged, 
if the end could not be averted, but for the bad luck which 
from this point throughout attended the army. As soon as 

II find the following in my diary of 1887: "February 13. — A visit from Abd- 
el-Salaam Moelhy (one of the original Constitutionalists, and member of the 
Chamber of 1882). He told me that he had been an intimate friend and 
partisan of Sultan Pasha's, and had been one of those who joined Sultan in 
his quarrel with Arabi, but they were all very sorry now for not having held to- 
gether; and he did not approve Sultan's conduct during the war. Sultan had 
been deceived by Malet, who induced him to act as he did on a distinct 
promise that the Egyptian Parliament should be respected in its rights. Malet 
gave this verbally, and Sultan asked to have it in writing, but was dissuaded from 
insisting by the Khedive, who assured him that the English Agent's word was as 
good as his bond. The old man, when he found out after the war how much he 
had been deceived, took it to heart and died expressing a hope that Arabi would 
forgive him, and that his name would not be handed down to posterity as the be- 
trayer of his country. It was jealousy and anger at Arabi having become 
Minister that caused the quarrel." 



Capture of Mahmud Fehmi 315 

it was quite clear that Egypt would be attacked from the East, 
Mahmud Fehmi, the engineer, the ablest of all Arabi's lieu- 
tenants, was despatched to Tel-el-Kebir, to carry out and finish 
the lines there, which had never been more than lightly traced. 
Had they been finished as they ought to have been, they should 
have proved a formidable obstacle to the advance of the English 
army, but by an extraordinary fatality, which was hardly within 
the range of the common hazards of war, the General, within a 
few days of his arrival, was captured and made prisoner by a 
small party of English Life Guards, who, far in advance of the 
English position, happened to be passing near. The accident 
was a strange one. Mahmud Fehmi, attended only by an A. 
D. C, and having put off his uniform on account of the heat, 
had passed one evening to the other side of the Wady Tumeylat, 
and partly to get a breath of air, partly, too, for a better view 
of the desert in the direction of Ismai'lia, had climbed alone, on 
foot, a low sandhill, of which there are several, running into 
the cultivated land, when suddenly the small English party 
pounced on him. As Mahmud was not in uniform. Colonel 
Talbot, in command of the party, was doubtful how to treat 
him, and was near accepting his explanation that he was an 
Effendi with property in the neighbourhood, but finally decided 
to carry him off with them, which they accordingly did, the A. 
D. C, having remained in a village hard by not knowing what 
had happened, nor had Talbot any notion of the value of his 
capture until some time after the return of the party to the 
English headquarters. As a matter of fact, however, it was 
one of the greatest possible importance, and a blow to the de- 
fence of Tel-el-Kebir for which there was no remedy. ^ 

The second misfortune was the disabling at Kassassin of 
the two generals, first and second in command, at a critical 
moment of that not altogether unequal combat. These were 
Ali Fehmi, Arabi's tried companion, and Rashid Pasha, two 
officers who were both good soldiers, with courage and some 
experience of war, and who took the initiative against Wolse- 
ley first by a reconnaissance, and then by a renewed attack on 
him in force at Kassassin. It was the best and last chance the 

^ I give this version of the capture as being that of Mahmud Fehmi himself, 
but some have recounted it otherwise, accusing him of desertion. This is, how- 
ever, not credited by those who knew him personally. 



3i6 Battle of Kassassin 

Egyptians had of checking the English advance, and it was not 
very far from being successful. According to the Egyptian ac- 
count of the affair, the enemy was taken by surprise, and for a 
long time the issue remained doubtful, the Duke of Connaught 
being at one moment near being made prisoner. Had this hap- 
pened and had the Egyptians maintained their advantage, there 
is no knowing what terms might not have been granted them of 
recognition and peace, for already public opinion had veered 
round in England, and people were becoming ashamed of a war 
waged against peasants fighting for their freedom from an an- 
cient tyranny. Two things, however, failed them in their plans, 
first Mahmud Sami was to have advanced from Salahieh with 
a couple of thousand men to join them in the morning and take 
the enemy on his right flank, but misled by Saoud's Bedouins 
in the night he missed the point of rendezvous; and secondly, 
it is certain that Arabi, if he had had any soldierly instincts, 
ought to have taken the field in person with them, if not in the 
front line of attack, at least as commanding a strong reserve. 
As it was, the whole force employable did not appear on the bat- 
tlefield, and by a still further stroke of ill fortune both the com- 
manders were wounded, and put for the rest of the campaign 
hors de combat. It is also certain that one of the Egyptian gen- 
erals, AH Bey Ylusuf, purposely betrayed his comrades. 

From this point all was confusion at Tel-el-Kebir, and the 
pitiful end became certain. Arabi had lost his best generals and 
knew not where to replace them. There were not many he 
could trust, and those men only of quite inferior ability. One 
man indeed there was who might still have given consistency tc 
the defence, but for some inexplicable reason he was left away 
from the field of action. This was the third of the original 
"three colonels," Abd-el-Aal Helmi, a valiant fighting man as 
any in the army. For some time past he had been employed in 
what was at one moment the important duty of defending Dami- 
etta from a possible British landing, and he had with him some of 
the very best troops, notably the Soudanese regiment which had 
been Abd-el-Aal's own. Had these, with their commander, been 
brought at once to Tel-el-Kebir, they might have saved at least 
the honour of the army, for Abd-el-Aal was one who could be 
relied upon for forward action, and his troops were full of spirit 
and undiscouraged by defeat. It seems, however, still to have 



'Arahi's Forces at Tel-el-Kehir 317 

been thought that Damietta needed Its garrison, for I cannot 
find that the Military Committee so much as suggested Abd-el- 
Aal as Ali Fehmi's successor. I have sometimes thought that 
Yakub Pasha Sami, the President of the Military Committee 
at Cairo, good service as he had done in organizing the war, had 
at this time been tampered with by the Khedive's agents. He 
was a Mussulman, of Greek origin, and so one of the ruling class, 
and there are documents in my possession which show him, 
though Arabi's right-hand man at the War Office, as always a 
Khedive's man rather than a Nationalist. The Khedive seems 
to have counted him as such, and as in other instances after the 
war, treated him for that reason with exceptional rigour, and 
he was one of the seven Pashas exiled to Ceylon, though the at- 
titude he adopted before the Judges had been one of servile re- 
pentance and protestations of loyalty. Of his deep jealousy of 
Arabi the papers give ample evidence, and it is quite possible 
that after the disabling of Ali Fehmi, he did his best to isolate 
Arabi and hasten his ruin at Tel-el-Kebir. Instead of Abd-el- 
Aal the command was given to a very worthy but quite incom- 
petent man, Ali Pasha Roubi, one of Arabi's old companions of 
the early days of the National movement, but who had no other 
qualification for so responsible a post. 

Arabi himself meanwhile, in spite of the imminence of the 
English attack, remained stolidly on in camp surrounded, as al- 
ways, by the country Notables, who still flocked to see him, and 
by religious men, with whom he passed the time in prayers and 
recitations. He relied implicitly on Saoud el Tihawi to give 
him news of any further advance by Wolseley, and Saoud al- 
ways lured him into security. The army at Tel-el-Kebir was the 
most incoherent one imaginable. Of regular, well-disciplined 
troops, infantry of the line, there cannot have been more than 
6,000 to 7,000, with, perhaps, 2,000 cavalry and a correspond- 
ing number of guns served by good artillerymen. This was all 
the really reliable force. The rest were a half-clothed and 
wholly undisciplined rabble of recruits and volunteers, good, 
honest fellahin, hardworking as labourers in the trenches, but of 
no fighting value whatever. Their total number may have been 
20,000, but I have no accurate statistics to go by. Day and 
night they worked valiantly to complete the unfinished lines, but 
this was all the military service they possibly could render. 



3i8 Treachery of Alt Bey Yusuf 

Stone Pasha, the American, after the war stated it freely at his 
opinion that not one of the whole number had even as yet fired 
a ball cartridge, and this was probably true. 

The end came suddenly at dawn on the morning of the 
13th of September. There has been much romance written by 
English military writers of the silent and hazardous night march 
from Mehsameh under guidance of the stars and of a young 
naval officer, and doubtless to those who took part in it it seemed 
that the English army was groping its way blindly to the un- 
known, but in reality the road had been made plain for them 
by the secret means I have alluded to. Two of Arabi's minor 
officers, both holding responsible positions, had accepted, a few 
days before, the bribes offered them by the Khedivial agents. 
The names of these two deserve, to their eternal shame, to be 
put on record. The first was Abd-el-Rahman Bey Hassan, com- 
mander of the advanced guard of cavalry, who was placed with 
his regiment outside the lines In a position commanding the 
desert road from the east, but who on the night In question 
shifted his men some considerable distance to the left, so as to 
leave the English advance unobstructed. The second was the 
already mentioned AH Bey Yusuf, in command of a portion of 
the central lines where the trenches were so little formidable 
that they could be surmounted by any active artillery. By the 
account generally given, and Arabi's own, he not only left the 
point that night unguarded, but put out a lantern for the guid- 
ance of the assailants. Other names have been mentioned to 
me, but not with the authority of these two, and I therefore pre- 
fer not to put them down. As to the two I have given, their 
position as traitors was notorious for years at Cairo, as little 
secret was made of It by them, especially by AH Bey Yusuf, who 
complained freely of the scurvy treatment he had received for 
his services. £1,000 indeed had been paid him down in gold 
before the battle, but a further promise of £10,000 had never 
been kept to him, nor did he succeed In obtaining more from 
the Government, when he had spent his first round sum, than 
a poor pension of £12 a month, which was paid him to his 
death. 

ArabI and the rest of the army, deluded by Saoud Into a false 
security as to that night at least, slept profoundly, the poor 
men in their trenches and ArabI at his headquarters, about a 



Arabics Flight from Tel-el-Kehir 319 

mile to the rear. Thus, without any warning, they suddenly 
found the enemy upon them, the lines crossed at their weak 
point by the English, and a little later artillery in their rear. 
The vast number of the recruits fled without firing a shot, half- 
naked as they were sleeping, worn out with their constant la- 
bour of entrenchment, and having thrown their arms away across 
the open plain, and were cut down in hundreds as they ran. 
It was a mere butchery of peasants, too ignorant of the ways 
of war even to know the common formulas of surrender. This 
was in the centre and to the right of the position. To the left 
a more gallant stand was made, especially where Mohammed 
Obeyd was in command, and here and there all along the lines 
by the Egyptian artillery. The whole thing lasted hardly more 
than forty minutes. Mohammed Obeyd fell gallantly fighting, 
and with him the flower of the regular army, and many gunners 
too who had stuck obstinately to their guns. But at the end 
of an hour the fighting was wholly over, and what remained of 
the National army was a mere broken rabble. 

As to the part played personally by ArabI that fatal morn- 
ing, I have the evidence, besides his own, of a very worthy man, 
Mohammed Sid Ahmed, his body-servant, who in 1888 entered 
my service as manager at Sheykh Obeyd and remained two years 
with me. From him I have over and over again heard the 
events narrated. According to Sid Ahmed, the whole camp 
that night was in profound slumber, having been assured by the 
scouts that the English were making no movement, his master's 
headquarters at about the centre of the whole camp, but more 
than a mile In rear of the front line of trenches, as undisturbed 
as the rest. The Pasha had undressed and gone to bed as 
usual and slept soundly through the night, nor was any one 
awake before the sound of the guns announced the attack. 
Arabi then threw hastily on his uniform and got on horseback 
and rode towards the firing, followed, among others, by his ser- 
vant, also mounted. They had not, however, got far when 
they were met by a crowd of fugitives, who declared that all 
was lost, while Saoud's Bedouins also were galloping wildly 
about, adding to the general confusion. The Pasha, Sid Ah- 
med assured me, did his best to rally the men, and continued to 
advance towards that part of the lines where Mohammed Obeyd 
was still holding out, but was gradually borne away with the rest, 



320 He Arrives at Cairo 

and yielded to his (Sid Ahmed's) prayers that he would seek 
his safety in flight. The idea that his master had any duty of 
dying on the field of battle was always wholly absent from Sid 
Ahmed's mind, and he prided himself on having succeeded in 
persuading him. They were both well mounted on horses, 
which had been sent to Arabi by one of the Bedouins of the 
Western Fayoum, and reached the Tel-el-Kebir station just be- 
fore it was occupied by the English, and though unable there 
to take train, got across the small canal bridge before it closed, 
and so by the causeway to the other side of Wady Tumjeylat, 
whence they galloped their best for Belbeis. They were alone, 
Arabi having been separated from his staff in the confusion. 
Arabi's one idea now was to get to Cairo before the news of 
the disaster should arrive and prepare the city for defence. At 
Belbeis they took train and reached the capital not long after 
noon. ^ 

Arabi, on his arrival in Cairo, seems to have had hopes still 
of continuing the patriotic struggle by defending the city. He 
went straight to the Kasr el Nil and assisted at a council being 
held there by the members of the War Committee, but a com- 
promise of opinion was all that he could obtain, namely, that 
while it was decided in principle to make submission to the 
Khedive, the question of defending Cairo against the English 
army was reserved. Nor had the matter got any forwarder 
next day when Drury Lowe with his Indian cavalry arrived at 
Abbassiyeh. The truth is all heart had been taken out of the 
official resistance by the intrigues of the Khedive's agents, and 
by Arabi's proclamation by the Sultan as a rebel having become 
known. Only the rabble of the streets, as yet ignorant of all, 
were still in favour of a defence. The military circumstances 
of Cairo were that it possessed nominally a large garrison, but 
these were all the newest of new recruits, and although they 
would probably have been sufficient to hold the citadel and so 
dominate the town, they could not have made a long defence 
without great destruction of property in the lower city. For 

1 In 1884 I received an account of Arabi's conduct at Tel-el-Kebir, almost 
identical with Sid Ahmed's, from his army doctor, Mustafa Bey, who was 
sleeping near him that night. His own account of his flight will be found in 
the Appendix. 



Prince KiamyVs Evidence 321 

this no one was prepared, and the sudden arrival of Drury 
Lowe decided the question with the War Committee for capit- 
ulation, and it was resolved to send him, according to his de- 
mand, the keys of the citadel. Arabi then seeing that all was 
over, and on the advice of John Ninet, with whom he had spent 
the night in anxious debate at the house of Ali Fehmi, drove to 
Abbassiyeh, and there surrendered his sword as prisoner of war 
to the English general. ^ 

1 1 find in my journal of 1884 that on the 29th October the Egyptian princes, 
Osman and Kiamyl, came to see me, and that they talked patriotically about the 
late war, and gave me much information. "Osman was not actually there. He 
was too fat a prince to do anything physically, but he sympathized with the 
cause, and behaved with some dignity after it was over. Kiamyl was a member 
of the provisional government, and saw a good deal of Arabi during the war, 
and while bearing testimony to his honest patriotism, blamed him for his too 
easy conduct of ailairs. He ought, he said, to have shot Ali Yusuf after Kassassin, 
for it was perfectly well known he was a traitor, having received five thousand 
pounds before the battle, which was thus lost. At one moment there were 18,000 
Egyptians close to 3,500 English, who had with them the Duke of Connaught. 
If Ali Yusuf, who commanded the centre, had advanced then, the English 
must have been crushed and the prince taken, but he left the field of battle, and 
allowed the wings to be broken. The money paid by the English was most of it 
false St. George sovereigns and Egyptian pounds with lead inside. Cairo was 
full of them after Tel-el-Kebir, but they were bought up for the Government 
by the bankers at five and ten francs apiece in a few days. The money orders 
were also mostly forgeries, but Ali Yusuf insisted upon having an order with 
a signature he knew. Abd-el-Ghaff^ar was paid in false St. George sovereigns, 
some of which his wife took to Ismail Jawdat's wife to change. Prince Kiamyl 
had himself broken open some of these pieces and found them to contain lead. 
The Bedouins would not be taken in thus, and Saoud el Tihawi had told him 
after the war that he had received — I forget the sum — in silver dollars from one 
of the English generals. The whole state of things was very disgracful, and 
Kiamyl was under orders to go in three days to Tel-el-Kebir to arrest Ali Yusuf 
when the collapse came. Arabi was betrayed by all about him, some for gold, 
others for jealousy. Mahmud Sami was jealous of Arabi, and spoilt the second 
battle of Kassassin because he was not in chief command. He was to advance 
from Salahieh, and did not keep his rendezvous with Ali Fehmi — the latter was 
an honest and good soldier, but most of them were very worthless. Arabi 
would not put any Turk into high command, and the fellah officers were incapable 
and cowardly. Mahmud Sami was the only Turk, and he was playing a selfish 
game throughout. Kiamyl was present at the council at the Kasr-el-Nil when 
Arabi returned and when he explained the destruction of the army with floods 
of tears. He said he had fought till he was alone, which was hardly true, and 
that all was over. Kiamyl then reproached him, saying, 'A man who embarks 
in a great enterprise ought first to count the cost.' 'Arabi ought never,' he said, 
'to have been at the head of the army. If he had hanged or shot a dozen men 
in the early part of the war, all would have gone well.' Prince Kiamyl would not 
hear of the campaign having been a complete walk over for the English." 
According to Mohammed Sid Ahmed Arabi had with him a body of about 



322 As to Arabics Character 

i,ooo encamped near him at Tel-el-Kebir, most of whom were slain before his 
master left the field. But I do not attach full credit to this, at least as to num- 
bers. There seem to have been some 10,000 Egyptians in all killed or wounded 
in the battle — mostly killed, for little quarter was given — but I do not pretend to 
answer for any of the figures named. The immense mounds of the buried dead 
tell their own tale perhaps best. 



CHAPTER XVII 



THE ARABI TRIAL 



While these great events were happening on the Nile, I at my 
home at Crabbet spent the summer sadly enough. My sympa- 
thies were, of course, still all with the Egyptians, but I was 
cut off from every means of communication with them, and the 
war fever was running too strongly during the first weeks of 
the fighting for further words of mine to be of any avail. Pub- 
licly I held my peace. All that I could do was to prepare an 
"Apologia" of the National movement and of my own connec- 
tion with it — for this was now being virulently attacked in the 
press ^- — and wait the issue of the campaign. 

Nevertheless, though in dire disgrace with the Government, 
I did not wholly lose touch with Downing Street. I saw Ham- 
ilton once or twice, and submitted proofs of my "Apologia" to 
him and Mr. Gladstone before it was published, and this was 
counted to me by them for righteousness. It appeared in the 
September number of "The Nineteenth Century Review," and 

1 One of the matters principally laid to my charge was due to a Renter's tele- 
gram announcing that my country house near Cairo had been broken open by 
Arabi's order, and that seventeen cases of firearms had been found in it. The 
foundation of this story was as follows: In 1881, when I was on my way, 
as I intended, to Arabia, I had brought with me some Winchester rifles and 
revolvers for the journey, amounting to seventeen rifles in all, as well as a small 
brass cannon of; the kind used on yachts, as a present, if I could find a way 
to send it to him, to Ibn Rashid at Hail. These were still stored in my house, 
and some one having announced the fact to the provincial authorities, they had 
taken possession of them, and removed them to the Cairo citadel. In the con- 
fusion after the war I could gain no intelligence of what had become of my 
property except the story which was afloat in London that my brass cannon had 
been taken there as a trophy of' war, and was forming an ornament at the 
Admiralty. It was not till some ten years afterwards that having lunched one day 
with my cousin, Colonel Wyndham, at the citadel at Cairo, he took me afterwards 
to visit the arsenal, where I soon recognized my cannon and other property in- 
tact. As the box containing the rifles had my name on it, no difficulty was made 
in restoring all to me. 

323 



324 Gordon's Letter 

at a favourable moment when the first sparkle of military glory 
had faded, and reasonable people were beginning to ask them- 
selves what after all we were fighting in Egypt about. Writ- 
ten from the heart even more than from the head, my pleading 
had a success far beyond expectation and, taken in connection 
with an anti-war tour embarked on in the provinces by Sir 
Wilfrid Lawson, Mr. Seymour Keay and a few other genuine 
Radicals, touched at last what was called the "Nonconformist" 
conscience of the country and turned the tide of opinion distinctly 
in my favour. This encouraged me. About the same time, too, 
a letter reached me from General Gordon, dated "Cape Town, 
the 3rd of August," in which he avowed his sympathy with the 
cause I had been advocating, and which elated me not a little. 
It was as follows: 

"Cape Town, 3, 8, 82. 
"My Dear Mr. Blunt, 

"You say in 'Times' you are going to publish an account of 
what passed between you and the Government. Kindly let me 
have a copy addressed as enclosed card. I have written a MS. 
bringing things down from Cave's mission to the taking of office 
by Cherif, it is called 'Israel in Egypt,' and shall follow it 
with a sequel, 'The Exodus.' I do not know whether I shall 
print it, for it is not right to rejoice over one's enemies. I 
mean official enemies. What a fearful mess Malet and Colvin 
have made, and one cannot help remarking the finale of all 
Dilke's, Colvin's, and Malet's secretivenes. Dilke, especially, 
in the House evaded every query on the plea that British inter- 
ests would suffer. Poor thing. I firmly believe he knows no 
more of his policy than the Foreign Office porter did; he had 
none. Could things have ended worse if he had said every- 
thing? I think not. No more Control — no more employes 
drawing £373,000 a year — no more influence of Consuls-Gen-, 
eral, a nation hating us — no more Tewfik — no more interest — 
a bombarded town, Alexandria — these are the results of the 
grand secret diplomacy. Colvin will go off to India, Malet 
to China — we shall know no more of them. All this because 
Controllers and Consuls-General would not let Notables see 
the Budget when Cherif was in office. As for Arabi, whatever 



Renewed Correspondence with Hamilton 325 

may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the 
people; they will never be 'your obedient servants' again. 

"Believe me, yours sincerely, 

"C. G. Gordon." 

The value to me of this letter I saw at once was great, for, 
though out of favour with the Foreign Office, Gordon's name 
was one to conjure with in the popular mind, and especially with 
that "Nonconformist conscience" which, as I have said, was be- 
ginning now to support me, and consequently I knew with Glad- 
stone; and it was on the text of it that I began a fresh corre- 
spondence with Hamilton. Mr. Gladstone had stated in Parlia- 
ment that I was the "one unfortunate exception," among Eng- 
lishmen who knew Egypt, to the general approval of the war; 
and I sent him, through Hamilton, a copy of Gordon's letter, 
and at the same time invited his attention to accounts which 
had begun to appear in the newspapers of certain atrocities of 
vengeance which had been indulged in by Tewfik and his new 
Circassian Ministers at Alexandria on Nationalist prisoners 
made during the war. Torture had, it was related, been in- 
flicted on Mahmud Fehmi, the engineer General, and the thumb- 
screw and kurbash were being used freely. I asked whether such 
was the state of things Mr. Gladstone had sent troops to Egypt 
to re-establish. The letter brought a prompt and interesting an- 
swer, and one which proved of value to me a few days later 
when it came to my pleading that Arabi should not be done to 
death by the Khedive without fair trial. 

"10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 
"September Sth, 1882. 
"I need hardly say that Mr. Gladstone has been much ex- 
ercise in his mind at the rumours about these 'atrocities.' I 
can call them by no other name. Immediate instructions were 
sent out to inquire into the truth of them, and to remonstrate 
strongly if they were confirmed. I am glad to say that, as far 
as our information at present goes, the statements appear to be 
unfounded. The strictest orders have been given for the hu- 
mane treatment of the prisoners. There seems to be some 
doubt as to whether thumbscrewing was not inflicted on a spy 
in one case; and searching inquiries are to be instituted with 



326 Arabics Surrender to Lowe 

peremptory demands of explanation and guarantees against re- 
currence. You may be quite sure that Mr. Gladstone will de- 
nounce 'Egyptian atrocities' as strongly as 'Bulgarian atrocities.' 
"I cannot help thinking that your and Chinese Gordon's opin- 
ion of Arabi would be somewhat modified if you had seen some 
of the documents I have read. 

'Some months ago (this, please, is quite private) certain in- 
quiries were made about Chinese Gordon. He had suggestions 
to make about Ireland, and the result of these inquiries were, 
to the best of my recollection, that he was not clothed in the 
rightest of minds." 

The last paragraph is historically curious. The proof Gor- 
don had given Mr. Gladstone's Government of his not being 
clothed in his right mind was that he had written, during a 
tour in western Ireland, to a member of the Government, Lord 
Northbrook, recommending a scheme of Land Purchase and, if 
I remember rightly. Home Rule as a cure for Irish evils. 

I was thus once more in a position of semi-friendly inter- 
course with Downing Street and of some considerable influence 
in the country when the crowning glory of the war, the news of 
the great victory of Tel-el-Kebir, reached England, and soon 
after it of Arabi's being a prisoner in Drury Lowe's hands at 
Cairo. The completeness of the military success for the mo- 
ment turned all English heads, and it was fortunate for me that 
I had had my say a fortnight before it came, for otherwise I 
should have been unable to make my voice heard, either with 
the public or at Downing Street, in the general shriek of 
triumph. It had the immediate result of confirming the 
Government in all its most violent views, and of once more 
turning Mr. Gladstone's heart, which had been veering back a 
little to the Nationalists, to the hardness of a nether millstone. 
The danger now was that in order to justify to his own con- 
science the immense slaughter of half-armed peasants that had 
been made at Tel-el Kebir, he would indulge in some conspicu- 
ous act of vengeance on Arabi, as the scapegoat of his own 
errors. His only excuse for all this military brutality was the 
fiction that he was dealing with a military desperado, a man 
outlawed by his crimes, and, as such, unentitled to any con- 
sideration either as a patriot or even the recognized General of 



General A dye Intervenes 327 

a civilized army. I have reason to know that if ArabI had been 
captured on the field at Tel-el-Kebir, it was Wolseley's inten- 
tion to give him the short benefit of a drum-head court martial, 
which means shooting on the spot, and that it was only the in- 
tervention of Sir John Adye, a General much older in years 
and in length of service than Wolseley, that prevented it later — 
Adye having represented to Wolseley the disgrace there would 
be to the British army if the regular commander of an armed 
force, whom it had needed 30,000 troops to subdue, should not 
receive the honourable treatment universally accorded to prison- 
ers of war. At home, too, I equally know that Bright, in in- 
dignant protest, gave his mind on the same point personally to 
Gladstone. It must not, however, at all be supposed that any- 
thing but the overwhelming pressure of public opinion brought 
to bear, as I will presently describe, frustrated the determina- 
tion of our Government, one way or other, to make Arabi pay 
forfeit for their own political crime with his life. Mr. Glad- 
stone was as much resolved on this as was Lord Granville, or 
any of the Whig lords in his Cabinet. To explain how their 
hands were forced in the direction of humanity I must go into 
detail. 

The capitulation of Cairo and Arabi's surrender to Drury 
Lowe were announced in the "Times" of the i6th, and with it 
a telegram from its Alexandria correspondent, Moberley Bell, 
who represented the Anglo-Khedivial official view, demanding 
"exemplary punishment" on eleven of the National leaders, 
whom he named, including Arabi. I knew that this could only 
mean mischief resolved on of the gravest kind, and I consequ- 
ently telegraphed at once to Button, asking him what the posi- 
tion in official circles was. His first answer was reassuring. 
"I can't think there is the least danger of their shooting any- 
body. You should, however, take immediate steps to appeal 
for merciful treatment." Two hours later, however, a second 
message from him came. "I don't like official tone with regard 
to your friends. Write me privately such a letter as I can show 
to my chief." By his "chief" he, of course meant Chenery, the 
"Times" editor, with whom, as I have said, he was on very 
intimate terms. I consequently wrote at once to Hamilton : 

"I cannot think there should be any danger of death for the 
prisoners taken at Cairo, but should there be, I trust you will 



328 Arabi's Death Demanded 

let me know in time, as I have certain suggestions to make re- 
garding the extreme difficulty of obtaining them a fair trial 
just now, and other matters." 

To this it is significant that I received no answer for two 
days, and then an off-hand one, to the effect that Hamilton was 
about to leave London for the country, "and so would be a bad 
person to depend upon for any intimation such as I wished." 
But I was not thus to be put off, and passing beyond Hamilton, 
I wrote once more direct to Mr. Gladstone. I did this after 
consultation with Button and with Broadley, whom I met at 
his house on the afternoon of the 19th. We decided that the 
latter would be the man for our purpose, and that the best 
chance of saving Arabi's and the other prisoners' lives would 
be for me to take Broadley out with me at once and produce 
him as their legal defender. Button, who knew the ins and outs 
of most affairs, was certain there was no time to lose, and we 
half engaged Broadley at a fee of £300, afterwards increased 
to £800 with refreshers. In the meantime Button rendered 
the cause a great service in the immediate crisis by managing 
that it should be announced next morning in the "Times" 
that Arabi and his companions were not to be executed with- 
out the consent of the English Government, and that they 
were to be defended by efficient counsel. Of course, we had 
not a shadow of authority to go upon for this statement, but the 
"Times" having announced it made it very difficult for the 
Government to go back upon a humane decision so publicly at- 
tributed to them. 

My letter to Mr. Gladstone, sent in the same evening, was 
as follows : 

''Sept. 19, 1882. 
"My Dear Sir, 

"Now that the military resistance of the Egyptians is at an 
end, and Arabi and their chief leaders have surrendered to Her 
Majesty's forces, I venture once more to address you in the 
interests of justice no less than of those whom the fortune of 
war has thus suddenly thrown into your hands. It would seem 
to be contemplated that a Court Martial should assemble 
shortly to try and judge the military leaders for rebellion, and, 
in the case of some of these, and of civil tribunal to inquire into 



The Proposed Court Martial 329 

their alleged connection with certain violent proceedings. If 
this should be the truth, I would earnestly beg your attention to 
certain circumstances of the case which seem to demand care- 
ful consideration. 

"i. The members of the proposed Court Martial, if Egyp- 
tians and appointed by the Khedive, can hardly be free agents 
or uninfluenced in their feelings towards the prisoners. They 
would be chosen from among the few officers who espoused the 
Khedive's cause, and would of necessity be partisans. 

"2. Even were this not the case, native false witness is so 
common in Egypt, and the falsification of Arabic documents so 
easy, that little reliance could be placed upon the testimony ad- 
duced. The latter would need to be submitted to experts be- 
fore being accepted with any certainty. 

"3. Native evidence, if favourable to the prisoners, will be 
given under fear. There will be a strong inducement to with- 
hold it, and as strong an inducement in the desire of Court fa- 
vour to offer evidence unfavourable. The experts charged with 
examining documents will, if natives, be equally subject to these 
influences. 

"4. The evidence of Europeans settled in Egypt, though 
given without fear of consequences, may be expected to be 
strongly coloured by resentment. These Europeans are, it 
would seem, themselves in some measure parties to the suit. 
They will many of them have lost property or have been injured 
in their trade during the late troubles or have personal insults 
to avenge. The vindictive tone of the English in Egypt is 
every day apparent in their letters published by the English 
Press. 

"5. It will be insufficient, if full justice for the prisoners is 
to be secured, that the ordinary form of Her Majesty's repre- 
sentative being present through a dragoman or otherwise, at 
the proceedings, should be the only one observed. Political 
feeling has probably run too high at Cairo during the last six 
months for quite impartial observation. 

"6. Should English officers, as it may be hoped will be the 
case, be added to the native members of the Court Martial, 
they will be ignorant or nearly ignorant of the language spoken 
by the prisoners, and will be unable themselves to examine the 
documents or cross-examine the witnesses. They will neces- 



330 Impossibility of Justice 

sarily be In the hands of their Interpreters, who, if unchecked, 
may alter or distort the words used to the detriment of the 
prisoners. Nearly all the dragomans of the Consulates are 
Levantine Christians violently hostile to the Mussulman Arabs, 
while it may safely be affirmed that there are no Englishmen in 
Egypt both fully competent and quite unbiassed who could be 
secured in this capacity. Arabic is a language little known 
among our officials, and their connection with the late troubles 
is too recent to have left them politically calm. 

"It would seem, therefore, that unless special steps are taken 
there is grave danger of a miscarriage of justice in the trial. 

"To remedy this evil as far as possible I have decided, at 
my own charge and that of some of my friends, to secure the 
services of a competent English counsel for the principal prison- 
ers, and to proceed with him to Cairo to collect evidence for the 
defence. I shall also take with me the Rev. Mr. Sabunji as 
interpreter, and watch the proceedings on behalf of the prison- 
ers. My knowledge of Arabic is too Imperfect for me to act 
alone, but Mr. Sabunji Is a friend of the chief prisoners, and is 
eminently capable of speaking for them. He knows English, 
French, Turkish, and Italian well, and is probably the first Ara- 
bic scholar now living. The prisoners have full confidence In 
him, and I believe also that they have full confidence In me. 
Thus alone, perhaps, they will obtain, what I submit they are 
entitled to, a full, a fair, and — to some extent — even a friendly 
hearing. 

"In conclusion, It may not be unnecessary that I should prom- 
ise you that while thus engaged I, and those with me, would 
scrupulously avoid all interference with contemporary politics. 
I shall esteem it a favour if I can be Informed at as early a 
date as possible what will be the exact nature of the trial and 
what the principal charges made. I hope, too, that every facil- 
ity will be accorded me and those with me in Egypt to prosecute 
our task, and I cannot doubt that your personal sense of justice 
will approve it. 

"I am, &c., 

"Wilfrid Scawen Blunt." 

This letter, which I knew it would be difficult for Mr. Glad- 



/ Ask for a Fair Trial 331 

stone to answer with a refusal, especially after his recent as- 
surances about "Egyptian atrocities" and "Bulgarian atrocities," 
I sent at once to Downing Street, having previously called there 
and seen Hamilton, to whom I explained my plan. He did not, 
however, give me much encouragement, as his answer to a 
further note I sent him next morning proves. My note was 
that I was writing to Arabi, and to ask him how the letter 
should be sent, and expressing a hope to have an answer from 
his Chief before Friday, the next mail day. Hamilton's an- 
swer suggests procrastination : 

"Your letter, I am sorry to say, just missed the bag last night. 
It reached me about three minutes too late; but in any case I 
don't think you must count on a very immediate reply. Mr. 
Gladstone is moving about, and moreover will most likely have 
to consult some one before he gives an answer. I am absolutely 
ignorant myself as to questions which your intended proceedings 
may raise; and therefore I have no business to hazard an opin- 
ion. But is it not open to doubt whether according to inter- 
national law or prescription a man can be defended by foreign 
counsel? I am equally ignorant about the delivery of letters 
to prisoners of war; but I should presume that no communica- 
tion could reach Arabi except through and with the permission 
of the Khedive and our Commander-in-Chief. In any case Ma- 
let will probably be your best means of communication." 

According to this suggestion I wrote a letter to Arabi telling 
him of our plans of legal defence and enclosed it, with a draft 
of the letter, to Malet, and for more precaution sent both by 
hand to the Foreign Office, to be forwarded, with a note to 
Lord Tenterden commending it to his care. By a singular ac- 
cident, however, both note and letter were returned to me with 
the message that His Lordship had died suddenly that morn- 
ing, and I was obliged, as the mail was starting, to send it by 
the same hand. Button's servant Mitchell, to Walmer Castle 
where Lord Granville was, and it was only just in time. In 
the sequel it will be seen that the packet, though despatched to 
Cairo, was not delivered farther than into Malet's hands and 
then with the instruction that my letter to Arabi should be re- 
turned to me. Malet's official letter to me performing his duty 
is sufficient evidence, if any were needed, to show how far the 



332 Foreign Office Tricks 

Government was from co-operating at all with me in my design 
of getting the prisoners a fair trial. It is very formal and un- 
mistakable : 

"Sir, ' "Cairo, Oct. 4, 1882. 

"Acting under instructions from Her Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State I return you herewith the letter for Arabi 
Pasha which you sent to me to be forwarded in your letter of 
the 22nd ultimo. 

"I am, etc., Edward B. Malet." 

My letter to Arabi had been as follows : 

"To My Honourable Friend H. E. Ahmed Pasha Arabi. 

"May God preserve you in adversity as in good fortune. 

"As a soldier and a patriot you will have understood the 
reasons which have prevented me from writing to you or send- 
ing you any message during the late unhappy war. Now, how- 
ever, that the war is over, I hope to show you that our friend- 
ship has not been one of words only. It seems probable that 
you will be brought to trial, either for rebellion or on some 
other charge, the nature of which I yet hardly know, and that, 
unless you are strongly and skilfully defended, you run much 
risk of being precipitately condemned. I have therefore re- 
solved, with your approval, to come to Cairo to help you with 
such evidence as I can give, and to bring with me an honest and 
learned English advocate to conduct your defence; and I have 
informed the English Government of my intention. I beg you, 
therefore, without delay, to authorize me to act for you in this 
matter — for your formal assent is necessary; and it would be 
well if you would at once send me a telegram, and also a written 
letter, to authorize me to engage counsel in your name. Sev- 
eral liberal-minded Englishmen of high position will join me in 
defraying all the expenses of your case. You may also count 
upon me, personally, to see, during your captivity, that your 
family is not left in want. And so may God give you courage 
to endure the evil with the good. 

"Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. 

"Sept. 22, 1882. 

"Crabbet Park, Threebridges, Sussex." 



Gladstone's Evasive Answer 333 

Gladstone's answer, which came sooner than I expected, 
shows as little disposition to favour any idea of a fair trial as 
was that of the Foreign Office. It came in this form from 
Hamilton : 

"10 Downing Street, 
"Sept. 22, 1882. 
"Mr. Gladstone has read the letter which you have addressed 
to him about Arabi's trial and your proposal to employ Eng- 
lish counsel. All that he can say at the present moment is that 
he will bring your request under the notice of Lord Granville 
with whom he will consult, but that he cannot hold out any as- 
surance that it will admit of being complied with." 

This was very plain discouragement, though short of a direct 
refusal, and a few words added by Hamilton in a separate note 
were even more so: "I confess," he says, "that the more I think 
of it the greater is the number of difficulties which present 
themselves to my mind involved by such a proposal as yours. 
You will, I presume, hear further on the subject in a day or 
two but not from me, because I am off as you know." 

I was left, therefore, still In doubts while the situation was 
daily becoming more critical. I dared not leave for Egypt 
without having received a definite answer, for I knew that at 
Cairo I should be powerless, if unarmed with any Government 
authority, and should probably not even be allowed to see the 
prisoners, while Broadley, tired of waiting, had gone back to 
Tunis. The Parliamentary session was over and every one 
was leaving London, the work of the Ministers being left to 
Under-Secretaries, and all business practically at a standstill. 
Meanwhile the question of Arabi's death was being keenly de- 
bated In the Press, and all the Jingo papers were clamouring 
for his execution, only here and there a feeble voice being raised 
in protest. Sir Wilfrid Lawson's Egyptian Committee, which 
had done such good work during the summer, had become silent, 
and from Lawson himself I received just then a most despond- 
ing letter: "I greatly doubt," he said, "whether they will 
allow Arabi to have anything like a fair trial. They know 
well enough that If they do It will end In their own condemna- 
tion, and 'Statesmen' are too crafty to be led into anything of 



334 ^^^ Craft of Statesmen 

that sort. At any rate you are right in trying to get fair play 
for him." All I could do was to stay on in London and still 
worry Downing Street for an answer and go on prompting the 
"Times." Therefore, after waiting five more days, I wrote 
again to Gladstone for a definite answer, the situation having 
become to the last degree critical at Cairo. 

"Sept. 27, 1882. 

"I wrote to you about ten days ago, stating my intention of 
engaging competent English counsel for Arabi Pasha and the 
other chief Egyptian prisoners in case they should be brought 
to trial, and of going myself to Cairo to procure evidence for 
them and watch the proceedings; and I begged you to give me 
early notice of any decision that might be come to regarding 
them. 

"Your reply, through Mr, Hamilton, though giving me no 
assurance that English counsel would be allowed seemed to sug- 
gest that my proposal would be considered; and I accordingly 
retained, provisionally, a barrister of eminence to act for the 
prisoners, should It be decided they should be thus defended. 
In view also of the legal necessity of gaining the prisoners' con- 
sent to the arrangement, I wrote, under cover to Sir Edward 
Malet, to Arabi Pasha, begging his authorization of my thus 
defending him, a letter to which I have as yet received no an- 
swer; nor have I received any further communication from 
yourself or from Lord Granville, to whom you Informed me the 
matter would be referred, 

"Now, however, I see it reported In the 'Times,' from Cairo, 
that a Military Court to try all offenders will be named no 
later than to-morrow, the paragraph being as follows : 

" 'The Military Court to try all offenders will be named to- 
morrow. The Khedive, Sherif, and RIaz all Insist strongly on 
the absolute necessity of the capital punishment of the prime 
offenders, an opinion from which there are few, If any, dissen- 
tients. Sherif, whose gentleness of character is well known, said 
to me to-day: "It is not because I have a feeling of spite against 
any of them, but because it is absolutely necessary for the se- 
curity of all who wish to live in the country. An English ex- 
pedition is an excellent thing, but neither you nor we want It 
repeated every twelve months." ' ^ 

1 Telegram from Moberly Bell, 



Gladstone Out of Town 335 

"If this statement is true it would seem to confirm my worst 
suspicions as to the foregone decision of the Khedive's advisers 
to take the prisoners' lives, and to justify all my arguments as 
to the improbability of their obtaining a fair trial. I there- 
fore venture once more to urge a proper legal defence being 
granted them, such as I have suggested; and, in any case, to 
beg that you will relieve me of further doubt and, if it must be 
so, responsibility in the matter, by stating clearly whether Eng- 
lish counsel will be allowed or refused in the case of Arabi Pasha 
and the chief prisoners, and whether proper facilities can be 
promised me in Egypt of communicating with the prisoners, and 
obtaining them competent interpretation. 

"In the present state of official feeling at Cairo, it would be 
manifestly impossible for me, and those I have proposed to 
take with me, to work effectually for the prisoners without 
special diplomatic protection and even assistance. 

"The urgency of the case must be my excuse with you for 
begging an immediate answer." 

This last letter, however, never reached Its destination. 
Gladstone had left London, and Horace Seymour, his secretary 
in charge of his correspondence, under cover to whom I had 
sent it, handed it on, whether by order or not I do not know, 
to the Foreign Office. "Mr. Gladstone," he explained, "is out 
of Town, so upon receipt of your letter yesterday I sent the 
further communication which you addressed to him straight to 
the Foreign Office. ... I did so because he had placed your 
former letter in Lord Granvillle's hands, as Hamilton informed 
you, and also because I gathered from your note that this would 
meet your wish and save time. I understand that you will 
shortly receive an official reply from Lord Granville conveying 
to you the view of the Government on the matters to which you 
refer." Gladstone therefore, had shifted his responsibility of 
saying "yes" or "no" on to Granville, and Granville being of 
course also out of town it was left for the Foreign Office clerks 
to deal with according to their ways. In spite of Seymour's 
promise that the view of the Government would shortly be con- 
veyed to me, all the answer I received was one signed "Julian 
Pauncefote," stating that Mr. Gladstone had referred my two 



336 Pauncefote's Reply 

letters of the 19th and 27th to Lord Granville, and that Lord 
Granville regretted that he did not feel justified in entering into 
correspondence with me on the subject. It was thus that Glad- 
stone, who had made up his mind that Arabi should be executed 
no less than had the Foreign Office, finally evaded the respon- 
sibility with which I had sought to bind him. I give the incident 
in detail as an illustration of official craft no less than as one 
of historical importance. 

This "Pauncefote" reply decided us to waste no more time. 
In consultation with Button and with Lord De la Warr, who 
had come to London and had been working to get an answer 
from Lord Granville on independent lines, and who now offered 
to share with me the costs of the trial if we could secure one (a 
promise which I may note Lord De la Warr failed to redeem) , 
it was agreed that we should telegraph at once to Broadley at 
Tunis to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Egypt, and that 
in the meanwhile we should send out to Cairo by that very 
night's mail the first briefless barrister we could lay our hands 
on as Broadley's junior till his arrival, and be on the spot to 
act as circumstances should suggest. Lord Granville had not 
agreed, nor had he at that time the least intention of agreeing, 
to the appearance of English counsel on behalf of the prisoners. 
But the "Times," as we have seen, had already committed the 
Government to a statement that Arabi was not to be executed 
without its consent, and that he was to be defended by efficient 
counsel; and this they had not had not the face publicly to dis- 
avow. And now Button's influence was so great with Chenery 
that he was confident he could again force Lord Granville's 
hand in the matter of English counsel through the insistence of 
the "Times" on a fair trial. 

All that day, therefore, we searched the Inns of Court, which 
were almost empty, it being holiday time, and it was only at 
the last moment that we were fortunate enough to light upon 
the man we wanted. This was Mark Napier, than whom we 
could not have found a better agent for our purpose, a resource- 
ful and determined fighter with a good knowledge of the law 
and one difficult to rebuff. He had the immense advantage, 
too, through his being the son of a former British Ambassador, 
of understanding the common usages and ways of diplomacy as 
also of speaking French fluently, a very necessary qualification 



Mark Napier 337 

at Cairo. Having agreed to go he received our short instruc- 
tions, which were that he was to go straight to Malet and say 
that he had arrived as Arabi's counsel, and insist on seeing his 
client. This was all he could hope at present to achieve, and 
if he could do this he would do much. If Malet should refuse 
he was to protest and take advantage of every opening given 
him to emphasize the refusal. Above all he was to keep us 
constantly informed by telegram of what was going on, while 
we on our side would fight the battle no less energetically at 
the Foreign Office and in the Press. Mark, as I have said, had 
the great advantage of having had a diplomatic training and 
so could not be imposed upon by the prestige and mystery with 
which diplomacy is invested for outsiders, and which gives it 
so much of its strength. We could not possibly have lit upon 
a better man. He started, as proposed, that night by the Brin- 
disi mail, taking with him a cipher code and two or three let- 
ters of introduction. That, with a hand-bag, was all his lug- 
gage. 

As to myself, De la Warr, who knew the temper of the For- 
eign Office and their personal rage against me, was very insist- 
ent that I should not go to Cairo and to this I assented. At 
Cairo I should have been only watched by spies, possibly ar- 
rested and sent home, while here I could continue far more 
effectively the Press campaign which, of course, could only 
really win our battle. Button that very night managed a new 
master-stroke in the "Times." De la Warr had succeeded in 
getting from Granville an assurance that all reasonable oppor- 
tunities would be given by the Khedive for the defence. This 
assurance was of course illusory as far as a really fair trial 
went, as the only legal assistance procurable at the time by the 
prisoners at Cairo was that of the various Levantine lawyers 
who practised in the international Courts, and these could be 
no better depended upon than were the terror-stricken native 
lawyers themselves to serve their clients honestly by telling the 
whole truth, though a defence of this perfunctory kind would 
be sufficient to serve our Government's purpose of being able, 
without risk of a conflict with English popular opinion, to ratify 
the intended sentences of death. It was intended to have the 
trial in the Egyptian Court over in a couple of days, and hav- 
ing proved "rebellion," to proceed at once to execution; and 



338 We Again Force Granville's Hand 

English counsel would, no doubt, have been ruled out of the 
proceedings as a preposterous intervention of foreigners with 
no legal status in the country. 

Granville's words to De la Warr had been no more than 
this: "I have no reason to doubt that the Khedive, with whom 
the proper authority rests, will give all reasonable opportunities 
for Arabi's defence which may not involve any extraordinary 
or unnecessary delay, and it devolves on the prisoners and their 
friends to take such measures as they may think fit on their own 
responsibility." This Button cleverly reproduced next morn- 
ing in the "Times" as follows: "Lord Granville has written 
that every reasonable facility will be afforded the prisoners in 
Egypt and their friends for obtaining counsel for their defence. 
Mr. Broadley has therefore been telegraphed to to go at once 
to Cairo." It is clear from Lord Granville's angry expostula- 
tion with Lord De la Warr (see Blue Book) how little inten- 
tion he had of having his words thus interpreted. But, once 
published in the "Times," he could not with any decency back 
out of the position; and thus by a very simple device we again 
forced his hand and this time on a point which, in the event, 
gained for us the whole battle. ^ 

Nevertheless, we were very nearly being tricked out of our 
fair trial after all, and a singularly ugly circumstance of the 
position in our eyes was the sudden reappearance, just then at 
Cairo, of Colvin, the man of all others most interested, after 
the Khedive, in preventing publicity. The Foreign Office ob- 
ject clearly now was to hurry on the trial, so as to get it over 
before Broadley should have time to arrive, for Tunis was and 
still is without any direct communication with Egypt, and it 
was probable that ten days would elapse before he could be 
there. Of Napier's sending they had no knowledge. Orders, 
therefore, were at once given as a first step that Arabi should 
be transferred from the safe keeping of the British Army to 
the ill-custody of the Khedivial police, where communication with 

1 1 have been recently asked to explain that the true reason why the "Times" 
so strongly supported us in our attempt at this critical Juncture to obtain for 
Arabi a fair trial was the Machiavellian one of forcing the British Govern- 
ment to undertake responsibilities which would entail their assumption of full 
authority in Egypt. I heard, however, nothing of this at the time, and I prefer 
still to believe that it was a generous impulse more worthy of the "Times's" 
better tradition and of Chenery's excellent heart. 



Napier Arrives at Cairo 339 

the outside world would be effectually barred for him without 
the English Government incurring thereby any odium. This 
was done on the 4th of October, two days before Napier's ar- 
rival; and the trial was fixed for the 14th, while Broadley did 
not succeed in reaching Cairo till the i8th. Nothing but Na- 
pier's unexpected appearance at the English Agency disarranged 
the concerted plan. 

A further step taken to hasten the end and make an English 
defence difficult was to select the French criminal military code 
for use in the court martial, a form which under an unscrupu- 
lous government gives great advantages to the prosecution. 
According to it a full interrogatory of prisoner and witnesses 
is permitted before these have seen counsel and they are thus 
easily intimidated, if they take a courageous attitude, from 
repeating their evidence at the trial. Thus both Arabi and 
others of his fellow prisoners were during the interval between 
the interrogatory and the day fixed for trial secretly visited by 
a number of the Khedive's eunuchs, who brutally assaulted and 
ill-treated them in their cells with a view of "breaking their 
spirit." Lastly, the Egyptian Government were permitted to 
declare that no counsel should be allowed to plead except in 
Arabic, thus excluding those we were sending to the prisoners' 
help. These particulars were telegraphed me by Napier soon 
after his arrival and made us anxious. 

All that the English Government had done in some measure 
to protect the prisoners from the Khedive's unregulated vio- 
lence was to appoint two Englishmen who had a knowledge of 
Arabic to be present at the proceedings. These by a great 
stroke of good fortune were both honest and humane men, and, 
as it happened, old friends of my own. Sir Charles Wilson, 
whom I had travelled with in 188 1 from Aleppo to Smyrna 
(not to be confounded with Sir C. Rivers Wilson), and Ardern 
Beaman, whom I had known at Damascus, and who now was 
Malet's official interpreter at the Agency. Both these men had 
been favourably impressed by Arabi's dignified bearing during 
the days of his detention as English prisoner of war, and now 
willingly gave Napier what little private help they could. 

With Malet himself Napier succeeded at least so far as to 
get his status and that of the solicitor Eve, whom he had for- 
tunately found at Cairo, recognized as legal representatives of 



340 Arabi's Life in Danger 

Arabi's friends, though he could not obtain from him any defi- 
nite promise or more than a vague assurance that English 
counsel would be allowed to represent Arabi himself. His ap- 
plications to see his client were consitantly put off by Malet by 
referring him to Riaz Pasha, the Khedivial Minister of the 
Interior, who as constantly refused, and in the meanwhile the 
trial was being pushed forward with all haste, so that it was 
clear to Napier that he was being played with and that the trial 
would be over before the question of the admissibility of Eng- 
lish counsel had been plainly decided. 

Things were standing thus when on the I2th of October I 
received a sudden warning from De la Warr, who was still in 
communication with the Foreign Office : "From what I hear, 
unless vigorous steps are taken, Arabi's life is in great danger. 
You have probably received information from Mr. Napier." 
With this ill news I rushed off immediately to Button's rooms 
and there fortunately found him, and as all his information 
tallied with mine we agreed that a supreme appeal must be made 
to the public, and that the Foreign Office must be directly and 
strongly attacked and Gladstone compromised and forced into 
a declaration of policy. I consequently sat down and wrote 
a final letter to Gladstone, in which I spared nothing in my 
anger of accusation against Granville and was careful to insist 
on his own connection with the matter, and his early sympathies 
with the Nationalist leader, and, without troubling ourselves to 
ask for an answer in Downing Street, Button "plumped" it into 
next morning's "Times," Chenery generously giving it full prom- 
inence and directing attention to it in a leading article. He 
had ascertained that the intention of the Government was that 
the trial should commence on Saturday, that sentence should be 
;pronounced on Monday, and that Arabi's execution should in- 
stantly follow. It was already Friday, so we only had three 
days (one of them a Sunday when no newspapers are published) 
in which to rouse English feeling against this coup de Jarnac. 
Fortunately it was enough. I believe it was on this occasion 
that Bright, learning from my letter how things stood, went 
down to Gladstone and told him personally and plainly that he 
would be disgraced through all history as a renegade from his 
humaner principles if he allowed the perpetration of so great 
a crime. Be this as it may, the Foreign Office capitulated to 



Gladstone's Intent of Death 341 

us there and then, and, admitting our plea of the necessity of 
a fair trial, gave instructions to Malet to withdraw his op- 
position and treat the counsel sent to Arabi favourably. The 
following telegram from Napier announces our success : 
"Granville has directed Malet to require that Arabi shall 
be defended by English counsel. Proceedings expected to be 
lengthy." 

I have thought it necessary to go into very minute detail in 
narrating these early phases of Arabi's trial, because in this 
way only is it possible to refute the false and absurd legend 
that has sprung up in Egypt to the effect that there was from 
the first some secret understanding between Gladstone and 
Arabi that his life should be spared. I can vouch for it, and 
the documents I have quoted in large measure prove it, that so 
far from having any sentiment of pity for, or understanding 
with, the "arch rebel," Gladstone had joined with Granville in 
the design to secure his death, through the Khedive's willing 
agency, by a trial which should be one merely of form and 
should disturb no questions, as the surest and speediest method 
of securing silence and a justification for their own huge moral 
errors of the last six months in Egypt. It was no qualm of 
conscience that prevented Gladstone from carrying it through 
to the end, only the sudden voice of the English public that at 
the last moment frightened him and warned him that it was 
dangerous for his reputation to go on with the full plan. This 
is the plain truth of the matter, whatever glosses Mr. Glad- 
stone's apologists may put on it to save his humane credit or 
whatever may be imagined about it by French political writers 
desirous of finding an explanation for a leniency shown to 
Arabi after the war, which has seemed to them inexplicable ex- 
cept on the supposition of some deep anterior intrigue between 
the English Prime Minister and the leader of the Egyptian re- 
bellion. 

This supreme point of danger past, it was not altogether 
difficult to foresee that the trial could hardly now end other- 
wise than negatively. A fair trial in open court with the Khe- 
divial rubbish heap turned up with an English pitchfork and 
ransacked for forgotten crimes was a thought not to be con- 
templated by Tewfik without terror, while for the British 
Government as well there would be revelations destructive of 



342 Broadley at Cairo 

the theory of past events constructed on the basis of official lies 
and their own necessity of finding excuses for their violence. 
The Sultan, too, had to be safeguarded from untimely revela- 
tions. The danger for the prisoners' lives was not over, but 
there seemed fair prospect of the thing ending in a compromise 
if we could not gain an acquittal. The changed state of things 
at Cairo is announced by Napier as early as the i6th October; 
and I will give the rest of my story of the trial mainly in the 
form of telegrams and letters. 

Napier to Blunt, Oct. 20th: 

"It is believed the Egyptian Government will try to quash 
the trial altogether, and that the chief prisoners will be directed 
to leave the country. I have not sufficient facts at my com- 
mand to form a judgment on this point, but I think it not un- 
likely." ! :, 

And again from Broadley, just arrived at Cairo: 

Broadley to Blunt, Oct. 20th: 

"Borelli Bey, the Government prosecutor, admitted frankly 
that the Egyptian Government had no law or procedure to go 
by, but suggested we should agree as to a procedure. He ad- 
mitted the members of the Court were dummies and incom- 
petent. He hoped I should smooth the Sultan and let down 
Tewfik as doucement as possible." 

Napier to Blunt, Oct. 20th: 

"I think now we can guarantee a clean breast of the whole 
facts. It is as much as the Khedive's throne is worth to allow 
the trial to proceed." 

The chief danger we had to face was a desire, not yet ex- 
tinct at the Foreign Office, till by hook or crook to establish 
some criminal charge against Arabi which should justify his 
death. Chenery writes to me 21st October: "Among im- 
portant people there is a strong feeling against him [Arabi] on 
the alleged ground that he was concerned with, or connived 
at, the massacre in Alexandria. The matter will almost cer- 
tainly come up at the trial." This danger, however, did not 
at Cairo seem a pressing one, and certainly it was one that 
the prosecution was least Hkely to touch, the Khedive himself 



Arahi's Moral Courage 343 

being there the culprit. Nothing is more noticeable in the inter- 
rogatories than the pains taken by the members of the Court 
to avoid questions tending in that direction and the absence on 
that point of all evidence which could incriminate any one. 
It was one, however, of great political importance to our 
Government that it should be proved against Arabi, for on it 
they had based the whole of their wilful insistence in forcing on 
a conflict, and without it their moral excuse for intervention 
fell flatly to the ground. The same might be said in regard to 
another absurd plea, insisted upon personally by Gladstone, 
that there had been an abuse of the white flag during the evacua- 
tion of Alexandria, a supposition which he had caught hold of in 
one of his speeches and made a special crime of, though in truth 
withdrawal of troops while a white flag is flying is permitted 
according to all the usages of war. Otherwise the coast seemed 
clear enough of danger, for it was evident that the British 
public would no longer allow our Government to sanction Arabi's 
death for mere political reasons. 

Meanwhile at Cairo things were going prosperously. On 
the 22nd Broadley and Napier were admitted to Arabi's cell 
and speedily found in what he could tell them the groundwork 
of a strong defence. Arabi's attitude in prison was a perfectly 
dignified one, for whatever may have been his lack of physical 
courage, he had moral courage to a high degree, and his demean- 
our contrasted favourably with that of the large majority of 
those who had been arrested with him and did not fail to impress 
all that saw him. Without the smallest hesitation he wrote 
down in the next few days a general history of the whole of the 
political affairs in which he had been mixed, and in form which 
was frank and convincing. No less outspoken was he in de- 
nouncing the ill-treatment he had received since he had been 
transferred to his present prison from those scoundrels, the 
Khedive's eunuchs, who had been sent at night by their master 
to assault and insult him. Not a few of the prisoners had been 
thus shamefully treated; yet by a singular lack of moral courage 
the greater number dared not put into plain words a crime per- 
sonally implicating the cowardly tyrant who had been replaced 
as master over them. Nothing is more lamentable In the de- 
positions than the slavish attitude assumed by nearly all the de- 
ponents towards the Khedive's person, hated as he had been 



344 "Chicken and Champagne" 

by them and despised not a month before. A more Important 
event still was the recovery from their concealment of Arabi's 
most important papers, which had been hidden in his house and 
which he now directed should be sought out and placed in Broad- 
ley's hands. It was with great difficulty that his son and wife in 
their terror could be brought to allow the search — for they, too, 
had been "visited" by the Khedive's servants — ^but at last the 
precious documents were secured and brought to Broadley by 
Arabi's servant already mentioned, Mohammed Sid Ahmed. 
The proved of supreme value — including as they did the letters 
written by order of the Sultan to Arabi and others of a like 
compromising kind. The nev/s of the discovery struck panic 
into the Palace and there seemed every chance that the trial 
would be abandoned. 

Napier writing to me October 30th says : "The fact is I believe 
we are masters now, and that the Khedive and his crew would be 
glad to sneak out of the trial with as little delay as possible. 
The fidelity of Arabi's servant and the constancy of his wife 
enabled us to recover all his papers but one. They are now 
in a safe deposited in Beaman's room at the Consulate. . . . 
The Government cannot face our defence. They will offer a 
compromise, banishment with all property reserved. What 
better could be got? . . . This question will probobly soon have 
to be considered." 

It will be understood that the changed aspect of affairs at 
Cairo found its echo, and more than its echo, in the London 
Press. Cairo was full of newspaper correspondents, and Broad- 
ley, who was a past master in the arts of journalism, soon had 
them mostly on his side. His hospitality (at my expense) was 
lavish, and the "chicken and champagne" were not spared. 
Malet and Colvin, supreme in old days, were now quite unable 
to stem the torrent of news, and revelation followed revelation 
all destructive of the theory they had imposed on the Govern- 
ment, that Arabi and the army had been alone in opposing the 
English demands and that the National movement had been less 
than a universal one. Colvin was now become discredited at the 
Foreign Office as a false guide, and Malet's incapacity was at 
last fully recognized. Lord Granville, furious at our success, 
and seeing the political situation in Egypt drifting into a hopeless 
muddle, did what was probably his wisest course in submitting 



Dufferin Ordered to Egypt 345 

the whole matter to Lord Dufferin for a settlement. I had 
early notice from Button of this new move and that Dufferin's 
first business on arriving at Cairo would be to bring about a 
compromise of the trial. My letter of instructions to Broad- 
ley in view of the situation thus created is worth inserting here : 

Blunt to Broadley, Nov. 2, 1882. 

"I wish to state over again my ideas and hopes in under- 
taking Arabi's defence and that of his companions, which if 
they are realized will repay mc for the cost even though larger 
than I had originally thought probable. Or course the main 
object was to save the prisoners' lives, and that I think we may 
consider already accomplished, for public opinion has declared 
itself in England, and, the preliminary investigation having so 
entirely failed in the matter of the June riots and the burning of 
Alexandria, no evidence that now could be produced and no ver- 
dict given by the judges could any longer place them in jeopardy. 
Since your arrival, however, and through your skill and good 
fortune, a flush of trumps has come into our hands. Instead 
of Arabi's papers being locked up in the Foreign Office they are 
in our possession, and, as you tell me to-day, our defence is 
perfect while we hold such a commanding position over the 
enemy that we can fairly dictate them terms. We cannot, there- 
fore, be content with anything less than an honourable acquittal 
or the abandonment of the trial. At present the latter seems 
the most probable. Lord Dufferin has been ordered to Egypt; 
the Premier yesterday threw out a feeler for a compromise, and 
from everything I hear proposals will shortly be made for some 
arrangement of the affair by which the scandal and discredit 
of an exposure will be avoided. It depends, therefore, entirely 
on us to save not only Arabi's life but his honour and his free- 
dom and also I believe the lives and freedom of all the political 
prisoners inculpated with him. 

"I believe a strong attempt will be made by Lord Dufferin 
to get Arabi to agree to a detention in the Andaman Islands, 
or some part of the British Empire where he would remain a 
political prisoner treated with kindness but not suffered to be at 
large. I believe also he will endeavour to get from him a cession 
of his papers. Neither of these attempts must be allowed to 
succeed, and all proposals including them must be rejected. It 



346 My Instructions to Broadley 

is no business of ours to save the Sultan's or the Khedive's hon- 
our nor to save Lord Granville from embarrassment, and I shall 
consider our failure a great one if we do not get far more. I 
think Arabi should, in the first place, state that he demands a 
trial in order to clear his honour, and especially to demonstrate 
the innocence of those who acted with him during the war, viz., 
the whole nation, or, if not brought to trial, that the charges 
against them should be withdrawn as well as against himself. 
There should, in fact, be a general amnesty, also he should re- 
tain his papers, though probably he might give an understanding 
that they should not be published for a term of years. We 
cannot, under the circumstances, object absolutely to exile, be- 
cause I suppose it would be argued the Khedive could exile him 
by decree, but even this I should make a matter of favour, be- 
cause the Constitution of February, 1882 (which I hope you 
have closely studied, and which is a most valuable document 
from the fact of its having been confirmed by the Sultan as well 
as granted by the Khedive) forbids such exiling. Still the point 
would have to be conceded. We should, however, refuse any- 
thing like imprisonment. The Khedive might exile him from 
Egypt, and the Sultan from the Ottoman Empire, but neither 
would have a right to fix the place or nature of his abode beyond 
them. 

"Nor could the English Government, having handed Arabi 
to the Khedive for trial, let him be taken back untried to be 
dealt with as a criminal by England. The English Government 
has recognized this by refusing so to take him back. Still less 
could it imprison him if so taken without trial. It is, there- 
fore, clear that unless tried and convicted he must leave Egypt 
a free man. Nor can he legally be deprived in Egypt of his 
rank and pay. But I should suppose that he will agree to retir- 
ing with military rank only, and a small maintenance to save 
him from actual poverty and the necessity of working with his 
hands. I think these terms would be dignified, and they are 
terms we can insist upon. Otherwise I urge the necessity of a 
defence tooth and nail, and I sincerely trust that you will not 
listen to any proposal which may be made of a pro forma trial 
and letting the Khedive down doucement, as Borelli proposed. 
There should either be a real honest exposure of all the facts, or 
an honourable withdrawal of all the charges. I trust in you 



Terms of Compromise 347 

to co-operate with me fully In obtaining this result, without 
regard for the feelings of Consuls or Ambassadors or Viceroys. 
They are nothing to us, and our client's honour and cause are 
everything. Your diplomatic skill is, I have no doubt, a match 
for Lord Dufferin's, and It will be a great game to win. You 
have made Malet do what you wanted, and so you will make 
Dufferin do. If you achieve this we will not talk more about 
the fee. I enclose a letter of Introduction to Lord Dufferin." 

The following from Mr. Beaman, Malet's official Interpreter, 
and a witness of unimpeachable authority, Is of the highest his- 
torical importance. Beaman had been In charge of the Agency 
at Cairo during the last weeks before the bombardment, and 
being a good Arabic scholar knew more of the true state of 
affairs than any one employed there. He had been appointed 
a few days before the date of his letter to superintend, on Malet's 
part, the trial: 

Beaman to Blunt, Cairo, Nov. 6, 1882. 

". . . This Is our last day before the adjournment. . . . 
The Palace people here are In a great stew at the advent of 
Lord Dufferin, who arrives to-morrow. Broadley's arrival has 
been an agony to them, but this Is the last blow. I believe Duf- 
ferin Is a man who will quickly see through our friend Twefik, 
and as I hear that his ears are open to everybody the temporary 
Embassy will be better Informed, I expect, than the Agency has 
ever been. I had a great deal of Intercourse with natives before 
the bombardment of all classes and parties, and knew the whole 
of the game from the four sides, English, Turkish, ArabI, and 
Tewfik. They were each quite distinct. As I could not have 
given my authorities, and as people would not have accepted my 
word for things I could have told, I kept my Information for 
myself, but I have given some good hints to Sir Charles Wilson, 
who now has a fairer idea of the Egyptian question than any of 
our officials here. He Is an extremely cautious man, with a great 
share of shrewdness and true judgment which he does not allow 
to be warped. Through him I have been able to get facts to 
Malet which I should never have told Malet himself. I think 
now that Malet has quite lost any respect he could ever have 
had for the Khedive. Throughout our proceedings he has acted 
with the greatest fairness to us, although dead against his own 



348 The Khedive's Dirty Linen 

interests. . . . You know how deeply he was pledged to the 
Khedive, and it is quite bitter enough a cup to him to see his 
idol come down from the card house which is breaking up. . . . 
I think the Ibrahim Agha business alone is quite enough to show 
the Khedive in his true colours, I heard the whole story direct 
from the Palace, how the titunji, the Khedive's pipe bearer, had 
kissed the Khedive's hand, and asked permission to spit in the 
faces of the prisoners, and it was on this that Sir Charles Wilson 
made inquiry and found it all true. Nevertheless, because it was 
evident that the Khedive had a very dirty piece of linen to be 
washed in the business, it was left alone. I suggested when 
all the witnesses swore falsely that the oath of triple divorce 
should be administered to them, and Sir Charles Wilson was in 
favour of it too, but it was hushed up. His Highness's own 
family now no longer pretend to deny it among themselves. 
And this is the man for whom we came to Egypt.^ 

"If I was not bound by my position here not to advise Broad- 
ley, I could give him hints enough for his cross-examination 
to turn out the Khedive to-morrow. I hope it will come out 
nevertheless. The first man to be got rid of is Riaz. He is 
playing the very devil through Egypt. The other day he said: 
'The Egyptians are serpents and the way to prevent serpents 
from propagating is to crush them under foot. So will I crush 
the Egyptians.' And he is doing it." 

Matters stood thus in the first week of November, the date 
of Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo. It was a fortunate cir- 
cumstance for us who were defending the cause of justice in 
England that Parliament that year happened to be holding an 
autumn session. It brought to our aid in the House of Commons 
several Members of first rate fighting value — Churchill, Wolff, 
Gorst, Lawson, Labouchere, besides Robert Bourke, Lord John 
Manners, W. J. Evelyn, and the present Lord Wemyss, of the 
regular Tory opposition, with two or three Irish Members. 
Percy Wyndham, to his credit, was the only Tory who had voted 
with the minority of twenty-one against the war. 

^ The fact of Tewfik's having sent his eunuchs to insult the Nationalist leaders 
in prison is attested by Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who was among the earliest 
arrested, and was himself one of its victims. He recorded his prison experience 
in a declaration submitted to Sir Charles Wilson 29th October, but which is 
absent from the Blue Books. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

dufferiin's mission 

Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo on the 6th November placed 
matters there on an entirely new footing. Up to that point 
Riaz Pasha and the rest of the Khedive's Ministers had been 
doing pretty much as they liked, subject only to Malet's weak 
supervision. But Dufferin was a man of another mould, and 
soon showed the Khedive that his position while in Egypt was 
to be that of master, not adviser. He paid little attention to 
his tales, and not much, I believe, to Malet's, but opened the 
doors of his Embassy to every one who could give information. 
Mackenzie Wallace, his chief assistant, in a very few days ac- 
quired a good general knowledge of what had been going on in 
Egypt during the last two years, and his book about it gives 
more of the truth than any other yet published in English. 
Dufferin, though an idle man, was a rapid worker, and where he 
had something serious to do, knew how easiest to do it. 

Nevertheless, for the first fortnight after Dufferin's arrival, 
and until he had quite assured himself of his ground, the prose- 
cution of Arabi was allowed to work on in its own casual way, 
swayed by the Khedive's ever shifting impulses of a desire to 
conceal the truth on the one hand, and an unwillingness on the 
other to let go his prey. These will be best recorded by simply re- 
producing the letters and telegrams which now passed almost 
daily between me in London and Messrs. Broadley and Napier at 
Cairo, as will the successive steps by which a compromise of 
the trial was eventually come to. 

Broadley to Blunt, November 6th (in answer to his letter of 
November 2nd) : 

"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the 
greatest prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, 
showing: 

349 



350 Broadley's Case for Arahi 

" ( I ) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations. 

"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12. 

"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout. 

"(4) Universality of the movement. 

"(5) Wholly illegal constitution of the Court Martial. 

"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier 
has secured A i deposition from Lambton). 

"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi. 

"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival. 

"(9) Torture of prisoners. 

"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against Eng- 
land. 

"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Monlteur.' 

"Shall demand release of all the accused. Keep this private. 

"Now all I fear Is the enormous expense of a protracted 
trial of eight or nine months. Arabi alone calls 400 witnesses. 
... I spend freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have 
wheedled the 'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. 
I have turned public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We 
are obliged to employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying 
from £1 to £2 1 05. a week, . . . My absence from Tunis 
means utter loss of all there. All my pending cases have 
been given up, including some of great magnitude. Bourke 
will tell you I have one retainer alone of £250 a year, and an- 
other of £100. ... I hope you will take all this into considera- 
tion. ... I only say I believe all will depend on liberal if not 
lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one against us, 
and people don't work without a reward here. . . . An Arabi 
fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial Is a 
specimen. But I don't think we should exceed one-tenth of that 
at the worst. . . . All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think 
of me but only of incidental expenses. ... I work sixteen hours 
a day. . . . Napier is invaluable." 

Napier to Blunt, November 6th: 

"You seem to be doubtful about the acte d'accusation. We 
have not had it officially communicated. It is not proposed 
by the prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. 
But in substance it Is fairly stated In a telegram I think to the 
'Times' ; 



Duferin and Broadley 351 

"(i) The abuse of the White Flag. 
"(2) Complicity in massacres and pillage, June 11. 
"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city. 
"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan. 
"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khe- 
dive and the Sultan." 

Broadley to Blunt ^ November ']th (telegraphed) : 
"If you don't mind expense great success sure — see my yester- 
day's letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of re- 
demption." 

Napier to Blunt, November lOth: 

"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, 
though he declined to enter on business at once. He had only 
just received his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him 
to-morrow. 

"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion 
question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to 
the ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me 
most. It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the 
Cape, and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed 
into a cocked hat at once. . . . Proposals for a compromise 
must come from the other side, must be put in writing, and 
must contain all that you claim — indeed I think they ought to 
amount to unconditional surrender. Of this of course more 
fully afterwards. You may be assured that we will not consent 
to anything without communication with you, and fullest de- 
liberation." 

Napier to Blunt, November i^th: 

"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with 
which we have to deal. In the first place since we were not per- 
mitted to be present at the examination of the witnesses, it is 
necessary for us not only to have the whole of the evidence cop- 
ied, but also to submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for 
his observation and consideration. . . . There are 136 wit- 
nesses who will be brought against us. Besides these, 125 
prisoners have been interrogated, and their answers will be used 
against each other. Then anybody who pleases seems to have 



352 Difficulty of Getting a Fair Trial 

been allowed to write letters to the Court, among others, H. H. 
the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or some of them. . , . 
Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most of it con- 
sists of hearsay and opinion. ... 'In your opinion is Arabi a 
rebel?" 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't 
you know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it 
over, and to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do 
know.' To-morrow the wretch arrives with a written statement 
that the prisoner in question is a rebel and incendiary. 

"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct trans- 
lations from the originals, and the originals are not true records 
of the evidence of the witnesses themselves. . . . 

"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. 
[He had been Secretary to the Government and Director of 
the Press.] They could not have done anything so destructive 
to their own case. Not only does he know French well, but 
he has good literary ability, and a very fair knowledge of all 
these tortuous and involved intrigues rolled up one within an- 
other the untanglement of which is a business enough to 
make the head reel. How if -it were to appear that the 
Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the Khedive 
as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable tutelage 
of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of 
June 1 1 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and 
French to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable Na- 
tional movement ! 

"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would 
not face the trial, and that they would find some means to put 
an end to the scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think 
that that will not be so. Many people in high places are 
prompted by motives of revenge, and still hope to wreak it upon 
their enemies. Others hope that by the unworthy devices of 
the Court a fair trial may yet be prevented. And I have 
no doubt they will in a great measure succeed. Again, perhaps 
it is the policy of the English Cabinet to insist upon the matter 
being threshed out, so as to give them time to meet the storm, 
and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks and perhaps 
Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the expense 
will be, but I fear it will be very great." 



Suliman Sami Arrested 353 

Napier to Lady Anne Blunt, November i6th: 

"Lord Dufferin began at once by lending us his assistance. 
Broadley and I called a day or two after his arrival. Broadley 
made a very masterly statement which put him in possession of 
the whole of our numerous causes of complaint. He has also 
been given copies of our formal protests, and I believe will in- 
directly assist us to defeat the Court of imbeciles with whom we 
have to deal. .. . . The correspondents, with the exception of 
Bell, are all, I believe, favourable. The 'Daily News' especially. 
Wallace of the 'Times' has just arrived, and I believe his in- 
fluence will go far to counteract Bell's extraordinary correspon- 
dence. Bell will particularly be called to account for his 'Arabi's 
head-in-a-charger' poHcy. I think he seems a little uncomfort- 
able on the prospect of being examined on his telegrams in 
Court." 

Mackenzie Wallace, here alluded to, arrived with Dufferin 
from Constantinople, where he was "Times" correspondent, and 
afterwards became Dufferin's private secretary when His Lord- 
ship went to India as Viceroy. He was an able man, and acted 
while in Egypt entirely in concert with Dufferin, and has written 
the only English narrative of the events of 1882 which has any 
historical value. 

What follows is in connection with the final attempt made by 
the prosecution to get evidence against Arabi on a point which 
might be treated as a capital one, namely, the arrest of Suliman 
Sami, who had been in command of the Egyptian rear-guard at 
the evacuation of Alexandria, and who, having been subjected to 
the usual intimidation treatment in prison, was now said to be 
ready to give evidence that Arabi had ordered him to burn 
the city. It was this sudden desperate attempt to obtain a 
capital verdict that brought matters to a crisis at Cairo, and 
resulted, as we shall see, in the compromise effected by Dufferin 
of the trial. 

Broadley to Blunt, November i']th: 

"An attempt has been made to force Suliman Bey to impli- 
cate Arabi. It has been done so clumsily that Suliman has con- 
tradicted every other witness called to prove the same thing, but 
I believe it was done at a midnight or secret sitting when Wilson 
was absent. . . . Try and make your peace with the Foreign 



354 Compromise Suggested 

Office, Dufferin is square, and we could get a lot by soft words." 

Beaman to Blunt, November I'jth: 

"I just write a line ... to say that things are going on 
very well. The evidence of Suliman Sami, which seems to have 
rejoiced the prosecution, is not worth a straw, having been 
palpably invented for the occasion, and not supported by any of 
the preceding testimony. The only question seems to be if the 
prisoners will get off without a trial, or if they will have a chance 
of being fairly heard in their own defence. I am convinced that 
the Government here is using every effort to quash the proceed- 
ings, as the facts that would ccme out in cross-examination would 
be compromising to every man almost now in power, and would 
lay bare some very unpleasant facts about the Khedive. For 
this last reason it is just possible that our Government may feel 
inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as it will be a rough expose 
if the trial proves the biggest scamp in Egypt is the man whom 
we brought an army here to uphold. Personally I have very 
little doubt that the Khedive and Omar Loutfi arranged the 
Alexandrian massacre in order to aim a blow at Arabi, who had 
just declared himself responsible for public safety. I hold 
proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time has 
not yet come to produce them." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November iSth: 
"Believe excellent compromise possible. Do not attack the 
Foreign Office. Absolute secrecy necessary." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 20th: 

"London parleys Dufferin. Egyptian Government's desire 

to compromise lessened by thinking public opinion in England 

changed owing to Suliman Sami's perjury." 

Broadley to Blunt, November 21st: 

"Important crisis imminent. The friends of the Egyptian 
Government assert intention of hanging Arabi. Remain in 
London." 

Broadley to Blunt, November 21st: 

"Nothing I could say could give you an idea of the infamous 
conduct of the Egyptian Government. They set our procedure 



Terms Of ere d 355 

rules at defiance, and say they do not care a curse, as they are 
treating diplomatically for the hanging of Arabi." 

Napier to Blunt, November 21st: 

"We are simply fighting all the force of the Egyptian Govern- 
ment single-handed, though I believe Lord Dufferin will come 
to the rescue. They are striving to procure the judicial murder 
of these prisoners, and It takes all our time to meet their many 
wiles. Wilson and Dufferin are helping us, but they, the 
Egyptian Government, are quick and unscrupulous. We are 
necessarily more slow and cautious," 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 26th: 
"Egyptian Government proposes to try Arabi alone. Tele- 
graph your opinion." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 2'jth: 
"Letters explaining situation fully posted. Reason to be- 
lieve If Arabi, Mahmud SamI and Toulba consent to admit 
formal charges of rebellion or continuing war against orders of 
the Khedive, the Egyptian Government will consent to exile or 
Internment at the Cape of Good Hope, or elsewhere, some of the 
accused simple exile, the majority amnesty. I Implore absolute 
secrecy. Napier and myself favourable to compromise seeing 
difficulty of proving efforts to prevent burning, etc." 

Blunt to Broadley, November 2%th: 

"Cannot approve terms named — certainly not Cape, but am 
consulting friends to-night about funds. Our political position 
Immensely strong. Definite answer later." 

Broadley to Blunt. Letter. November 2'jth,i 1882: 

("Private and most urgent.) 
"My dear Blunt, 

"I invite all your prudence, calm consideration and tact to 
the subject of this letter. I have had a long Interview [with] 
Dufferin to-day. He Is most friendly. The dossier Is before 
us. Nothing presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. 
As regards this I believe the proof will fail as to Araby's orders, 
but many ugly facts remain, viz. : no efforts to stop conflagration 



356 Interview with Duferin 

and loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami after- 
wards. (3) No punishment of offenders. (4) Large pur- 
chases petroleum. (5) Systematic manner of incendiarism by 
soldiers. 

"This is the rub. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole 
thing]? Besides, some of his former speeches, etc., have a very 
burning appearance. 

"If Arabi will plead guilty formally to one of the charges 
of rebellion (i. e., his continuing war after Khedive's orders) 
he will be exiled. 

"Cape of Good Hope under certain conditions with sufficient 
allowance. I think I can secure these terms for him, Mahmud 
Sami and Toulba. Rest, simple exile or pardon. Can I think 
secure allowance or with forfeiture property — retention military 
rank. 

"Against this we have enormous length trial — chances of turn 
public opinion — expense and the five facts which I allude to 
above. 

"If a word of this transpires you will do me incalculable injury. 
Think over all this and remember our great and grave responsi- 
bility. Dufferin is charming. Please at once telegraph as fol- 
lows: If you say 'I accept the principle. Make best possible 
terms,' say pax. I advise this course as best. If you say, 'Go 
on — no sort of compromise can be accepted,' say bellum. 

"I am prepared to fight manfully to the bitter end strongly 
as ever. I leave all to you — but think well over all the con- 



tmgencies. 



"Very faithfully yours, 

"A. M. Broadley. 



Napier to Blunt. Letter. November I'-jth: 

"Cairo, Nov. i^th, 1882. 
"Dear Blunt, 

"It is much to be regretted that the Post Office people have 
found out our correspondence, for they have, to my knowledge, 
opened your last letter to me registered and received last Friday. 
It contained the Borelli charges returned, and a short note from 
you. I do not think anything was abstracted. I shall send this 
by ordinary post under cover to H. H. Asquith, Temple, E. C, 
in the hope that it may escape their vigilance, I, of course, pro- 



Napier Urges Compromise 357 

tested at once, but do not suppose that they will mend their ways. 
I also greatly regret that I have no time to keep copies of my 
own letters to you for reference. You must not be surprised 
therefore if you sometimes meet with repetition. I cannot tell 
you of all the tricks they have played upon us, as they would fill 
volumes. The letter had been obviously opened by being slit 
across above the seal, and gummed up again. It had been 
cleverly done, and I might not have discovered it but for the 
fact that the gum used was not quite set. It therefore opened 
along the line of the slit, and I at once found the gum where 
no gum should have been. I will send you a short note by the 
direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay in the 
delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since 
last mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has 
occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of 
Mahmud Sami, with whom we have had several long conferences. 
Toulba is ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I think, and 
asthma. I do not know whether he will die, but I have done 
everything in my power to get him proper medical assistance, a 
change of room, a companion, and, if possible, a raised bed. 

"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria 
has not been communicated to us except through the medium of 
the Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It 
is not formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour 
to a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes, 
therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether there 
is no way out other than through the portals of the court martial. 
There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence, and even 
smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the other 
charges of Rebellion and Massacre of June nth I feel sure we 
could make it hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion 
in a very high quarter that there is a strong determination to 
execute if the Court should find guilty. Assume, therefore, 
that the Court Martial find the prisoner (for I am only speaking 
of the chief now) guilty, it will be for the English Government 
to reverse the sentence. I am of opinion that it would be danger- 
ous to trust them to carefully examine the evidence and the 
manner in which it has been obtained. I think it possible that 
that matter would be hastily disposed of in the Foreign Office, 
and that they might leave the prisoner to the Court, declaring 



35 8 Danger of Refusal 

that everything had been done to secure a fair trial, and that 
they could not interfere with a verdict deliberately arrived at 
after the fullest opportunity given to the defence. And besides, 
it is more than probable that they would allow some sentence 
to pass — any sentence suffered here would be most dangerous 
to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare not advise 
the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an alternative. If 
terms of banishment are offered, with proper safeguards and 
provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in favour of ac- 
cepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court, some 
punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be in- 
flicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without 
means, or remaining in the country at the mercy of the Govern- 
ment here. If he leaves the country under a compromise all 
charges except that of rebellion would have to be withdrawn, 
and provision for his life in a suitable place would have to be 
accorded. I have reason to believe that the course of a com- 
promise finds favour with all but Riaz, and is also favourably 
regarded by Dufferin. 

"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely 
yours, 

"Mark Napier. 

"P. S. — As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In 
law, in fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. 
But there are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to. 
Broadley has in my opinion conducted all the different discus- 
sions with the Court and Dufferin with the greatest energy, 
skill, and judgment. The law of the case is perfect for us, 
but it is a case which will be decided in the Cabinet and not in 
the Court. It is impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had 
no opportunity to consider the whole evidence, I will not offer an 
opinion on that now." 

Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November iSth, 
7.42 p. m.: 

"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us dis- 
cretion to obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. 
Rely on our judgment. Foreign Office's support unreliable. 



Arabi Authorizes Compromise 359 

Dufferin disposed to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Duf- 
ferin rules Egyptian Government. Defense case burning Alex- 
andria suspicious. Hence anxiety. Embrace present moment. 
Dufferin's good offices absolutely necessary. Telegraph in- 
stantly full discretion. Interview Dufferin ten to-morrow. 

"Broadley, Napier." 

Napier to Blunt. Same date: 

"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram 
herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every 
personal interest contrary to our request. Napier, private." 

Blunt to Broadley, November iSth midnight: 
"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile — not in- 
ternment — Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use dis- 
cretion." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 2gth: 
"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in 
concert with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on 
formal charge of rebellion — others abandoned. Sentence read 
commuting punishment to exile — exile simple on parole — good 
place which you can settle with the Foreign Office — perhaps 
Azores. Suitable allowance granted and compensation for loss 
of property entailed by sentence. You probably fail to realize 
difficulty of rebutting case of burning Alexandria and obtaining 
evidence for defence. Foreign Office certainly indisposed to 
interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of death — for example, 
long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am convinced ultimate 
result inevitably worse, dreading great responsibility, having full 
knowledge of the position of affairs. I trust you will leave us 
discretion, to avoid possible disaster." 

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November igth, 3 p. m.: 
"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion 
on basis of telegram just received." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 2>^th: 

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De 

la Warr the place of exile — Fiji suggested. Gratified at your 

confidence." 



360 / Consent to Compromise 

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 2^th, 2.30 p. m.: 
"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for re- 
ligious life. They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De 
la Warr away." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st: 
"Dufferln's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's ar- 
ranging place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely 
satisfied." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rJ; 
"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' 
Egyptian Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December ^th: 
"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks — Inclined to 
Cape. Dufferin brick [jic]." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m.: 
"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyp- 
tian colony furious." 

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th: 
"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in Eng- 
lish territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How 
about Gibraltar or Guernsey. Consult Arabi." 

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December ^th: 
"Many thanks kind telegram." 

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not with- 
out reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by 
Dufferin. We had at the moment the full tide of English opin- 
ion with us, and I knew that the Foreign Office could not do 
otherwise than agree to almost any terms we chose to Impose, 
and I was most unwilling that the charge of rebellion should 
be admitted by us. At the same time it was not possible for 
me In the face of Broadley's, and especially Napier's, telegrams 
to withhold my assent. The responsibility was too great. I 
had also the question of costs to consider. It is true that a 



Retrospect 361 

public subscription had been opened which had brought us 
valuable names. But the actual sums subscribed did not yet 
amount to £200, while Broadley's bill was running already to 
£3,000. A continuation for another month of the trial would 
have meant for me a larger expenditure than I was prepared 
to face in a political quarrel which was not quite my own. I 
therefore took counsel with De la Warr, and especially with 
Robert Bourke, of whom I have already spoken, and who warned 
me how frail a thing public opinion was to rely on, and advised 
me strongly to consent. I remember walking up and down with 
him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision for half an 
hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I consequently 
sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after much argu- 
ment, we succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile the 
Island of Ceylon, the traditional place of exile of our father 
Adam when driven out of Paradise. No more honourable one 
could possibly have been fixed upon. 

The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin 
were unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an over- 
sight on Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this 
and thus saved us much after trouble and misunderstanding. 
The negligence allowed the Egyptian Government to inflict deg- 
radation of rank on the prisoners, which was certainly not in 
the spirit of Lord Dufferin's arrangement, though, perhaps, 
legally following the pro forma sentence of death for rebellion. 
Room, too, was left for dispute as to what was the amount of 
the allowance intended as compensation for the confiscations. 
Broadley seems to have exaggerated to his clients the promises 
on this head. Personally I consider that they were not illiber- 
ally death with, as the property of most of them was insignifi- 
cant, and they were allowed to retain property belonging to 
their wives. The only considerable sufferer pecuniarily was 
Mahmud Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he forfeited. 
As to Arabi, his sole worldly possessions, besides what furni- 
ture was in his house at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses 
in his stable, consisted of the eight acres of good land he had 
inherited from his father in his native village, to which he had 
at various time added parcels of uncultivated land on the 
desert edge, amounting to some six hundred acres, paid for out 
bf his pay in prosperous days. These at the time of the con- 



362 Hopes for the Future 

fiscation cannot have been worth much over £2,000 or £3,000, 
for barren land was then selling for only a few reals the acre, 
and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them. ^ 

A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer 
of importance, was whether the paroles of the prisoners were 
given to the Egyptian or the English Governments. But with 
these matters I need not trouble myself more than to say that 
the English Government, having gained its end of getting the 
rebellion admitted by us, and so a title given for their interven- 
tion in Egypt, gave little more help to the defence of certain 
unfortunate minor prisoners who on various pretexts found 
themselves excluded from the amnesty, and were subjected to all 
the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled authority. These, 
however, belong to a period beyond that of which I now propose 
to write, namely, that of the permanent Occupation, and cannot 
be detailed in my present memoir, which now, I think, has made 
clear at least my own part in the events of the revolution to the 
last point where that part was personal. 

Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, 
with its early successes and its final failure to obtain for the 
National Government fair treatment at English hands, I cannot 
wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mis- 
takes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure responsible 
for the determination the Nationalists came to to risk their 
country's fortune on the die of battle. But I still think their fate 
would have been a worse one if they had not fought, tamely sur- 
rendering to European pressure. They at least thus got a hear- 
ing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been 
paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by Arabi's per- 
sistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their 
political principles even to the point of war. It obliged Eng- 
land to listen to their complaints and. If it could not prevent her 
from depriving them of their political liberty, it has forced her 
since to remedy most of their secular material wrongs. 

1 A claim made recently in his name for a large indemnity in regard to these 
lands, and embodied in a petition addressed to our King Edward, is an entire 
illusion on Arabi's part, and marks the fact, otherwise very apparent to those 
who know him, that he has fallen into a condition of senile decay for which there 
is no remedy. 

The worst oversight was that the promised general amnesty was not exactly 
defined. Hence the later prosecutions on so-called "criminal" charges. 



Marvel Not at Injustice 363 

What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has 
grown rich under EngHsh tutelage, and though I do not consider 
riches synonymous with the well being of a nation, they have 
been in Egypt of at least this value, that they have enabled the 
native Nile population so far to hold its own against foreign 
intrusion as owner of the soil. While this is, the Nation will 
remain alive, and the day may yet come for the fellah race 
when self-government will be restored to them, and the armed 
struggle of 1882 will appear to them in its true light as the be- 
ginning of their national life, and one, as such, glorious in their 
annals. To that day of final emancipation I still pin my hopes, 
though it is not likely I shall live to see it.^' 

If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to 
continue the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much 
that is of importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high 
historical value as the recital already made. The present volume 
may well stand by itself, and so with regret I leave it. I should 
have wished to include in it an account of Lord Dufferin's 
mission of reconstruction, and the weak efforts made by Glad- 
stone to undo the wrong he had inflicted on the cause of liberty, 
and on his own reputation as a man of good. But this would 
lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual narrative at the 
point where we have now arrived, the close of the eventful year, 
1882. On one of the last days of it I received a second charac- 
teristic letter from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and the 
suppression of liberty in Egypt, he quotes the following ap- 
propriate verse : 

"When thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the 
subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the 
Highest regardeth it." 

1 This was written in 1904. 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX I 

Arabi's Account of his Life and of the Events of 1881-1882, 

AS told to me^ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt^ in Arabic yesterday^ 

March i6th^ 1903, at Sheykh Obeyd 

I was born in the year 1840 at Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in the Sherkieh. 
My father was Sheykh of the village, and owned eight and a half feddans 
of land, which I inherited from him and gradually increased by savings 
out of my pay, which at one time was as much as £250 a month, till it 
amounted to 570 feddans, and that was the amount confiscated at the 
time of my trial. I bought the land cheaply in those days for a few 
pounds a feddan which is worth a great deal now, especially as it was 
in a poor state (luahash) when I bought it and now is in good cultivation. 
But none of it was given me by Said Pasha or any one, and the acreage I in- 
herited was only eight and a half. I invested all the money I could save 
in land, and had no other invested money or movable property except a 
little furniture and some horses and such like, which may have been 
worth £1,000. ' I I , 

As a boy I studied for two years at the Azhar, but was taken for a 
soldier when I was only fourteen, as I was a tall well grown lad and Said 
Pasha wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the village 
Sheykhs, and train them tO' be officers. I was made to go through an 
examination, and what I had learned at the Azhar served me well, and 
I was made a boulok-amin, clerk, instead of serving^ in the ranks, at 
sixty piastres a month. I did not, however, like this, as I thought I 
should never rise to any high position, and I wished to be a personage 
like the Mudir of our province, so I petitioned Ibrahim Bey, who was my 
superior, to be put back into the ranks. Ibrahim Bey showed me that I 
should lose by this as my pay would then be only fifty piastres, but I 
insisted and so served. I was put soon after to another examination, out of 
which I came first, and they made me chowish, and then to a third and 
they made me lieutenant when I was only seventeen. Suliman Pasha el 
Franzawi was so pleased with me that he insisted with Said Pasha on 
giving me promotion, and I became captain at eighteen, major at nine- 
teen, and Lieutenant-Colonel, Caimakam, at twenty. Then Said Pasha 
took me with him as A. D. C. when )ie went to Medina, about a year 
before he died. That was in a. h. 1279 (1862?). 

367 



3^^ Appendix 1 

Said Pasha's death was a great misfortune to me and to all, as he was 
favourable to the children of the country. Ismail was quite otherwise. 
In his time everything was put back into the hands of the Turks and 
Circassians, and the Egyptians in the army got no protection and no 
promotion. I went on serving as Caimakam for twelve years without 
much incident till war came with Abyssinia. I was not sent to the 
war with Russia, but when the war with Abyssinia broke out all avail- 
able troops were wanted, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the 
stations on the Haj Road, and I was sent to do this. I was sent quite alone 
without a single soldier or a single piastre and had to get there as best 
I could on a camel. I went in this way to Nakhl and Akaba and Wej 
collecting the garrisons and putting in Arabs to take charge of the forts 
there as ghaffirs. Then we crossed over the sea to Kosseir and so by 
Keneh to Cairo. I was not paid a penny for this service or even my 
expenses. The country was in a fearful state of oppression, and it was 
then I began to interest myseH in politics to save my countrymen from 
ruin. I was sent on to Massowa from Cairo and took part in the 
campaign of which Ratib Pasha was commander-in-chief, wit,h Loringe 
Pasha, the American, as Chief of the Staff. 1 was not present at the 
battle of Kora, being in charge of the transport service between Massowa 
and the army. It was a disastrous battle, seven ortas being completely 
destroyed. Loringe Pasha was the officer mostly in fault. The Khedive's 
son, Hassan, was there, but only as a boy, to learn soldiering. He was not 
in command nor is it true that he was taken prisoner by the Abyssinians. 

After this I thought much about politics. I remember to have seen 
Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din, but not to speak to, but my former connection with 
the Azhar made me acquainted with several of his disciples. The most 
distinguished of them were Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and Sheykh Hassan 
el Towil. The first book that ever gave me ideas about political mat- 
ters was an Arabic translation of the "Life of Bonaparte" by Colonel 
Louis. The book had been brought by Said Pasha with him to Medina, 
and its account of the conquest of Egypt by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered 
him that he threw the book on the ground, saying "See how your country- 
men let themselves be beaten." And I took it up and read all that 
night, without sleeping, till the morning. Then I told Said Pasha that 
I had read it and that I saw that the French had been victorious because 
they were better drilled and organized, and that we could do as well 
in Egypt if we tried. 

You ask me about the affair of the riot against Nubar Pasha in the 
time of Ismail and whether I had a hand in it. I had none, for the 
reason that I was away at Rashid (Rosetta) with my regiment. But the 
day before the thing happened I was telegraphed for by the War Office 



Arabi's Autobiography 369 

with my fellow Caimakam, Mohammed Bey Nadi, to deal with the 
case of a number of soldiers that had been disbanded by the new Ministers 
without their arrears of pay or even bread to eat, and who were at 
Abbassiyeh. But I knew nothing of what was being arranged against 
Nubar. That was done by order of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, through a 
servant of his, Shahin Pasha, and his brother-in-law, Latil Eff. Selim, 
director of the military college. These got up a demonstration of the 
students of the college, who went in a body to the Ministry of Finance. 
They were joined on the way by some of the disbanded soldiers and 
officers, not many, but some. At the Ministry they found Nubar get- 
ting into his carriage, and they assaulted him, pulled his moustache, and 
boxed his ears. Then Ismail Pasha was sent for to quell the riot and he 
came with Abd-el-Kader Pasha and Ali Bey Fehmy, the colonel of his 
guard, whom he ordered to fire on the students, but Ali Fehmy ordered 
his men to fire over their heads and nobody was hurt. Ali Fehmy was 
not with us at that time. He was devoted to Ismail, having married a 
lady of the palace, but he did not like to shed the blood of these young 
men. 

Ismail Pasha, to conceal his part in it and that of those who got up 
the affair, accused Nadi Bey and me and Ali Bey Roubi of being their 
leaders and we were brought before a mejliss on which were Stone Pasha 
and Hassan Pasha Afflatoun with Osman Rifki, afterwards Under-Sec- 
retary of War, and others. I showed, however, that its was impossible we 
could be concerned in it as we had only that very night arrived from 
iRosetta. Nevertheless we were blamed and separated from our regiments, 
Nadi being sent to Mansura, Roubi to the Fayum, and I to Alexandria 
where I was given a nominal duty of acting as agent for the Sheykhs of 
Upper Egypt, whose arrears of taxes in the shape of beans and other 
produce were to be collected and sent to Alexandria in security for money 
advanced to Ismail by certain Jews of that place. But before We separated 
we had a meeting at which I proposed that we should join together Sand 
depose Ismail Pasha. It would have been the best solution of the case, 
as the Consuls would have been glad to get rid of Ismail in any way, 
and it would have saved after complications as well as the fifteen millions 
Ismail took away with him when he was deposed. But there was nobody 
as yet to take the lead, and my proposal, though approved, was not executed. 
The deposition of Ismail lifted a heavy load from our shoulders and all 
the world rejoiced, but it would have been better if we had done it 
ourselves as we could then have got rid of the whole family of Mohammed 
Ali, who were none of them, except Said, fit to rule, and we could have 
proclaimed a republic. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din proposed to Mohammed Abdu 
to kill Ismail at the Kasr-el-Nil Bridge and Mohammed Abdu approved. 



370 Appendix I 

Ismail collected the money of the Mudiriehs six months before his de- 
position. Latif afterwards avowed his part in the affair. Latif was 
put in prison but released on application of the freemasons to Nubar. 

Tewfik Pasha, when he succeeded Ismail, by his first act made public 
promise of a Constitution. You ask me whether he was sincere in this. 
He never was sincere, but he was a man incredibly weak, who never 
could say "no," and he was under the influence of his Minister, Sherif 
Pasha, who was a sincere lover of free forms of government. Tewfik, 
in his father's reign, had amassed money, which was what he cared for 
most, by receiving presents from persons who had petitions to make, and 
who thought he could forward their ends. He had no wish for a Con- 
stitution, but he could not say "no" when Sherif pressed him. So he 
promised. Two months later he fell under the stronger influence of 
the Consuls, who forbade him to decree it. On this Sherif called the 
Ministers together, and they all gave him their words of honour that 
they would resign with him if he resigned. And so it happened. But 
some of them, notwithstanding their promise, joined Riaz Pasha when 
he became Prime Minister in Sherif's place. In order to persuade them 
Riaz engaged that each Minister should be supreme in his own depart- 
ment, and that they would not allow Tewfik to interfere in any way 
with the administration. Mahmud Sami joined him as Minister of 
the Awkaf, Ali Mubarak as Minister of Public Works, and Osman 
Pasha Rifki, a Turk of the old school, who hated the fellahin, was 
made Minister of War. The new government -was a tyrannical one. 
Hassan Moussa el Akkad, for signing a petition against the break- 
ing of the Moukabala arrangement, was exiled to the White Nile, 
and Ahmed Fehmi for another petition, and many other people were 
got rid of who incurred the displeasure of the Ministers. Of all the 
Ministers the worst was Osman Rifki. 

We colonels were now once more with our regiments, and as native 
Egyptians subject to much oppression. On any pretext a fellah officer 
would be arrested, and his place filled by a Circassian. It was the 
plan to weed the whole army of its native officers. I was especially in 
ill favour because I ,had refused to allow my men to be taken from 
their military duty and put to dig the Tewfikieh Canal, which it was 
the practice to make them do without extra pay. Plans were made to 
involve me in some street quarrel with the view to my assassination, 
but through the love of my soldiers I always escaped. All officers who 
were not Circassians were in danger, and all were alarmed. It was 
thus that Ali Fehmy, who was a fellah born, though through his wife 
connected with the Court, came to join us, for he feared he, too, would 
be superseded. He was Colonel of the ist Regiment of Guards, and 
stationed at Abdin ; I was at Abbassiyeh with the 3rd Regiment, and 



Arabi's Autobiography 371 

Abd-el-Aal Helmi was at Toura. Ali Roubi commanded the cavalry. 

Matters came to a crisis in January, 188 1. I had gone to spend 
the evening with Nejm ed Din Pasha, and there were at his house 
some pashas talking over the changes Osman Rifki had in hand, 
and I learned from them that it had been decided that I and Abd-el-Aal 
should be deprived of our commands, and our places given to officers 
of the Circassian class. At the same moment a message arrived for me 
from my house to say that Ali Fehmy had come there with Abd-el-Aal 
and was awaiting me. So I went home and I found them there, and 
from them I learned the same evil news. We therefore took council 
what was to be done. Abd-el-Aal proposed that we should go in force 
to Osman Rifki's house and arrest or kill him, but I said, "No, let us 
petition first the Prime Minister, and then, if he refuses, the Khedive." 
And they charged me to draw the petition up in form. And I did 
so, stating the case, and demanding the dismissal of Osman Rifki, and 
the raising of the army to 18,000 men, and the decreeing of the prom- 
ised Constitution. [N. B. — I think Arabi makes a mistake here, con- 
fusing these last two demands with those made on the 9th of September. 
But he insisted on it the three proposals were first made in February, 
and made in writing then.] This we all three signed, though knowing 
that our lives were at stake. 

The following morning we went with our petition to the Minister 
of the Interior and asked to see Riaz. We were shown into an outer 
room and waited while the Minister read it in an inner room. Pres- 
ently he came out. "Your petition," he said, "is muhlik" (a hanging 
matter). "What is it you want? to change the Ministry? And what 
would you put in its place? Whom do you propose to carry on the 
government?" And I answered him, "Ye saat le Basha, is Egypt then 
a woman who has borne but eight sons and then been barren?" By 
this I meant himself and the seven ministers under him. He was angry 
at this, but in the end said he would see into our affair, and so we 
left him. Immediately a council was assembled with the Khedive and 
all his Court, and Stone and Blitz also. And the Khedive proposed 
that we should be arrested and tried, but others said, "If these are put 
on trial, Osman Pasha also must be tried." Therefore Osman was left 
to deal with it alone. And the rest you know. 

You ask did the Khedive at that time know of our intention to 
petition. He did not know that nor that Ali Fehmy came to us. But 
afterwards he knew. You ask did I know the Baron de Ring. I did 
not know him, nor any one of the Consuls, but I heard that the French 
Consul had the most influence, and I wrote to him telling him what 
our position was, and begging him to let the other Consuls know that 
there was no fear for their subjects. You ask if I knew Mahmud 



372 Appendix I 

Sami. I did not know him yet. But he was friends with my friend 
Ali Roubi, and I had heard a good account of him as a lover of freedom. 
He was of a Circassian family, but one that had been 600 years in 
Egypt. 

As to the second demonstration of September gth, we knew then that 
the Khedive was with us. He wished to rid himself of Riaz, who dis- 
regarded his authority. I saw him but twice to speak to that summer, 
and never on politics. His communication was through Ali Fehmy, who 
brought us word to the following effect : "You three are soldiers. With 
me you make four." You ask me whether he was sincere. He never 
was sincere. But he wished an excuse to dismiss Riaz. We there- 
fore demanded next time the dismissal of Riaz, as well as the rest, 
knowing he would be pleased. On the morning of the 9th September 
we sent word to the Khedive that we should come to the asr to Abdin 
to make demand of the fulfilment of his promises. He came, and with 
him Cookson, and it was with Cookson that I debated the various 
proposals made. He asked if we should be content with Haidar Pasha, 
but I said "we want no relation of the Khedive." There were no 
written demands the second time, only a renewal of the three demands 
of the I St February, the Chamber of Notables, the raising of the army 
to 18,000 men, according to the firmans, and the dismissal of Riaz. 
They agreed to all. The Khedive was delighted. I know nothing of 
Colvin having been there, or of any advice he gave to the Khedive. 
The only ones I saw were Cookson and Goldsmid. It was Cookson 
who talked to me. If the Khedive had tried to shoot me, the guns would 
have been fired on him, and there would have been bad work. But he 
was entirely pleased with the whole of the proceedings. 

You ask about Abu Sultan (Sultan Pasha). He was disappointed, 
because when the Ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha he was not 
included in it. It was thought, however, that the post of President of 
the Chamber of Deputies was more honourable and more important. 
Only he did not take this view, and was put out at being omitted from 
the Ministry. That was the beginning of his turning against us. 

To your question about the ill-treatment of the Circassians arrested 
for a plot while I was Minister of War, I answer plainly, as I have 
answered before, I never went to the prison to see them tortured or ill- 
treated, I simply never went near them at all. 

About the riots of Alexandria there is no question but that it was 
due to the Khedive and Omar Pasha Loutfi, and also to Mr. Cookson. 
The riots were certainly planned several days beforehand, and with the 
object of discrediting me, seeing that I had just given a guarantee of 
order being preserved. The Khedive sent the cyphered telegram you 
know of to Omar Loutfi, and Omar Loutfi arranged it with Seyd Kandil, 



Arahi's Autobiography 373 

the chief of the Alexandria mustafezzin. Seyd Kandil kept the thing 
from us who were at Cairo. Mr. Cookson's part in it was that a number 
of cases of firearms were landed, and sent to his consulate, obviously with 
the intention of arming somebody. The moment I heard of what had 
happened, I sent Yakub Sami to Alexandria with orders to make a full 
inquiry, and the facts were abundantly proved. Much of what has been 
said however was incorrect. It is not true that the bodies of Christians 
were found dressed as Moslems. The riot began with a Maltese donkey 
boy, but that was only the excuse. Omar Loutfi, as you say, was a 
strong partisan of Ismail's. You ask why a man so dangerous was left 
in a post where he could work so much mischief. I can only say 
that he was not under the orders of the Minister of War, but of the 
Interior. It was a misfortune he was left there. Neither Nadim nor 
Hassan Moussa el Akkad went to Alexandria on any business of that kind. 
Hassan Moussa went there on a money errand. 

What you ask me is true about Ismail Pasha. He made us an offer 
of money. The circumstances of it were these. We had ordered a 
number of pieces of light artillery from Germany, but they would not 
deliver them without payment, and we had none. Ismail Pasha offered 
to let us have £30,000 to pay this, on condition that we would allow 
it to be said that we were acting in his interests. The offer was made 
through M. Mengs [Max Lavisson], Ismail's Russian agent, and 
Hassan Moussa had some hand in it. But it was never produced, and if 
Ismail really sent it to Alexandria, it remained there in their hands. We 
never touched it. 

I do not remember to have heard of any offer such as you speak of 
having been made by the Rothschilds [this was an offer made as I heard at 
the time by the Paris Rothschilds of a pension to Arab! of £4,000 ( 100,000 
francs) yearly, if he would leave Egypt], but I received soon after the 
leyha [the note sent in by the Consuls demanding the dismissal of the 
Mahmud Sami Ministry], a visit from the French Consul, during which 
he asked me what my pay then was, and offered me the double — that is to 
say, £500 a month from the French Government if I would consent to 
leave Egypt and go to Paris and be treated there as Abd-el-Kader was 
treated. I refused, however, to have anything to do with it, telling him 
that it was my business, if necessary, to fight and die for my country, not 
to abandon it. I never heard of the Rothschilds in connection with this 
offer. 

I will now give you an account of how Tel-el-Kebir was lost. Some 
days before, when the English were advancing, we made a plan to attack 
them at Kassassin. Mahmud Sami was to advance on their right flank 
from Salahieh, while we were to advance in front, and a third body was 
to go round by the desert, south of the Wady, and take them in the rear. 



374 Appendix I 

The attack was tried and put partly in execution, but failed because the 
plan had been betrayed by Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis, who sent the original 
sketch made by me to Lord Wolseley. He and others in the army had 
been corrupted by Abou Sultan acting for the Khedive. When Mahmud 
advanced, he found artillery posted to intercept him and retreated, leaving 
us unsupported, and the battle was lost. Sir Charles Wilson, while 1 was 
in prison at Cairo, brought me my plan, and asked me whether it was in my 
own hand, and I said "yes," and he told me how they had come by it. "It 
is a good plan," he said, "and you might have beaten us with it." 

This was our first misfortune. At Tel-el-Kebir we were taken by 
surprise and for the same reason of treachery. The cavalry commanders 
were all seduced by Abou Sultan's promises. They occupied a position in 
advance of the lines, and it was their duty to give us warning of any 
advance by the English. But they moved aside and gave no warning. 
There was also one traitor in command within the lines, Ali Bey Yusuf 
Khunfis. He lit lamps to direct the enemy, and then withdrew his men, 
leaving a wide space open for them to pass through. You see the marks 
upon this carpet. They just represent the lines. That is where Ali Yusuf 
was posted. Mohammed Obeyd was there, and I was at this figure on the 
carpet a mile and a half to the rear. We were expecting no attack as no 
sound of firing had been heard. I was still asleep when we heard the 
firing close to the lines. Ali Roubi, who was in command in front, sent 
news to me to change my position as the enemy was taking us in flank. I 
said my prayer and galloped to where we had a reserve of volunteers, and 
called to them to follow me to support the front line. But they were only 
peasants, not soldiers, and the shells were falling among them and they ran 
away. I then rode forward alone with only my servant Mohammed with 
me, who, seeing that there was no one with me and that I was going to 
certain death, caught hold of my horse by the bridle and implored me to go 
back. Then seeing that the day was lost already, and that all were 
flying, I turned. Mohammed continued with me and we crossed the Wady 
at Tel-el-Kebir, and keeping along the line of the Ismailia Canal reached 
Belbeis. There I had formed a second camp, and I found Ali Roubi arrived 
before me, and we thought to make a stand. But on the arrival of Drury 
Lowe's cavalry none would stay, and so we abandoned all and took train 
for Cairo. Ali Roubi made mistakes by extending the lines too far north- 
wards, but he was loyal. The traitors were Abdul Ghaifar, I think, and 
certainly his second in command of the cavalry, Abd-el-Rahman Bey 
Hassan, and Ali Yusuf Khunfis. You say Saoud el Tihawi, too. It may 
be so. Those Arabs were not to be trusted. His grandfather had joined 
Bonaparte when he invaded us a hundred years ago. 

Now I return home after twenty years of sorrowful exile, and my own 



Arahi's Autobiography 375 

people I laboured to deliver have come to believe, because the French papers 
have told them so, that I sold them to the English! 

The Grand Mufti's remarks on the above 

[N. B. — On March i8th, 1903, I read the foregoing account to Sheykh 
Mohammed Abdu at his house at A'l'n Shems. He approved most of it as 
correct, but made the following remarks: 

I. As to the riot against Nubar. — Arabi's account of this is correct, ex- 
cept that the order given to Ali Femy to fire on the students was not in- 
tended to be obeyed and was part of the comedy. Ali Fehmy fired over 
their heads by order. Latif Bey was arrested and imprisoned after the 
riot by Nubar, but was released on an application made to Nubar by the 
freemasons, Latif being a member of that body. Latif in after days freely 
acknowledged his share in the affair. As to what Arabi says of his having 
proposed at that time to depose Ismail, there was certainly secret talk of 
such action. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din was in favour of it, and proposed to me, 
Mohammed Abdu, that Ismail should be assassinated some day as he passed 
in his carriage daily over the Kasr el Nil bridge, and I strongly approved, 
but it was only talk between ourselves, and we lacked a person capable of 
taking lead in the affair. If we had known Arabi at that time, we might 
have arranged it with him, and it would have been the best thing that could 
have happened, as it would have prevented the intervention of Europe. It 
would not, however, have been possible to establish a republic in the then 
state of political ignorance of the people. As to Ismail's having taken away 
fifteen millions with him to Naples, nobody knows the amount. All that 
is known is that it was very large. For the last few months of his reign 
Ismail had been hoarding money, which he intercepted as it was sent in to 
the Finance Office from the Mudiriehs. 

2. As to Tewfik in his father s time. — ^What Arabi says of Tewfik having 
taken presents for presenting petitions to Ismail may be true, but the thing 
was not talked of, nor is it in accordance with Tewfiik's conduct when in 
power. I do not believe it. 

3. As to Riaz' tyranny. — Riaz was tyrannical, but not to the point of 
shedding blood. This he was always averse to. I do not remember any 
talk about the people being made away with secretly by him. There was 
no danger of such at any rate before the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil. Dur- 
ing the summer, however, of that year, 1881, there was talk of attempts 
against Arabi and the other colonels. 

4. As to the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil, February 1st, 188 1. — Arabi's ac- 
count is confused and incorrect. The first petition made by Arabi and the 
officers was simply one of injustice being done them. It was made by 
Osman Rifki, and it drew down upon them the anger of the Minister of 



376 Appendix I 

War, who determined to get rid of them, and first brought Arabi under the 
notice of the Consuls. Baron de Ring, who had a quarrel with Riaz, 
interested himself in their case, but only indirectly. The petition talked 
of by Arabi as having been drawn up in January by him and taken 
to Riaz, certainly contained no reference to a Constitution or to the increase 
of the army to 18,000 men. These demands were not made until the 
September demonstration. The petition of the Kasr-el-Nil time was sim- 
ply a strong complaint to Riaz of Osman Rifki's misdoings, and demanding 
his dismissal from the Ministry of War. Riaz, at the council after the 
demonstration, was in favour of its being made the subject of an inquiry, 
which would have necessitated the trial by court-martial not only of the 
petitioners, but also of Osman Rifki. Riaz was not in favour of violence. 
iBut it was pointed out to him, privately, that if he opposed the more 
violent plan it would be said he was seeking to curry favor with the 
soldiers as against the Khedive, and he, therefore, left the matter to Osman 
Rifki, to be dealt with as he pleased. 

5. As to the demonstration of Abdin, September gth_, 1 88 1. — The 
seven months between the affair of Kasr-el-Nil and the demonstration of 
September were months of great political activity, which pervaded all 
classes. Arabi's action gained him much popularity, and put him into 
communication with the civilian members of the National party, such as 
Sultan Pasha, Suliman Abaza, Hassain Sherei, and myself, and it was we 
who put forward the idea of renewing the demand for a Constitution. 
The point of view from which he at that time regarded it was as giving 
him and his military friends a security against reprisals by the Khedive of 
his Ministers. He told me this repeatedly during the summer. We con- 
sequently organized petitions for a Constitution, and carried on a campaign 
for it in the press. Arabi saw a great deal of Sultan Pasha during the 
summer, and Sultan, who was very rich, made much of him, sending him 
presents, such as farm produce, horses, and the rest, in order to encourage 
him, and to get this support for the constitutional movement. It was in 
concert with Sultan that the demonstration of Abdin was arranged, and it 
is quite true that Sultan expected to be named to a Ministry after the fall 
of Riaz. But Sherif Pasha, who became Prime Minister, did not think of 
him and overlooked him. Afterwards Sultan was pacified and pleased 
when he was offered the presidency of the new Chamber of Notables. It 
was not till after the leyha, ultimatum, that he had any quarrel with Arabi. 
Then it is true that Arabi drew his sword in Sultan's presence and that 
of other members of the Chamber when they hesitated and were afraid to 
oppose the leyha. Up to this they had acted together. Arabi's account of 
the Khedive's message, "You three are soldiers. With me you are four," 
is excellent, and exactly shows the situation as between him and the offi- 
cers. Colvin certainly was with the Khedive at Abdin, but as he knew 



Arabics Autobiography 377 

no Arabic he probably was not noticed by Arabi. It was Cookson who 
did the talking. Baron de Ring had been recalled by his government on 
the request of Riaz, who complained of his encouragement of the officers. 
6. As to the riots of Alexandria. — Arabi is correct in his account as 
regards Omar Loutfi and the Khedive, who had been arranging the riot 
for some weeks. But it is not true as regards Seyd Kandil, who was only 
weak and failed to prevent it. He is also wrong about Cookson. The 
firearms introduced into the Consulate were for the defence of the Maltese 
and other English subjects. Seyd Kandil was exiled for twenty years, but 
was allowed quietly to come back, and is now at his country place in 
Egypt, and I have often talked over the affair with him. If you like we 
will go together and pay him a visit next autumn. Arabi is right in say- 
ing that neither Hassan Moussa nor Nadim were concerned in the riot. 
Nadim went down to Alexandria to deliver a lecture and Hassan on money 
business.] 

[The Mufti also added the following remarks on March 20th, 1903. 

There was an attempt to introduce freemasonry into Egypt in the later 
years of Ismail Pasha. The lodges were all connected with lodges in 
Europe. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din joined one, but he soon found out that 
there was nothing of any value in it and withdrew. Ismail encouraged 
it for his purposes when he began to be in difficulties, but freemasonry 
never was a power in Egypt. 

Mohammed Obeyd was certainly killed at Tel-el-Kebir. There were 
rumours for a long time of his having been seen in Syria, and we used to 
send from Beyrout when we were living there in exile to try and find him 
for his wife's sake, who was at Beyrout, but they always turned out to be 
false reports. 

Mahmud Sami was one of the original Constitutionalists, dating from 
the time of Ismail. He was a friend of Sherif and belonged to the same 
school of ideas. It is most probable that he gave warning to Arabi of his 
intended arrest, as he was one of the Council of Ministers and must have 
known. After the afFair of Kasr-el-Nil he was altogether with Arabi and 
the Colonels. That was why Riaz got rid of him from the Ministry and 
appointed Daoud Pasha in his place. 

Riaz, at the beginning, underrated the importance of Arabi's action. 
Afterwards he was afraid of it. He began by despising it as he did all 
fellah influence in politics. 

Sherif Pasha resigned in February, 1882, not on account of any quarrel 
with Arabi, but because he was afraid of European intervention. He was 
opposed to an insistence on the power of voting the budget claimed by the 
Chamber of Notables, and he retired so as not to be compromised. 

Ragheb Pasha is (as mentioned by Ninet) of Greek descent, though a 



37^ Appendix I 

Moslem. He had been Minister under Ismail, but was a Constitutionalist. 
After the leyha he was named Prime Minister, with Arabi for Minister of 
War. He acted honestly with Arabi, and remained with the National 
Party during the war, 

Butler gives May 20th, 1880, as the date of the first military petition. 
That is probably correct. 

Ibrahim el Aghany was one of the best and ablest of Jemal ed Din's 
disciples at the Azhar, He is still living and employed in the 
Mekhemeh (?). 

"When the Council was summoned to consider Arabi's petition asking 
for Osman Rifky's dismissal, the Khedive was with Osman Rifky for 
having Arabi arrested and sent up the Nile, but Riaz at first was for an 
inquiry. During an adjournment, however, of the Council, Taha Pasha 
persuaded Riaz that if he was for lenient measures it would be thought 
he was intriguing with the soldiers against the Khedive — to make him- 
self Khedive — and Riaz thereupon made no further opposition. This I 
learned afterwards from Mahmud Sami who, as one of the Ministers, 
was present at the Council. 

Ibrahim Eff. el Wakil with Hassan Sherei and Ahmed Mahmud were 
the leaders of the liberal party in the Chamber of Notables.] 

Further Account given by Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, 
December 22nd^ 1903 

[When Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din was exiled a few days after the Sherif's 
dismissal in 1879, I was told to leave Cairo where I was professor in 
the normal school, and to go to my village. My successor at the school 
was Sheykh Hassan the blind. I was soon tired of being in my village 
and went to Alexandria where I was watched by the police, so I went 
secretly to Tantah and wandered about for a long while. Then I came 
back to Cairo hoping to see Mahmud Sami, who was my friend, and 
at that time Minister of the Awkaf, but he was away, so I went to Ali 
Pasha Mubarak's, Minister of Public Works, who was also a friend, 
hut he received me badly, and everybody advised me not to stay, as it 
would be thought I came in connection with a secret society which had been 
recently formed by Shahin Pasha and Omar Lutfi and other Ismailists 
against Riaz, so I went to my village again. But again I grew tired of 
it, as the villagers were always quarrelling and resolved to return once 
more and lecture at the Azhar. Riaz Pasha was at that time in difficulty 
to find any one who could write good Arabic in the Official Paper, and 
he consulted Mahmud Sami, who told him that if there were but three 
more like me Egypt could be saved. And my successor, Sheykh Hassan, 
gave him the same opinion of me. 

So I was appointed at the end of Ramadan (October, 1880), third 



Arabi's Autobiography 379 

Editor of the Journal. But my two senior Editors were jealous and 
would give me no work to do. So the Journal was no better written. 
At this Riaz was displeased, and made inquiry, and as the result I was 
made Editor, and a little later Director of the Press. This was before 
the end of 1880. The first time I saw you was when I called on you 
with Rogers Bey at the Hotel du Nil, and it was I who recommended to 
you Mohammed Khalil, and afterwards he brought you to see me at my 
house. I criticized the Government strongly in the Official Journal, and 
as Director of the Press allowed all liberty. But I was not in favour 
of a revolution, and thought that it would be enough if we had a Con- 
stitution in five years' time. I disapproved of the overthrow of Riaz 
in September, 1881, and, about ten days before the military demonstration 
at Abdin, I met Arabi at the house of Toulba Ismat, and Latif Bey 
Selim had come with him, and there were many there. And I urged him 
to moderation, and said, "I foresee that a foreign occupation will come 
and that a malediction will rest for ever on him who provokes it." On 
this Arabi said that he hoped it would not be he. And he told me at 
the same time that Sultan Pasha had promised to bring petitions from 
every Notable in Egypt in favour of the Constitution. This was true, 
for all the Omdehs were angry with Riaz for having put down their 
habit of employing forced labour. Suliman Abaza would not join in the 
revolution as he thought it premature, and Sherei Pasha was also against 
it. But when once the Constitution was granted we all joined to pro- 
tect it. But Arabi could not control the army, where there were many 
ambitions. 

I did not know of the intended demonstration at Abdin, as I was known 
to be friendly to Riaz, but it was arranged with Sultan Pasha and Sherif 
Pasha. The Khedive was in a constant change of mind about Arabi at 
that time, and joined Riaz and Daoud Pasha in their attempt to crush 
Arabi, but the day before the event they told the Khedive, who, to over- 
throw Riaz, approved.] 

Conversation with Arabi at Sheykh Obeyd, January 2nd, 1904 

You ask me at what date the Khedive Tewfik put himself first into 
communication with us soldiers. It was in this way. Shortly before 
the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil he encouraged Ali Fehmy to go to us, with 
whom we were already friends, his intention being to use him as a spy 
on us, he being Colonel of the Guard. But Ali Fehmy joined us in 
our petition to Riaz Pasha, and was involved with us in our arrest. 
After the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil, and seeing the position we had gained 
in the minds of the people, the Khedive thought to make use of us against 
Riaz, and he sent Ali Fehmy to us with the message, "You three are 
soldiers. With me you make four." That was about a month after 



380 Appendix I 

the affair, and we knew he was favourable to us also through Mahmud 
Sami, who was then Minister of War. And Mahmud Sami told us, 
"If ever you see me leave the Ministry, know that the Khedive's mind is 
changed to you, and that there is danger." In the course, therefore, of 
the summer (1881) when trouble began to begin for us through the spies 
of Riaz Pasha, who was Minister of the Interior, and who had us watched 
by the police, we had confidence in Mahmud Sami. 

And I was specially involved in displeasure through my refusal to 
allow my soldiers to be taken from their military work to dig the Tew- 
fikieh Canal, they being impressed for the labour by AH Pasha Moubarak 
as Minister of Public Works. For this and for other reasons the Khe- 
dive turned from us, and resolved, with Riaz Pasha, to separate and 
disunite the army; and the regiments were to be sent to distant places so 
that we should not communicate one with the other. And Mahmud 
Sami was called upon, as Minister of War, to work their plan against 
us, the Khedive at that time being at Alexandria with the rest of the 
Ministers. And when Mahmud Sami refused, Riaz Pasha wrote to him, 
"The Khedive has accepted your resignation." And both he and the 
Khedive notified Mahmud Sami that he was to go at once to his village 
in the neighbourhood of Tantah, and remain there, and not to go to 
Cairo, and on no account to have communication with us. He neverthe- 
less came to Cairo to his house there, and we called on him, but he re- 
fused to see us. Then we knew that evil was intended against us. An(| 
the Khedive appointed Daoud Pasha Yeghen in his place, and the vexa- 
tion on us increased, and we knew that attempts were to be made against 
us. At the beginning of September the Khedive returned to Cairo with 
Riaz and the Ministers, and it was resolved to deal with us. Then I 
took counsel with Abd-el-Aal and Abd-el-Ghaffar, the commander of 
the cavalry at Gesireh, and Fuda Bey Hassan, Caimakam in command at 
the Kalaa. The miralai in command at the Kalaa had been dismissed 
by Mahmud Sami shortly before leaving office, and had not been replaced. 
This mirala'i was of us but ikha'in (a traitor), and we agreed that we 
would make a demonstration and demand the dismissal of the whole Min- 
istry, and that a Ministry favourable to the Wattan should replace them, 
and that a Mejliss el Nawwab should be assembled, and that the army 
should be raised to 18,000 men. But we did not tell Ali Fehmy of our de- 
sign, for we did not wholly at that time trust him. And the next morning 
I wrote stating our demands, and sent it to the Khedive at Ismailia Palace, 
saying that we should march to Abdin Palace at the asr, there to receive 
his answer. And the reason of our going to Abdin and not to Ismailia, 
where he lived, was that Abdin was his public residence, and we did not 
wish to alarm the ladies of his household. But if he had not come to 
Abdin we should have marched on to Ismailia. 



Arabi's Autobiography 381 

When, therefore, the Khedive received our message he sent for Riaz 
Pasha and Khairy Pasha and Stone Pasha, and they went first to Abdin 
Barracks, vv^here both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoke to the soldiers, 
and they gave orders to Ali Fehmy that he should, with his regiment, 
occupy the Palace of Abdin. And Ali Fehmy assented, and he posted his 
men in the upper rooms out of sight, so that they should be ready to 
fire on us from the windows. But I do not know whether they were 
given ball cartridge or not. Then the Khedive with the Generals went 
on to the Kalaa, and they spoke to the soldiers there in the same sense, 
calling on Fuda Bey to support the Khedive against us, the Khedive scold- 
ing him and saying, "I shall put you in prison" ; but the soldiers surrounded 
the carriage, and the Khedive was afraid and drove away, and he went on 
by the advice of Riaz to Abassiyeh to speak to me, but I had already 
marched with my regiment through the Hassaneyn quarter to Abdin. 
They asked about the artillery and were told that it also had gone to 
Abdin, and when the Khedive arrived there he found us occupying the 
square, the artillery and cavalry being before the west entrance, and I with 
my troops before the main entrance, and already when I arrived before the 
palace I had sent in to Ali Fehmy, who I had heard was there, and had 
spoken to him, and he had withdrawn his men from the palace, and they 
stood with us. 

And the Khedive entered by the back door on the east side, and presently 
he came out to us with his generals and aides-de-camp, but I did not 
see Colvin with him, though he may have been there, and he called 
on me to dismount, and I dismounted, and he called on me to put up 
my sword, and I put up my sword, but the officers approached with me 
to prevent treachery, about fifty in number, and some of them placed 
themselves between him and the palace, but Riaz Pasha was not with 
the Khedive in the square, and remained in the palace. And when 1 
had delivered my message and made my three demands to the Khedive, 
he said, "I am Khedive of the country and shall do as I like" {"and 
Khedeywi 'I beled wa 'amal zey ma inni awze") . I replied, "We 
are not slaves, and we shall never more be inherited from this day forth" 
("Nahnu ma abid wa la nurithu ha'd el yom"^. He said nothing more, 
but turned and went back into the palace. And presently they sent out 
Cookson to me with his interpreter, and he asked me why, being a soldier, 
I made demand of a parliament, and I said that it was to put an end 
to arbitrary rule, and pointed to the crowd of citizens supporting us 
behind the soldiers. He threatened me, saying, 'We shall bring a British 
army," and much discussion took place between us, and he returned 
six or seven times to the palace, and came out again six or seven 
times to me, until finally he informed me that the Khedive had agreed 
to all, and the Khedive wished for Haidar Pasha to replace Riaz. But 



382 Appendix I 

I would not consent, and when it was put to me to say I named Sherif 
Pasha, because he had declared himself in favour of a Mejliss el Nawwab, 
and I had known him a little in former times, in the time of Sa'id Pasha, 
when he served with the army. And in the evening the KJiedive sent 
for me and I went to him at Ismai'lia Palace, and I thanked him for 
having agreed to our request, but he said only, "That is enough. Go now 
and occupy Abdin, and let it be without music in the streets" (lest that 
should be taken as a token of rejoicing). 

And when Ali Pasha Nizami came to Cairo with Ahmed Pasha Ratib 
from the Sultan, the Khedive was alarmed lest an inquiry should be made, 
and Mahmud Sami being again Minister of War ordered us to leave 
Cairo, and I went to Ras-el-Wady and Abd-el-Aal to Damiata, but Ali 
Fehmy remained at Cairo. And I saw nothing of Ali Nizami. But 
being at Zagazig on a visit to friends, Ahmed Eff. Shemsi and Suliman 
Pasha Abaza, as I was returning by train to Ras el Wady, it happened 
that Ahmed Pasha Ratib was on his way to Suez, for he was going on 
to Mecca on pilgrimage. And I found myself in the same carriage with 
him, and we exchanged compliments as strangers, and I asked him his 
name, and he asked me my name, and he told me of his pilgrimage and 
other things, but he did not speak of his mission to the Khedive, nor 
did I ask. But I told him that I was loyal to the Sultan as the head 
of our religion, and I also related to him all that had occurred, and he 
said, "You did well." And at Ras el Wady I left him, and afterwards 
he sent me a Koran from Jeddah, and later, on his return to Stamboul, 
he wrote to me, saying that he had spoken favourably of me to the 
Sultan, and afterwards I received a letter dictated by the Sultan to 
Sheykh Mohammed Dhaifar telling me what I know. 

As to Yakub Sami, he was of family originally Greek from Stamboul. 
He went by my order to Alexandria to inquire into the affair of the riot, 
but they would not allow a true inquiry to be made into it. It was 
Yakub Sami who, with Ragheb Pasha, proposed that we should cut off 
the Khedive's head. You say we should have done better to do so, but 
I wished to gain the end of our revolution without the shedding of a drop 
of blood. 



APPENDIX II 

Programme of the National Party of Egypt, forwarded by 

Mr. Blunt to Mr. Gladstone, Dec. 20Th, i88i, 

WITH Mr. Gladstone's Answers 

1. The National party of Egypt accept the existing relations of Egypt 
with the Porte as the basis of their movement. That is to say: They 
acknowledge the Sultan Abd el Hamid Khan as their Suzerain and Lord, 
and as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion ; nor do they pro- 
pose, while his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit the 
right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to military assistance in 
case of foreign war. At the same time, they are firmly determined to 
defend their national rights and privileges, and to oppose, by every means 
in their power, the attempts of those who would reduce Egypt again to 
the condition of a Turkish Pashalik. They trust in the protecting Powers 
of Europe, and especially in England, toi continue their guarantee of Egypt's 
administrative independence. 

2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the person of 
the reigning Khedive. They will continue to support Mohammed 
Towfik's authority as long as he shall rule in accordance with justice and 
the law, and in fulfilment of his promises made to the people of Egypt in 
September 1881. They declare, however, their intention to permit no 
renewal of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has so often 
witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of his promise of Parlia- 
mentary government and of giving the country freedom. They invite 
His Highness, Mohammed Towfik, to act honestly by them in these 
matters, promising him their cordial help ; but they warn him against listen- 
ing to those who would persuade him to continue his despotic power, to 
betray their national rights, or to elude his promises. 

3. The National party fully recognize the services rendered to Egypt by 
the Governments of England and France, and they are aware that all 
freedom and justice they have obtained in the past has been due to them. 
For this they tender them their thanks. They recognize the European 
Control as a necessity of their financial position, and the present continu- 
ance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity. They declare their 
entire acceptance of the foreign debt as a matter of national honour — this, 
although they know that it was incurred, not for Egypt's benefit, but in 
the private interests of a dishonest and irresponsible ruler — and they are 

383 



384 Appendix II 

ready to assist the Controllers in discharging the full national obligations. 
They look, nevertheless, upon the existing order of things as in its nature 
temporary, and avow it as their hope gradually to redeem the country out 
of the hands of its creditors. Their object is, some day to see Egypt 
entirely in Egyptian hands. Also they are not blind to the imperfections 
of the Control, w^hich they are ready to point out. They know that 
many abuses are committed by those employed by it, whether Europeans 
or others. They see some of these incapable, others dishonest, others too 
highly paid. They know that many offices, now held by strangers, would 
be better discharged by Egyptians, and at a fifth of the cost; and they 
believe there is still much waste and much injustice. They cannot under- 
stand that Europeans living in the land should remain for ever exempt 
from the general taxation, or from obedience to the general law. The 
National party does not, however, propose to remedy these evils by any 
violent action; only it would protest against their unchecked continuance. 
They would have the Governments of France and England consider that, 
having taken the control of their finances out of the hands of the Egyp- 
tians, they are responsible for their prosperity, and are bound to see that 
efficient and honest persons only are employed by them. 

4. The National party disclaim all connection with those who, in 
the interest of Powers jealous of Egypt's independence, seek to trouble 
the peace of the country — and there are many such — or with those who 
find their private advantage in disturbance. At the same time they are 
aware that a merely passive attitude will not secure them liberty in a land 
which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is hateful. The silence 
of the people made Ismail Pasha's rule possible in Egypt, and silence now 
would leave their hope of political liberty unfulfilled. The Egyptians 
have learned in the last few. years what freedom means, and they are 
resolved to complete their national education. This they look to find in 
the Parliament just assembling, in a fair measure of freedom for the 
press, and in the general growth of knowledge among all classes of the 
people. They know, however, that none of these means of education can 
be secured except by the firm attitude of the national leaders. The Egyp- 
tian Parliament may be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at Constan- 
tinople; the press may be used as an instrument against them, and the 
sources of instruction cut off. It is for this reason and for no other that 
the National party has confided its interests at the present time to the 
army, believing them to be the only power in the country able and will- 
ing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, however, in the plans of 
the party that this state of things shall continue; and as soon as the 
people shall have established their rights securely the army will abandon 
its present political attitude. In this the military leaders fully concur. 



Gladstone's Correspondence 385 

They trust that on the assembling of the Parliament their further inter- 
ference in affairs of State may be unnecessary. But for the present they 
will continue to perform their duty as the armed guardians of the unarmed 
people. Such being their position, they hold it imperative that their 
force should be maintained efficient, and their complement made up to 
the full number of 18,000 men. They trust that the European Con- 
trol will keep this necessity in view when considering the army esti- 
mates. 

5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a religious party. 
It includes within its ranks men of various races and various creeds. 
It is principally Mohammedan, because nine-tenths of the Eg\q3tians are 
Mohammedans; but it has the support of the Moors, of the Coptic Chris- 
tians, of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and speak the lan- 
guage of Egypt. Between these it makes no distinction whatever, hold- 
ing all men to be brothers and to have equal rights, both political and 
before the law. This principle is accepted by all the chief Sheykhs of 
the Azhar who support the party, holding the true law of Islam to for- 
bid religious hatred and religious disabilities. With Europeans resi- 
dent in Egypt the National party has no quarrel, either as Christians 
or as strangers, so long as these shall live comformably with the laws and 
bear their share of the burdens of the State. 

6. Finally, the general end of the National party is the intellectual 
and moral regeneration of the country by a better observance of the law, 
by increased education, and by political liberty, which they hold to be 
the life of the people. They trust in the sympathy of those of the nations 
of Europe which enjoy the blessing of self-government to aid Egypt in 
gaining for itself that blessing; but they are avi^are that no nation ever 
yet achieved liberty except by its own endeavours; and they are resolved 
to stand firm in the position they have won, trusting to God's help if all 
other be denied them. 

December 18, 1 88 1. 



Mr. Gladstone's Answer 

Hawarden Castle, Chester, 

Jan. 20th, 1882. 
My Dear Sir, 

You will I am sure appreciate the reasons which disable me from of- 
fering anything like a becoming reply to your very interesting letter on 
Egyptian affairs, which occupy, I am sorry to say, an insignificant share 
of my daily attention. 



386 Appendix II 

But I am sensible of the advantage of having such a letter from such 
an authority, and I feel quite sure that unless there be a sad failure of 
good sense on one or both, or, as I should say, all sides, we shall be en- 
abled to bring this question to a favourable issue. 

My own opinions about Egypt were set forth in the "19th Century" 
a short time before we took office, and I am not aware as yet of having 
seen any reason to change them. 

I remain, my Dear Sir, 

Faithfully yours, 

W, E. Gladstone. 
Wilfrid S. Blunt, Esq. : 



10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 

Jan. 2ist, 1882. 
My Dear Wilfrid, 

I feel I owe you a great apology for your not having received an earlier 
acknowledgment of your most able and interesting communication on the 
Egyptian movement. Holiday making must be my excuse; but my ab- 
sence frolm Downing Street did not prevent the prompt submission of 
your letter to Mr. Gladstone, from whom I enclose a note. He is 
sorry that it is somewhat tardy in its despatch. 

It is difficult, if not impossible, to write on the present critical state of 
affairs, when the situation may alter from day to day. 

You may imagine that the alleged national character to the move- 
ment necessarily commends itself to Mr. Gladstone with his well-known 
sympathy with young nationalities struggling for independence. The great 
crux (I am of course only speaking for myself, and with a strong con- 
sciousness of ignorance) seems to be, how to favour such a movement 
with due regard to the responsibilities in which we have been involved, 
and the vested interests which are at stake. Every alternative seems to 
be beset with insuperable objections and insurmountable difficulties. I 
can only say that if you can do anything towards finding a solution for 
these difficulties you will be doing a great work for Egypt, for the country, 
and for the present Government. I know that you have already been of 
great service, and are entitled to speak on this question with greater 
authority than almost any one else. 

With special regards to Lady Anne, and apologies for such a cursory 
uninteresting note in return for your information. 

Always yrs. affectionately 

E. W. Hamilton. 



Gladstone's Correspondence 387 

Mr. Gladstone's Answer to Mr. Blunt's Second Letter 

DATED CaIRO^ FEBRUARY 7TH, 1 8 82 

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 

2nd March, 1882. 
My Dear Wilfrid, 

Mr. Gladstone has read with much interest your further letter, for 
which he is much ohliged. He hopes that you will have felt, or will 
feel, assured from the language in the speech from the Throne, of which 
I enclose by his desire a copy, that the British Government, while intend- 
ing firmly to uphold international engagements, have a sympathy with 
Egyptian feelings in reference to the purposes and means of good govern- 
ment. 

Yours always, 

E. W. Hamilton. 



Extract from the Queen's Speech forwarded to Mr. 
Blunt by Mr. Hamilton 

In concert with the President of the French Republic, I have given 
careful attention to the afFairs of Egypt, where existing arrangements 
have imposed on me special obligations. I shall use my influence to 
maintain the rights already established, whether by the Firmans of the 
Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to 
the good government of the country and the prudent development of its 
institutions. 



APPENDIX III 

Text of the Egyptian Constitution of February 7th, 

1882 

{N.B. — This occurs in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 7 (1882), but is 
given there in French only. The clauses embodying the amendments or 
explanations obtained at Sir Edward Malet's and Sir Auckland Colvin's 
instance by the author on January 19th, 1882, are marked with an 
asterisk. ) 



388 Appendix III 

Letter from Mahmoud Samy Pasha on taking office^ 
February 2ND:, 1882, to His Highness the Khedive 

Monseigneur, 

Your Highness has condescended to entrust to me the care of forming 
a new Cabinet ; I consider it as the first of my duties to submit to you the 
principles which Vv^ill guide my conduct and inspire that of the Ministry 
over which I am to preside. 

The events which have succeeded each other in Egypt for some years 
past have prejudiced public opinion in various ways here, and in foreign 
countries. These prejudices relate to two orders of ideas: our financial 
expenditure and our internal reforms. 

The general debt of the country was definitely regulated by a series of 
Decrees which was itself completed by the Law of Liquidation of 19th 
July, 1880. 

These laws have acquired the character of International Conventions. 
Your Highness's Government has never ceased to respect them. The 
Ministry will watch over their exact and faithful execution. 

The liquidation of the floating debt is an accomplished fact for all 
those interested (and they are immensely in the majority) whose rights 
have been recognized up to now by the competent authorities; it will 
continue to be actively proceeded with. 

The service of the Consolidated Debt, which includes the special 
administrations of the Da'ira and the Domains employed to guarantee the 
Loan of 1878 is being regularly performed. The administrations which 
were created to secure this service, the General Control, the Commission 
of the Debt, the Control of the Da'ira, the Commission of Domains, 
are institutions which must be always loyally supported by the Govern- 
ment; they have always been so up to the present day. 

Nothing will be changed in this state of things in the future: the 
Ministry will endeavour to consolidate these institutions and to facilitate 
their action. It considers harmony in all these public services as an 
essential condition to the regular course of affairs, and it thinks that the 
general administration of the country owes incontestable advantages to 
this policy. 

Your Highness has always been convinced that, to accomplish internal 
reforms with wisdom and security, the co-operation of a Chamber of 
Deputies was necessary, and it is with this idea that the present Chamber 
has been convoked. 



Text of the Constitution of 1882 389 

The Ministry share these sentiments. They will concentrate all their 
attention upon the reorganization of the Tribunals, the reform of the 
administration, the improvements necessary to public education to aid the 
country to advance in the path of progress and civilization. They will 
study measures suitable for the development of agriculture, commerce, 
and industry, as well as all the other projects of reform which have been 
the object of your Highness's constant solicitude. But before all they 
believe it necessary to determine the powers of the Chamber of Deputies, 
in order to enable it to give to the Government the co-operation which it 
expects, and to realize the hopes of the people. 

This is why the Cabinet's first act will be to sanction an Organic 
Law for the Chamber of Deputies. 

This law will respect all rights and obligations of a private or inter- 
national character, as well as all engagements relating to the Public Debt 
and to the charges which the latter imposes upon the State Budget. It 
will determine wisely the responsibility of the Ministers before the Cham- 
ber, as well as the mode of discussing the laws. 

Far from being a source of anxiety, this Organic Law will unite all the 
conditions necessary for securing the interests of the public. 

Such is, Monseigneur, the programme of the new Ministry, conform- 
able to the wishes of the country. 

The High Powers — and particularly the Sublime Porte, whose friendly 
support has never failed us in the exercise of the rights and privileges 
which it has granted us — ^will continue, I confidently hope, to lend to 
your Highness's Government, as in the past, that valuable co-operation 
which has always been beneficial to Egypt. 

I also hope that the authority of your Government will be devoted 
solely to safeguarding individual rights and the maintenance of order, 
and that it will guide the nation In the way of progress and prosper- 
ity. 

The day on which your Highness took in hand the reins of power you 
promised to Egypt a new era of progress. We come to assure your High- 
ness of our absolute unanimity for the realization of that promise. The 
goal you would attain, Monseigneur, is the same which we are striving 
for. Full of confidence in you, we have faith in the future. 

If your Highness deigns to consent to the programme which I submit, I 
have the honour to beg your Highness to sanction the decrees which I 
present for signature, to constitute the Ministr5\ 

Mahmoud Samy. 



390 Appendix III 

Letter from His Highness the Khedive to His Excellence 
Mahmoud Samy Pasha 

15, Rabi-Awel, 1299. 
(February 4, 1882.) 
My dear Mahmoud Samy Pasha^ 

In accepting the task of forming a new Cabinet, without being ignorant 
of the importace of this undertaking, you give a new proof of your de- 
votion and of your patriotism. If I have charged you with this mission, 
it is because I knew these your noble sentiments of which you have 
given many proofs, by the numerous services j'ou have rendered in the 
various offices you have already filled. I approve of your programme, and 
of the principles which you develop in it. These principles are the foun- 
dation of justice. They are calculated to maintain and assure order in the 
country as well to^ give security to all those who inhabit it. 

I share your opinion that my Government should take the necessary 
measures to ensure judicial and administrative reforms, and that it should 
promulgate for the Chamber of Deputies the Organic Law in conformity 
with the ideas explained in your programme. 

My Government ought also to take upon itself the task of developing 
public instruction, agriculture, commerce, and industry. My loyal and 
sincere co-operation shall always be yours in the accomplishment of this 
object. 

I pray God to crown our common efforts for the benefit and prosperity 
of the people. 

Mehemet Tewfik. 

DECREE 

We, Khedive of Egypt, 

In view of our Decree of the 4th October, 1881 (11 Zilcade, 1298), 
In view of the decision of the Chamber of Delegates, and conformably 
with the advice of our Council of Ministers, 

Have decreed and decree. 

Art. I. The Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected. An 
ulterior and special Law will make known the conditions of electorability 
and of eligibility for election, and at the same time the mode of election to 
the Chamber of Deputies. 



Text of the Constitution of 1882 391 

Art. 2. The Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected for a 
period of five years. They receive an annual payment of c£E.ioo. 

Art. 3. The Deputies are free in the exercise of their mandates They 
cannot be bound either by promises or by (government) instructions, or by 
fin (administrative) order, or by menaces of a nature to interfere v/ith the 
free expression of their opinions. 

Art. 4. The Deputies are inviolable. In case of crime or misde- 
meanour committed during the course of the Session, they cannot be put 
under arrest except with the leave of the Chamber. 

Art. 5. The Chamber may also, after its convocation, demand, pro- 
visionally and for the duration of the Session, that any one of its Members 
who has been imprisoned shall be set at liberty, or that all action directed 
against him shall be suspended during the Chamber's recess, if for a crim- 
inal matter, where no judgment has yet been pronounced. 

Art. 6. Each Deputy represents not only the interests of the con- 
stituency which has elected him, but also the interests of the Egyptian 
people in general. 

Art. 7. The Chamber of Deputies shall sit at Cairo. It is convoked 
each year by Decree of the Khedive, and according to the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. 

Art. 8. The ordinary annual Session of the Chamber of Deputies 
shall be for three months, viz., from the ist November to the 31st Jan- 
uary. But if the work of the Chamber is not finished by the 31st January, 
it may then demand a prolongation of fifteen to thirty days. This pro- 
longation will be accorded by Decree of the Khedive. 

Art. 9. In case of necessity the Chamber will be convoked in Extraor- 
dinary Session by the Khedive. The duration of the Extraordinary Session 
will be fixed by the Decree convoking it. 

Art. 10. The Sessions of the Chamber shall be opened in the presence 
of the Ministers either by the Khedive or by the President of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, acting by delegation of the Khedive. 

Art. II. At the first sitting of each annual Session an opening Speech 
shall be pronounced by the Khedive, or in his name by the President 
of the Council of Ministers. It shall have for its object to make known 
to the Chamber the principal questions to be presented to it in the course 
of the session. Afer the reading of the opening speech the sitting shall 
be adjourned. 

Art. 12. During the three following da}^s, the Chamber, having named 
a Committee for the purpose of preparing a replv to the opening speech, 
shall vote its reply, which shall be presented to the Khedive by a deputa- 
tion chosen from amongst its jnembers, 



392 Appendix III 

Art. 13. The reply to the opening speech may not treat of any question 
In a decisive sense, nor contain any opinion which has been the object of 
previous deliberations. 

Art. 14. The Chamber shall submit to the Khedive a list containing 
the names of three Members whom it may propose for the office of 
President. The Khedive shall name by Decree one of the Members, 
thus designated, President of the Chamber of Deputies. The office of 
President shall continue for five years. 

Art. 15. The Chamber shall elect two Vice-Presidents which it shall 
choose from among its Members, and shall name the Secretaries of its 
Bureau. 

Art. 16. An official report of the sittings of the Chamber shall be 
drawn up under the direction of the Bureau of the Chamber, composed 
of its President, Vice-President, and Secretaries. 

Art. 17. The official language for the Chamber shall be Arabic. The 
proceedings and reports of the Chamber shall be drawn up in the official 
language. 

Art. 18. The Ministers shall have the right of being present at the 
sittings of the Chamber, and of speaking there, when they shall think 
f^.t. They may cause themselves to be represented there by high state 
officials. 

Art. 19. If the Chamber decides that there is reason for summoning 
one of the Ministers to appear before it to give explanations on any 
question, the Minister shall apear in person or cause himself to be repre- 
sented by another official to give the required explanations. 

*Art. 20. The Deputies shall have the right to supervise the acts of 
all public functionaries during the Session, and through the President of 
the Chamber they may report to the Minister concerned all abuses, irreg- 
ularities, or negligences charged against a public official, in the exercise of 
his functions. 

Art. 21. The Ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the 
Chamber for every measure taken in Council, which may violate existing 
rules and regulations. 

Art. 22. Each Minister is individually responsible, in the cases foreseen 
in the preceding article, for his acts occurring in the exercise of his 
functions. 

*/^r/. 23. In case of persistent disagreement between the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Ministry; when repeated interchanges of views and 
motives shall have taken place between them, if then the Ministry does 
not withdraw, the Khedive shall dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and 
decree that new elections shall be proceeded with, within a period of time 



Text of the Constitution of 1882 393 

not exceeding three months, counted from the day of dissolution to that of 
reassembly. All Deputies thus dismissed shall be eligible for reelection. 

Art. 24. If the new Chamber confirms by its vote that of the preceding 
Chamber which had provoked the disagreement, this vote shall be accepted 
as final. 

^'A?-t. 25. The Bills and Regulations emanating from the initiative of 
the Government shall be brought into the Chamber of Deputies by the 
Ministers, to be examined, discussed and voted. No' Law shall be- 
come valid until it has been read before the Chamber of Deputies, 
Article by Article, voted clause by clause, and consented to by the Khedive. 
Each Bill shall be read three times and between each reading there shall 
have been an interval of fifteen days. In case of urgencj'' a single read- 
ing shall, by a special vote of the Chamber, be declared sufficient. If 
the Chamber judges it necessary to demand the introduction of a Bill 
from the Council of Ministers, it shall make the demand through the 
intermediary of the President of the Chamber, and in case of the approval 
of the Government, the Bill shall be prepared by the Ministry and intro- 
duced to the Chamber according to the forms fixed by this Article. 

Art. 26. The Chamber shall choose from amongst its Members a 
Committee, charged to examine all Bills and Regulations submitted 
to it. This Committee may propose to the Government amendments 
of such bills as it has been charged to examine ; in which case, the bill 
and the amendments proposed shall be sent back, before any general 
discussion, by the President of the Chamber, to the President of the 
Council of Ministers. 

Art. 27. If the Committee does not propose any amendments or if 
those proposed are not adopted by the Government, the original text 
of the Bill shall be placed for discussion before the Chamber. If the 
amendments proposed by the Committee are accepted by the Government, 
then the text thus amended shall be placed for discussion before the 
Chamber. In case the Government should not accept the amendments 
proposed by the Committee, then the latter shall have the right of 
submitting its opinion and observations to the Chatnber. 

Art. 28. The Chamber of Deputies may adopt or reject all Bills 
submitted to it by the Committee. It may also return them to the Com- 
mittee to be examined a second time. 

Art. 29. The President of the Chamber shall convey to the Presi- 
dent of the Council of Ministers the Laws and Regulations voted by the 
Chamber. 

Art. 30. No fresh tax — direct or indirect — on movable, immovable 
or personal property may be imposed in Egypt without a Law voted 
by the Chamber. It is therefore formally forbidden that any new tax 
shall be levied, under whatever title or denomination it may be, without 



394 Appendix III 

having been previously voted by the Chamber of Deputies, under penalty, 
against the authority w^hich shall have ordered it, against the employes 
who shall have drawn up the schedules and tariffs and against those who 
shall have effected the recovery of the amounts, of being prosecuted as 
peculators. All contributions thus unduly levied shall be returned to 
those who have paid them. 

Art. 31. The Annual Budget of the Receipts and Expenditures of the 
State shall be communicated to the Chamber of Deputies not later than 
the 5 th of November of each year. 

Art. 32. The General Budget of Receipts shall be presented to the 
Chamber, accompanied by notes explanatory of the nature of each re- 
ceipt. 

Art. 33. The Budget of Expenditure shall be divided Department 
by Department, and shall be subdivided into sections and chapters, corre- 
sponding to the various branches of the public service depending upon 
each Ministry. 

Art. 34. The following cannot on any account be objects of discussion 
in the Chamber: 

The service of the Tribute due to the Sublime Porte. 
The service of the Public Debt. 
Also all matters relating to the Debt and resulting from the Law 
of Liquidation, or Conventions existing between the Foreign Powers and 
the Egyptian Government. 

*Art. 35. The Budget shall be sent to the Chamber, to be examined 
and discussed there (under reserve of the preceding Article). 

A Committee composed of as many Deputies, and having the same 
number of votes as the Members of the Council of Ministers and its 
President, shall be named by the Chamber to discuss, in common with 
the Council of Ministers, the Budget Estimates, and to vote them either 
unanimously or according to the majority. 

Art. 36. In case of an exact division of votes between the Com- 
mission of the Chamber and the Council of Ministers, the Budget shall 
be returned to the Chamber and, should the Chamber confirm (by its 
vote) that of the Council of Ministers, this vote shall become execu- 
tory (executoire). But if the Chamber should maintain the vote of its 
Committee, then the procedure shall be according to Articles 23 and 24 
of the present Law. In this case, the credits of the Budget Estimates 
which shall have caused the division of votes, if they figured in the 
Budget of the preceding year, and if they are not affected to any new 
object of expenditure, such as public works or others, shall be em- 
ployed provisionally and until the meeting of the new Chamber, accord- 
ing to Article 23. 

Art. 37. If the new Chamber confirms the vote of the preceding 



Text of the Constitution of 1882 395 

Chamber, on the Budget, this vote shall become definitely executory, in 
conformity with Article 23. 

Art. 38. No Treaty or contract between the Government and third 
parties and no farming concession shall acquire a final character without 
having been first approved by a vote of the Chamber, provided that such 
Treaty, contract or concession does not relate to an object for which a 
sum has already figured in the approved Budget, corresponding to the 
year for which the Treaty, contract or concession shall have been proposed. 
Likewise no concession for public works, the execution of which shall 
not have been foreseen by the Budget, and no sale, or gratuitous alienation 
of the State domains, nor concession of privilege of any kind shall be- 
come definitive until it shall have been approved by the Chamber. 

A7't. 39. All Egyptians may address a petition to the Chamber of 
Deputies. The petitions shall be sent to a Committee chosen by the 
Chamber from among its Members. Upon the report of this Com- 
mittee the Chamber shall take into consideration or reject the petitions. 
The petitions taken into consideration shall be sent back to the Minister 
concerned. 

Art. 40. All petitions relative to personal rights or interests shall 
be rejected if they are outside the competence of the Administrative and 
Civil Tribunals, or if they have not been previously addressed to the 
competent administrative authority. 

Art. 41. If during the recess of the Chamber grave circumstances shall 
demand that urgent measures be taken to avoid a danger menacing the 
State, or to assure public order, the Council of Ministers may, then, upon 
its own responsibility and with the sanction of the Khedive, order those 
measures to be taken, even if they should be within the competence of the 
Chamber, supposing the time to be too short for the convocation of the 
latter. Nevertheless, the affair should be submitted for examination, at 
its next sitting, to the Chamber. 

Art. 42. No one may be admitted to explain or discuss questions or to 
take part in the deliberations of the Chamber other than its Members, 
with the exception of the Ministers or of those who are assisting or repre- 
senting them. 

Art. 43. The votes of the Chamber shall be given by the holding up 
of hands or by calling over of names or by ballot. 

Art. 44. The vote by calling over of names shall only be on the de- 
mand of at least ten Members of the Chamber of Deputies. All votes 
which may affect the provisions of Article 47 shall be made openly. 

Art. 45. The naming of the three candidates for the Presidency of 
the Chamber, as well as the election of the two Vice-Presidents and the 
nomination of the first and second Secretaries to the Chamber shall be 
made by ballot. 



396 Appendix III 

Art. 46. The Chamber of Deputies may not validly deliberate unless 
at least two-thirds of its Members are present at the deliberation. All 
decisions shall be taken absolutely according to the majority of votes. 

Art. 47. No votes entailing Ministerial responsibility shall be given 
without a majority of at least three-quarters of the Members present. 

Art. 48. No opinion shall be given by proxy. 

Art. 49. The Chamber of Deputies shall elaborate its own internal 
Regulations. These shall be made executory by Decree of the Khedive. 

^Art. 50. The present Organic Law may be amended after agreement 
between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers. 

*Art. 51. The interpretation of all Articles and phrases of the present 
law which it may be necessary to make clear shall be made on agreement 
between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers. 

Art. 52. All provisions of Laws, Decrees, Superior Orders, Regu- 
lations, or Usages contrary to the present Law are and shall remain 
revoked. 

Art. 53. Our Ministers are charged, each in what concerns him, 
with the execution of the present Law. 

Done in the Palace of Ismailieh, 7th February, 1882 
(18 Rabi Awel, 1299). 

{Signed) Mehemet Tewfik. 
By the Khedive : 

The President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior. 

{Signed) Mahmoud Samy. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Justice. 

MOUSTAPHA FeHMY. 

The Minister of War and Marine. 

Ahmed Arabi. 
The Minisiter of Finance. 

Ali Sadik. 
The Minister of Public Works. 

Mahmoud Fehmy. 
The Minister of Public Instruction. 

Abdallah Fikry. 
The Minister of the Wakfs. 

Hassan Cherey. 



APPENDIX IV 

Letter Received by Mr. Blunt from Boghos Pasha Nubar as to 
HIS Father Nubar Pasha's Political Connection with the Khe- 
dive Ismail. (Translated from the French.) 

Paris, September 26th, 1907. 
Sir, 

I have just read in the Egyptian Gazette of the 14th instant your 
reply to Mr. Lucy about the Cyprus Convention, and I was very glad to 
observe the offer you made in it of correcting in your book any errors 
which might be pointed out to you. It has decided me to appeal to 
your loyalty in regard to a mistake about my father which has found 
its way into it. I do not know from what sources you have drawn your 
information, nor do I doubt your good faith, which has certainly been 
misled. 

You say that Nubar Pasha was Ismail's Minister of Finance, and that 
in virtue of this office he was responsible for the ruinous loans contracted 
by the latter. This is evidently a complete mistake, my father never 
having been Minister of Finance, and having had nothing to do directly 
or indirectly with any of the loans. 

The only offices which he filled during Ismail's reign were the Ministry 
of Public Works and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was never, 
I repeat, Minister of Finance, for this very good reason that, in spite 
of his great intelligence and qualities as a statesman, he recognized that 
he did not understand financial questions, and the Khedive, who also knew 
it, would never have thought of confiding a Ministry to him, which he 
himself felt he was incapable of directing. 

Ismail's Minister of Finance was the Moufettish Ismail Pasha Sadek, 
whom you speak of on pages 18, 39 and 40 of your book. He was the 
sole collaborator and confidant of the Khedive upon financial matters, 
and it was he who organized the loans. 

As to my father, I think what will best show you how entirely he was 
a stranger to financial administration, is a simple resume of his career, 
under Ismail, which I shall try to condense into a few lines. 

"In the very first year of Ismail's accession, 1863, Nubar Pasha was 
sent on a mission to Paris to regulate the differences relating to the 
Suez Canal. He remained there two years, and upon his return to Egypt 
he was appointed, first. Minister of Public Works, and then. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. A year later, in 1866, he went once more on a 

397 



39 8 Appendix IV 

mission to Europe, and remained three years absent. It was during this 
period that he obtained the Firman of 1867, granting to Egypt administra- 
tive autonomy, the right of making Customs Conventions w^ith the Powers, 
and the title of Khedive for the Viceroy. It was at this time, too, that he 
commenced the first negotiations for Judicial Reform with the Powers. 
He did not return to Egypt until 1869, and then for six months only, 
in order to assist at the opening of the Suez Canal, and preside at the 
Commission of Inquiry for Judicial Reform which was sitting at Cairo, 
and he returned to Paris in 1870 to continue there the negotiations for the 
Reform. These negotiations, begun in 1867, lasted until 1875, about 
eight years, during which time Nubar Pasha lived almost entirely in 
Europe, with the exception of short intervals of a few months in Egypt. 
In 1874 ^^ was dismissed by the Khedive on account of a difference of 
opinion relative to the said negotiations, and he remained in Europe with- 
out employment for a year. He v\^as recalled by Ismail to the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in June, 1875. Six months later, he was again dis- 
missed, January, 1876. He then remained two years in Europe, exiled, 
and did not return until 1878, when recalled by the Khedive to form the 
Mixed Ministry in conjunction with Sir Rivers Wilson." 

My father declares in his memoirs, which I hope one day to be able 
to publish, that during the fifteen years of Ismail's reign, he spent twelve 
in Europe on missions, on leave of absence, or in exile. The dates and 
facts which I have recited above prove the accuracy of this statement. 
During all these absences from Egypt, Nubar Pasha, exclusively occupied 
with his negotiations, could not take any part in the interior affairs of the 
country, about which he was not even consulted. Thus, while in Paris in 
1869, he learnt from M. Behic, Minister of Public Works to the Em- 
peror Napoleon III, in the course of a conversation with him relative 
to the Judicial Reform, that the Khedive had just arranged a loan of 
ten millions sterling, of which my father had not even been informed; 
and again, at Constantinople in 1873, where he was pursuing his nego- 
tiations for the Reform, it was indirectly that he learned that the Khedive 
was negotiating a fresh loan of thirty millions. 

You see, Sir, by these facts, which it will be easy for you to verify, 
that not only was my father never Minister of Finance, nor connected 
with the Khedive's loans, but that all his energy, his talents and the in- 
fluence which he had acquired were employed in negotiations abroad : ( i ) 
for the regulation of the question of tfhe Suez Canal, which culminated in 
the arbitration of Napoleon III, through which Egypt obtained a verdict 
for the abolition of forced labour in the making of the Canal; (2) for 
obtaining Firmans from the Sublime Porte; (3) for the Judicial Re- 
form which was his conception and his work, and to which he consecrated 
all his energy, his intelligence, and the best years of his life. I must also 
add that he continued to work zealously for the abolition of forced 



Letter from Boghos Pasha Nuhar 399 

labour while Director of Railways and at the Ministry of Public Works. 
This we owe in large measure to him, as Sir W. Wilcocks so courteously 
testifies in his book on the Irrigation of Egypt. 

Do you not think, Sir, that I have a right under these circumstances to 
appeal to your courtesy in asking you to rectify in the new edition of 
your book the erroneous passages which I have mentioned? You cannot 
fail to see the importance which I attach to these corrections, for it would 
not be just, in a work bearing upon history, for my father to be held 
responsible for government measures to which he was altogether a stranger. 

My father in the course of his laborious career made many friends, 
but also many enemies, as all politicians do. His enemies have not failed 
to spread calumnies about him and to invent stories. I will only cite 
two: First, that concerning his nationality. His political adversaries, in 
the interest of their cause, successively reproached him with being an Eng- 
lish and a German subject! These allegations, the object of which was 
to discredit him in the course of his negotiations for Judicial Reform 
by contesting, though he was a Minister of the Khedive, his Egyptian 
nationality, have been since recognized as being without any foundation. 
Another legend relates to his supposed immense fortune. The most ca- 
lumnious and fantastic assertions have been made with regard to this, 
generally by people who were interested in tarnishing the memory of an 
adversary by leaving it to be understood that such great wealth could 
only have been acquired by unlawful means. They did not hesitate to 
say and write that he possessed more than four millions sterling. Al- 
though I have not condescended up to now to reply to calumnies which 
have appeared in newspapers, there is no reason why I should not give 
you, for your personal information, the precise facts and figures. 

At his death my father left a fortune of £155,000, having settled upon 
my mother during his lifetime a personal fortune amounting to an equal 
sum. Thus the four millions, at which the most moderate estimators 
valued what he possessed, were not in reality more than about £300,000. 
This is a fact which can easily be verified, for the Deed of Partition of his 
inheritance — there being children who were minors among the heirs — 
was registered at the Mixed Tribunal at Cairo. 

It is equally easy to show the sources from which this fortune was de- 
rived. It consisted of donations, which he had received from the Khe- 
dive in recompense for services rendered, and of an exceptionally fortunate 
investment of a part of these donations. 

By the resume which I have given of his career, you \yill see the im- 
portance of the services he rendered to his country and the results obtained 
by his various negotiations. The Khedive did not fail to recompense him, 
as he had recompensed others of his Ministers, and as the British Parlia- 
ment has recently done for Lord Cromer by voting him a donation of 



4C>o Appendix IV 

£50,000. Thus he received, upon the successful result of the negotiations 
relating to the Suez Canal, the Firman of 1867 and the Judicial Reform, 
various recompenses consisting of sums of money, of a property of nine 
hundred acres, and of a house in Alexandria — the w^hole being of the 
value of about £80,000. 

My father had the fortunate inspiration, at the creation of the Cairo 
Water Company, of which he was President, to invest an important part 
of this sum, £25,000, in shares of the Company; and this investment 
alone sufficed to raise his fortune to the sum I have indicated, for it is 
a matter of public knowledge that the Cairo Water Company's shares had 
gone up to ten times their value at the date of Nubar Pasha's death. 

I will end by begging you to excuse my having written you so long a 
letter, but your offer of rectification proves your anxiety to be impartial 
and has authorized my doing so. Thanking you in advance, therefore, 
for the corrections which my information will enable you to make, I beg 
you will accept, Sir, etc., 

BoGHos Nubar. 

Note. — ^I am glad to have obtained Boghos Pasha's permission to publish 
the whole of this interesting letter, and regret that I cannot, at the late 
date of my receiving it, make any alteration in the text of this edition, 
such as he at first suggested. I think, however, that the letter, published 
in full, will be found more satisfactory than a mere omission of the pas- 
sages it corrects could possibly have been. 

W. S. B. 



APPENDIX V 

Note as to the Berlin Congress. 

It has been pointed out by Mr. Lucy, in the Westminster Gazette, 
that the account given in the text, page 34, of the quarrel between M. 
Waddington and Lord Salisbury, at the Berlin Congress, is manifestly 
incorrect, inasmuch as it was the Anglo-Russian agreement of 31st May, 
not the Cyprus Convention with Turkey of 4th June, that was published 
by the Globe newspaper through the instrumentality of Marvin, the 
Cyprus Convention being issued in the ordinary way. The confusion 
between the two instruments in the text is undeniable and needs correction. 
At the same time the result of as full an enquiry as I have been able to 
make into the affair, by a reference to contemporary documents, is not 



Note as to the Berlin Congress 401 

such as to make me doubt the substantial truth of the story. What 
seems precisely to have happened is this: 

Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, before entering the Congress, had 
concluded two separate agreements, both secret, regarding Ottoman af- 
fairs — the one with Russia, the other with Turkey. These while con- 
ceding something to Russia, would, they thought, conjointly secure the 
integrity of the Sultan's dominions on the Asiatic side against further ag- 
gression. The agreement with Russia recognized her permanent posses- 
sion of Batum, but was more than counterbalanced, in their opinion, by 
the second Convention, unknown to the Russian Government as to the 
rest of the world, guaranteeing the remainder of his Asiatic dominions 
under English protection to the Sultan. The two treaties were drafted 
at the Foreign Office almost simultaneously, and by accident or negli- 
gence that with Russia became known, the very day it was signed, to M. 
Charles Marvin, a poor journalist and teacher of languages, who had 
been taken on as extra Writer for his knowledge of Russian in the Treaty 
Department at the Foreign Office. Marvin, who was wretchedly under- 
paid at the rate of tenpence an hour, had been intrusted with the copy- 
ing of the agreement, and yielded to the temptation of betraying a sum- 
mary of it to his employers in the Press. This was on the 31st May, a 
fortnight before the Congress met. 

For some days after this Marvin seems to have remained on unsus- 
pected at the Foreign Office, it being imagined at first that it was perhaps 
Count Schouvalof himself, the Russian ambassador in London, who had 
given the information to the Press. Later, seeing that the summary was 
no more than a summary, and had appeared in one newspaper only, the 
Globe, it was resolved to deny it; and Lord Salisbury had little diffi- 
culty in persuading the House of Lords and the country that it lacked 
authenticity. In answer to a question put to him about it by Lord Grey, 
Lord Salisbury declared roundly "the statement to which the noble Earl 
refers, and other statements that have been made that I have seen, are 
wholly unauthenticated and are not deserving of the confidence of your 
Lordship's House." 

Nevertheless, the incident raised a suspicion of England's good faith 
abroad, and, doubtless was the cause of the declaration, mentioned in the 
text, being demanded of the Ambassadors at the first sitting of the Con- 
gress. This must have been subscribed to by Lords Beaconsfield and 
Salisbury on the 13th June, the other dates being: 

The Agreement with Russia, signed in London, 31st May. 

The Globe summary, published in the evening of the same day, 31st 

May. 
Lord Salisbury's denial in the House of Lords, 3rd June. 
First sitting of the Berlin Congress, 13th June. 



40^ Appendix V 

Publication by the Globe of the full text of the Agreement, on evening 
of 14th June. 

Lord Beaconsfield's and Lord Salisbury's discomfiture must conse- 
quently have been still more sudden than in my account of it when the 
news became public property at Berlin on the 15th; and doubtless the 
sensation caused there was primarily on account of the Agreement, not of 
the Convention, which latter was not published till 8th July. All the 
same I still adhere to my recollection of the letter shown me at Simla 
that it was the Cyprus Convention that was the main cause of M. Wad- 
dington's resentment, and of Lord Salisbury's concession to him about 
Tunis and the rest. That it was so is confirmed to me by a passage in 
my diary of 1884, when, being at Constantinople and having just had a 
conversation with Count Corti on the subject, I made the following entry. 
It must be remembered that the Count had been Italian ambassador at the 
Berlin Congress, and was actually ambassador to the Sultan at the date 
of the conversation; nor was he other than a friendly witness, for he 
was always regarded as an Anglomane and ally of our British diplo- 
macy. 

"October 26. Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to The- 
rapia. We had luncheon with the Wyndhams, and called on the Noailles 
(at the English and French Embassies). . . . On our way back to Con- 
stantinople Count Corti entertained us with stories of the Berlin Congress 
and of Lord Salisbury's antics there. Disraeli and Salisbury had gone 
there quite on their high horse to curb the territorial ambitions of Russia, 
and the publication of the secret convention for the acquisition of Cyprus 
was a great shock to everybody. Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington 
before the news was published, and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it 
being generally agreed that there was no middle course between going to war 
and saying nothing. *I1 faut la guerre ou se taire.' But the publication 
was a great blow to Disraeli, who took to his bed and did not appear for 
four or five days. Lord Salisbury, however, brazened it out, and came 
to the Congress with an air of defiance. There was no rupture between 
him and Waddington, and they remained on apparently friendly terms, 
but Waddington had his revenge. He was sitting one day with Salisbury, 
and, the conversation leading that way, Waddington asked what the 
English Government would say to France taking Tunis, and Salisbury 
said he did not see the harm. Whereupon Waddington communicated 
this to Paris, and on his return the French ambassador in London was 
instructed to write to Lord Salisbury reminding him of his words. Thus 
Salisbury was caught. 'But,' said Corti, 'if he had known anything of 
his business he would have declined to answer the note officially and would 



Note as to the Berlin Congress 403 

have pleaded a private conversation.' He did not believe that any ar- 
rangement of condominium was come to between Salisbury and Wadding- 
ton at that time, though I told him, without mentioning names, of the 
letter Lytton had shown me. Corti is interesting diplomatically, as he 
has been to more congresses than any man in Europe." 

This entry, which is a contemporary record of Count Corti's recollec- 
tion of the incident, five years after it happened, shows that the two secret 
agreements had remained closely connected in his mind as the cause of 
Waddington's displeasure. They certainly were present in the Duke of 
Richmond's mind when, representing the Foreign Office on 17th June, in 
answer to a further question about the authenticity of the full text of the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement, he said "as an explanation of the policy of 
Her Majesty's Government it is incomplete and therefore inaccurate," for 
this incompleteness can only be understood as an allusion to the Cyprus 
Convention in 1878, and the seizure of Tunis by France in 1881, which 
after all is the important matter. Some day, no doubt, the whole incident 
will be made clear by a publication of the secret records at the Foreign 
Office or at the Quai d'Orsay. In the meantime we may accept it as 
probable that, finding the Russian Agreement divulged. Lord Salisbury 
resolved to make a clean breast also of the other Agreement, and, in Count 
Corti's words, broke gently to M. Waddington the existence also of a 
Convention with Turkey. One thing I am certain of in my recollection, 
that the letter shown me at Simla described the quarrel and the terms 
obtained in the reconciliation with M. Waddington. 

The Cyprus Convention was published in London on the 9th July, 
having been signed on the 4th June, but there is evidence of its having 
been in Lord Beaconsfield's thoughts at least three months earlier, for 
Lord Derby, speaking in the Lords, i8th July, gave it as his reason for 
leaving the Cabinet in March that the policy of the Government had be- 
come such, that it was already, at that date, being considered necessary 
"to seize and occupy the island of Cyprus." 

W. S. B. 



APPENDIX VI 

THE WIND AND THE WHIRLWIND 

A Poem by Wilfrid Scawen Blunt 
Published 1883 



I have a thing to say. But how to say it? 

I have a cause to plead. But to what ears? 
Hbw shall I move a world by lamentation — 

A world which heeded not a Nation's tears ? 

How shall I speak of justice to the aggressors, — 

Of right to Kings whose rights include all wrong,— 

Of truth to Statecraft, true but in deceiving, — 
Of peace to Prelates, pity to the Strong? 

Where shall I find a hearing? In high places? 

The voice of havock drowns the voice of good. 
On the throne's steps? The elders of the nation 

Rise in their ranks and call aloud for blood. 

Where? In the street? Alas for the world's reason! 

Not Peers not Priests alone this deed have done. 
The clothes of those high Hebrews stoning Stephen 

Were held by all of us, — ay every one. 

Yet none the less I speak. Nay, here by Heaven 
This task at least a poet best may do, — 

To stand alone against the mighty many, 
To force a hearing for the weak and few. 

Unthanked, unhonoured, — yet a task of glory, — 
Not in his day, but in an age more wise, 

WTien those poor Chancellors have found their portion 
And lie forgotten in their dust of lies. 
404 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 405 

And who shall say that this year's cause of freedom 

Lost on the Nile has not as worthy proved 
Of poet's hymning as the cause which Milton 

Sang in his blindness or which Dante loved? 

The fall of Guelph beneath the spears of Valois, 

Freedom betrayed, the Ghibelline restored, 
— Have we not seen it, we who caused this anguish, 

Exile and fear proscription and the sword? 

Or shall God less avenge in their wild valley 

Where they lie slaughtered those poor sheep whose fold 

In the gray twilight of our wrath we harried 
To serve the worshippers of stocks and gold? 

This fails. That finds its hour. This fights. That falters. 

Greece is stamped out beneath a Wolseley's heels. 
Or Egypt is avenged of her long mourning. 

And hurls her Persians back to their own keels. 

'Tis not alone the victor who. is noble. 

'Tis not alone the wise man who is wise. 
There is a voice of sorrow in all shouting. 

And shame pursues not only him who flies. 

To fight and conquer — 'tis the boast of heroes. 

To fight and fly — of this men do not speak. 
Yet shall there come a day when men shall tremble 

Rather than do misdeeds upon the weak, — 

' — ^A day when statesmen baflfled in their daring 

Shall rather fear to wield the sword in vain 
Than to give back their charge to a hurt nation. 

And own their frailties, and resign their reign, — 

— ^A day of wrath when all fame shall remember 

Of this year's work shall be the fall of one 
Who, standing foremost in her paths of virtue. 

Bent a fool's knee at War's red altar stone. 

And left all virtue beggared in his falling, 
A sign to England of new griefs to come. 



4o6 Appendix VI 

Her priest of peace who sold his creed for glory 
And marched to carnage at the tuck of drum. 

Therefore I fear not. Rather let this record 
Stand of the past, ere God's revenge shall chase 

From place to punishment His sad vicegerents 
Of power on Earth, — I fling it in their face. 

n 

I have a thing to say. But how to say it? 

Out of the East a twilight had been born. 
It was not day. Yet the long night was waning, 

And the spent nations watched it less forlorn. 

Out of the silence of the joyless ages 
A voice had spoken, such as the first bird 

Speaks to the woods, before the morning wakens, — 
And the World starting to its feet had heard. 

Men hailed it as a prophecy. Its utterance 
Was in that tongue divine the Orient knew. 

It spoke of hope. Men hailed it as a brother's. 
It spoke of happiness. Men deemed it true. 

There in the land of Death, where toil is cradled, 
That tearful Nile, unknown to Liberty, 

It spoke in passionate tones of human freedom. 

And of those rights of Man which cannot die, — 

— Till from the cavern of long fear, whose portals 
Had backM'^ard rolled, and hardly yet aloud. 

Men prisoned stole like ghosts and joined the chorus. 
And chaunted trembling, each man in his shroud. 

Justice and peace, the brotherhood of nations, — 
Love and goodwill of all mankind to man, — 

These were the words they caught and echoed strangely. 
Deeming them portions of some Godlike plan, — 

A plan thus first to their own land imparted. 
They did not know the irony of Fate, 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 407 

The mockery of man's freedom, and the laughter 
Which greets a brother's love from those that hate. 

Oh for the beauty of hope's dreams! The childhood 

Of that old land, long impotent in pain. 
Cast off its slough of sorrow with its silence, 

And laughed and shouted and grew new again. 

And in the streets, where still the shade of Pharaoh 

Stalked in his sons, the Mamelukian horde. 
Youth greeted youth with words of exultation 

And shook his chains and clutched as for a sword. 

Student and merchant, — Jew, and Copt, and Moslem, — 
All whose scarred backs had bent to the same rod, — 

Fired with one mighty thought, their feuds forgotten. 
Stood hand in hand and praising the same God. 

Ill 

I have a thing to say. But how to say it? 

As in the days of Moses in the land, 
God sent a man of prayer before his people 

To speak to Pharaoh, and to loose his hand- 
Injustice, that hard step-mother of heroes. 

Had taught him justice. Him the sight of pain 
Moved into anger, and the voice of weeping 

Made his eyes weep as for a comrade slain. 

A soldier in the bands of his proud masters 

It was his lot to serve. But of his soul 
None owned allegiance save the Lord of Armies. 

No worship from his God's might him cajole. 

Strict was his service. In the law of Heaven 
He comfort took and patient under wrong. 

And all men loved him for his heart unquailing. 
And for the words of pity on his tongue. 

Knowledge had come to him in the night-watches, 
And strength with fasting, eloquence with prayer. 



4o8 Appendix VI 

He stood a Judge from God before the strangers, 
The one just man among his people there. 

Strongly he spoke: "Now, Heaven be our witness! 

Egypt this day has risen from her sleep. 
She has put off her mourning and her silence. 

It was no law of God that she should weep. 

"It was no law of God nor of the Nations 
That in this land, alone of the fair Earth, 

The hand that sowed should reap not of its labour. 
The heart that grieved should profit not of mirth. 

"How have we suffered at the hands of strangers. 
Binding their sheaves, and harvesting their wrath! 

Our service has been bitter, and our wages 
Hunger and pain and nakedness and drouth. 

"Which of them pitied us? Of all our princes, 
Was there one Sultan listened to our cry? 

Their palaces we built, their tombs, their temples. 
What did they build but tombs for Liberty? 

"To live in ignorance, to die by service; 

To pay our tribute and our stripes receive: 
This was the ransom of our toil in Eden, 

This, and our one sad liberty — to grieve. 

"We have had enough of strangers and of princes 
Nursed on our knees and lords within our house. 

The bread which they have eaten was our children's, 
For them the feasting and the shame for us. 

"The shadow of their palaces, fair dwellings 

Built with our blood and kneaded with our tears, 

Darkens the land with darkness of Gehennem, 
The lust, the crime, the infamy of years. 

"Did ye not hear it? From those muffled windows 
A sound of women rises and of mirth. 

These are our daughters — ay our sons — in prison. 
Captives to shame with those who rule the Earth. 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 409 

"The silent river by those gardens lapping 

To-night receives its burden of new dead, 
A man of age sent home with his lord's wages, 

Stones to his feet, a grave-cloth to his head. 

"Walls infamous in beauty, gardens fragrant 

With rose and citron and the scent of blood. 
God shall blot out the memory of all laughter. 

Rather than leave you standing where you stood. 

"We have had enough of princes and of strangers. 
Slaves that were Sultans, eunuchs that were kings, 

The shame of Sodom is on all their faces. 

The curse of Cain pursues them, and it clings. 

"Is there no virtue? See the pale Greek smiling. 

Virtue for him is as a tale of old. 
Which be his gods? The cent, per cent, in silver. 

His God of gods? The world's creator. Gold. 

"The Turk that plunders and the Frank that panders. 
These are our lords who ply with lust and fraud. 

The brothel and the winepress and the dancers 
Are gifts unneeded in the lands of God. 

"We need them not. We heed them not. Our faces 

Are turned to a new Kebla, a new truth, 
Proclaimed by the one God of all the nations 

To save His people and renew their youth. 

"A truth which is of knowledge and of reason; 

Which teaches men to mourn no more and live; 
Which tells them of things good as well as evil. 

And gives what Liberty alone can give, 

"The counsel to be strong, the will to conquer. 
The love of all things just and kind and wise. 

Freedom for slaves, fair rights for all as brothers. 
The triumph of things true, the scorn of lies. 

"Oh men, who are my brethren, my soul's kindred ! 
That which our fathers dreamed of as a dream. 



4IO Appendix VI 

The sun of peace and justice, has arisen 

And God shall work in you His perfect scheme. 

"The rulers of your Earth shall cease deceiving, 

The men of usury shall fly your land. 
Your princes shall be numbered with your servants, 

iAnd peace shall guide the sword in your right hand. 

"You shall become a nation with the nations. 

'Lift up your voices, for the night is past. 
Stretch forth your hands. The hands of the free peoples 

Have beckoned you — the youngest and the last. 

"And in the brotherhood of Man reposing, 

Joined to their hopes and nursed in their new day, 

The anguish of the years shall be forgotten 

And God, with these, shall wipe your tears away." 

IV 

I have a thing to say. But how to say it? 

How shall I tell the mystery of guile — 
The fraud that fought — the treason that disbanded — 

The gold that slew the children of the Nile? 

The ways of violence are hard to reckon, 

And men of right grow feeble in their will, 

And Virtue of her sons has been forsaken, 
lAnd men of peace have turned aside to kill. 

How shall I speak of them, the priests of Baal, 
The men who sowed the wind for their ill ends? 

The reapers of the whirlwind in that harvest 
Were all my countrymen, were some my friends. 

Friends, countrymen and lovers of fair freedom — 
Souls to whom still my soul laments and cries. 

I would not tell the shame of your false dealings, 
iSave for the blood which clamours to the skies. 

A curse on Statecraft, not on you my Country! 
The men you slew were not more foully slain 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 411 

Than was your honour at their hands you trusted. 
They died, you conquered, — both alike in vain. 

Crime finds accomplices, and Murder weapons. 

The ways of Statesmen are an easy road. 
All swords are theirs, the noblest with the neediest. 

And those who serve them best are men of good. 

What need to blush, to trifle with dissembling? 

A score of honest tongues anon shall swear. 
Blood flows. The Senate's self shall spread its mantle 

In the world's face, nor own a Csesar there. 

"Silence! Who spoke?" "The voice of one disclosing 
A truth untimely." "With what right to speak? 

Holds he the Queen's commission?" "No, God's only." 
A hundred hands shall smite him on the cheek. 

The "truth" of Statesmen is the thing they publish, 
Their "falsehood" the thing done they do not say. 

Their "honour" what they win from the world's trouble, 
Their "shame" the "ay" which reasons with their "nay." 

Alas for Liberty, alas for Egypt! 

What chance was yours in this ignoble strife? 
Scorned and betrayed, dishonoured and rejected, 

What was there left you but to fight for life? 

The men of honour sold you to dishonour. 

The men of truth betrayed you with a kiss. 
Your strategy of love too soon outplotted. 

What was there left you of your dreams but this? 

You thought to win a world by your fair dealing. 

To conquer freedom with no drop of blood. 
This was your crime. The world knows no such reasoning. 

It neither bore with you nor understood. 

Your Pharaoh with his chariots and his dancers. 

Him they could understand as of their kin. 
He spoke in their own tongue and as their servant. 

And owned no virtue they could call a sin. 



412 Appendix VI 

They took him for his pleasure and their purpose. 

They fashioned him as clay to their own pride. 
His name they made a cudgel to your hurting, 

His treachery a spear-point to your side. 

They knew him, and they scorned him and upheld him. 

They strengthened him with honours and with ships. 
They used him as a shadow for seditions. 

They stabbed you with the lying of his lips 

Sad Egypt! Since that night of misadventure 
[Which slew your first-born for your Pharaoh's crime, 

No plague like this has God decreed against you. 
No punishment of all foredoomed in Time. 

V 

I have a thing to say. Oh how to say it! 

One summer morning, at the hour of prayer, 
And in the face of Man and Man's high Maker, 

The thunder of their cannon rent the air. 

The flames of death were on you and destruction. 

A hail of iron on your heads they poured. 
You fought, you fell, you died until the sunset; 

And then you fled forsaken of the Lord. 

I care not if you fled. What men call courage 
Is the least noble thing of which they boast. 

Their victors always are great men of valour. 
Find me the valour of the beaten host! 

It may be you were cowards. Let them prove it, — 
What matter? Were you women in the fight. 

Your courage were the greater that a moment 
You steeled your weakness in the cause of right. 

Oh I would rather fly with the first craven 
Who flung his arms away in your good cause. 

Than head the hottest charge by England vaunted 
In all the record of her unjust wars. 



« 



t 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 4^3 

Poor sheep! they scattered you. Poor slaves! they bowed you. 

You prayed for your dear lives with your mute hands. 
They answered you with laughter and with shouting, 

And slew you in your thousands on the sands. 

They led you with arms bound to your betrayer— 
His slaves, thej^ said, recaptured for his will. 

They bade him to take heart and fill his vengeance. 
They gave him his lost sword that he might kill. 

They filled for him his dungeons with your children. 

They chartered him new gaolers from strange shores. 
The Arnaout and the Cherkess for his minions, 

Their soldiers for the sentries at his doors. 

He plied you with the whip, the rope, the thumb-screw. 

They plied you with the scourging of vain words 
He sent his slaves, his eunuchs, to insult you. 

They sent you laughter on the lips of Lords. 

They bound you to the pillar of their firmans. 

They placed for sceptre in your hand a pen. 
They cast lots for the garments of your treaties, 

And brought you naked to the gaze of men. 

They called on your High Priest for your death mandate. 

They framed indictments on you from your laws. 
For him men loved they offered a Barabbas. 

They washed their hands and found you without cause. 

They scoffed at you and pointed in derision, I _ 

Crowned with their thorns and nailed upon their tree. 

And at your head their Pilate wrote the inscription— 
"This is the land restored to Liberty." 

Oh insolence of strength! Oh boast of wisdom! 

Oh poverty in all things truly wise! 
Thinkest thou, England, God can be outwitted 

For ever thus by him who sells and buysi" 

Thou sellest the sad nations to their ruin. 

mat halt thou bought? The child within the womb, 



414 Appendix VI 

The son of him thou slayest to thy hurting, I 
Shall answer thee "an Empire for thy tomb," 

Thou hast joined house to house for thy perdition. 

Thou hast done evil in the name of right. 
Thou hast made bitter sweet and the sweet bitter, 

And called light darkness and the darkness light. 

Thou art become a bye-word for dissembling, 
A beacon to thy neighbours for all fraud. 

Thy deeds of violence men count and reckon. 
Who takes the sword shall perish by the sword. 

Thou hast deserved men's hatred. They shall hate thee. 

Thou hast deserved men's fear. Their fear shall kill. 
Thou hast thy foot upon the weak. The weakest 

With his bruised head shall strike thee on the heel. 

Thou wentest to this Egypt for thy pleasure. 

Thou shalt remain with her for thy sore pain. 
Thou hast possessed her beauty. Thou wouldst leave her. 

Nay. Thou shalt lie with her as thou hast lain. 

She shall bring shame upon thy face with all men. 

iShe shall disease thee with her grief and fear. 
Thou shalt grow sick and feeble in her ruin. 

Thou shalt repay her to the last sad tear. 

Her kindred shall surround thee with strange clamours, 
Dogging thy steps till thou shalt loathe their din. 

The friends thou hast deceived shall watch in anger. 
Thy children shall upbraid thee with thy sin. 

All shall be counted thee a crime, — thy patience 

With thy impatience. Thy best thought shall wound. 

Thou shalt grow weary of thy work thus fashioned. 
And walk in fear with eyes upon the ground. 

The Empire thou didst build shall be divided. 

Thou shalt be weighed in thine own balances 
Of usury to peoples and to princes. 

And be found wanting by the world and these. 



The Wind and the Whirlwind 415 

They shall possess the lands by thee forsaken 

And not regret thee. On their seas no more 
Thy ships shall bear destruction to the nations, 

Or thy guns thunder on a fenceless shore. 

Thou hast no pity in thy day of triumph. 

These shall not pity thee. The world shall move 
On its high course and leave thee to thy silence, 

Scorned by the creatures that thou couldst not love. 

Thy Empire shall be parted, and thy kingdom. 

At thy ow^n doors a kingdom shall arise, 
Where freedom shall be preached and the wrong righted 

Which thy unwisdom wrought in days unwise. 

Truth yet shall triumph in a world of justice. 

This is of faith. I swear it. East and west 
The law of Man's progression shall accomplish 

Even this last great marvel with the rest. i 

Thou wouldst not further it. Thou canst not hinder. 

If thou shalt learn in time thou yet shalt live. 
But God shall ease thy hand of its dominion. 

And give to these the rights thou wouldst not give. 

The nations of the East have left their childhood. 

Thou art grown old. Their manhood is to come; 
And they shall carry on Earth's high tradition 

Through the long ages when thy lips are dumb, 

Till all shall be wrought out. O Lands of weeping. 

Lands watered by the rivers of old Time, 
Ganges and Indus and the streams of Eden, 

Yours is the future of the world sublime. 

(Yours was the fount of man's first inspiration, 
The well of wisdom whence he earliest drew. 

And yours shall be the flood time of his reason. 

The stream of strength which shall his strength renew. 

The wisdom of the West is but a madness. 
The fret of shallow waters in their bed. 



41 6 Appendix Ft 

Yours is the flow, the fulness of Man's patience 
The ocean of God's rest inherited. 

And thou too, Egypt, mourner of the nations, 
Though thou hast died to-day in all men's sight, 

sAnd though upon thy cross with thieves thou hangest. 
Yet shall thy wrong be justified in right. 

'Twas meet one man should die for the whole people. 

Thou wert the victim chosen to retrieve 
The sorrows of the Earth with full deliverance. 

And, as thou diest these shall surely live. 

Thy prophets have been scattered through the cities. 

The seed of martyrdom thy sons have sown 
Shall make of thee a glory and a witness 

In all men's hearts held captive with thine own. 

Thou shalt not be forsaken in thy children. 

Thy righteous blood shall fructify the Earth. 
The virtuous of all lands shall be thy kindred, 

And death shall be to thee a better birth. 

Therefore I do not grieve. Oh hear me, Egypt! 

Even in death thou art not wholly dead. 
And hear me, England! Nay. Thou needs must hear me. 

I had a thing to say. And it is said. 



THE END 



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